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Hubenstein, who typed this, for her extraordinary patience, 
and my parents, for their help in making me and it.
Most of all, my gratitude goes to my wife, Wendy, 
without whose support this work could not have been 
completed.
ALAN HUGHES 
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS
1.1. Introduction
’The subtlety of Nature,’ said Bacon, 'is a great 
many times more subtle than the subtlety of Logic.’ The 
complexity of the actual social world demands, not 
merely invites, empirical methods of investigation, which 
are indispensable for a proper understanding. In humane 
studies, deduction from first principles is a path that 
leads directly to error. An intuitive anticipation of 
what kind of things may be found, on the other hand, is 
likely to be an aid to scholarly investigation of human 
activity, since our ordinary understanding of social 
processes is often a useful short-cut: there is no need
to behave like the blind men trying to discern the shape 
of the elephant, if we are, in fact, sighted. This thesis 
is primarily a statistical investigation, sometimes with 
an aim of defining structures not previously known; but 
where structures are already identified, or common 
knowledge can be adduced, then it is addressed to a better 
description of the structure and an investigation of its 
correlations.
1
2It is an interdisciplinary study, in one aspect 
concerned with four major psychological dispositions, 
which are regarded as already identified. These are 
alienation, conceived as social estrangement; the 
authoritarian personality tendency of the ’Right’; 
ethnocentrism; and anxiety. Since the first three of 
these have not been well measured, nor their structure 
well described, this study is partially addressed to the 
development of adequate measures for them. An empirical 
test of the disparateness of their identity is also 
introduced. In part, therefore, this thesis lies in the 
domain of social psychology. In considering the correlations 
of the dispositions and their social meaning, it dwells 
partly in sociology; and in investigating and identifying 
disparate structures of political opinion, not previously 
well recognized, its purpose is best described as 
political science. Whilst the measurement of the 
psychological dispositions, on the one hand, and of 
political attitudes, on the other, are both intended to 
be substantive to the thesis, the focal point of the 
research is at the connections to be discovered between 
the two i.e. its central concern is with political 
psychology.
5Greensteirr- has recently suggested three divisions 
of heuristic utility in organizing the issues of enquiry 
into personality and politics: the ’individual case
study,' diagnosing a single actor; the ’typological 
study,' to 'classify actors and to explain the origin 
and behaviour of the types in the classification’; and 
'aggregative analysis,’ to explain features of the 
larger social and political system.
In its separate investigation of each of the four 
psychological constructs mentioned above, this study 
falls within the second category. It is concerned with 
modal psychological processes which throw light on 
individual functioning. The alienated man, for example, 
is first considered as a possibility, in that the 
connectedness of the various sentiments said to be 
associated with social estrangement is first tested, and 
their cohesiveness shown not to be a result of their 
covariance with anxiety. It is argued here, also, that 
alienation cannot be regarded as a social modality of 
anxiety. The social incidence of alienation and its 
statistical correlations with other psychological
1
F.I. Greenstein, 'The Need for Systematic Inquiry into 
Personality and Politics: Introduction and Overview,’
Journal of Social Issues, 24 (1968) pp. 1-14.
4constructs are then elaborated, in accordance with the 
general strategy endorsed by Lasswell^ of moving 
outwards, as it were, from ’nuclear types’. The 
implications of the investigation of the dispositional 
paradigm for an understanding of individual actors is 
then illustrated by introducing two men, ’John’ and 
’Patrick’, both interviewed in depth; the first is 
alienated, the second not.
A general qualification to the characterization of 
this investigation as a typological exercise of the kind 
described by Greenstein should here be made. Whilst it 
is recognized that each of the four constructs bears upon 
modes of personality functioning, it is not suggested 
here that each wholly describes a type of person. A 
person may be highly alienated and ethnocentric but not 
anxious or authoritarian, for example. Whilst this thesis 
does not attempt a typology of persons, in the sense of 
the preceding sentence, it is also oriented away from the 
qualities of political actors considered as unique 
persons. The methodological approach of this research, 
consisting chiefly in correlational analysis of data 
from mass surveys, is inclined to lead the reader away
T~H.D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Mew York, 
I960) (first ed. 1930) Ch. j4.
5from an appreciation of the idiosyncratic qualities of 
the dispositions and political views of individuals. Its 
main hope is that an understanding of general processes 
will lead back:., as it were, to finer insights into the 
variety of what individuals feel, think, and do.
The thesis is broad in its scope, extending to four 
dispositions and their relation to the structure of 
political attitudes on policy matters, political perceptions 
and voting behaviour. It therefore extends in some degree 
into the third division of research described by Greenstein, 
aggregative analysis. It attempts to define, in a limited 
area, some of the norms, in the statistical sense, of the 
interrelations of dispositions and political attitudes in 
an Australian urban context. Although broad in scope in 
this sense, it does not aim to provide anything 
approaching a psychological interpretation of all 
Australian political events or circumstances in the 
contemporary period. The argument will, indeed, emphasise 
many of the limitations of ’psychological* influences on 
politics, in general, and of the influence of dispositions, 
in particular.
The four dispositions were chosen because my primary 
interest, like that of many, lay in the political 
repurcussions of sentiments of aggression and insecurity.
6Its primary inspiration was drawn from the research of
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford1 into
the psychodynamics of ethnocentrism, but also from the
dramatic, even if methodologically unsound, intervention 
2of Srole in the chain of associated work which followed 
in such quantity, indicating the need to take into account 
social frustration and uncertainty. My attention was also 
excited by the comedy of errors which followed from the 
intrusion of acquiescence into the measures, which is 
reviewed in extenso. Anxiety was added as the psychological 
disposition of most general interest, apart from the first 
three. It is considered that these four dispositions all 
deserve the term 'psychological,' because they are all 
related to features of personality functioning, and are 
all in some degree opaque to the common understanding, 
thus entitling them to be qualified by the name of a 
specialized discipline. Alienation, on which the term 
'psychological' sits least easily, is so described 
because, conceived as social estrangement, it refers to a 
very large part of the individual's relations with his
1
T.W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D.J. Levinson and R.N. 
Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality, (New York, 1950).
2
L. Srole, 'Social Integration and Certain Corollaries:
An Exploratory Study,' American Sociological Review, 21
(1956), pp. 709-16.
7social environment, including some areas of which he may 
be unaware. The term 'disposition* was chosen because 
of its generality, its implication of inclination to 
action, and because it did not connote intention in the 
same degree as 'attitude,’ although intention is not 
precluded by it. Disposition is defined by English and 
English1 in the relevant sense as 'a general term for any 
(hypothesized) organized and enduring part of the total 
psychological or psycho-physiological organization in 
virtue of which a person is likely to respond to certain 
statable conditions with a certain kind of behaviour.’
The manner in which the dispositions are measured, their 
incidence and interrelations charted, and their influence 
upon political attitudes investigated in this milieu is 
perhaps best described by a brief summary of the structure 
of this thesis.
1.2. The Structure of this Thesis
This Introduction touches upon some theoretical 
considerations, including the present status of the 
’behaviouralist' approach to politics, with which, in 
broad terms, I am in sympathy; and also on the place of
1
H.B. English and A.C. English, A Comprehensive Dictionary 
of Psychological and Psychoanalytical Terms, (New York,
1958), p. 158.
8the process named verstehen in social inquiry. The 
principle of parsimony is also briefly discussed. It 
suggests what might be considered original, or novel, 
in this work, considered as a research enterprise.
Chapter Two provides a very brief sketch of the 
political environment within which this study is set. 
Beginning with the normative values (what is ’given’) in 
Australian politics, it proceeds to some implications of 
the present quasi-Federal system, and then to a description 
of the policies of the main political parties. The new 
electoral equilibrium established by the Labor ’split’ of 
1955* and the Federal elections of 1965 and 1966 are 
discussed. These were contemporaneous with the surveys of 
disposition and attitude carried out by the writer, the 
report of which is the substance of the thesis. The nature 
of Australia as an immigrant polity, and the impact of the 
external events of the period on Australians’ conceptions 
of their situation is then considered.
Chapter Three describes the two samples surveyed in 
1965 and 1966, and compares them with population parameters. 
The 1965 sample was of voters in Melbourne only; the 1966 
voter sample, the survey of which was funded by the 
Australian National University as the principal substance 
of this thesis, was of 400 voters, 200 in Melbourne and
9200 in Sydney. A ’captive* sample of 155 low-grade 
public servants was also surveyed in 1966 as a preparatory 
step to the main operation. The internal sociological 
structure of the 1966 voter sample, on which the most 
important survey was conducted, is described in detail.
Chapters Four and Five are essentially reports of 
preliminary empirical work on the data of the 1963 
survey, although a selective review of some empirical work 
done in recent times is included. Chapter Four introduces 
electoral findings of the conventional kind, but its 
principal subject matter is a cluster analysis, based on 
a correlational analysis, of opinions on policy issues 
(the data obtained in 1963) which suggested that there 
may have been three dimensions of radicalism in (principally 
internal) policy matters, and that the conception of a 
single ’Left-Right* continuum is a most inappropriate one 
for political analysis; indeed, not viable at all. It 
then proceeds to develop a predictive model for likely 
changes in political opinion, given what we know of 
likely sociological change.
Chapter Five, the matter of which has already been 
published,'*’ but which has been amended in minor ways to
I
A. Hughes, ’Authoritarian Orientation, Alienation and 
Political Attitudes in a Sample of Melbourne Voters’, 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 3 (196?) 
pp~ 134 -50.
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make it appropriate in this chapter sequence, describes 
exploratory findings of the interrelations of 
authoritarianism of the ’Right’, ethnocentrism and 
alienation, their social incidence and their relation to 
the dimensions of political opinion, or ’political 
attitudes’, the discovery of which is reported in Chapter 
Four. The scales used here for the dispositional 
constructs are regarded as tools for only short-order 
preliminary work, being brief, although ’balanced’ instruments. 
The report of their use, apart from its substantive value, 
forms an integral part of what might be termed the 
intellectual history of this enterprise, and their 
shortcomings, together with the methodological deficiencies 
of the early work of Chapter Four, noted in the text, led 
directly to the major enterprise described in Chapter Six.
This was the construction of adequate paired-alternative 
measures for alienation, authoritarianism (always meaning 
of the ’Right’ in this thesis) and alienation. Item pools 
for these were administered to ’captive’ samples of 
low-grade (’Fourth Division’) public servants in Melbourne 
and Sydney, and those items which retained their cohesiveness 
in the way described in Chapter Six were then conserved 
for candidacy for the final scales, the content of which 
was determined after their administration to a sample of
11
!
400 voters in Melbourne and Sydney. An adapted form of 
the Cattell IPAT anxiety measure was also administered.
A large number of questions were also asked about the 
respondents’ policy opinions, their perception of 
political situations, political participation (remembered 
and intended vote, membership of organizations and political 
conversation) and background data such as self-chosen 
social class, education, the income of the householder, 
age, sex and religious affiliation.
Factor analysis (or principal components analysis) 
was used for five purposes: firstly, to test the
disparateness of the items supposed to tap the four 
psychological constructs, and so, by inference, the 
disparateness of the constructs themselves; secondly, to 
identify groups of items capable of defining sub-scales 
of each major construct; thirdly, to test the stability 
of the three sub-scales of anxiety by factor analysing 
the anxiety items alone; fourthly, to define five sub-scales 
of alienation (apart from those developed in the second 
exercise) for the purpose of testing their cohesiveness 
when covariance with anxiety was withdrawn by the method 
of partial correlations; and lastly, to explore the 
interrelations of the political policy items, with the 
aim of arriving at a solution capable of indicating how
12
many ’dimensions of radicalism’ were suggested by the 
available data.
Chapters Six to Nine are the main substance of this 
thesis. They describe the exercises above, and the more 
adequate and reliable measures which were the outcome.
Chapter Six describes the development of the ’psychological’ 
instruments; Chapter Seven is more discursive, and considers 
the social incidence of the dispositions, the variations 
in their interrelations and the implications of these 
findings; Chapter Eight explores in detail the political 
findings, the structure apparent in political attitudes 
and the means at hand for measurement; and Chapter Nine 
unites the two sets of findings, psychological and political, 
using correlational analysis and tests of significance to 
discern bridges between the two. There is theoretical 
discussion of the mechanisms linking the dispositions 
with each other in Chapter Seven; of the links between 
political attitudes in Chapter Eight; and of links between 
the two in Chapter Nine. Inconstancies as well as constancies 
in relationships within different social and educational 
groups are also noted, and speculative explanations 
proferred in every case of apparent variation, as is 
appropriate to an exploratory enterprise.
Chapter 10 is an excursus: it contains a speculative
15
discussion of a tape-recorded political conversation in 
a small group, which has the advantage of portraying 
political opinions in conflict in situ, as it were, 
partly to recall to the reader the immense complexity of 
both the structure and function of political attitudes in 
situations of personal interaction. The Chapter has the 
added purpose of showing how such contrived situations 
may be useful in suggesting hypotheses which may be 
testable with data from larger samples.
Chapter Eleven selectively reviews some general 
findings and concludes the work.
1.3* What is Original in this Thesis?
The main claims to originality lie, firstly, in the 
construction and validation of three measures of 
dispositions: alienation, authoritarianism and
ethnocentrism. The first and last of these have satisfactory 
reliability coefficients, and are suitable for general 
research use. The reliability of the second is modest, 
but it is capable of being used as a ’core* instrument 
for the development of an authoritarianism scale with 
items more central to personality functioning, the 
desirability of which is argued throughout the text. The 
procedure for demonstrating, by factor analysis, the 
disparateness of each of the four constructs, and the
14
substantive outcome; which is consistent with the 
hypothesis of disparateness, is also an original 
departure. So too, is the test of the cohesiveness of 
alienation as social estrangement, when the covariance 
with anxiety of each element of the construct is withdrawn.
The application of these instruments to a 
representative mass sample in an Australian urban milieu 
is another way in which this research contributes something 
new. A very general exercise in cartography was involved, 
which began with the charting of the social incidence of 
the dispositions, went on to the exploration of their 
interrelations, and the variations in interrelations in 
different social groups. No previous analysis of the 
structure of psychological dispositions or political 
attitudes in Australia of this degree of generality, or 
even one approaching it, has been attempted, and it is 
suggested that the discovery of the dimension of ’Conscience* 
radicalism, for example, and its separateness from other 
dimensions of political sentiment, although specific to 
the Australian urban context, may have applications 
elsewhere. The report of the relation of the psychological 
dispositions to political attitudes, and the theoretical 
discussion of the interconnections between them, whilst 
new in its substance for Australia, varies from previous
15
work in other places^ in differentiating between the 
varieties of political radicalism and conservatism. The 
charting of the social incidence of these varieties in 
Australia, whilst not original in technique to social 
psychologists, has not been done in this way by political 
scientists. Throughout Chapters Seven to Nine, attention 
has been paid to both constancies and inconstancies in 
correlations in differing groups, for each of which a 
tentative explanation has been afforded. In short, the 
psychological instruments are new, the differentiation of 
the varieties of political sentiment is original and the 
general cartography of their interrelations in the 
Australian urban context has yielded facts of substantial 
importance, not previously known.
1.4. Some Theoretical Considerations
The reputation of political psychology has, in 
recent times, undergone a change for the better. This is 
partly through the careful balancing of the nomothetic 
and idiographic approaches to the problems of analysis by
1
For example, H. McClosky, ’Conservatism and Personality,’ 
American Political Science Review, 52 (1958) pp. 27-45.
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Greenstein'*' and others. It is now generally recognized 
that without a comprehension of the special opportunities 
which may occur for psychological influence, which relies 
very often on an idiographic study paying attention to 
what is peculiar to a situation, the generalizations 
afforded by nomothetic research resemble an armoury of 
weapons whose potency is uncertain from time to time and 
case to case.
pGreenstein has specified some of the circumstances
in which ’personality* factors may influence political
behaviour. Systematization of this kind is desirable
and necessary, but there remains an irreducible residue
of judgement about the quality of particular socio-political
environments, a Fingerspitzengefühl for the occasions
when psychological influence is likely to become not
merely an accident of events but systemic. To say this
•3implies the methodological utility of verstehen in its 
elderly and still somewhat disreputable sense of
1
F.I. Greenstein, ’The Impact of Personality on Politics:
An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush,’ American Political 
Science Review, 6l (1967) PP• 628-41.
2
Ibid.
5 The most well known analysis of this is that of T. Abel, 
’The Operation Called Verstehen*, American Journal of 
Sociology, 54 (1948) pp. 211-18.
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insightful understanding of the normative elements of a
culture. It does not necessarily follow from this that
I recognize verstehen as one means by which the social
scientist comprehends the situation, but in fact I would
also argue its utility in this sense. In the methodological
point, I follow Strauss, himself varying a theme propounded
by Weber. Strauss *s position is discussed in a recent
conciliatory article by Kalleberg.1 Strauss avers that
human behaviour cannot be understood ’without being
aware of the standard of judgement that is inherent in
the situation and accepted as a matter of course by the
2actors themselves.’
There is another sense of verstehen, seeing the 
meaning of a situation from the viewpoint of the actor, 
before stepping back into the shoes of the social 
scientist, which, as Kalleberg rightly points out, is 
useful to those of the ’behaviouralist’ persuasion in 
political analysis, (with which psychological analysis of 
political behaviour is closely allied) and is a common 
ground with those of a ’traditionalist’ persuasion.
1
A.L. Kalleberg, ’Concept Formation in Normative and 
Empirical Studies: Toward Reconciliation in Political
Theory,’ American Political Science Review, 63 (19&9) 
pp. 26-39.2
Quoted in Kalleberg, ibid.
18
There are five ways in which, I would submit, that 
verstehen in both senses is useful to the ’political 
psychologist.’
(i) The first is very general, and has to do with
the presence of ’meaning’ in the social world as opposed
to the natural order investigated by scientists. It has
been well put by Schutz.1
The world of nature, as explored by the natural 
scientist, does not ’mean’ anything to the 
molecules, atoms and electrons therein. The 
observational field of the social scientist, 
however, namely the social reality, has a 
specific meaning and relevance structure for 
the human beings living acting and thinking 
therein. Thus, the constructs of the social 
sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the 
second degree, namely constructs of the constructs 
made by the actors on the social scene, whose 
behaviour the social scientist has to observe 
and to explain in accordance with the procedural 
rules of his science.
(ii) The second way is more particular. Construction 
of the items of an alienation scale, for example, of 
necessity requires verstehen both in comprehending the 
viewpoint of the actor and cultural norms. But here 
verstehen is used as an ancillary process to empirical 
investigation.
(iii) Having constructed an alienation scale, and 
applied it to empirical use, the social meaning of the
1
A. Schutz, ’Concept and Theory Formation in the Social 
Sciences,' Journal of Philosophy, 51 (195*0 PP* 266-7*
19
correlations obtained has then to be explained, a procedure 
again sometimes requiring a very general understanding of 
behaviours in a culture. Here the use is partly 
methodological, since it may lead on to further 
’operational' research, and partly epistemological, since 
empathy here contributes to the overall understanding of 
the observer in human terms.
(iv) As has been suggested above, intimate understanding 
of a socio-political system may assist the analyst to 
perceive opportunities for, say, psychological influence
on political events, which may not be apparent to an 
observer with only formal knowledge. This is another 
aspect of the methodological utility of verstehen.
(v) The behavioural scientist will, and in my view 
should, try to test the insights, derived in the way 
described, by empirical procedures e.g. by operationalizing 
the constructs and measuring them and their correlations
in a sample. But whether or not he does so, comprehension 
of a socio-political situation must extend beyond formal 
knowledge, reducible to numerical or linguistic 
expressions, to at least a momentary communion with the 
meanings of the situation in the minds of the actors 
therein i.e. verstehen of individual feelings; and also
of the human implications for the culture, perhaps in
20
what is foreseeable i.e. cultural verstehen also.
The acceptance of the meanings of situations as 
seen by their actors, and still more of the 'cultural 
implications' of empirical findings, multiplies the 
data of social research in a manner unnerving to the 
more simplistic proponents of attitude scale technology, 
since nomothetic generalization, or even the construction 
to be placed on described social situations, becomes 
difficult. This is so even when value judgements of the 
analyst are excluded in principle. The principle of 
parsimony, which is a fundament of science, is more 
difficult to apply when data of these kinds are admitted. 
If the concept of intention is also admitted, as I think 
it should be, the stockade containing the babbling horde 
of data groans and bulges under the stress. Nevertheless, 
since it is the explication of social reality and not an 
(illusory) convenience for social commentators which is 
the primary concern of social science, it follows that 
what is said in a general way about the data must be 
said very carefully, after looking in every direction.
A difficulty in verifying a complex proposition does not 
reduce its epistemological status. Lafitte,^ in 
arguing 'the simple proposition has no special status'
I
P. Lafitte, The Person in Psychology: Reality or
Abstraction, (London, 1957) p. 41.
21
remarks:
That an intense narcissistic need for personal 
approval is typical of the schizoid character 
may be hard to verify not only because of the 
complexity of the work involved but also because 
specifying the operations is rendered difficult 
by the terms of the proposition. ’Narcissistic 
need,1 ’schizoid character’ and even ’personal 
approval’ do not have self-evident meanings.
The principle of parsimony, of applying the most
economical construction to the available data, is not,
of course endangered by this argument. What is being
pointed out is that its application may be extraordinarily
difficult.
The use of verstehen in this thesis is most obvious 
in the second, third and fourth ways outlined above. 
General questions of method are raised again in Chapter 
Nine. It will be obvious from the text of Chapters 
Seven to Nine that another methodological orientation 
of this work is anti-reductionist, or 'contextualist,’ 
to use Greenstein’s1 term. But not only must the overt 
behaviour and sometimes dormant dispositions or attitudes 
of the political actors be understood within their 
context; intended actions, which usually, but not 
necessarily, involve a value orientation must also be
1
F.I. Greenstein, ’The Need for Systematic Enquiry into 
Personality and Politics: Introduction and Overview,’
Journal of Social Issues, 24 (1968) p. 9«
22
taken into account. It is argued here that some 
phenomena are political per se, and have few sociological 
or psychological correlates. The fact that most workers 
in this field now acknowledge the independence of 
political behaviour in many of its aspects is one of 
the main reasons why political psychology is now more 
reputable. Despite the wide claims for originality 
made above for this thesis, I would not, indeed dare not, 
argue that it explains more than a tiny fraction of 
contemporaneous Australian political activity. The 
recognition of the many factors which may be at work in 
shaping events is exemplified in Smith’s'*' schematic map 
for the analysis of personality and politics, especially 
in his complex Figure 2, where not only feed-back but 
the engagement, or disengagement, of dispositions and 
attitudes are accommodated. This may be contrasted with
pthe work of earlier theorists, particularly Eysenck 
whose approach was, by implication, heavily reductionist. 
Figure 17 in his book-^  is an early counterpart of that of
1
M. Brewster Smith, ’A Map for the Analysis of Personality 
and Politics,’ Journal of Social Issues, 24 (1968) 
pp. 15-28, esp. p. 20.
2
H.J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics, (London,
195^) chs. 4 and 8.
1) Ibid., p. 112.
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Smith, and implies a loose governance by 'ideology* 
of attitudes, and, in their turn of 'habitual opinions' 
and 'specific opinions.' Although Eysenck's argument 
is more sophisticated than his diagram might suggest, 
there is a dearth of discussion of politics qua politics 
everywhere in his work. In advancing the conception of 
'Tough-Tender-Mindedness' as the principal dimension 
governing opinions on social issues apart from a single 
'radical-conservative' political dimension, he omits 
(i) to describe anywhere the technical features of the 
factor analysis on which the conception is based; (ii) 
conjures up a construct validation based on James' 
discussion-1- of temperamental types which is at 
unacknowledged and possibly unseen variance with his own: 
James' 'tenderminded' type is 'monistic' and 'dogmatical' 
as opposed to 'pluralistic' and 'sceptical'. The whole 
analysis reeks of confusion between larger and smaller 
issues: 'Abolish abortion and licensing laws' is the
2cryptic label attached to one point of his Diagram 25. 
This kind of work may bring the whole body of 
psychological research into politics into disrepute, 
and, I fear, did so. The main ground of the feeling
1
Ibid., p. 151.
2
Ibid., p. 150.
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against such research in the 1950s was that it tended 
to be simplistic and reductionist, and, indeed, 
derisory of politics: in other words, it was felt that
it made a puerile and misguided attempt to diminish the 
human stature in the political domain.
This was not true of the work of Adorno and his 
colleagues, and it is principally to them, and those 
psychologists who followed up their work, and engaged 
the sympathetic attention and, indeed, the admiration of 
political scientists, that we owe the present burgeoning 
interest in the bearing of psychological dispositions on 
political attitudes. The difficult birth of the psychology 
of politics is, in one way, no cause for surprise, for it 
is a peculiar creature, having the features of both art 
and science. Possibly the Germans were right in giving 
that psychology which practices verstehen and is 
idiographic in inclination one of their improbably long 
but evocative titles: Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie
(literally, cultural science psychology). As practised 
in this thesis, political psychology is not of this type, 
since it has a nomothetic intent; but it is deferential 
to it. ’Statistical research' said Coilingwood,^ ’is
1
R.G. Coilingwood, The Idea of History, (London, 1946)
p. 228.
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for the historian a good servant but a bad master.
It profits him nothing to make statistical 
generalizations, unless he can thereby detect the 
thought behind the facts about which he is generalizing’. 
This is true also for the student of the psychology of 
politics. But it is not merely the ’thought’ of the 
actors to which we wish to penetrate; it is to their 
unconscious or half-aware motivations. The measurement 
of psychological dispositions makes this possible. 
Moreover, statistical research has the great virtue of 
putting a distance between the analyst's prejudgements 
and the eventual outcome of his analysis: it makes it
easier for him, in Collingwood’s own phrase, ’to work 
against the grain of his own mind’.'1'
I
Ibid., p. 305.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL CONTEXT, 1960-67 
2.1. Introduction
This Chapter fulfils the promise of Chapter One 
in providing a very brief sketch of some features of the 
Australian political scene. Particular attention is 
given to the political system as it bears upon the 
'political* matter of the more substantive parts of the 
thesis in Chapters Four and Eight, e.g. the policy 
opinion items, perceived situations, and voting trends. 
Some crucial features of the system as it functions may 
not emerge in surveys of the mass public. A notable 
case in point is the central role of the Democratic Labor 
Party and its social base in a section of the Victorian 
Catholic vote, mobilized by the National Civic Council. 
This will be treated also, although the highly compressed 
presentation here can hardly to justice to its 
significance, not to say its theatrical potential, as a 
highly successful, at times semi-clandestine operation, 
led by a lay organizer and publicist, Mr. B.A. Santamaria. 
But we must first turn to what is most, not least,
27
obvious in Australian politics.
2.2. Legitimacy: What is >Givent in Australian Politics
Gallup Poll (Australian Public Opinion Polls: 
hereafter, APOP) findings are of some interest here, and 
an admirable guide to them has been provided by Goot.'*' 
However, as is so often the case, the socio-political 
character of Australia has been better described by 
historians, of whose works the most generally highly
pregarded is perhaps that of Hancock, and by writers
offering a general commentary, such as the brilliant
•3autobiography by Horne, describing his boyhood in an 
Australian country town, than by political scientists. 
Davies and Encel^ have produced a general sociological 
commentary, and Davies’^  studies in depth of five 
second-rank political activists gives a vivid impression 
of the ambience of Australian politics.
1
M. Goot, Policies and Partisans: Australian Electoral
Opinion, 1941 to 194~q~^ Occasional Monograph No. 1, 
Department of Government and Public Administration, 
University of Sydney (Sydney, 1969)•
2
W.K. (Sir Keith) Hancock, Australia, (Brisbane, 196I; 
first ed. 1930).
3 D. Horne, The Education of Young Donald, (Sydney, 1967)«
4
A.F. Davies and S. Encel (eds.), Australian Society:
A Sociological Introduction, (Melbourne, 1965") •
5 A.F. Davies, Private Politics: A Study of Five Political
Outlooks, (Melbourne, 1966).
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During this period, as through almost its entire
history, the constitutional government of Australia
was at once ’effective’ and regarded as ’legitimate’ in
the senses described by Lipset.1 Considered in relation
to other countries, it was a very stable system.
Australia has never faced the prospect of civil war, and
only once the prospect of invasion (by the Japanese, in
1942) . Only a few towns in the far North-west (for
example, Darwin, in 1942) have ever been subjected to
aerial bombardment. Parliamentary government and the
prerogatives of a strong, independent judiciary are so
much a matter of course that no APOP question about their
desirability was asked of the public in the period.
Australians are wedded to the federal system and to the
present structure of the constituent States. An APOP
question about the desirability of the present number of
States found overwhelming support for it (of the order of
75 per cent)^ in 1967* Federal elections are held
frequently (every three years) and there is overwhelming
■3support for this also, as well as for voting being 
compulsory.^ About the desirability of the Federal Upper
1
S.M. Lipset, Political Man, (London, 1963) ch. 3*
2
M. Goot, op. cit., p. 126.
Ibid., p. 126.4
Ibid., p. 126.
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House,, the Senate, which represents the States equally, 
there is a more even division of opinion, but still a 
majority in support (1961 and 1965)
The nature of Australian patriotism is a curious 
one. The Australian Labor Party has been less of an 
enthusiast for the Imperial idea than the conservative 
parties (presently the Liberal and Country Parties), but 
the generally accepted concept of a wider loyalty has 
impeded the growth of a parochial chauvinism. The notion 
of Empire and its obligations has impelled this small 
nation to send a variety of military expeditions abroad, 
beginning with a small contingent sent to fight the 
’Mad Mahdi’ in the Sudan in the 1880s, a larger one to 
the Boer War, and a huge volunteer army of 400,000 (for 
a nation with a population then approaching five million) 
in support of the ’Mother Country’ in the First World 
War. The idea of the military expedition, embarked upon 
to protect some threatened interest far away, has a high 
place in the Australian imagination. ’War’ does not 
carry much sense of immediacy to the Australian locale: 
it is A Great Moment when the men volunteer, embark, 
and sail away, some to return as heroes. Voting is 
compulsory, but war, until recently, was not. But a
1
Ibid ., p. 126.
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moral imperative was involved. The young Donald Horne 
is asked anxiously by his father in the 1930s: 'You’d
go if you had to, wouldn't you, son?' Only after the 
threat of Japanese invasion was a limited form of 
conscription for overseas service introduced, even then 
with great reluctance. Conscription for the war in 
Vietnam came as something of a shock to the public. 
Australia has always cast itself in the role of a 
plucky ally, and this partly explains the early 
general support for the Vietnam commitment.
Australians combine republican manners and an 
affection for the Crown of England, which is nearly 
always seen as a symbol of the country's British 
inheritance. Support for continuing our present ties 
with Britain rather than becoming an entirely separate 
Republic waned from about 65 per cent to 55 per cent 
between 1966 and 1968.^  However, the celebration of the 
principle of Constitutional Monarchy is prominent in 
the rituals of the armed services, the churches, the Law, 
the independent and State schools and all State as well 
as Federal Parliaments. Indeed, it is the practice of 
some States, such as Victoria, still to invite
M. Goot, ibid., p. 125.
1
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distinguished Englishmen to act as Governor, the 
Queen’s representative; but the habit of doing the same 
in the Federal sphere died during the period, and it 
seems most unlikely that any future Governor-General 
will be an Englishman.
Australia tends to see itself as a kind of social 
microcosm of the United Kingdom and Ireland, with the 
English upper class left out, and a higher proportion of 
Scots and Irish. Englishmen, Scotsmen and Irishmen are 
not regarded as foreigners. Despite the increasing 
economic, political and academic orientation to the 
United States, Americans are regarded with more curiosity 
and some resentment. The National Anthem remains fGod 
Save the Queen’, although there is a seemingly perpetual 
public debate on the desirability of a purely Australian 
alternative.^- The nature of Australia as an immigrant 
polity is a subject to which we shall return.
The Federal Government has been formed by a 
coalition of the Liberal and Country Parties (the former 
the larger partner) since 19^9  ^ without interruption, and 
these had gradually taken on the appearance of being the 
normally ruling parties, despite a vigorous Labor
1 The APOP found overwhelming popular support for ’keeping 
the Union Jack in our flag’ in 1967» Cf. M. Goot, ibid.,
p. 125.
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opposition. This had split in 1955^ when the 
'Anti-Communist' (later, the 'Democratic’) Labor Party 
was formed, but the Australian Labor Party maintained 
a very large (40 to 50 per cent) share of the vote 
throughout the period.
We shall now briefly consider the 'effectiveness' 
of the Federal Government during this period. Its chief 
implication, as of this discussion of 'legitimacy', is 
of stability and confidence in the regime.
2*5* 'Effectiveness' of Government: Economic Growth
Australian society is an affluent one, especially 
by comparison with its neighbours in Asia. The Gross 
National Product per head in 1967.» in 1967 U.S. Dollars, 
was $214-3j compared to $326 in Malaysia, and $1158 in 
Japan.1 It is also one growing steadily more affluent. 
After a minor recession in I96O-6I, the annual growth of 
the G.N.P. per head at constant prices was 5*7 per cent, 
between 1962 and 1967«2 This was achieved despite a 
population growth of from 10.3 million in i960 to 11.6 
million in 1966.^  Moreover, consumer prices rose only
1
A.N.Z. Bank: Quarterly Survey, 19 (1969) No. 1, p. 23.
2
Ibid.
5 Trends, (published by the Rural Bank of New South Wales) 
7 (1966) No. 1, p. S.
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moderately during this period: if the financial year
1 9 5 2 /3 is taken as a base of 1 0 0, the Consumer Price 
Index was 125.7 in 1 9 6 3 /4 and 138.9 in March, 1 9 6 7«1 2345
Personal consumption expenditure showed a marked increase 
per head, and a smaller proportion devoted to basic
pnecessities, such as food and drink. In terms of selected 
indicators of economic growth, production of steel 
increased from 1.5 million tons in 1951/2 to 5.6 million 
tons in 1965/6, an annual growth rate of 9*8 per cent.
The number of motor vehicles per 1000 of population increased 
from 187 in 1951/2 to 331 in 1965/6, reflecting an annual 
growth rate of 4 .2  per cent.^ Expenditure on education 
by all Public Authorities rose (at current prices) from 
$ 2 8 0 million (Aus. dollars) in 1 9 5 9 /6 0 to $530 million 
in 1965/6, a considerable increase even when deflated 
for rising costs and the growth in population.  ^ Australia 
is not, however, a heavily taxed country, compared with 
other Western nations. In 1965, total taxes were 2 9 . 9
1
Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical Bulletin, 
(June 1967), p. 2 9 2 .2
Trends, 7 (1966) No. 1, p. 8.
3 Ibid., p. 8.
4
Ibid., p. 8.
5 Ibid., p. 8.
per cent of National Income in Australia, compared with 
33*6 per cent in the U.S.A., 37*9 per cent in the United 
Kingdom, and 51.2 per cent in France.'1'
This brief review indicates an economic situation 
in which consumers’ rising aspirations were steadily fed, 
where no rentier class was enraged by galloping inflation, 
where immigration could be sustained without greatly 
retarding the growth of real income per head and demands 
for more spending in the public sector on services such 
as education were being met with some degree of satisfaction 
in short, where social change was gradual, orderly, and 
favourably regarded by the community at large. This is 
not to say that there was contentment with, for example, 
the level of spending on public services. It could have 
been, and was, in fact, argued that public expenditure 
should have been rising more rapidly than it did. Indeed, 
this issue penetrated the mass consciousness both at the 
level of individual experience and public debate. There 
was a vociferous demand for more and better educational 
facilities, and as Table 3*l6in Chapter Three suggests, 
the younger generation were indeed becoming better 
educated than their elders. But th.-,re was little in the 
overall socio-economic situation to provoke a radical
A.N.Z. Bank Quarterly Survey, 18 (1969) No. 2, p. 13.
I
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challenge to the bases of the established system; 
rather, proposals for gradual reforms were given a 
slowly widening circulation in an increasingly well 
educated and financially more ’comfortable1 political 
public. The left-of-centre fashion was for reformism, 
not extreme proposals, and the data of the surveys of 1965 
and 1966 should be considered in this light. The general 
improvement in living conditions was not entirely uniform, 
but such pockets of poverty"*- as remained in Australian 
society were not easily politically mobilized: they
were amongst pensioners, handicapped people, deserted 
wives with families, and recent immigrants from Southern 
Europe. ’Poverty’ as a global issue was not to be raised
until 1968-69«
Tout bref, it is easy to see why most Australians 
regard their politics as almost a light-hearted game, 
to be played with detachment and some cynicism. When an 
affair of state becomes important, it ceases, in common 
parlance, to be ’political’; it becomes a ’public’ or 
’national’ issue. There is no dispossessed ruling class, 
which history has passed by, longing for a restoration of
1
See e.g. R.J.A. Harper, ’Survey of Living Conditions in 
Melbourne-1966,’ Economic Record, 45 (1967) PP • 262-88. 
Harper concludes that about five per cent of Melbourne’s 
population were then living in ’poverty', by Australian 
standards.
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an ancien regime; no Great Pretender; no local equivalent 
of the Action Fran^aise. The grand issues of style, 
capable of arousing great emotion, have been settled long 
ago. Modernists in Australia often feel, indeed, that 
the ancien regime is too long with us; but they would not 
trouble to cross the street in the cause of a republic.
The main issues in internal politics are socio-economic: 
who is to get how much of the growing cake of national 
production. These are matters fought over by political 
syndicates of interested groups, organized as political 
parties; but before we consider them we must note an 
ironical feature of the Federal system.
2.4. An Implication of the Federal System
A federal system is one in which power is divided 
between a central authority and political authorities for 
the constituents, in such a way that neither can, by its 
own fiat, withdraw powers from the other. It is sometimes 
remarked that by virtue of this inbuilt inflexibility, 
federations tend to conservatism. I wish here to argue 
the reverse for Australia. The Constitution spells out 
the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament, leaving the 
residue to the States. In 1942, through its power to 
levy taxes, which it holds concurrently with the States, 
the Commonwealth Parliament passed four Acts, later held
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to be intra vires in peace time, which had the effect 
of taking over all taxation of incomes, previously 
levied by the States. The Commonwealth, now in possession 
of this principal ’growth’ tax, makes grants to the 
States from its Consolidated Revenue, which account for 
about 55 per cent of their total receipts of revenue.'*'
Since they have few ’growth’ taxes of their own, 
the States are thus heavily dependent upon Commonwealth 
generosity to finance the services they are constitutionally 
empowered to provide, in the field of education, for 
example. Section 96 of the Constitution permits, but 
does not compel, the Commonwealth to attach any conditions 
it pleases to the grants to the States. Conditions are,
pin fact, applied to about one fifth of these grants.
But notice the implication here: should the Commonwealth
wish to usurp the policy-making functions of the States, 
it could apply conditions to all its grants, including 
ones requiring their expenditure to be matched, dollar 
for dollar, by the States. The Commonwealth would then 
have de facto withdrawn, unilaterally, powers now in the 
hands of the States. Since this extraordinary capability
1
Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, (Canberra, 
1966) No. 52, p. 765 and pp. 786-88.
2
R.J. May, Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment, (Oxford,
1969) PP- 5 6 -bb^ esp. p. 60.
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lies with the Commonwealth, it follows that Australia 
does not have, in the strict sense, a federal system, 
but one better described as quasi-federal.
The result of the present financial relations 
between the Commonwealth and the States is that the 
Governments of the States, whatever their political 
complexion, will be mendicants pressing the Commonwealth 
for more funds for public projects in great demand, 
especially in education, whilst at the same time avoiding 
the odium attached to levying extra taxation. It follows 
that (a) actual policy-making discretion is, in most 
fields, really in the hands of the Commonwealth, on to 
which our surveys are, therefore, properly focussed; 
and (b) that since the pressure from the States is always 
for increased spending, the quasi-federal system, as it 
nov/ functions, has a radical, and not a conservative 
bias .
As we shall see, policy alignments between the major 
parties are more distinct than in the United States, for 
example. The A.L.P. applies continuous pressure for 
greater expenditure in the public sector, and the Government 
Parties have to fend off its electoral challenge by an 
apparently good performance, which is measured in the 
eyes of the press and the public largely by the degree
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to which it satisfies the demands of the States. It is 
seldom recognized how closely the Labor Party and the 
Governments of the States, nearly all^ conservative 
in Party complexion, are associated in pressing for 
increased public expenditure.
2.5. The Main Political Parties and the Elections of 
1963 and 1966.
The structure of Parliamentary Government within
which the Parties operate has been described, inter alia, 
o ' 2) 4by Davies, Crisps and Miller. The House of 
Representatives is pre-eminent, and, as British 
constitutional principles have been received, a Federal 
Government which does not command a majority in this House 
must resign. The two major surveys on which this thesis 
is based were accordingly taken during the elections for 
the House of Representatives in 1963 and 1966. The 
Australian political party system has a mild family 
resemblance to its British relative, as the analyses by
1
In 1970, all are governed by non-Labor Ministries.
2
A.F. Davies, Australian Democracy (Melbourne, 1958).
3 L.F. Crisp, The Parliamentary Go\ernment of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, third ed. (London, 1961).
4
J.D.B. Miller, Australian Government and Politics; An 
Introductory Survey^ second ed. (London, 1959)-
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1 2Jupp and Overacker make clear, although it should be 
noted that the creation and rise to power of the 
Australian Labor Party antedated its British counterpart 
by about twenty years, and the British system contains 
no counterparts of the Country Party and the Democratic 
Labor Party.
All Australian Parties of significance are oligarchies.
Their mass membership is small, and has very little
influence on policy. This fact probably contributes to
the detachment and mildness of interest on the part of
the Australian voter. The Liberal and Country Parties
are coalitions of urban and rural capital, with an
electoral base in the urban middle class and the general
country population. The A.L.P. has its electoral base in
the urban working class, and its State and Federal
Conferences are heavily dominated by the representatives
4of its affiliated Trade Unions. Australian politics is 
the politics of class and interest group, well understood 
to be so by the public. The interest group struggle is
1
J. Jupp, Australian Party Politics, (Melbourne, 1964).
2
L. Overacker, The Australian Party System, (London, 1952).
5 See A.F. Davies and S. Encel, Australian Society, 
pp. 110-13»4
In 1968, there was an infusion of Parliamentary Leaders 
into the A.L.P. Federal Conference.
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carried on continuously through strikes and collective 
bargaining between unions and employers, within a 
framework of arbitration tribunals and ’conciliation’ 
commissions. But neither party can hope to govern 
without obtaining voters from the ’other side of the 
class fence’, and this fact is widely supposed to account 
for a convergence in their domestic policies. Labor no 
longer proposes nationalization, but instead concentrates 
on proposals for new or revived public corporations, or 
redistributive proposals which would, on balance, favour 
the working class, and improved public facilities, by, 
for example, greatly increased grants to the States for 
their education systems. The Liberal and Country 
Parties’ habit is to propose more modest increases in 
public spending, limited income redistribution, and to 
emphasise the American alliance and the British 
connection. Although the A.L.P. stands neither for a 
republic nor for any change in Australia’s system of 
alliances with the U.S.A., its refusal to support the 
sending of troops to combat the insurgency in Malaya, in 
1955, or to Vietnam in 1965, was taken up by the 
Government as symbols of a weak defence policy.
In both elections, the A.L.P. was led by Mr. Arthur 
Calwell, who epitomized that type of elderly Labor
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politician indifferent to middle class support and 
suspicious of intellectuals. In 1963* the Prime 
Minister was Sir Robert Menzies, the darling of suburban 
middle-class matrons, an orator of the grand style, 
devoted to both the Imperial connection and the American 
alliance. He resigned in January 1966 and his place was 
taken by Mr. Harold Holt, an amiable team leader, well 
regarded but scarcely ’the man Mr. Menzies was’ (The title 
is almost always overlooked in common conversation:
’Mr' Menzies is a title with a dignity all its own).
The 1963 elections were dominated by issues of 
domestic policy, with the parties taking well-defined 
stands of the kinds outlined above and discussed in 
Chapter Four. They were won handsomely by the L.C.P. 
Coalition. The Australia-wide results are set out in 
Table 2.1.
TABLE 2.1.
1963 House of Representatives Elections -^
Lib . Party Country Party A.L.P. D .L .P. Other Total
Votes: 37.1$ 8.9$ 4 5 .5# 7 .^ 1.1# 100#
Seats: 52 20 52 , 0 0 124
The electoral system for the House is based on
single-member constituencies and preferential voting.
1
C.A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian 
Government and Politics, 1890“19~64, (Canberra, 1 9 6 8) pT 4l6.
If no candidate has a majority of votes on the first 
count, the second preference votes of the least 
successful, at the full value of one vote, are 
successively allotted until a majority for one candidate 
is attained. It can be seen that the second preferences 
of the Democratic Labor Party, of which 80 to 90 per cent 
went to the Government Parties, were important in this 
outcome. Had they gone the other way, the A.L.P. might 
well have won.
In 1966, the elections were, at the level of public 
debate, very much concerned with issues in external 
policy, particularly Australia’s commitment of troops 
to the war in Vietnam and conscription of a proportion 
of twenty year olds for service in that war. There was 
some conflict over economic issues, but they assumed 
much less public prominence than in 1963* The issue of 
the American alliance was dramatized by a pre-election 
visit to Australia for the President of theU.S., Mr. 
Lyndon Johnson, from October 20 to October 22, during 
which he was lionized by the public. At both elections, 
the D.L.P. was a vociferous proponent of a 'strong* 
defence policy posture, with an ideological pace in its
1
C.A. Hughes, ‘Political Review,* Australian Quarterly, 
36 (1964) No. 1, p. 103.
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rhetoric matched only by the miniscule Communist Party, 
alleging Communist influence in the A.L.P., particularly 
in Victoria. There was some substance in this latter 
claim, but not a great deal.'1' That the public was 
more indifferent to external issues than the 
politicians realized is demonstrated by the data of 
Chapter Eight. The Government Parties inflicted a 
crushing defeat on the A.L.P., which was probably 
partly a result of growing public impatience with Mr. 
Calwell’s leadership.
TABLE 2.22
1966 House of Representatives Elections
Lib. Party Country Party A.L.P. D.L.P. Other Total
Votes: 40.1# 9-9% 40.0# 7-3$ 2.7# 100#
Seats: 6l 21 4l 0 1 124
The Government Parties would have won the 1966 elections
even if the D.L.P. had amalgamated with the A.L.P., but
the D.L.P.’s support is clearly vital to the Liberal
and Country Parties when their electoral stocks are low,
T
For a more extended discussion of the Byzantine 
situation in Victorian Labor politics, see A. Hughes, 
’Political Review,’ Australian Quarterly, 41 (1969)^
No. 2, pp. 103“6.
2
D. Aitkin, ’Political Review,’ Australian Quarterly,
39 (1967) No. 1, p. 87.
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as they were in 1961, and were again to be in 1 9 6 9»
A note on the genesis of this unusual Party and the 
general balance of electoral power may here be useful. 
2.6. The Labor Split of 1955 and the Balance of 
Electoral Power
From the early 1940s until 1954, a lay Catholic
pmovement led by Mr. B.A. Santamaria worked within 
Australian trade unions to combat Communist influence. 
The ’Catholic Social Movement,’ as it was called, was 
a semi-clandestine affair, for fear of raising 
Protestant hackles, but operated with non-’Movement’ 
allies in ’Groups’ officially endorsed by the A.L.P. 
After gaining control, with their allies, of a number of 
key unions in Victoria and New South Wales in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, the ’Groupers’ found themselves, 
willy-nilly, in a position of power within the A.L.P.
At the height of its influence, there were actually some 
eighty members of the ’Movement’ itself-  ^as delegates at
1
For a discussion of the 1969 elections, see A. Hughes, 
’Political Review,’ and B.A. Santamaria, ’Struggle on 
Two Fronts: the D.L.P. and the 1969 Election, Australian
Quarterly, 41 (1 9 6 9) No. 4, op. 1 5 -2 5 and pp.
2
For a brief history of the ’Movement,' see B.A. 
Santamaria, ’’’The Movement”: 1941-60 - an Outline’ in
H. Mayer (ed.) Catholics and the Free Society; an 
Australian Symposium, (Melbourne, 19oT] pp. 54-105«
5 Interview by the writer with Mr. B.A. Santamaria,
2 November 1956.
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the Victorian State Conference of the A.L.P., a 
cohesive body large enough, with its allies, to command 
control of the Party in that State. However limited 
its aims may have been, its militancy alarmed many 
A.L.P. members, particularly as it seemed to be behaving 
as a Party within a Party. Late in 1954, the then 
Federal Leader of the A.L.P., Dr. H.V. Evatt, possibly 
fearing that the ’Movement* was seeking to replace him, 
organized intervention in the affairs of the Victorian 
branch of the A.L.P. by the Party’s Federal bodies, 
which culminated in the departure of the ’Groupers’
(the ’Movement’ and their allies) from the Labor Party in 
1955 to form a body first known as the ’A.L.P.
(Anti-Communist)’ and later the ’Democratic Labor Party.’1 
The D.L.P. and the ’Movement,» now renamed the ’National
1
A somewhat unsatisfactory account of the history of 
the ’Movement’ and the split in the A.L.P. has been given 
by T. Truman, Catholic Action and Politics (Melbourne, 1959)« The title is misleading, since the ’Movement’ 
was never officially ’Catholic Action’ i.e. a lay body 
whose policy is directed by the Bishops, who bear 
responsibility for its actions. The ’Movement’ was in 
the category ’action of Catholics,* i.e. a lay body whose 
policy was directed by its lay leaders, who bear the 
entire responsibility for it, although it received 
personal support from influential members of the Catholic 
hierarchy in Victoria. Other Catholics could, and did, 
oppose it. A more reliable account of the Labor ’split’ 
is contained in R.A. Murray, The Split: Australian Labor
in the Fifties, (publication forthcoming),
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Civic Council’ have been in implacable opposition to 
the A.L.P. ever since. This is a central fact of 
Australian politics, since it is the D.L.P. voters’ 
second preference votes which have sustained the Liberal 
and Country Party Federal Government in every crisis, 
and prevented A.L.P. victories. In electoral terms, 
it seems that about half the Victorian Catholic 
community votes for it. It has little Protestant 
support. To put the point baldly, these events have had 
the effect of detaching a large part of the Irish 
working class and petit bourgeois vote from the A.L.P., 
a section of its electoral base which had previously 
been amongst its most loyal supporters. Since the basic 
position of the D.L.P. has been to allege a Communist 
threat to the country from without and within, and to 
concentrate on external politics, the result of this 
fragmentation of the Labor social infra-structure has 
been to determine the balance of electoral power in 
favour of the conservative parties, who are more in 
harmony with the D.L.P. in external affairs. This new 
electoral equilibrium has thus had the paradoxical 
effect of settling domestic economic policy questions 
on quite other grounds, i.e. defence policy. Nobody can 
understand the course of Australian politics without
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knowing this. However, although it is a fact of 
crucial importance, it can almost escape notice in a 
mass survey of the electorate, such as those described 
here. It has therefore been imperative to describe 
this contextual feature of Australian politics 
separately.
Even had the A.L.P. not suffered this critical 
loss of support, it would probably have seen its 
electoral strength ebbing during this period. There is 
a long-term sociological drift against the A.L.P., 
brought about by the expansion of the middle class and 
the contraction of the working class. This is a 
reflection partly of the changing structure of the work 
force,'1' in particular the growth of its professional and 
higher clerical components, and partly of the rising 
tide of affluence, which has encouraged middle class 
identification amongst higher income manual workers.
The embourgeoisement of the Australian urban electorate, 
manifest in the occupationally mixed streets of the 
prosperous outer suburbs, has given an old-fashioned 
ring to working class politics and a contemporary air 
to being middle class in life-style and outlook. The
1
See Trends (published by the Rural Bank of New South 
Wales) 6 (1964) No. 3> where the occupational census data 
for 1947 and l$)6l are compared.
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A.L.P., especially when led by Mr. Calwell, could 
not easily keep pace with this changing situation.
Its corporate image, built around conferences chiefly 
of semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers, was simply 
all wrong. Its policy position on domestic affairs 
was more in harmony with the electorate’s mood (as both 
the APOP surveys and those reported here confirm) but 
the advantage was difficult to exploit, mainly because 
of the unpopularity of its 'Left* position on foreign 
policy. There is (see Chapter Eight) an overwhelmingly 
strong conviction that Communism in Asia is a danger to 
this country, and issues where the Government’s policy 
has clearly been unpopular (for example, in its decision 
to send conscripts to Vietnam) have been encapsulated 
in the larger defence issue, on which the A.L.P. was not 
trusted by the electorate. The A.L.P.’s electoral 
position was partly retrieved in 1969 by its new-look 
leader, Mr. G. Whitlam, but in the period to which we are 
addressed, its support was comparatively low.
Of all the disparate political sentiments most 
surely identified in this thesis, in Chapter Eight, 
the Left-Right continuum in foreign policy is the one most 
free of sociological and psychological correlates, and 
the most susceptible to influence by political leaders,
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who must sometimes act in ways dictated by external 
events. It is, therefore, the one most liable to future 
flux, not having its roots in any secure sociological 
or psychological ground. The implications of the 
changing nature of Australia’s international position 
will be noted in this political introduction; but it 
might as well, before doing so, to return to Australia’s 
nature as an immigrant polity.
2.7* Australia as an Immigrant Polity
Most Australians, and their fathers, are not 
immigrants, but the polity was in its first style a 
colonial one, with institutions transplanted from the 
United Kingdom. The period after the Second World War 
saw a flood of immigration from Southern Europe, as well 
as the traditional British source, a phenomenon which at 
first nearly raised the hair on the heads of British 
Australians. (All Australians are, by law, still both 
'Australian citizens’ and ’British Subjects’). After the 
first shock-wave of immigration from the Continent, 
Australians came to accept their new multiplicity. As 
Table 2.5 suggests, they were much less resistant to 
migration of Jewish people, Greeks, Italians or Negroes 
(but not Chinese) in 1964 than in 1948.
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TABLE 2.5
Desirability of Immigrants of FourRace or Nation. Groups, 1948 and 1964
1 Keep them out’ (a)
1948 1964
Negroes: 11% m %Jews: 58% 17%Greeks: 32% 18*Italians: h5% 23^Chinese: 24* 33^
(a) The percentages refer to the proportion of all 
respondents expressing this sentiment.
The patterns of immigration and the life-style of 
the immigrants are described in works cited in Chapter 
Six. Suffice it is to say here that in the case of Jews, 
Italians and Greeks, the pattern has been one of 
integration rather than assimilation. That is to say: 
these three groups have formed communities with marked 
internal links, and also connections with the host 
society; each group therefore retains a special character 
which has not been dissolved. In the case of Italians and 
Greeks, this has been as much the result of happenchance 
as of deliberate policy, these migrants having settled
1
The 1948 sample is a Melbourne one (n=370) reported in 
O.A. Oeser and S.B. Hammond (eds.) Social Structure and 
Personality in a City (London, 195^1 p 55. The 1964 
sample is Australia-wide, (n=474) reported in A. Huck, 
The Chinese in Australia, (Melbourne, 1967) P- 95* The 
characteristics of the sample, which appears adequately 
representative, are discussed at pp. 98-IOO.
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mainly in the inner-city areas, giving them a changed 
and distinctive atmosphere.
In many Australians, of British, Irish and European 
stock alike, there is often faintly discernible in 
their outlooks a nostalgia for their countries of 
origin. The Anglican Church is still, officially, ’The 
Church of England in Australia.’ A Kiplingesque ’public 
school’ tradition persists. ’Land of Hope and Glory’ is 
still sung with feeling at school concerts. Irish folk 
songs are played to small drinking groups of Irish 
descent. Illustrated maps of Italy adorn the walls of 
'espresso’ cafes. Australians bring to each other, 
sometimes with trembling hands, the images of their 
homelands far away. The dominant British tradition is 
overtly passionate only on rare occasions. When Sir 
Winston Churchill died, in 1965, an enormous fund was 
raised for Fellowships in his memory. A memorial service 
to him was held in St. Paul’s Anglican Cathedral, in 
Melbourne, at which the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Edmund 
Herring, delivered the oration. When he quoted the 
famous speech of determination to fight on, and came to 
the sombre passage contemplating defeat, the struggle to 
be carried on by ’our Empire beyond the seas,’ his voice
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broke with emotion.'1' It was no wonder, when the 
British decision to withdraw troops East of Suez was 
announced, that many Australians, particularly the older 
generation, felt strangely bereft.
2.8. External Events
The war in Vietnam was the first in which Australia 
participated without Britain as an ally. The American 
orientation presented new problems. Australia is a much 
smaller nation in relation to the U.S. than it is to 
Britain. Moreover, Australians were not sure of how they 
were viewed by this mighty power: whether or not the
great flood of affect disgorged upon President Johnson in 
1966 was to be requited. If the U.S. were to retreat into 
isolationism, as the British were withdrawing from the 
Indian Ocean, what would become of us? Within the British 
Empire, in which Australians had felt themselves first-class 
citizens, there was an intrinsic ’overseas’ commitment.
The reality of the disintegration of the Imperial system 
in the 1950s was partly concealed from Australians by 
continuing British military activity in South-east Asia, 
first in suppressing the Communist insurgency in the Malay 
peninsula, and then in the defence of Malaysia during 
’Confrontation’ by Indonesia. Both of Australia’s ’great
1
Observation of the writer.
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and powerful friends’ (as Sir Robert Menzies liked to
call them) were still seen to be active in the region.
<?When Sir Robert Menzies retired, the Imperial mantle 
seemed to vanish with him. An active debate arose about 
the Australian-British relation in 1967* In April, The 
Bulletin, a weekly which had been a strident advocate 
of the new American orientation, spread over its cover: 
’Britain: The End of the Affair?’^  When, on July 18,
Britain announced withdrawal of its forces East of Suez 
by the mid 1970s, there was a nation-wide sigh of regret. 
The Sydney Morning Herald ran three editorials on the 
subject in one week. On 20 July it said: ’Britain
perhaps has been no bad guide for us in the past, but 
we must find our own sign posts for the future.* On 22 
July, in an editorial headed ’Twilight of an Empire’ it 
spelt out the general mood: ’To anyone with the slightest 
sense of history, this week has been of profound and 
moving significance. For the announcement that Britain 
will withdraw her troops East of Suez by 1975 means the 
formal end of the British Empire.’
There can be no doubt, however, that many of the 
close associations between Britain and Australia will 
continue. The mixture of amusement and affectionate
The Bulletin, 8 April, 1967-
I
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fascination with which Australians regard the British
monarchy was admirably captured by a columnist"^ in the
Melbourne Herald, 10 July, 196?:
Imperial Grandeur east of Suez has now rubbed 
thin. Back in London, the splendid fairytale 
continues in the sonorous unchanging language 
of the Court Circular. Listen-
The Queen this evening visited the new 
Jewel House and the Chapel Royal of St. Peter 
Ad Vincula at the Tower of London. Her Majesty 
was received upon arrival by the Constable 
(Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer) who presented 
to The Queen the Keys of the Tower, which Her 
Majesty was graciously pleased to return . . . .
The point of this short account of Australia’s inheritance
and its present international position, which was, in
1966, somewhat uncertain, and now, in the light of
American withdrawal from Vietnam, increasingly so, is
twofold. Firstly, if this multiplicity of national
inheritances is to continue to exist with internal
harmony, then the psychological grounds of harmony and
disharmony have to be understood. This thesis, which is
in large part an analysis of the antecedents of disharmony,
of ethnocentrism, is directed towards that end, as part
of its more general purposes. Secondly, it bears upon the
nature of the Australian outlook, and on Australians’
conception of themselves and others, in the new and
strange external situation which was emerging when the
1
Geoffrey Tebbutt.
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attitude surveys reported here were carried out. The 
attitudes have therefore to be understood in this 
context.
2.9. Conclusion
This introductory sketch of the Australian political 
scene is meant to provide the reader with some contextual 
understanding of the structure of dispositions and 
attitudes to be explored. To many, it will be superfluous, 
but it has been offered in the conviction that the stuff 
of politics is in only some aspects related to 
psychological disposition., and that no study of political 
attitudes can be complete without a survey, however brief., 
of the environment in which they are held. The apertures 
through which we can look at the structure of disposition 
and attitude in the population are the samples surveyed, 
and these will now be described.
57
CHAPTER THREE
THE SAMPLES OF 1963 AND 1966 
5.1. Introduction
The major survey, the matter of which is reported 
and discussed in Chapters Six to Nine, is that of the 
sample of voters in Melbourne and Sydney of October- 
November i960, (n=595) taken just before the Federal 
elections for the House of Representatives in that year. 
Since the interview was a long one, varying from ninety 
minutes to four hours, considerations of expense 
dictated that more time be given to the interview itself 
rather than the discovery of the location of the 
interviewee. This meant some lack of precision in the 
accuracy of sampling, but with the compensating advantage 
of being able to administer long and reliable scales 
for the psychological dispositions. It is nevertheless 
important to test the accuracy of sampling by comparing 
some sample characteristics with available parameters 
for the reisvanc populations, and this is the main 
purpose of this chapter. In addition, the internal 
characteristics of the 1966 sample are examined in some
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detail.
In refining the instruments for the voter survey of 
1966., use was made of a captive sample of low-grade 
(Fourth Division) Commonwealth Public Servants, which 
is described at Section 12.2.1 of Chapter Six, in the 
course of the account of method.
The voter survey of 1966 was funded by the Australian 
National University and carried out by a Melbourne 
polling organization, Australian Sales Research Bureau.
It was possible, in this survey, to control sampling 
procedures closely. In the preliminary exercise of 1963.» 
which was a survey of a sample in Melbourne only, 
interviewing was done by volunteers, and it was not 
possible to dictate procedures with the same rigidity. 
However, the representativeness of the samples is adequate, 
judged against population parameters.
A statistical note may be offered here on the 
technique of applying tests of significance in this 
thesis, mainly the chi-square test, to non-random samples. 
Since these tests are, in principle, intended to test 
differences between independent random samples, it follows 
that the generalizations which they make possible are, 
strictly, generalizations to hypothetical universes of 
content of which the samples are random samples. The
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p o p u l a t i o n  t o  which  one g e n e r a l i z e s  i s  t h u s  a 
h y p o t h e t i c a l ,  n o t  an a c t u a l  o ne .  The p o i n t  o f  t h i s  
C h a p t e r ,  how ever ,  i s  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  a c l o s e  i d e n t i t y  
b e tw ee n  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  and a c t u a l  p o p u l a t i o n s ,  by 
show ing  t h a t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  non-random  
sa m p le s  a r e  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  p o p u l a t i o n  p a r a m e t e r s ,  so 
t h a t  t h e s e  s a m p le s  have  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t h e  same f u n c t i o n  
a s  ( a d m i t t e d l y  s u p e r i o r )  random sam p les  would have  h a d .  
However,  t h i s  s p e c i a l  m eaning  o f  t h e  t e s t s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
s h o u l d  be k e p t  i n  mind.
The model o f  a l l  t h e  s a m p l in g  t e c h n i q u e s  d e s c r i b e d  
i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  t h a t  o f  s t r a t i f i e d  c l u s t e r  s a m p l i n g , ^  
b u t  t h e  a c t u a l i t y  o f  p r o c e d u r e  i n  1965 d e p a r t s  m ark e d ly  
from t h e  m o d e l .  The 1966 v o t e r  sam ple  i s  a c l o s e r
pa p p r o x i m a t i o n  t o  i t .  I t  i s  m o d e r a t e l y  l a r g e ,  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
so  t o  p e r m i t  s m a l l  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a l i t i e s  t o  r e a c h  
s i g n i f i c a n c e .  A l th o u g h  i t  i s  c o n f i n e d  o n ly  t o  t h e  two 
b i g g e s t  c i t i e s  i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  t h e r e  i s  a g e n e r a l  u n i f o r m i t y  
i n  A u s t r a l i a n  u r b a n  l i f e ,  a s  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t o  C h a p te r
1
See L. K i s h ,  S u rvey  Sam p l in g  (New York,  1965) p p . ^9 ~ 5 5  
and 164-166.
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A p r o c e d u r e  f o r  d ra w in g  a p r e c i s e  sam ple  o f  t h e  
A u s t r a l i a n  e l e c t o r a t e  and i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  t o  be found 
i n  M. Kahan and D. A i t k i n ,  Drawing a Sample o f  t h e  
A u s t r a l i a n  E l e c t o r a t e , O c c a s i o n a l  P a p e r  No. 5 j> D ep ar tm en t  
o f  P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e ,  R e s e a r c h  S c h o o l  o f  S o c i a l  S c i e n c e s ,  
A u s t r a l i a n  N a t i o n a l  U n i v e r s i t y  ( C a n b e r r a ,  1968).
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Four suggests,, which make it seem likely that the 
trends to be discerned in it apply to urban Australia 
generally. But we shall first consider the sample taken 
for the preliminary exercise of 1963.
3.2. The Melbourne Sample of 1963
3.2.1. Method of Interviewing and Sampling
Interviewing was done by some thirty volunteers, 
all of them University graduates or undergraduates, 
during the six weeks 8 November - 21 December 1963» The 
period of interviewing thus spanned the elections, which 
were held on 30 November.
Thirty locations were selected within the metropolitan 
area by the following procedure. An estimation was made 
of the proportion of the electorate within each major 
metropolitan division - inner, established, outer, and 
marginal - on the basis of the data of the 1961 Census. 
Within each division, the number to be drawn from the 
various municipalities was derived directly from the 
population ratios. The locations allotted to each 
municipality were then randomly selected. Two streets 
were specified adjacent to each location.
The sample was confined to persons eligible to vote 
and fluent in English.
Interviewers were instructed to proceed from a
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particular intersection and in a given direction in a 
specified street. They were asked to administer the 
questionnaire to the first ten willing voters in the 
houses in that street, provided that no more than one 
voter from each household was to he interviewed, and that 
they should try to arrive at the same numbers of women 
and men.
Thus the formal target was 600 interviews, although 
it was anticipated that because of the voluntary nature 
of the interviewing, only about 400 would be effectively 
completed. The final sample was 437.
The questionnaire administered in the interview is 
set out in Appendix 1 to this thesis.
3.2.2. The Representativeness of the Sample
Table 3*1 compares the sample percentages intending 
to vote or having voted for the various political parties 
(those undecided or refusing to answer this question 
were excluded) with the actual vote reported for the
1metropolitan area by the Commonwealth Electoral Officer.
T
House of Representatives Elections - 30 November, 1963. 
Summary of Votes for Political Parties, unofficial notes 
circulated by F.L. Ley, Commonwealth Chief Electoral 
Officer, 21 February, 1964.
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TABLE 3.1
Vote in 1963 
(percentages)
L.C.P. A.L.P. D.L.P. Other
Sample: 44.0 42.7 12.3 1.0 = 100%
Actual: 42.5 43.6 12.8 1.1 = 100^
The sample does not appear to be as closely
representative of denominational or age groups. The
tables below compare the survey data 1with those for
the metropolitan area from the 1961 Census.'1' The
latter may not, of course, correspond closely with the
figures for the voting population.
TABLE 3.2
Religious Affiliation 
(percentages)
Sample Census
Church of England 33.7 35.2
Presbyterian 12.8 11.6
Methodist 12.4 8.8
Catholic 29.7 30.7
Other Christian 5.9 11.3
Non-Christian 2.4 1.8
No religion 3.1 • 5
=100% =100%
1
Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30 June, 1961, 
Voli (ii): Victoria, Part 1. Commonwealth Bureau of
Census and Statistics, Canberra, 1963* pp. and
pp. 2-3.
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TABLE 3.3
Age
(percentages)
Sample
Less than 
36
26.7
36-55
47.4
More than 
55
26.0 = 100$
Census
popln.
(Adult 
only): 33.1 40.7 26.2 = 100$
Some underestimation of the youngest age group 
might be expected, in view of the method of sampling.
The attempt to obtain about equal numbers of men 
and women was successful.
TABLE 3.4 
Sex
(percentages)
Men Women
Sample: 48.8 51.2 = 100$
Thus the sample seems adequately representative 
of sociological characteristics, and closely 
representative of political opinion.
3.3. The Melbourne-Sydney Sample of 1966 
3 .3 *1 * Method of Interviewing and Sampling
Interviewing was carried out by a polling 
organization, as noted in the Introduction to this 
chapter, commencing in Melbourne on 5 November 1966 and 
in Sydney on 6 November 1966. The period of the survey 
ran up to election day, 26 November. By a mischance,
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three interviews in Melbourne were completed after the 
election.
The intention was to obtain 200 completed interviews 
in Melbourne and 200 in Sydney. Forty locations within 
each of the two metropolitan areas were designated, 
spread over each city on the basis of the 1961 Census 
data, but arbitrarily discounting the inner-city area 
in both cases by 25 per cent to allow for the non-voting 
migrant population. As in the 1963 survey, interviewers 
were instructed to proceed from a particular intersection 
(the location designated), in a given direction in a 
specified street. They were asked to administer the 
questionnaire to the first five willing voters in that 
street, provided that not more than one voter in each 
household was to be interviewed, and that for each quota 
of ten interviews, they should try to obtain equal numbers 
of women and men.
The sample was again confined to persons eligible to 
vote and fluent in English.
In an effort to obtain a more correct proportion of 
young people, who were under-sampled in 1963, interviewers 
were instructed to give first preference to a voter under 
50 years, if one was present. In the absence of a voter 
under 30 years, any willing voter was interviewed, without
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discrimination as to age.
The questionnaire administered is set out in 
Appendix 2 to this thesis. As noted above it is a very 
long one. Of the 400 interviews completed* some had 
missing responses on one or more of the political policy 
items (n=5) and some had missing responses on one or more 
of all the dispositional scale items* (n=22). Since the 
factor analyses required an identical sample for each 
correlation* all those interviews with one or more 
blanks on the political policy items were excluded from 
the analysis of political policy items* and subsequent 
breakdowns by background data. The maximum size of the 
sample used in the ’political’ analysis was therefore 595»
An identical consideration led to the exclusion of 
the 22 interviews with one or more blanks on all the 
dispositional scale items. Members of the minority 
groups mentioned in the ethnocentrism scale were excluded 
from the dispositional analyses* as the items of the 
ethnocentrism scales referred to themselves* and responses 
could not* in principle* measure an attitude to an 
out-group. These numbered 23. The sample used for the 
dispositional scale analysis* excluding these two groups* 
was 355« If all questionnaires with any blanks on the 
political policy or dispositional items were excluded*
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the sample was 552.
The sample size is indicated in every table. Maxima 
range from 552 to 595* Its representativeness is not 
seriously affected by the reduction, as the figures 
below demonstrate, except that, of course, the small 
proportion of the sample (approximately five per cent) 
who are actually members of the Jewish, Greek or Italian 
minority groups are not included when the sample is 
reduced to 552. However, this deficiency is more than 
compensated by the increased clarity of the analysis, a 
consideration which outweighed the small drop in 
representativeness and sample size.
5.5.2. The Representativeness of the Sample
Table 5*5 compares the sample percentages intending 
to vote or having voted for the various political parties 
with the sum of the actual votes of both metropolitan 
areas reported by the Commonwealth Electoral Officer."**
I
House of Representatives Elections - 26 November, 1966. 
Summary of Votes for Political Parties, unofficial notes 
circulated by F.L. Ley, Commonwealth Chief Electoral 
Officer, 27 January, 1967«
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TABLE 3-5
Vote in 1966 (a) 
(percentages)
L.C.P. A.L.P. D.L.P. Other
Sample (n=395):52.9 38.9 5.3 2.9 = 100%Sample (n=355):52.7 39.2 5.5 2.6 = 100^Actual: 47.8 39.3 8.5 4.4 = 100$
(a) The sample figures exclude those undecided 
or refusing to answer this question.
The D.L.P. vote is somewhat under-represented, and 
the L.C.P. vote somewhat over-represented. The general 
balance of the samples of both sizes is adequate to our 
purposes.
The data of the Census of 1966 have not yet been 
officially published, but personal communications of 
the figures were made to the writer by the Commonwealth 
Statistician, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 
in Canberra, and the Deputy Commonwealth Statisticians 
in Melbourne and Sydney. Only figures for the entire 
population, juvenile and adult, are available for religious 
affiliation. Census figures for the proportion in each 
age group were categorized on a slightly different basis 
from those in the sample. Table 3*6 sets out data for 
religious affiliation.
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TABLE 3.6
Religious Affiliation 
(percentages)
Sample
(n=395)
Sample
(n=355)
Census
Church of England: 30.1 32.0 37.7
Presbyterian: 12.5 13.3 9.2
Methodist: 9.2 9.6 6.8
Catholic: 31.9 30.6 32.3
Other Christian: 8 .4 8 .2 11.3
Non-Christian: 2.8 . 6 1.5
No religion: 5.1 6.7 1.2
=100$ =100$ =100$
As in 1963> it seems that agnostics or atheists
are more prepared to offer this self-description in a 
sample survey than a census. The expected under­
representation of ’Other Christians' and 'Non-Christians' 
is evident, although here again, overall 
representativeness is adequate.
Table 3«T exhibits data for age groups.
TABLE 3.7
Age Groups 
(percentages)
100$ 
100$
100$
21-35
Sample (n=395): 34.4
Sample (n=355): 35*5
Census: 20-35
52.1
36-55 56 and over
44.3 21.3
43.7 20.8
35-54 55-and over40.5 27.4
There is a more accurate representation of younger
people than in 1963» probably achieved by the constraining
instruction to interviewers. But the elderly are 
under-sampled.
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Table 3*8 indicates that the attempt to obtain 
about equal numbers of men and women was successful.
TABLE 3.8
Sex
(percentages)
Men Women
Sample
Sample (n=395): (n=355):
50.6
51.0
49.4 = 100# 
49.0 = 100#
These data, taken together, suggest that the 
sample is representative of the sociological and political 
characteristics of the parent population to a degree 
adequate to our purposes.
3.3•3• Further Characteristics of the 1966 Sample
Obviously, a sample of this moderately large size 
is capable of suggesting the sociological characteristics 
of the parent population, as well as those political 
and psychological features to which this thesis is 
addressed. Some cross-tabulations of sociological data 
are provided below, since they are of general assistance 
in clarifying the data more central to our interest. In 
exhibiting these data, the same format as for those in 
the main substantive chapters has been adopted, the 
rationale of which is discussed at the beginning of
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Chapter Seven. The tables are of percentages; the 
probability figuresbelow are derived from the frequency 
tables from which the percentages are derived, collapsed 
to four cells. This format, it is hoped, preserves 
clarity in exposition with the added and necessary 
stringency provided by tests of significance.
Those with data refused or missing have been 
removed from the relevant tables.
Table 5*9 exhibits the relation between education 
and self-identified social class. The relation is close, 
but does not approach identity.
TABLE 3-9
Education by Self-identified 
Social Class (a) (b) 
(percentages)
Education Class
Middle Working
Higher: 88 12 = 100$ (n=9l)
Middle: 67 53 = 100$ (n=lll
Lower: 50 50 = 100$ (n=119
(pc.001, n=32l)
(a) Four ’social class’ categories were offered: 
'Upper middle,’ ’Average middle,’ ’Lower middle’ 
and 'Working’.
(b) ’Higher’ education refer to Leaving Certificate 
or above, including University education. The 
Leaving Certificate is taken at about 16 years of age
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’Middle’ education refers to Intermediate Certificate 
or a Trade Certificate. The former is taken at 
about 15 years of age.
’Lower’ refers to any lesser qualification. Very 
few of the sample would have failed to complete 
primary education (ending at 12 years).
Table 3*10 shows the relation between income of the 
head of the household (whether or not the respondent) 
and self-identified class of the respondent.
TABLE 5.10
Householder’s Income by 
Self-identified Social Class (a) 
(percentages)
Income Class
Higher: 
Middle: 
Lower:
Middle Working
88
5949
(p <: .001, n=297)
12 = 100$ (n=110)
41 = 100$ (n=92)
51 = 100$ (n=95)
(a) ’Higher’ income refers to $60 per week or
more; ’Middle' income to $45 - $60 per week; ’Lower'
income to less than $45 per week.
Again, the relation stops far short of identity, 
especially at the lower level of each variable.
Table 5 • H  depicts education of the respondent
by householder’s income.
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TABLE Jt.ll
Education by Householder’s Income 
V percentages")
Education Income
Lower Middle Higher
Higher: 21 14 65Middle: 29 33 38Lower: 46 37 17
100$ (n=9*0100$ (n=108) 
100$ (n=ll8)
(p <.01, n=320)
The relation is less marked than in the two 
previous cross-tabulations. These three variables, 
householder’s income, education level and class, are all 
dubbed ’status’ variables in the text. The usage is 
loose but convenient.
TABLE 3.12
Self-identified Class by Religion 
(percentages)
Religion
Class Protestant Catholic Other
Middle: 59 26 15 = 100$ (n=2l4)
Working: 48 43 9 = 100$ (n=106)
(difference between Protestant and Catholics, p < .01,
n=28o).
Catholics are disproportionately numerous amongst 
the self-identified ’working class’.
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TABLE 5 . 1 5
Education by Religion 
(percentages')"
Religion
Education Protestant Catholic Other
Higher: 62 20 18 = 100$ (n=105
Middle: 56 29 15 = 100^ (n=117Lower: 49 40 11 = 100$ (n=126
(difference between Protestant and Catholics, 
p < .02, n=2 9 4 )
Catholics are disproportionately uncommon amongst
the well educated. However, there is no reliable relation 
to be found between householder’s income and religious 
denomination.
TABLE 5 . 1 5
Age by Religion 
(percentages)
Religion .
Age Protestant Catholic Other
Less than 56: 45 58
56 - 5 5 : 61 2756 or older: 64 25
19 = 100^ (n=1 2 5 ) 
12 = 100^ (n=1 5 4) 
15 = 100^ (n=7 5 )
(difference between Protestant and Catholics,
p < .02, n=300)
Catholics are more numerous amongst the young.
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TABLE 3-16
Age by Education 
(percentages)
Age Education
Lower Middle Higher
Less than 36:
36-55:56 or older:
23
36
60
3740
19
40 = 100^ (n=123 
24 = 100^ (n=154 
21 = 10C$ (n=73)
(p <.001, n=350)
The younger generation are very much better 
educated than their elders.
3.4. Conclusion
The brief foregoing summary of some of the 
sociological characteristics of the sample gives some 
evidential bases for the following trends: the
electorate is becoming better educated; the proportion 
of Catholics in the community seems likely to increase, 
and, as the better educated younger generation grow 
older and accumulate status and possessions, the proportion 
of the electorate declaring itself ’middle-class’ will 
rise sharply. The three 'status’ variables, education, 
class identification and householder's income, are 
moderately to strongly related to each other, but in no 
case does the relation approach identity. As we shall 
see, they occasionally exhibit differential relations 
with political opinion.
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The two samples seem adequate peep-holes through 
which to observe the population, judging by the degree 
to which their characteristics approximate to population 
parameters, in so far as these are known. The following 
two Chapters, Four and Five, describe preliminary 
exercises in the identification of ’structures' in 
political opinion and their relation to some psychological 
dispositions, measured by short scales, in the 1965 
Melbourne sample. These are followed by a major exercise 
in the construction of longer dispositional scales on 
the basis of the ’captive’ sample of public servants 
and the voter sample of 1966. This is described in 
Chapter Six. This, with the following Chapters, Seven 
to Nine, forms the major substantive part of this thesis. 
Differences in the structure of political attitudes in 
1965 and 1966 are noted.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN 1963 
4.1. Introduction
This chapter and the following one report findings 
of an exploratory survey of 1963.» which was a precursor 
to the more elaborate one of 1966. In the course of 
analysing the data of the 1963 survey, a number of 
devices were employed which were developed more fully 
in planning the 1966 survey and analysing the data 
therefrom. In addition, the shortcomings of the 1963 
survey indicated ways of carrying out a more satisfactory 
empirical exercise in 1966. These two chapters, 
therefore, deal essentially with work preliminary to 
the main corpus of the research embodied in this thesis, 
which is contained principally in Chapters Six to Nine.
It is not the purpose of this chapter to review 
in extenso theoretical or empirical work on the 
structure of political attitudes. This whole thesis, 
indeed, aims principally at reportage of empirical work 
by the writer in the Australian setting and discussion 
of its implications. This emphasis is based on a
((
consideration of the relative merits of undertaking an 
extended discussion of new empirical work, as against 
a comprehensive review of the literature. The former 
course was chosen. However, here, as elsewhere, 
relevant literature will be selectively touched upon.
Where deep delving in the literature is actually required 
to show the rationale of this research, as in Chapter 
Six, this has been done. In Chapter Five, a lighter 
review seemed appropriate.
A sample of 437 Melbourne voters was surveyed by 
the present writer during the Federal Elections' of 1963«
The survey was sponsored by the Victorian Fabian 
Society, to whom thanks are due for permission to 
report the outcome here. It was conceived, planned and 
directed by the writer.^ The investigation was 
necessarily an exploratory probe. Beneath the spidery 
furrows of the Australian Public Opinion Poll’s (APOP)
ppercentages, the field of public opinion research in 
this country was at this time almost unploughed. The
1
I owe a special debt of gratitude to David Bottomley 
of Nation's Opinion Service, Melbourne, who made technical 
services available free of charge.
2
For an index of these, see M. Goot and J. Ilbery, 
Australian Public Opinion Polls: Index 1941-1968,
Occasional Monograph No. 2, Department of Government and 
Public Administration, University of Sydney, (Sydney, 1969).
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cross-tabulation of political opinion beyond party 
and occupation was a modern wonder which Australian 
political science had seldom employed. Where more 
detailed studies have been undertaken in the time since 
this survey, the findings have often emerged as disparate 
snatches of information, which related to various points 
of interest, but do not disclose much in the way of 
organic structures in political attitudes.^
A general survey of the attitudes of the Australian 
electorate is now being carried out under the auspices 
of the Research School of Social Sciences of the Australian 
National University, under the direction of D. Aitkin 
and M. Kahan. But until the date of the 1963 survey 
reported here, and indeed since, there has been little 
Australian political cartography reported. It therefore 
seemed worthwhile to conduct a survey oriented to the
1
A summary of some work in Australia has been provided 
by D. Aitkin in Politics, 2 (1967) pp. 91”5 - The following 
issue of Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3* is devoted to studies 
of public opinion and political attitudes. The increasing 
sophistication of Australian political science surveys 
is reflected in the work of the Queensland ’school’, 
notably in C.A. Hughes, Images and Issues: The Queensland
State Elections of 1963 and 1966 (Canberra, 1969) esp. 
pp . 926-96; and P. V/. C o 11 ins and J.S. Western, ’Participation 
in Politics: A Preliminary Analysis,' Australian and
New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 5 (19S9") pp. 9&-110.
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discovery of whatever general patterns might exist in 
the material, as well as the illumination of particular 
puzzles. Accordingly, an attempt was made to cover a 
rather wide area in each interview, to extract as much 
information as was practicable in the time available, 
and to make some sort of invasion of the forests of 
possible intercorrelations. The purpose was essentially 
to try to throw up a number of hypotheses, especially 
ones which might impart a general order to the data, 
which could be tested in future more detailed investigations.
The sample and interviewing procedures have been 
described in Chapter Three. The questionnaire (the 
relevant parts of which are to be found in Appendix 1 
to this thesis) included items probing opinions on 
twelve major political questions, views on the relative 
importance of five election issues, the party for which 
the respondents voted in 1961 and the party of their 
choice in 1963* the main reason for the choice in 1963* 
the degree of interest taken in politics and the extent 
of participation in political discussion. The 
interviewers also administered three short dispositional 
scales to each respondent, designed to measure 
authoritarian tendency of the Right, alienation, and 
hostility to minority groups or out-groups.
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Respondents were also asked their occupation, 
marital status, number of children, educational level, 
class identification, and religion and frequency of 
church attendance. Age and sex were estimated by the 
interviewer.
The sample has been shown (in Tables J>.13 J>.2 and 
5.3 of Chapter Three) to be closely representative of 
its parent population in its voting intention, and 
adequately representative of religious and age groups.
It contains roughly equal numbers of men and women. Its 
size makes it of special value in the search for 
systematic correlations, although the relative magnitudes 
of these have to be interpreted with caution.
This chapter will sketch some findings of the 
conventional kind; discuss the results of a ’cluster 
analysis’ of a table of intercorrelations of political 
opinions, which suggested that there may be not one, but 
three dimensions of radicalism in Australian politics; 
examine some sociological correlates of each dimension 
of radicalism and attempt to draw some conclusions as 
to likely future shifts in opinion.
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4.2. Some Findings of the Conventional Kind^
4.2.1. Associations between Vote and Age, Sex, and Occupation
TA3LE 4.1
Vote in 1963 by Age Group 
(Percentages)
LCP ALP DLP Undecided (DK)
Less than 3 6 : 37 38 14 11 = 100$ (n=109
3 6 -5 5 : 43 42 11 4 = 100$ (n=l80Over 5 5 : 49 36 10 5 = 100$ (n-9 8 )
Table 4.1 suggests that the younger and middle-aged
groups differ very little from each other in their voting 
intentions, whilst the older group may be more 
conservative. However, the difference between the older 
and middle-aged groups is not significant.
TABLE 4.2
Vote in 1963 by Sex 
(Percentages)
LCP ALP DLP DK & Other
Men: 4l 46 10 3 = 100$ (n=196)
Women: 42 35 14 9 100$ (n=206)
The well-known tendency of women to be attracted to 
the Parties of respectability and refinement is perhaps 
a little in evidence in Table 4.2, but the main beneficiary
1
By ’conventional’, I mean findings which have emerged 
in the past using well-established techniques of analysis. 
These are mainly those of the APOP. A useful summary of 
APOP data of December 1961 is contained in A.F. Davies 
and S. Encel, (eds.), Australian Society: A Sociological
Introduction (Melbourne, 19?>5 5 at pp. 109-13 •
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of aversion from the A.L.P. may be the D.L.P. However, 
the difference between L.C.P. and A.L.P. voters by sex 
is not significant in this table.
The usual relations between vote and occupational 
status, and vote and self-identified social class were 
obtained. Figures for the former are given in Table 4.3.
TABLE 4.3
Vote in 1963 by Occupational Group (a) (b)
(Percentages)
LCP ALP DLP DK & Other
’White collar' 56
(Professional, 
managerial, small 
business and 
clerical)
25 11 8 = 100$ (n=l66)
’Blue collar' 21
(Skilled, semi­
skilled and 
unskilled manual)
60 13 6 = 100$ (n=l45)
Home Duties, 49
Retired, etc. 36
10 5 = 100$ (n=83)
(a) Voters are here classified by the occupation 
of the head of their household.
(b) The difference between ’blue collar’ and 
’white collar' workers by vote (L.C.P. and A.L.P. 
only) is highly significant (p < .001) .
4.2.2. Identification of the ’Tractable’ Vote
An effort was made to identify the actually or 
potentially ’floating' group of voters, hereafter called
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the ’tractable’ vote. Those who stated that they 
always voted for a particular party were classified 
separately from those who were less fixed in their voting 
habits, that is, those who either
(1) voted for the same party in 1961 and 1963; 
but stated that they did not always do so;
(2) were undecided on their 1963 vote;
(3) actually switched their vote intention from 
1961 to 1963; or
(4) were new voters (mostly under 25).
TABLE 4.4
The Tractable Vote 
(Percentages)
Always LCP Always ALP Always DLP Tractable
28^ 33^ 1% 32$ = 100#
The high proportion of tractable voters shown in 
Table 4.4 probably represents a ’ceiling’ figure, since 
it may include a number who always vote for the same 
party but are loath to admit it to an interviewer (or 
themselves).
The internal structure of the tractable vote is
displayed in Table 4.5.
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TABLE 4.5
Structure of the Tractable Vote 
(Percentages)
Undecided: 21$
New voters: 11$
Those who switched, 1961-1963: 21$
LCP 1961 and 1963, but ’not always’: 23$)
ALP 1961 and 1963.» but ’not always’: 9$) = 38$
DLP 1961 and 1963* but ’not always’: 6$)
Other ’floating’ categories: 9$
= 100$
This crucial group of voters was distinguished so 
that their views on some alternative policies, and on 
the relative importance of a number of election issues, 
could be considered separately from those of fixed 
loyalties.
4.2.3. The Structure of the DLP Vote
The size of the D.L.P. sub-sample is small (n=47), 
and breakdowns within it must therefore be approached 
cautiously. Nevertheless, some of its characteristics 
emerge quite clearly:
79$ of the D.L.P. voters were Church-going Catholics 
and 62$ of them stated that they always vote for 
that party.
The section below on ’opinion leaders’ indicates 
that it is a disproportionately talkative and politically
conscious vote: and the figures above suggest that it
85
contains a higher proportion of young people and of 
women that do the two major parties. It is not drawn 
disproportionately from any particular occupational 
group social class.
On most domestic issues, habitual D.L.P. voters 
were about midway in radicalism between the habitual 
supporters of the A.L.P. and L.C.P.; on some external 
policies, however, they tend to be more radical than 
either (See Table 4.15). They are the only group with a 
majority in favour of relaxation of the White Australia 
Policy, and have the highest proportion in favour of 
increased economic aid to Asian countries.
The propensities of the Catholic vote as a whole 
may also be of some interest. The Catholic sub-sample 
numbered 125, and of these 95 had been to Church during 
the preceding month, outnumbering those of the major 
Protestant denominations who had done so (76). About 
half of the votes of Church-going Catholics went to the 
D.L.P.
TABLE 4.6
Vote of Church-attending Catholics, 1963 
(Percentages)
LCP ALP DLP DK
24 26 42 8 100$
86
4.2.4. The Incidence of Politically Persuasive Talk
Some research on voting behaviour, notably that by 
Lazarsfeld in the United States,-1- has suggested that there 
may be a two-step flow of information and influence, 
in the first place from the mass media to the more 
interested and articulate voters (his so-called 
’opinion leaders’), and secondly from these (mainly 
through casual conversation), to tractable voters among 
the less interested.
Whether or not aggressive political talkers may 
’lead opinion’ in the same way in Australian society 
today is a question to which the data of this survey as 
yet provide no definite answer. It may be that the 
influence of political talk is lower here because our 
society has less grass-roots cohesion than the 
community of ’joiners’ which Lazarsfeld explored in Ohio. 
The two-step flow may have become obsolescent with the 
introduction of TV.
Nevertheless, on the assumption that political talk 
has probably remained at least of marginal significance, 
it seemed worthwhile to adopt Lazarsfeld’s method of 
identifying ’opinion leaders’.
I
P.F. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson and H. Gaudet, The 
People’s Choice, (New York, 1948).
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Interviewees were asked:
'Have you tried to convince anyone of your 
political views recently?'
and
'Has anyone asked your advice on a political 
question recently?'
If the interviewee answered 'yes' to either of these 
questions, he or she was classified, following Lazarsfeld, 
as an opinion leader. The proportion of opinion leaders 
in the major political groupings is shown in Table 4.7.
TABLE 4.7
Proportions of Opinion Leaders by Party Affiliation
(Percentages)
Amongst those always voting LCP: 18%
Amongst those always voting ALP: 38%
Amongst those always voting DLP: 4 5$
Amongst 'tractable' voters: y>%
Its high proportion of opinion leaders may assist
the Labor vote to resist the pressure of the predominantly
anti-Labor mass media.
'Opinion leaders,' defined in this way, were on 
the whole proportionately spread amongst occupational 
groups, but a little more numerous than average amongst 
skilled manual workers, and amongst housewives very 
rare.
4.2.5. The Relative Importance of the Issues: Comparisons
Between Voting Groups
Interviewees were handed a card on which were
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printed five ’election issues’: Foreign and Defence
Policy, education, Housing, Social Services, and 
Unemployment and Economic Policy. Two types of card 
were used, each of which listed the issues in reverse 
order to the other, as an attempt to offset the influence 
of any particular listing order. They were asked:
’in your own personal opinion, which of these 
election issues is of first importance?'
When a response was given, they were then asked which was 
second, third and fourth in importance, the fifth being 
taken to be of least importance. The results are shown 
in Table 4.8. The numerical ranking given to the 
various issues has been averaged for each voting group, 
to indicate how the different groups see them in order 
of importance.
TABLE 4.8
Average Ranking of Election Issues 
Amongst those always voting LCP:
Education
Housing
Foreign Policy 
Unemployment
2.20 (First importance) 
2.74 (Second importance) 
2.99 (Third importance) 
3.37 (Fourth importance)
Social Services 3*64 (Fifth importance)
Amongst those always voting ALP:
Education 
Housing 
Unemployment 
Social Services 
Foreign Policy
2.34
2.472.54
3.46
4.21
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TABLE 4.8 (Cont.)
Amongst those always voting DLP:
Education 
Foreign Policy 
Housing 
Unemployment 
Social Services
2.44
2.87
2.94
3.00
5.78
Amongst ’tractable’ voters:
Education 
Unemployment 
Housing 
Foreign Policy 
Social Services
2.40
2.62
3.093.22
3.74
The notable features here are clearly the consistent 
prominence attributed to ’education’ as an election 
issue, the wide disagreement over the importance of 
foreign policy, the apparent indifference to ’social 
services’ as an issue, and the fairly close agreement 
between ’tractable’ and A.L.P. voters, on the one hand, 
and L.C.P. and D.L.P. voters, on the other. Whatever 
prevented a drift to the A.L.P., it would not seem to 
be opposition to the A.L.P.’s stress on education, 
unemployment and economic policy as election issues. 
4.2.6. The Divisions of Opinion on Twelve Ma.jor Political
In order to avoid the effects of ’agreement tendency’, 
two or more alternative views, instead of a single 
opinion, were presented in each case. The alternatives
Questions
9o
were phrased so as to correspond to the usual conservative 
or radical positions. The questions, and percentages 
agreeing with each alternative, are shown in Table 4.9«
TABLE 4.9
Opinions on Twelve Political Issues (a) (b)
(percentages)
(a) The alternatives labelled ’Radical’ and 
’Conservative’ in the tables which follow are denoted 
by an asterisk. The labelling is necessarily 
arbitrary in some instances, and represents no more 
than a convenient shorthand.
(b) A note on the approximate standard error for 
a random sample (which this is not) of this size
may here be useful. For response splits of the order 
70/90, the sampling error is about 6.5 per cent; 
i.e. the probability that the value estimated will be 
within the range 6.5 per cent above or below the 
sample figure is .95*^
Age Pensions
’Do you think age pensions should be increased,* 81% 
or
should they be kept as they are now, for the
time being ?' Xyf>
Other opinion and Don’t know 6%
100%
1
See L. Kish, Survey Sampling, (New York, 1965) P» 576.
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TABLE 4.9 (Cont.)
Defence Spending
'Do you think Australia should increase its 
spending on defence, * 59/6
or
does Australia spend enough on defence 
already?' 23$
Other opinion and Don't know 18$
100$
Child Endowment
'Do you think child endowment should be 
doubled,* 19$
or
be raised by a smaller amount,* 46$
or
be kept at the present rate?' 24$
Other opinion and Don't know 11$
100$
Education
'Should government spending on education 
remain about the same as it is now, 5$
or
be moderately increased, 32$
or
be greatly increased?'* 58$
Other opinion and Don't know 5$
100$
Public Enterprise
'Should the Commonwealth Government start 
up new business enterprises of its own,* 29$
or
should it keep out of new business ventures?' 45$
Other opinion and Don’t know 26$
100$
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TABLE 4.9 (Cont.)
Nationalization
’Should the government avoid nationalization 
and promote private enterprise, 47$
or
should it nationalize some business 
monopolies?’* 29$
Other opinion and Don't know 24$
Iöö£
Aboriginal Welfare
'On the aborigines: do you think the
government should spend more on their welfare 
and education,* 8^$
or
spend about the same as it does now?’ 9$
Other opinion and Don't know 8$
100$
Economic Aid to Asia
’Australia now gives equipment to Asian 
countries to help them develop. This aid 
amounts to about £5 million a year. Do 
you think this aid should be increased,* 28$
or
kept about the same as it is now?’ 55$
Other opinion and Don’t know 17$
100$
White Australia
’Do y^u think the White Australia policy 
should be kept as it is, 47$
or
should the policy be relaxed to allow greater 
number of Asians to settle in this country?’* 44$
Other opinion and Don't know 9$
100$
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TABLE A.9 (Cont.)
Capital Punishment
’Do you think the death penalty for murder should 
be abolished, * 31%
or
should the death penalty be kept?' 56$
Other opinion and Don’t know 13$
100$
Economic Planning
’Should the government start more detailed 
economic planning,* ^0%
or
should it use only the present controls?’ 24$
Other opinion and Don't know 26$
100$
Capital Gains Tax
’if a man gets income from increases in the 
value of stocks and shares that he owns, 
should such income be left free of tax, 40$
or
should it be taxed?’* 49$
Other opinion and Don’t know 11$
100$
The meaning of the figures above is limited by the 
representativeness of the sample, and also by the fact 
that the ’conservative’ and ’radical’ percentages can 
be influenced by the phrasing of the questions. The 
significance of these divisions will be discussed below,
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after an attempt has been made to uncover some 
structural features of the data through the introduction 
of rather more adventurous statistical techniques than 
have been employed so far.
4.3. A Cluster Analysis: Three Kinds of Radicalism?
The first step taken to clarify the relationships 
between views on the issues set out above was to arrange 
the data in tables to indicate which opinions were more 
closely associated. Views on each issue were conceived 
as scattered along a conservative-radical continuum 
specific to that subject; the questions related to each 
issue may be regarded as providing a cutting-point 
dividing those towards the radical and of the hypothetical 
scale from those more conservative. The fact that each 
continuum is split at a different point and that a 
different set of questions would have produced different 
splits is not material, provided that the data can be 
arranged in such a way that the splits are not extreme. 
(The method of coping with the ’Don't know’ and ’Other 
opinion' categories is set out in Appendix 5 to this 
thesis). Once a two-way split on each issue, representing 
the division of opinion, has been obtained, the data may 
be set out in 2 x 2 tables indicating the strength of the 
relationship between opinions on the different issues.
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For example, the relationship between views on hanging 
and the White Australia policy is displayed in Table 4.10.
TABLE 4.10
Opinions on White Australia and Capital Punishment
(Frequencies)
White Australia
Rad. Cons. Totals
152 Capital
Punishment 294 Cons. ----------
Totals 224 202 = 426 Grand Total
It is evident by inspection that there is some correlation
between opinions on these issues. For this table, the
tetrachoric correlation coefficient is .98, indicating
a moderate positive relationship between radicalism
on the two issues: that is, those radical on one of
these issues tend to be somewhat more radical than
overage on the other.
The assumptions involved in computing the tetrachoric 
coefficient are set out in Appendix 2« A H  tetrachoric 
coefficients displayed in this chapter have been 
estimated by using Davidoff and Goheen’s table'*' and
92 40
132 162
1
A.L. Edwards, Satistical Methods for the Behavioural 
Sciences, (New York, 1955) > p. 5IO, Table X, reprinted 
from M.D. Davidoff and H.W. Goheen, 'A Table for the 
Rapid Determination of the Tetrachoric correlation 
Coefficient,’ Psychometrika, IS (1953)* pp.115-21.
corrected for marginal splits at points away from 
the median by Jenkins' method.^
Table 4.11 sets out the correlation coefficients 
for every possible combination of issues, computed 
from 2 x 2  tables such as the one above.
TABLE A .11 (a)
Intercorrelations between Political Opinions 
(Tetrachoric correlations)
1 (Pensions)
2 (Defence
spending)
3 (Endowment)
4 (Education)
5 (Public
enterprise)
6 (Nationaliz­
ation)
7 (Aboriginal
welfare)
3 (Economic aid 
to Asia)
9 (White
Australia)
10 (Death
penalty)
11 (Economic
planning)
12 (Capital
gains tax)
(a) For a sample of 400 or more, correlation coefficients of .10 
or higher are significant at the .05 level of confidence; those of 
.13 or higher at the .01 level of confidence. The former are marked 
by one asterisk; the latter by two.
W.L. Jenkins, 'An Improved Method for Tetrachoric r, 
Psychometrika, 20 (1955) PP• 255 “'3•
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We are now in a position to consider whether 
there^ are groups or clusters of issues which go together, 
or more precisely, which are significantly more closely 
associated with each other than with issues outside the 
cluster. This can be done by means of a formal 
statistical treatment of the table of correlations known 
as a 'cluster analysis'.
The method used has been that suggested by Fruchter.^ 
This allows little scope for subjective judgement or 
discretion, and requires that in order to be admitted to 
a cluster, an item (or 'issue') must have substantially 
higher correlations with the items already in it than 
with other items outside it; and that in the outcome, 
the average intercorrelation between items within a cluster 
must be significantly higher than the average correlation 
between items in the cluster and those outside.
It may be useful to dwell on the meaning of a 'cluster' 
before proceeding to the results of the analysis. The 
notion may be illustrated from some popular views of the 
dimensions of radicalism. It is commonly supposed that 
opinions on, say, the White Australia policy, on the one 
hand, and increases in child endowment, on the other, are
_ _
B. Fruchter, Introduction to Factor Analysis, (New 
York, 1954) pp.'12-17.
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not closely associated; that is, given a person's views 
on the White Australia policy, we would be unable to predict 
with any confidence whether or not he is likely to be 
radical or conservative about endowment« That this 
supposition is well founded is indicated by the table 
of correlations above. There is no discoverable relation 
between opinions on these two issues; they vary 
independently of each other. But one might very well 
suppose that views on endowment might be systematically 
connected with views on age pensions; that is, that 
persons radical on the one issue may be more radical 
than average on the other. This is also shown to be the 
case. It is also true that opinions in favour of 
modification of the White Australia policy are connected 
with views on increased aid to Asian countries.
Now these two groups of issues, White Australia - 
economic aid and pensions-endowment, will, on these 
suppositions, represent 'clusters’ in the sense we have 
been using the term. There is a closer relationship 
between the issues within each cluster than obtains 
between those within the cluster and the issues outside.
We might speak of a 'social service radicalism’ and an 
'Asian-oriented radicalism’, in describing this 
situation, to indicate that there are two sorts of
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radicalism involved. We need not mean by this that the 
two types of radicalism are totally unrelated; merely 
that one finds empirically that relations between the 
two troups of issues are much looser than those within 
each group.
My expectations as to the sort of clusters which 
would emerge from the data reflected one set of 
stereotypes about the groupings of political issues in 
Western societies. I thought that opinions on hanging,
White Australia and economic aid might intercorrelate 
relatively closely and form a cluster representing a 
’conscience1 radicalism, and that the remainder, with the 
exception of opinions on defence, might cohere to represent 
a general socio-economic radicalism, only loosely related 
to the first cluster.
These expectations were not fulfilled. Instead, 
three distinct clusters were defined by the analysis.
They are constituted as follows:
Cluster 1. Opinions on age pensions, child endowment, 
aboriginal welfare, nationalization, and 
Commonwealth business enterprise.
The B-coefficient (or ’coefficient of belonging’),
which gives the ratio of the average
intercorrelation of the variables in a cluster
to their average correlation with variables
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not included in the cluster) for this 
cluster = 3.^8. (The minimum significant 
value for a B-coefficient has been set1 at 
1.30.) The mean of intercorrelations in the 
cluster = .30.
For reasons set out below, the continuum
represented by this cluster is labelled the
* Established 1 radicalism-conservatism.
Cluster 2. Opinions on economic aid to Asian countries, 
the White Australia policy and the death 
penalty.
B-coefficient = 3*7^*
Mean of intercorrelations in the cluster = .37
The continuum this represents has been labelled
’Conscience’ radicalism-conservatism.
Cluster 3* Opinions on defence spending, expenditure on 
education, economic planning and a capital 
gains tax.
B-coefficient = 2.5O.
Mean of intercorrelations in the cluster = .21. 
The continuum represented here has been labelled 
the ’New' radicalism-conservatism.
This means, for example, that opinions in favour of 
increased defence spending, increased expenditure on 
education, the introduction of a capital gains tax and
By Fruchter, op . -cit., pp. 12-17.
1
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economic planning tend to go together; that opinions 
against these measures are also related; and that 
opinions on this group of issues are substantially more 
closely related to each other than they are to opinions 
on other issues.
The mean of the intercorrelations of items in Cluster 
1 with those in Cluster 2 is .10; of those in Cluster 1 
with those in Cluster .08; of those in Cluster 2 
with those in Cluster , .10. Statistical significance
is achieved at .10. Thus in two cases out of three, 
the three kinds of radicalism are shown to be related to 
a degree which only just reaches statistical significance.
In view of the exploratory nature of this investigation, 
and the novelty of some of the methods employed, it may be 
as well at this point to note some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the statistical basis of the three 
clusters.
Given the relative magnitudes of the correlations 
in Table 4.11, this three-cluster resolution is clearly 
unavoidable. The moderately large size of the sample and 
the low threshold of statistical significance enable low 
but systematic correlations to be identified unequivocably. 
But the relative magnitudes of the correlations here 
depend in large part on the validity of the procedures
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set out and discussed in Appendix 3 for dichotomising 
opinion on each variable. Whilst these procedures appear 
the most readily defensible, there are other possible 
means of doing so. A violent test of the stability of 
this cluster resolution is to reverse these procedures 
in every case, and to adopt the least plausible means of 
dichotomising opinion on each variable. When this is 
done, the chief effects are the reduction of the division 
between the 'Established* and the 'New' radicalisms, and 
the reduction of the internal consistency of the latter.
A replicatory study would have been required to 
clarify these relations with certainty. However, the 
correlations set out in Table 4.11 represent the best 
obtainable data on the relationships betv/een these issues, 
and lead directly to the three-cluster hypothesis which 
has been adopted.
With these caveats in mind, we may now take a closer 
look at the implications of the pattern of correlations, 
and enter some speculation on the political grounds of 
the cohesiveness of each cluster.
It will be noted that all the significant correlations 
(those at or above .10) are moderate to low. Clearly 
no comprehensive ideologies govern opinions on political 
issues in this sample. In view of the low correlations 
exhibited, it is more appropriate to speak of sentiments 
influencing opinion.
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A diagrammatic representation of the relations 
within and between the three clusters can be derived 
as follows. Let us take initially the two continua or 
dimensions represented by the ’Established’ radicalism 
(Re) and ’Conscience’ radicalism (Rc). The two continua, 
Re and Rc, may be regarded as defining the axes of a 
two-dimensional space, and arbitrarily represented as 
orthogonal (at right angles) to each other. Now the 
relation of any particular item to the axis Re will be 
indicated by its mean intercorrelation with items in the 
cluster defining Re, except for items within the cluster 
Re, for which the average correlations with the other 
items in it will serve this purpose. The relation of each 
item to the axes Rc and Rn may be similarly obtained.
It should be borne in mind that the correlations 
on which the diagrams are based are approximate and 
subject to sampling error. For example, for a sample of 
this size, the 95 per cent confidence limits of a 
correlation of .40 are .48 to .32; and of a correlation 
of .20, are .29 to .11. The account of the implications 
of each diagram is meant to clarify the meaning of the 
sample statistics only.
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FIGURE 4.1
Relationships within and between Clusters Rp and RP 
(the !Established 1 radicalism and 1 Consciencef radicalism)
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CONSCIENCE RADICALISM
Figure 4.1 displays the relationship between 
issues of the ’Established' radicalism and 'Conscience' 
radicalism.
The adjacent point on the Rc axis defines the 
closeness of the relation of an issue to 'Conscience' 
radicalism. Thus a radical opinion on the White Australia 
policy is the most closely related to this cluster,
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Hanging is a little less closely related to it, but the 
difference is slight. Adjacent points on the Re axis 
indicate the closeness of relation to ’Established’ 
radicalism. Here views on child endowment are the 
most closely related, and aboriginal welfare least, 
although once more the difference is not great.
The correlations of the 'Conscience' radicalism 
issues with others in the ’Conscience’ radicalism cluster 
range from .34 to .40, whilst the correlations of the 
’Established’ radicalism issues with others in the 
’Established’ radicalism cluster range from .27 to .57*
The ’Established radicalism cluster is thus a little less 
internally cohesive than the ’Conscience’ radicalism cluster.
Some connections between the clusters are evident. 
Amongst the issues of ’Established' radicalism, welfare 
spending on aborigines has the closest relation (about .22) 
with ’Conscience’ radicalism. However, its place in the 
’Established’ radicalism cluster is secured by its higher 
average intercorrelation with those issues (about .27).
Opinions in favour of nationalization and new government 
business enterprises also display a relation with the 
other type of radicalism, but this barely achieves 
statistical significance. The same is true of radical 
views on hanging and White Australia. The fact that all
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issues lie within the two axes, in the one quadrant, 
indicates a consistent, but not here strong, relation 
between the two radicalisms.
This discussion has been entered in terms of 
radicalism, for the sake of semantic and conceptual 
convenience. However, the correlations imply that 
conservative opinions are also related in precisely the 
same way. Opposition to a change in the White Australia 
policy is also most closely associated with opposition to 
’Conscience’ radicalism.
FIGURE 4.2
Relationships within and between Clusters Rn and R0 
(The 'New’ radicalism and ’Conscience' radicalism)
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Figure 4.2 exhibits the relationship between the 
’New* radicalism and 'Conscience1 radicalism. The issue 
most closely related to 'New' radicalism is education 
spending; the least closely related to 'New' radicalism 
is defence. Education spending has also a marked 
relation (about .25) to 'Conscience' radicalism, but is 
retained in the 'New' radicalism cluster because of its 
higher correlation there (.29). Like aboriginal welfare, 
it is something of a 'bridge' issue. Views on planning, 
a capital gains tax and economic aid to Asian countries 
also cross-relate significantly to the other dimension 
of radicalism.
The mean correlations of 'New' radicalism issues 
with the 'New' radicalism cluster range from .15 to 
.29* and it is less internally cohesive than 'Conscience' 
radicalism or 'Established' radicalism.
Defence spending falls outside the quadrant and is 
thus negatively related to 'Conscience' radicalism, although 
not to a degree which achieves statistical significance.
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FIGURE 4.3
Relationships within and between Clusters Rn and RP 
(ehe 1 New1 radicalism and the rEstablished1 radicalism)
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ESTABLISHED RADICALISM
Figure 4.3 displays the relationship between ’New* 
radicalism and 'Established' radicalism. Cross-relationships 
here are less marked than in either of the two preceding 
Figures. Only views on aboriginal welfare spending* 
planning and education are significantly related to both 
clusters.
Defence spending again falls outside the quadrant*
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and has a slight non-significant relation with the 
’Established’ radicalism.
Inspection of the three Figures indicates that 
economic planning, education spending and aboriginal 
welfare spending are the only issues which significantly 
relate to all three dimensions of radicalism.
* * * * *
The cluster labelled ’Established’ radicalism- 
conservatism contains issues of long standing: the
extension of social services and public ownership. A 
radical position here is oriented towards income 
redistribution and some movement towards a collectivist 
society, objectives which have a traditional appeal for 
socialists. The expansion of social services seems now 
regarded by all social and political groups as desirable, 
within certain limits, (see Tables 4.9 and 4.15) but of 
relatively little importance (see Table 4.8). The 
extension of public ownership is on the whole unpopular.
The 'New' radicalism-conservatism cluster, by 
contrast, contains a number of issues - defence commitments, 
economic planning and education - which have come into 
prominence in the post-war period, almost, one might say, 
in the late 1950s. The remaining issue, the introduction
no
of a capital gains tax, has yet to be seriously raised 
in Australian politics.
After those ’undecided' are distributed, there are 
radical majorities, ranging from 55 per cent to 75 per cent 
on these four issues.
The emphasis on education rather than social 
security suggests that it may be associated with rather 
more individualistic values than those of the 'Established1 
radicalism. The radical orientation here is not to a 
collectivist arrangement but to the insistence on a more 
rational order of priorities in the economy and in 
society to be achieved through political action. In short, 
it looks surprisingly like the objective correlative, in 
an Australian context, of the views of contemporary 
British socialists of the Right. It is rather as if the 
electorate had Crosland’s 'Future of the Left'^ up its 
sleeve. But as the discussion below suggests, it is 
probably more superficial.
The 'New’ radicalism, as it emerged in this survey, 
seemed to represent the outcome of a sort of prudential 
review of the problems of an affluent capitalist society 
against social criteria which do not question the
1 ‘
Cf. C.A.R. Crosland, Future of the Left, Encounter 
Pamphlet No. 4, March i960; and C.A.R. Crosland, The 
Conservative Enemy, (London, 1962).
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fundamentals of that society, but on the contrary, are 
widely accepted within it, even perhaps generated by it. 
It seeks only to rationalize this social system, and to 
make it more self-consistent.
Since this kind of radicalism manifests a concern 
over a perceived imbalance in social priorities, and 
deficiencies in governmental performance, it must be 
more dependent than the ’Established1 radicalism on 
political circumstances as they change from time to 
time. When this survey was conducted, the memory of the 
Liberal and Country Party government’s miscalculation in 
monetary policy (the mismanaged ’credit squeeze’ of 
1960-61) was still fresh in respondents’ minds. It 
very likely influenced replies to the question about 
‘economic planning’, which might have been simplistically 
understood as ’management1. ’Defence neglect* and a 
decline in facilities for secondary education were much 
in the news. The ’New' radicalism is perhaps best 
interpreted as a wave of dissatisfaction generated by 
governmental lapses in competence, and not as a 
principled and self-sustaining political orientation.
In general, the proportion radical on these issues might 
be expected to fluctuate with the need for remedy.
The ’New’ radicalism is, as one might expect,
1X2
particularly popular amongst the post-war generation 
(See Table 4.12). It represents the impact of quite a 
different set of social conditions from those which 
obtained when the issues of the ’Established’ radicalism 
were first exposed to public debate. The economic crisis 
of the inter-war period, with its characteristically 
low level of technological innovation and climate of 
social despair, pointed up the necessity for adequate 
social services, and suggested, to some, the desirability 
of a fundamental change to a collectivist society, and 
public ownership of the means of production.
In short, the ’Established1 radicalism issues are 
those of the climate of pre-war pessimism; the ’New' 
radicalism issues are those of the climate of post-war 
optimism.
The cluster labelled ’Conscience’ radicalism-conservatism 
represents issues on which intellectuals commonly take a 
radical stance, accompanied by rather less than a 
conscientious majority of the electorate. The radical 
view had still to make up a good deal of ground on two 
out of three of these issues, whilst a roughly even split 
remained on White Australia.
This dimension of radicalism seems to represent a 
concern for out-groups; the objects of it are Asians
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presently outside the Australian national system, and 
criminals whose lives may be taken by the state.
Radicalism here essentially will rely on imaginative 
empathy. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that 
opinions on this cluster of issues have a psychological 
basis; authoritarian personality structure and racial 
prejudice, as we shall see in Chapter Five, have independent 
negative relations with radicalism on all three issues. 
Social despair also has a part to play through its 
positive relation with prejudice.
4.4. The Prospects for the ’Established ’ and the ’New*
Radicalism
Having briefly examined the nature of the three 
dimensions of political opinion suggested by the data, 
we may now speculate on the future prospects of the two 
kinds of socio-economic radicalism that have been 
identified. The most interesting question here is what 
movements in opinion are likely to take place even if the 
relative strength and stance of the major political parties 
remains more or less unchanged; that is, what relatively 
independent shifts in opinion may be expected in the 
electorate. This will lead to a consideration of the 
relative attractiveness of the ‘Established’ and the 
’New’ radicalism as electoral propositions. The discussion
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will rely heavily on the evidence on the sociological 
correlates of opinions on the various issues set out 
in Tables 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14, set out at the end of 
this chapter.
The outstanding feature of the sociological relations 
of the 'Established’ radicalism is the negative correlation 
with social class, the well-known tendency of the middle 
class to be less radical than the working class on most 
of these issues. The differences are significant on 
both issues related to government economic enterprise, 
where even the working class group has conservative 
majorities when 'Don't knows' are distributed; and also 
on pensions, although here the correlation arises only 
because the middle class, whilst radical in the majority, 
is less enthusiastic than the working class about pension 
increases. Increases in expenditure on aboriginal welfare 
also command general support despite the weak negative 
class correlation. Of all the issues in the cluster, 
only endowment escapes an association with social class.
None of these issues exhibits a significant over-all 
correlation of any kind with educational level.
Opinions on most items in the cluster correlate 
positively with youth, i.e. young people tend to be more 
radical than older people, even, rather surprisingly, on
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pension increases. The question arises as to whether 
the differences here are ones specific to the process 
of ageing and its social correlates, or whether they 
represent a division between generations: a change in
the way youth perceives these issues, which will persist 
even as the younger generation grows older.
The former view is better supported. There is 
independent evidence of a positive correlation between 
increasing age and middle class identification.'*' The 
’Established’ radicalism, which is explicitly socialist, 
entails not merely adjustment, but changes of some 
magnitude in the socio-economic system. The opposition 
of older age groups may be founded in even a modest stake 
in the established order. The radicalism of youth is 
therefore likely to be dissipated by the accumulation of 
status and possessions. Moreover, it can be argued that 
as clerical and professional categories annexe a growing
pproportion of the work force and as the tide of economic 
prosperity rises, increasing middle-class identification 
will reinforce hostility to government enterprise, and
1 ‘
Cf. APOP iata cited in A.F. Davies and S. Encel, (eds.) 
Australian Society, (Melbourne, 1965) at p. 112.
2
A comparative analysis of the census data of 19^7 and 
1961 is to be found in a publication of the Rural Bank 
of New South Wales, Trends, 1964, Vol. 6, No. 3»
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perhaps sap the present strength of radical opinion on 
social services. Child endowment would be exceptional to 
such a trend, because of the absence of a class 
correlation with opinion on this issue. In this case, 
the high correlation of radicalism with youth may perhaps 
inflate support for it as time goes by.
On the whole, there is thus no likelihood of general 
views on this cluster of issues becoming more radical, 
unless more energetic and effective steps are taken by 
opinion-forming agencies to effect a fundamental change 
in the position. There is the further point that even 
where radical policies of this kind enjoy the support of 
a majority of tractable voters, as in the case of 
expansion of social services, they are seen to be low 
in importance as election issues by all political groups 
in the electorate (see Table 4.8). They were, 
incidentally, rated lower by middle-class than by working 
voters, and lower by youth than by age. Given the 
occupation trends mentioned above, and the likelihood 
that the educational level of the electorate will slowly 
rise, they will probably recede in significance. Thus 
while it may be argued that the parties can and should 
take a radical position on social services, to do so in 
these terms will not: improve a party's electoral strength. 
A more dramatic presentation of the problem of poverty
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as a general issue may attract some sense of urgency 
and enable publicists to draw on the resources of 
'Conscience' radicalism. But on the whole, the prospects 
for radicalism on the issues of the 'Established' 
radicalism are not good.
The issues of the 'New' radicalism cluster are a 
different proposition. There are no significant class 
differences here; if anything, the middle-class is 
slightly more radical. On three of the four issues, 
education, planning and a capital gains tax, the sample 
shows a marked relationship between radicalism and youth, 
highly significant in the case of education, and 
approaching significance on planning. The absence of 
significant class correlations with this cluster entails 
an important conclusion: the radicalism of youth will
not here be defeated by increasing middle-class identification. 
Here radicalism is of recent origin and connotes a desire 
for adjustment, not fundamental change. The age 
correlation probably has a different meaning to that 
observed in the case of 'Established* radicalism. What 
we have in this case seems to be a cleavage in the way 
the generations perceive the issues, where the radicalism 
of youth represents a change in attitudes which will persist 
even as age increases.
There is also a positive correlation between
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radicalism and educational level on all four issues, 
significant in the case of planning and a capital gains 
tax, and approaching significance for education.
It follows from the associations we have noted that 
as the present younger generation grows older, and as the 
educational level of the electorate increases, the 
proportion of radicals on these issues may well rise, 
and in the case of education rise sharply.
The data also present evidence that those who are 
radical on some issues in this cluster tend to rate them 
more important than do those who are conservative. This 
trend is to be observed in the case of education, 
defence spending and foreign policy. A further conclusion 
follows from this. Not only will the proportion radical 
on these issues rise, but the proportion rating them 
important will also rise. This view is supported by the 
following tendencies exhibited in the data: young people
rate education more important than do older people, and 
the more educated and the middle-class rate education 
and foreign policy higher in important than do the less 
educated and the working class.
In sum, the issues of the ?News radicalism appeared 
to have the following attractions as an electoral proposition 
(i) A majority of 'tractable’ voters were radical, 
when 'Don't knows' are distributed, on every
issue in the cluster.
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(ii) These majorities seemed likely to increase.
(iii) One of the issues which it comprehends, 
education, was rated as being of most importance 
by all political groups, and it and the other 
issues seemed likely to increase in importance 
in the minds of the electorate.
(iv) Those radical on education and defence spending 
were also willing to embrace proposals which 
might augment the revenue available to pay for 
expansion in these fields, namely a capital 
gains tax and economic planning.
We may thus conclude that the issues of the 'New' 
radicalism may come increasingly into prominence in 
Australian political discourse, and that both the 
electorate and the political parties will give it greater 
attention. However, as the foregoing discussion indicates, 
the kinds of dissatisfactions it represents are 
susceptible to political remedy. Better governmental 
performance can defeat the ‘New' radicalism from time to 
time, but efficient performance must be sustained if it is 
to prevent its recrudescence.
4.5. The Prospects for ’Conscience1 Radicalism
The future prospects for 'Conscience' radicalism 
seem moderately good, although not as promising as for 
the ’New’ radicalism. The sample exhibits some correlation
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with youth for all three issues, although the differences 
are weak and nowhere approaching significance. The same 
holds for its association with social class: the
middle class sample is in every case slightly more 
radical than the working class, but the differences are 
too small for confident generalization. The overall 
positive correlations with education are significant 
only for economic aid, although the differences between 
extreme groups (at primary and university level) are 
significant for capital punishment and White Australia also.
Given the sociological trends mentioned in the 
preceding section, these associations taken together 
suggest that the radical view on White Australia will 
slowly gather strength, and the conservative majorities 
on capital punishment and economic aid to Asia will 
gradually be eroded.
4.6. To Conclude
A cluster analysis of responses to twelve political 
opinion items elicited by this survey had yielded three 
clusters, which seemed to represent three dimensions of 
radicalism-conservatism. The first related to opinions 
on social services and public ownership, and was 
labelled the 'Established' radicalism; the second to 
opinions on increased education and defence spending, 
and the introduction of a capital gains tax and economic
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planning, the 'New* radicalism; and the third to 
opinions on increased economic aid to Asia, modification 
of the White Australia Policy, and the abolition of 
capital punishment, ’Conscience’ radicalism.
Opinions within each cluster of political issues 
had a moderately close relationship: it was possible
to predict, for example, that respondents with radical 
views on aid to Asia would contain a disproportionately 
high number in favour of the abolition of the death 
penalty. But links between the clusters were far more 
tenuous: confident predictions could seldom be made from
opinions within one cluster to opinions within another.
For each group of issues, a basic predictive model 
has been developed, based on two assumptions: first,
that the proportion of the educated and those with middle 
class identification will increase in the electorate, 
as a result of rising prosperity; and second, that the 
relation of each of these sociological variables with 
radical opinion will remain constant. The relations of 
the two socio-economic dimensions of radicalism with 
education and class identification indicate a positive 
prognosis for the ’New’ radicalism, but a negative one 
for the ’Established’ radicalism. Each has a positive 
association with youth, which, however, will probably 
assist only the ’New' radicalism. The sociological
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relations of 'Conscience' radicalism are weak, and it 
seems more useful to think in terms of psychological 
influences and political leadership in making predictions here.
The clarification of the relations between the 
issues of the 'New' and ’Established' radicalisms, 
obviously the area where the conclusions based on the data 
of this preliminary study have been the most hazardous, 
would have required a replicatory survey with the 
following desiderata:
(i) The elimination of 'Other opinion’ as a possible 
response.
(ii) The minimisation of 'undecided' responses 
through the employment of a 'pressure-to-choose’, 
if not ’forced’choice’ format.
(iii) The rephrasing of a question about economic 
planning, with clear reference to control of 
non-governmental business enterprise.
(iv) The inclusion of questions on a wider range of 
political issues.
Whilst no replicatory survey was possible at the 
time, these lessons were applied in the 1966 survey, 
whose findings are discussed in Chapter Six to Nine.
We turn now to a discussion which touches on the relation 
of psychological dispositions to political attitudes, and 
data from the 1963 survey which shed a forward light 
on these in the Australian urban context of the time.
TABLE 4 . 1 2
Political Opinions by Age (a) (b) (c) (d)
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ISSUES IN 'ESTABLISHED 
RADICALISM* CLUSTER
Pensions
Rad, Cons. D.K.
Younger: 88 
Older: 79
9 3=100$
is 3=100$
(p < .05)
Endowment
Rad. Cons. D.K.
Younger: 8l Older: 54
15 4=100$
36 10=100$
(p <.001)
Aborigines
Rad. C 011s. D.K.
Younger: 86 
Older: 85
9 5=100$
11 6=100$
(p is n.s.)
CommonwealthEnterprise
Rad. Cons. ^D.K.
Younger: 51  
Older: 28
42 27=100$
49 25=100$
(p is n.s.)
Nationalization
Rad. Cons. D.K.
45 20=100$
54 20=100$
(p <.10, n.s.)
ISSUES IN 'NEW RADICALISM'
Rad.
CLUSTER
Defence 
Cons. D.K.
59 56 15=100$61 25 16=100$
Rad.
(p is n.s.)
Education 
Cons. D.K.
71 26 3=100$
46 52 2=100$
Rad.
(p <.001)
Planning 
Cons. D.K.
55 25 22=100$
44 27 29=100$
(p < .10, n .s .)
Rad.
Capital Tax 
Cons. D.K.
54 40 6=100$
46 45 11=100$
(p is n.s. )
Younger: 55 
Older: 26
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Younger: 
Older:
Younger: 
Older:
Younger: 
Older:
TABLE 4.12 (Cont.)
ISSUES IN 'CONSCIENCE 
RADICALISM* CLUSTER
Econ. Aid
Rad. Cons. D.K.
31 59 10=100$
29 60 11=100$
(p is n.s .)
White Australia
Rad. Cons. D.K.
48 46 6=100$
42 49 9=100$
(p is n.s .)
Hanging
Rad. Cons. D.K.
33 57 10=100$28 58 lk=100%
(p is n.s
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Notes to Table 4.12
(a) The statistical significance of differences related 
to age, education, and self-identified social class has 
been determined by the chi-square test. This was not 
performed on the tables of percentages shown, but on two 
by two frequency tables from which the categories ’Don’t 
know’ and ’Other opinion’ were in every case excluded.
The result of each test on the frequency tables has been 
entered beneath the percentage tables as a guide to the 
magnitude of the differences shown; the probability 
values are for random samples.
(b) Subjects responding 'Other opinion’ and those with no 
recorded response on any particular issue have been 
excluded from the sample for that issue. (These are in no 
case more than 8 per cent of the total in Tables 4.12 to 
4.15.) The composition of the samples is thus not identical.
(c) Here, as in the following tables on class, education, 
and Party affiliation, cases with data missing on the 
background variable for each table have been removed from 
that table.
(d) As in Tables 4.13 and 4.14, the sample has been split
as nearly as possible to the median of the background variable. 
Here, ’older’ means 46 or more; ’younger’, less than 46.
(e) Absolute numbers in the samples: less than 46, 197-214;
46 or more, 187-196.
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TABLE 4 . 1 5
Political Opinions by Self-identified Social Class (a)
ISSUES IN ’ESTABLISHED ISSUES IN ’NEW RADICALISM'
RADICALISM’ CLUSTER CLUSTER
Class Pensions Defence
Rad. Cons. D.K. Rad. Cons. D.K.
Middle: 74 23 3=100# 66 22 12=100#
Working: 8 9 8 3=100# 6l 24 15=100#
(p <.001) (p is n.s.)
Endowment Education
Rad. Cons. D.K. Rad. Cons. D.K.
Middle: 70 27 3=100# 58 4 0 2=100#
Working: 72 25 3=100# 64 34 2=100#
(p is n.s.) (p is n.s.)
Aborigines Planning
Rad. Cons. D.K. Rad. Cons. D.K.
Middle: 81 12 7=100# 53 28 19=100#Working: 88 7 5=100# 50 22 28=100#
(p• .10, n.s .) (p is n.s.)
Commonwealth Capital Tax
Enterprise
Rad. Cons. D.K. Rad. Cons. D.K.
Middle: 25 55 20=100# 52 40 8=100#Working:: 37 39 2 4=100# 50 4 2 8=100#
(p < .01) (p is n.s.)
Nationalization
Rad. Cons. D.K.
Middle: 27 56 17=100#Working: 35 42 25=100#
(p <.0 5 )
TABLE 4.13 (Cont.)
ISSUES IN 'CONSCIENCE 
RADICALISM' CLUSTER
Class Econ;_Aid
Rad. Cons. D.K.
Middle: 32 57 11=100#
Working: 27 o4 9-100#
(p is n.s.)
White Australia
Rad. Cons. D.K.
Middle: 47 46 7=100$Working: 42 51 7=100$
(p is n.s .)
Hanging
Rad. Cons. D.K.
Middle: 31 57 12=100#Working: 30 57 13=100#
(p is n.s.)
(a) See notes to Table 4.12.
(b) Absolute numbers in the samples: middle
class, 163-1ÖO; working class, 192-202.
TABLE 4 .1 4
Political Opinions by Education (a) (b) (c)
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ISSUES IN 'ESTABLISHED 
RADICALISM' CLUSTER
Education Pensions
R ad. Cons. D.K.
Higher: 80 16 4=100#
Lower: 87 12 1=100#
(p is n. S . )
Endowment
R a d . Cons. D.K.
Higher: 73 22 5=100#
Lower: 66 29 5=100$
(p is n. s.)
Aborigines
R ad. Cons. D.K.
Higher: 82 12 5=100$
Lower: 83 12 5=100$
(p is n. s.)
Commonwealth
Enterprise
Rad. Cons. D.K.
Higher: 30 50 20=100#
Lower: 30 42 28=100#
(p is n. S . )
Nationalization
Rad. Cons. D.K.
Higher: 31 5b 13=100#
Lower: 31 42 27=100$
(p is n.,s.)
ISSUES IN 'NEW RADICALISM' 
CLUSTER
Defence
Rad. Cons. D.K.
66 22 12=100#
56 25 19=100#
(p is n.s.)
Education
Rad. Cons D.K.
65 33 2=100$
54 43 3=100#
(p <. 10, n.s.)
Planning
Rad. Cons D.K.
57 22 21=100#
43 28 29=100#
(P -c .05)
Capital Tax
Rad. Cons D.K.
59 34 7=100$
40 50 10=100#
(p < .001)
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TABLE 4.13 (Cont.)
ISSUES IN 'CONSCIENCE 
RADICALISM’ CLUSTER
Education Econ. Aid
Rad. Cons. D.K.
Higher: 36 56 8=100#
Lower: 24 64 12=100#
(p < .0 2)
White Australia
Rad. Cons. D.K.
Higher: 48 46 6=100#
Lower: 40 51 9=100#
(p is n,.s.)
Hanging
Rad. Cons. D.K.
Higher: 33 57 10=100#
Lower: 29 56 15=100#
(p is n.s.)
(a) See notes to Table 4.12.
(b) Here ’Higher’ means Intermediate Certificate 
(taken at about age 15); ’Lower’, any lesser 
qualification.
(c) Absolute numbers in the samples: Intermediate
or higher, 207-225; less than Intermediate,
188-203.
130TABLE 4 . 1 5
Political Opinions by Party Affiliation (a) (b) (c) (d)
ISSUES IN ’ESTABLISHED ISSUES IN 'NEW RADICALISM
RADICALISM' CLUSTER CLUSTER
Pensions Defence
Rad. Cons, D.K. Rad. Cens. D.K.
LCP: 72 23 5=100$ 60 22 18=100$ALP: 97 2 1=100$ 60 27 13=10056DLP: 82 18 0=100$ 63 20 17=100#Tractable: 77 18 5=100$ 60 21 19=10056
(p < .001) (p is n.s • )
Endowment Education
Rad. Cons. D.K. Rad . Cons. D.K.
LCP 55 58 9=100$ 45 51 4=100$ALP 79 18 3=100$ 75 26 1=100$DLP 71 25 4=100$ 56 44 0=100$Tractable: 75 21 4=100$ 65 54 3=ioo$
(p <.001) (p <.001)
Aborigines Planning
Rad. Cons . D.K. Rad . Cons. D.K.
LCP 75 16 9=100$ 42 28 30=100$ALP 95 5 2=100$ 59 19 22=100$DLP 97 0 3=100$ 55 51 3 4=100$Tractable: 79 15 8=100$ 51 24 25=100$
(p <.01) (p <- 0 5 )
Commonwealth Capital Tax
Enterprise
Rad . Cons. D.K. Rad. Cons. D.K.
LCP 20 60 20=100$ 45 48 9=100$ALP 45 54 23=100$ 56 56 8=100$DLP 22 59 39=100$ 41 55 4=100$Tractable: 26 45 29-100$ 49 42 9=100$
(p <.001) (p <.05)
Nationalization
Rad Cons . D.K.
LCP : 15 68 17=100$ALP : 47 55 20=100$DLP 51 52 17=10056Tractable: 29 47 2 4=100$
(p < .001)
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TABLE 4.15 (Cont.)
ISSUES IN ’CONSCIENCE 
RADICALISM’ CLUSTER
Econ. Aid •
Rad. Cons. D.K.
LCP: 29 57 14=100$ALP: 28 66 6=100$DLP: 48 48 4=100$Tractable: 30 57 13=100$
(p is n.s. )
White Australia
Rad. Cons. D.K.
LCP: 40 49 11=100$ALP: 42 53 5=100$DLP: 57 30 13=100$Tractable: 47 46 7=100$(p is n.s 
Hanging
.)
Rad. Cons. D.K.
LCP: 21 67 12=100$ALP: 36 55 9=100$DLP: 33 57 10=100$Tractable: 30 54
(p <.02)
16=100$
(a) Voters classified ’LCP’, ’ALP’ and ’DLP’ are 
those who ’always’ vote for those parties.
(b) Voters with ’Other opinion’ are excluded.
(c) The probabilities below each cross-tabulation 
relate to the significance of the difference between 
LCP and ALP voters only.
(d) Absolute numbers in the samples: always LCP,
105-3.12; always ALP, 123-131; always DLP, 27-30; 
tractable, 114-124.
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CHAPTER FIVE
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATION OF DISPOSITIONS 
' TO POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN 1053
5.1. Purpose and Method
The purpose of this investigation was to test the 
hypothesis that some psychological factors, such as 
authoritarian personality orientation, may be important 
in influencing political attitudes and decision-making.
This suggestion obviously could not apply equally 
to all kinds of political decisions. In the case of 
domestic economic policy, for example, the movements of the 
political actors may be chiefly related to the kinds of 
class or group pressures to which they are subject; there 
may be no need at all to refer to the peculiarities of 
individual functioning in explaining the political process. 
However, special studies of the attitudes of groups and 
individuals may have particular point in explaining 
decisions on issues of foreign policy, and such domestic 
matters as capital punishment or migrant assimilation, 
because attitudes on these questions cannot readily be 
related to clearly defined interests. In these areas, an 
approach that seeks to interpret political events in
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terms of antecedent social and economic conditions, or 
institutional conflicts, cannot be expected to provide 
the answers.
This argument is in part accessible to empirical 
verification. If it can be shown that voters’ attitudes 
on these kinds of issues are liable to be influenced by 
psychological factors, then it becomes plausible to 
maintain that dispositions among politicians are also 
likely to be affected by them, either directly or through 
sensitivity to the climate of opinion in the electorate.
This chapter reports the results of the administration 
of three short dispositional scales, intended to measure 
authoritarian orientation, alienation, and ethnocentrism, 
to the sample of 457 Melbourne voters whose political 
attitudes have been described in Chapter Four. The 
administration of the scales took pace in the same interview 
in which the political and ’background’ questions were 
asked.
The brevity of the scales used necessitates caution 
in the interpretation of the findings reported here. But 
at this stage, it seemed desirable to make a preliminary 
investigation before returning, as it were, with the longer 
and more valid instruments whose construction is described 
in Chapter Six. The marvellous confusion of previous
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research will now be briefly reviewed.
5.2. Authoritarian Orientation and Alienation; Some 
Previous Research
The concept of the authoritarian personality was 
evolved by a group of American and German psychologists 
and sociologists on the basis of empirical research 
amongst samples of highly prejudiced subjects in the U.S. 
after the last war.1 Their research was related to
0earlier work by Fromm, and parallel findings by Dicks 
in a sample of German prisoners of war were simultaneously 
reported in 1950.^ The term ’authoritarian’ is here used 
in a technical sense. It relates to a personality pattern, 
or syndrome, widely diffused in Western societies, which 
combines a number of interrelated characteristics commonly 
regarded as unpleasant by liberal intellectuals: the
authoritarian type is aggressive, inflexible, submissive 
to in-group authorities and generally punitive. These 
personality characteristics have been shown to be 
systematically related to each other and frequently to 
have their roots in emotional relationships experienced
1
T.W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D.J. Levinson and 
R.N. Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality, (New York, 1950). 
2
E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom,, (London, 1942)
3 H. Dicks, ’Personality Traits and National Socialist 
Ideology,’ Human Relations, 3 (1950) pp. 111-54.
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in infancy, as well as in later institutional or 
class conditioning. The psychodynamic basis of the 
syndrome is hypothesized to lie in conflicts between 
strong, thrusting instinctual impulses towards aggression 
and destructiveness, and a rigid set of moral norms 
perceived as binding by the authoritarian personality 
but as external to the self. The conflicts are controlled 
by the relatively weak ’ego’ only by resort to a number of 
unconscious defence mechanisms, notably ’projectivity’
(the tendency to impute one’s own repressed desires to 
others), ’anti-intraception’ (rejection of the subjective, 
the imaginiative and the tender-minded) and stereotypical 
thinking. These in turn facilitate the more conscious 
defence ’stratagem’ of ethnocentrism, which may be 
loosely described as hostility to, or intolerance of, 
out-groups, combined with exaggerated glorification of the 
in-group.1 The syndrome is dubbed’authoritarian’ because 
it predisposes the individual to recruitment to an 
authoritarian movement of the Right; but as Shils and
1
A more precise definition and discussion of ’ethnocentrism’ 
is to be found in Chapter Six. The discussion of 
’alienation’ in this chapter is also necessarily somewhat 
cursory, and the nature of this disposition, conceived as 
social estrangement, is also discussed in more detail in 
that chapter, as well as Chapter Seven,
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others have pointed out,*** similar psychological 
characteristics are concentrated also on the extreme 
Left.
Numerous dispositional scale surveys have lent
support to the findings of the original researchers that
authoritarian personality characteristics are linked with
2hostility to minority groups. However, much empirical 
work done with the standard device for measuring authoritarian
*3orientation, the California P scale, has been shown to be 
of dubious value because of an important methodological 
weakness in scale construction. The F scale is all-positive 
in form, that is, every ’item’, or statement, with which 
the interviewee is asked to agree or disagree is phrased 
in such a way that the ’authoritarian’ response is in every 
case agreement. It is therefore possible to score highly 
merely by virtue of having a generalized tendency to 
agree with questionnaire items. The importance of this
1
E.A. Shils, 'Authoritarianism: ’’Right and Left”’, in
R. Christie and M. Jahoda (eds.), Studies in the Scope 
and Method of 'The Authoritarian Personality*, (Glencoe,
'19547.2
Cf., for example, E. Campbell and B. McCandless, 
’Ethnocentrism, Xenophobia, and Personality’, Human Re1ations,
4 (1951) pp. 185-92; A . V /. Siegman, 'A Cross-Cultural 
Investigation of the Relationship between Ethnic Prejudice, 
Authoritarian Ideology, and Personality’, Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology. 65 (1961) pp. 654-5; and studies 
reported in R. Christie and P. Cook, 'A Guide to Published 
Literature relating to "The Authoritarian Personality” 
through 1956’, Journal of Psychology, 45 (1958) pp. 171-99»
5 T.W. Adorno et al op. cit., pp. 255-7«
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deficiency was clarified in a study by Chapman and 
Bock,1 2who analysed eight studies which had employed 
both positive and ’reversed’ F scales (ones where disagreement 
with the items registered authoritarianism) and concluded 
that, on the positive scale, for college populations in 
the U.S., ’content variance’ (reflecting authoritarianism) 
probably accounts for only 30 to 40 per cent of the total 
variance, the remaining reliable variance (the upper and 
lower limits of which were fixed at 70 and 85 per cent) 
being divided between agreement tendency and the interaction 
between agreement tendency and content variance, in 
proportions which varied markedly from sample to sample.
In short, agreement tendency was, apparently, often nearly 
as important as authoritarian orientation in determining 
scale scores.^
It follows that where researchers have reported 
significant correlations between two all-positive scales, 
purporting to measure, for example, authoritarianism and 
ethnocentrism, these may be interpreted in some cases as 
meaning simply that two imperfect measures of agreement
1
L.J. Chapman and R.D. Bock, ’Components of Variance due 
to Acquiescence and Content in the F Scale Measure of 
Authoritarianism,’ Psychological Bulletin, 55 (195Ö) PP* 328-33»2
This brief discussion of the problem of infection of scores 
by acquiescence is also intended as a mis-en-scene. The 
controversy surrounding the subject is considered in extenso 
in Chapter Six.
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tendency will correlate with each other, which is not 
very remarkable.
The present study attempts to avoid this difficulty 
by using ’balanced' scales, i.e. ones where half the 
items are positive, and the other half reversed. On 
this type of scale, respondents with very high agreement 
or disagreement tendency will have their scores driven 
towards the arithmetic mean, but this kind of contamination 
of the variance should not seriously distort correlations 
between the scales.
There has been remarkably little research on the 
relation between authoritarian orientation and political 
opinion. Eysenck1 has provided some evidence on its 
relationship to opinion on capital punishment and harshly 
punitive treatment of sex offenders, as did the original 
American researchers; but his T measure is of dubious
pvalidity. Lipset has suggested that the apparent tendency 
of working-class-samples to score higher than middle-class 
samples on measures of authoritarianism should lead us to 
shift our gaze from the lower middle-class when on the 
look-out for threats to the democratic order or libertarian 
_____
H.J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics, (London, 195^) 
ch. 4.
2
S.M. Lipset, ’Democracy and Working-class Authoritarianism', 
American Sociological Review, 24 (1959) PP* 482-501; and 
S.M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics,
(London, 1960T-eh.~4 .
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values. Sanford"1 has reported a finding that in a 
large (n=9o3) Philadelphia adult sample, high P scale 
scorers were disproportionately reluctant to engage in 
political activity. In the United States, authoritarianism 
has been found not to be related to Party choice by 
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes.2 34
A brief review of the generally thin and inconclusive 
findings of the research into the relations between 
authoritarianism and political attitudes has been 
provided by Xirscht and Dillehay. Their book provides 
a comprehensive, although not very critical review of the 
more general literature on authoritarianism.
The only reported work with an F measure in Australia 
(apart from this one) has been a survey of a sample of
4schoolchildren conducted by Xnopfelmacher and Armstrong. 
They found that correlations between F and ethnocentrism 
scales were not invariant with respect to religious
1
F.H. Sanford, Authoritarianism and Leadership, (Philadelphia 
1950) p. 168.
2
A. Campbell, P.E. Converse, W.E. Miller and D.S. Stokes,
The American Voter, (New York, i960) ch. 8.
3
J.P. Xirscht and R.C. Dillehay, Dimensions of 
Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory,
(/Lexington, 1967) esp. pp. 57-69«
4
F. Xnopfelmacher and D.B. Armstrong, ’The Relation between 
Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism and Religious Denomination 
among Australian Adolescents,’ American Catholic Sociological 
Review, 24 (1963) PP- 99-11^.
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denomination. Significant correlations were obtained 
between F and E scales in Protestant and Jewish schools, 
but the correlation dropped below the level required for 
statistical significance in a Catholic school. This 
finding is not of great importance, since the Catholic 
sample was quite small (n=47), the correlation was in the 
expected direction although non-significant, and the 
difference between the correlation in the Catholic sample 
and the averaged correlation for the other groups was 
not itself statistically significant. On the other hand, 
the results obtained with a rather different measure of 
attitudes to out-groups, the Bogardus scale, which 
measures ’social distance’ from out-groups but not 
necessarily hostility to them, indicated that the Catholic 
sample different significantly from the other groups in 
that the usual correlation between the F and the Bogardus 
scales was in the Catholic case uniquely reversed. Thus 
it seems that institutional influences may in certain 
circumstances act as a solvent of the usually reliable 
connection between authoritarianism and prejudice.
However, the study had two methodological flaws. 
Firstly, the F and E scales employee were all-positive, 
and therefore contaminated by agreement tendency to an 
unknown extent; secondly, the Bogardus measure did not
refer exclusively to groups distinctly alien to all the 
sub-samples, but included British and Italians, It is 
therefore difficult to say how far scores on the Bogardus 
scale reflected rejection of out-groups. The data of 
this survey are accordingly ambiguous.
A chain of research initiated by Srole1 had also 
suggested a need for caution in predicting from F scale 
scores to ethnocentrism. In a large (n»40l) adult sample 
in Springfield, Massachusetts, a significant first-order 
correlation between an F scale and a measure of ethnocentrism 
was substantially reduced when 'anomia’ was held constant. 
This last term was used to refer to a breakdown in the 
individual’s sense of attachment to society, expressed 
as a feeling of meaninglessness, social isolation, and 
powerlessness to achieve life goals, a conception 
approximating to some meanings of ’alienation’. Since the 
correlation between his anomia scale and ethnocentrism was 
not much affected when authoritarianism was in turn held 
constant, Srole concluded that F scale scores do not stand 
in close relation to ethnocentrism independently of the 
anomia factor. This suggested that the magnitude of the 
correlations between F and E measures found in previous
I
L. Srole, ’Social Integration and Certain Corollaries:
An Exploratory Study5, American Sociological Review,
21 (1956) pp. 709-16.
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research might be accounted for in large part by their 
common variance with alienation. Srole’s work was
naturally regarded as menacing to the view that rejection 
of minority groups was mainly a function of personality 
structure, which had until then appeared well supported 
by the empirical evidence. The position was indeed even 
more confused than it appeared. Srole’s F and anomia scales 
were very short (five items in each) and all-positive.
The measure of ethnocentrism was a mixture of scores on 
an all-positive 5-item scale and ’spontaneous comments’ 
elicited by projective-type pictorial stimuli, and therefore 
subject to some contamination from agreement tendency.
The meaning of the pattern of intercorrelations between 
these three scales is quite obscure. It may be that 
Srole’s study merely showed that the correlation between 
two oblique indices of agreement tendency will be 
reduced if a third index of agreement tendency is held 
constant, a finding difficult to interpret and perhaps 
scarcely worth the trouble.
The Springfield survey provoked replications by
1 pRoberts and Rokeach, and McDill, all achieving distinction
1 ' “
A. Roberts and M. Rokeach, ’Anomie, Authoritarianism and 
Prejudice: A Replication’, American Journal of Sociology,
61 (1956) pp. 955-8.2
E.L. McDill, ’Anomie, Authoritarianism, Prejudice, and 
Socio-Economic Status: An Attempt at Clarification’,
Social Forces, 39 (I96O-61) pp» 239-’+5•
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by their use of short, all-positive scales for the three 
variables. Both found their F and anomia measures to be 
related, and reported moderate and statistically significant 
residual correlations between the F and anomia measures 
and ethnocentrism, when anomia and F were respectively 
held constant. Both also drew highly precarious conclusions 
as to the relative importance of authoritarian orientation 
and anomia as determinants of ethnocentrism. Like Srole, 
they found an independent negative relationship between 
their measures of anomia and social status.
McDill went so far as to perform a factor analysis 
of responses to all fifteen positive items in his three 
scales, together with four other positive F scale items 
and one reversed item. Not surprisingly, his analysis 
extracted a common factor, which was almost certainly 
agreement tendency or something inextricably confounded 
with it. This he labelled ’a Weltanschauung which is 
negative in nature’, representing ’a dim world view'. 
’Negative Weltanschauung’ might appear to be a rather 
inflated term to use for a generalized tendency to agree 
with questionnaire items.
A study by Dean1 found correlations between measures
1
D.G. Dean, ’Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement’,
American Sociological Review, 26 (1961) pp. 753“8.
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of powerlessness to achieve life-goals, normlessness 
(defined as disintegration and conflict in moral values), 
and socihl isolation. He combined the three scales to 
form an alienation measure, and fourd a weak but significant 
negative relation between it and occupational status, and 
a weak positive relation with advancing age. The sample 
consisted of 384 adults in Columbus, Ohio.
The nature of all twenty-four items in Dean’s scale 
is not reported, but of the six given in illustration five 
are positive. There is therefore no assurance that this 
study avoided the methodological weakness of those 
described above.
Empirical research on alienation, authoritarianism 
and ethnocentrism, before the date of the Australian survey 
reported in this chapter, thus presented a somewhat occluded 
picture. Many of the correlations obtained between the 
various scales may well have been the result of common 
variance with agreement tendency. Moreover, the higher 
authoritarianism and alienation scores reported for 
working-class and elderly respondents might be accounted 
for in the same way. The social geography of agreement 
tendency has yet to be mapped with clarity.
An urgent need for the construction of paired-alternative 
or balanced scales was evident. So, too, was the necessity
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for specifying more exactly the meaning of whatever 
concept of alienation was embodied in a particular scale.
Empirical research and conceptual discussion in the 
U.S. after the present Australian survey have resulted in 
some advances in method and in substantive findings. In 
1963* Neal and Rettig,1 using a large (n=603) urban sample, 
constructed a paired-alternative measure of ’powerlessness 1 
and a balanced measure of ’normlessness’, each of twelve 
items. A factor analysis using varimax rotations suggested 
that scores on the two scales together were governed by a 
unitary construct, within which four empirical divisions 
were discernible: the political and economic domains of
powerlessness and normlessness emerged as separable 
components. 'Normlessness’ was here understood as a 
judgement, by the respondent, that immorality and fraud 
were rife. The content of the items was strictly confined 
to the polity and the macro-society, and did not enter the 
field of personal relations.
No significant relationship was found between any 
of these components and Srole’s measure of anomia nor 
with a ’status-mobility’ scale (which registered a penchant 
for unscrupulous social climbing).
1
A.G. Neal and S. Rettig, ’Dimensions of Alienation among 
Manual and Non-Manual Workers’, American Sociological Review, 
28 (1963) PP. 599-608.
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In 1965 McClosky and Schaar^ presented a 9-item 
*anomy' scale of satisfactory reliability, together 
with data on correlations with personality characteristics 
for a large but unrepresentative sample. Unhappily, the 
scale is all-positive, the items somewhat vague in meaning, 
and the personality tests not adequately described.
pThis research has been sharply attacked by Srole, 
mainly on the grounds of sampling and interviewing 
deficiencies. He adverts briefly to the problem of infection 
of scores by response-set, but proposes no solution other 
than careful interviewing. Obviously many unsatisfactory 
measures are still in use, and the correlates of ’alienation* 
are not known with any certainty. A sine qua non for
1
H. McClosky and J.H. Schaar, ’Psychological Dimensions 
of Anomy1 2, American Sociological Review, 50 (1 9 6 5) 
pp. 14-40.
2
L. Srole, ’A Comment on 1 Anomy" 1, American Sociological 
Review, 9 0 (1 9 6 5 ) pp. 757-62. Gwynn Nettler offers rA 
Further Comment on "Anomy"’ in the same issue at p. 762; 
McClosky and Schaar reply at pp. 765-7»
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useful research is the construction of scales on which 
scores are less likely to be affected by agreement 
tendency. The employment of balanced scales in the present 
exploratory study in an Australian urban sample (hopefully) 
avoids the methodological traps into which so many 
researchers have plunged headlong. However, whilst 
balanced scales offer distinct advantages over all-positive 
measures, they are not necessarily free of response-set 
contamination. The requirements for balancing out agreement 
tendency may not hold. The development of scales using 
only paired-alternative items is an attractive means of 
eliminating these difficulties. The short scales 
employed in this chapter can only be presented with some 
diffidence. Their utility lies only within the scope of 
a preliminary investigation.
5*3* Hypotheses for the Present Study
The erratic career of empirical research in this field 
suggests many points of interest; but its uncertainties 
indicate that, for this initial investigation, the data 
should be tested against only conservative suppositions. 
Each is stated in a null form; the data of the Melbourne 
survey were used to test and possibly reject formal 
hypotheses of n£ relation:
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1. That an P measure will not correlate with a 
measure of socio-economic status.
2. That an F measure will not correlate with age.
3. That an alienation measure will not correlate 
with a measure of socio-economic status.
4. That an alienation measure will not correlate 
with age.
5. That an F scale and an A (alienation) scale will 
not correlate with each other.
6. That an F scale will not correlate with an E 
(ethnocentrism) scale independently of A.
7. That an A scale will not correlate with an E scale 
independently of F.
8. That the degree of association between F and E 
measures in a Catholic church-going sample will not 
differ from that in other religious or non-religious 
groups.
9. That F is unrelated to political activity and 
interest.
10. That A is unrelated to political activity and 
interest.
11. That neither F, A, nor E measures will show any 
relation to opinions on political issues.
Having set up this tabula rasa, we may proceed to a 
description of the measures used in this survey.
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5.4. The Authoritarian Orientation Scale
This scale was constructed as follows. Six items 
were abstracted from the original all-positive 29-item 
F scale. The criteria for selection were that they should 
be amongst the top fifteen in discriminatory power, i.e. 
in the magnitude of their correlation with scores on the 
scale as a whole; that they should appear to be amongst 
those least specific to right-wing authoritarianism; and 
that they should not refer to sex offences, in order to 
maintain untroubled rapport with interviewees. Three of 
these six items were then ’reversed’. In phrasing the 
reversals, an attempt was made to capture the psychological 
as well as the semantic negation of the original items.
The six items were then administered to the sample, and 
the pattern of responses was examined in order to 
determine whether any should be excluded from the scale.
An attitude scale of this type is normally required 
to be internally consistent, as a sign that responses 
are related to a unitary underlying continuum. The usual 
criterion for this is that responses to each item should 
correlate significantly with scores on the scale as a 
whole. A more stringent requirement is that each item’s 
average correlation with all other items should be 
statistically significant. The latter criterion was initially 
adopted in this case.
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Tetrachoric correlation coefficients, corrected for 
’unevenness of split’ by Jenkins’ method, were computed 
for the relation of each item with every other. The 
average correlation of these for each item was then 
calculated. The items, with their average correlation 
with the others, are shown in Table 5.1 in descending 
order of discriminatory power.
TABLE 5.1
A Short Authoritarianism Scale (a)
Type Item Average Range of correlations
correlation with other items
with other 
items Lowest Highest
Positive What the youth .24**
needs is strict
.11* .30**
discipline, rugged 
determination, and 
the will to work and 
fight for family and 
country.
Positive An insult to our .18**honour should always 
be punished.
.02 .37**
Positive People can be divided.18** 
into two distinct 
classes: the weak
and the strong.
.03 .37**
Reversed Obedience and respect.13** 
for authority are not 
the most important 
things to teach children.
-.05 .31**
Reversed If it weren’t for the.09 
rebellious ideas of youth 
there wouid be less 
progress in the world.
.02 .19**
Reversed If people spent more .09 
time talking about ideas 
just for the fun of it,
-.05 .23**
everybody would be better off.
(a) For a sample of 400, the 1 per cent level of
significance is reached at .13; the 5 per cent level at
.10, The former is indicated by two asterisks; the latter by one.
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It can be seen that the three positive items and 
one reversal have significant average intercorrelations 
with all others, whilst the remaining two reversals fall 
just short of significance at the 5 per cent level . The 
difficulty of retaining some psychological meaning in 
reversing items is well in evidence. However, the last 
two items were retained in the scale, in view of the 
desirability of balancing out agreement tendency. The 
average inter-item correlation in the scale is significant 
at .15, and higher than that reported for the original F 
scale on a final test sample.1 Of the 15 inter-item 
correlations, 10 are significant. However, this 6-item 
scale is clearly a weak instrument, with a very modest 
degree of internal consistency.
5.5 . The Alienation Scale
The alienation scales reported in the literature 
(notably those used by Srole and McDill) were regarded as 
unsatisfactory, partly because their internal consistency 
must have been inflated by agreement tendency, partly 
because their items are sometimes specific to the American 
social context and idiom, and partly because the wording 
of the items seems in many cases unnecessarily oblique. 
However, the attitudes to which the items were intended
T.W. Adorno et al., op. cit., pp. 261-2.I
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to refer appear to be coherently related to the 
literature on alienation and thus to offer a useful 
starting point for the construction of a scale suited to 
the Australian milieu. The items of Sroie’s anomia scale, 
for example, were intended to tap the following subjective 
feelings of the respondent:
1. That the social order is fickle and unpredictable, 
and that one is powerless to achieve one’s goals.
2. That society is regressing from goals already 
attained.
5. That public officials are indifferent to the 
individual’s needs and aspirations,
4. That one is no longer oriented to a set of 
coherent values, that life is meaningless.
5. That immediate personal relations are no longer 
predictable or supportive.
These can be reduced to the categories of powerlessness, 
normlessness and social isolation, which correspond to the 
sub-scales of Dean’s measure. Like Dean, Srole is 
prepared to admit malfunction at the level of microcosmic 
social relations, in small groups or voluntary associations, 
to his conception of estrangement from society. On the 
other hand, Seeman, in an influential review of the 
meanings given to the term ’alienation’,1 identified
1
M. Seeman, ’On the Meaning of Alienation,’ American 
Sociological Review, 24 (1959) pp. 785-91»
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five logically independent connotations (powerlessness, 
normlessness, meaninglessness, isolation and self-estrangement). 
and suggested that a more satisfactory usage would be to 
confine all of these to the individual’s relations with 
the macro-society. This does not seem to be a tenable 
position if alienation is viewed as the subjective 
experience of a social malfunction, since this may well 
be impacted upon many individuals only at the level of 
their micro-relations. Accordingly, an attempt was made, 
in constructing items for this study, to capture 
dissatisfactions at the personal level as well as grouches 
against society as a whole. The items, with their average 
correlations with the others, are given in Table 5.2.
TABLE 5.2
A Short Alienation Scale
Type Item Average Range of correlations
correlation with other items 
with other
items “Lowest Highest
Positive Life seems to be 
rather meaningless.
.32** .17** • 5 5 * *
Positive Life today is a difficult 
and dangerous business, 
and it's a matter of 
chance who gets on top.
.30** .06 .48**
Positive One can’t hope to 
become the sort of 
person one would like 
to be.
.27** 00• .55**
Reversed In our society, if you 
work hard you can usually 
get ahead.
.25** .09 .33**
Reversed Most people can be 
trusted.
.23** .13** .32**
Reversed Most members of 
parliament and city
.17** 00• .32**
councillors are sympathetic 
people and do a good job.
All these items thus ’work’ well. The first and 
second were intended to capture normlessness (here 
meaning the absence of reliable norms for the comprehension 
of governance of social behaviour); the second., fourth 
and sixth, powerlessness; the third, self-estrangement; 
the fifth, social isolation. The average inter-item 
correlation is .26. Of the 15 inter-item correlations 
12 are significant. This scale is clearly a stronger
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1
measure than the F scale described above.
5.6. The Ethnccontrism Scale
This was intended to measure hostility or intolerance 
towards minority groups and out-groups. Since the scale 
was not intended to trap precisely prejudice (that is, 
prejudgements of minorities involving derogatory and 
incorrigible mistakes), the items did not need to have a 
delusional content. The target-groups selected were Jews, 
Italians and Japanese. The two items reflecting attitudes 
to Jewish people were abstracted from Eysenck’s anti-Semitism 
scale,^ on which they were heavily loaded with the common 
factor. The others were constructed ad hoc.
The two items referring to Jewish people may be 
regarded as criterion items, since their validity has been 
previously established. All the other items have a 
significant average correlation with these.
The average inter-item correlation for the scale is 
.29. The three highest inter-item correlations reflect 
the close relations of the pairs relating to each target 
group. The scale is thus somewhat heterogeneous. However, 
if each pair is treated as a separate index of hostility, 
the three indices all relate significantly to each other.
Of the 15 inter-item correlations, 12 are significant.
H.J. Eysenck, op. cit., pp. 89-95«
1
TABLE 5.3
A Short Ethnocentrism Scale
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Type
Reversed
Item Average Range of correlations 
correlation with other items 
with other
Jews are as valuable, 
honest and public- 
spirited citizens as 
any other group.
items
.24-
Lowest
.1?**
Highest
.72**
Reversed Visits to Australia by 
Japanese politicians and 
businessmen should be 
welcomed.
.22** .04 .84**
Positive The Jews have too much 
power and influence in 
this country.
.32** .09 .72**
Positive Australians should not .21** 
be too keen on friendship 
with Japanese after the 
lessons of the last war.
.09 .84**
Positive Italian migrants have not.29** 
added much of value to 
the Australian way of 
life.
#17** .60**
Reversed The Italian communities which have 
settled in the inner 
suburbs have made them 
brighter and more 
pleasant places to live 
in.
.16** .09 .60**
All three scales were scored so that 'authoritarian',
'alienated* or 'ethnocentric' responses earned the 
respondent +2, 'undecided' +1, and anti-authoritarian',
'non-alienated’ and 'non-ethnocentric1 responses 0. Scores 
on all three could thus vary from 0 to 12. All three
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distributions were dichotomized at the median, and 
respondents classified as ’high* or ’low’ on each 
variable. Relations between them were obtained by 
computing corrected tetrachoric coefficients from four­
cell frequency tables.
5.7. Results
The tetrachoric correlation coefficient is denoted 
by i»£. P will stand for authoritarian orientation, A 
for alienation, and E for ethnocentrism.
The following relationships obtained in the sample 
between P and socio-economic status,1 2and F and age:
F SES = -.27**) (hypotheses 1 and 2)rt F Age = .24**)
The first two null hypotheses can be rejected at 
a high level of confidence. The older group is significantly 
more authoritarian than the younger; and those with lower 
social status are more authoritarian than the higher 
status group.
1 The index of socio-economic status was a compound of the 
occupational status of the head of the respondent’s household, 
using the ratings obtained by Congalton; the respondent’s 
level of education; and the judged status of his residential 
area. These elements were given an arbitrary loading of 3*
2 and 1. (Cf. A. Congalton, Occupational Status in 
Australia (mimeographed), University of N.S.W., Kensington,
1963).
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The following relations obtained for alienation: 
ll A Age - "'.18*](hypotheses 5 and 4)
X/
The third and fourth hypotheses are thus rejected, 
and the finding is in accordance with the results 
obtained by Srole, Roberts and Rokeach, McDill and Dean: 
the lower status group contains a substantially greater 
number of alienated respondents than the higher status 
group. The tendency for the older group to be more 
alienated is in keeping with Dean’s results.
No correlation at all was obtained between the F and 
A scale scores:
rt F A = .00 (hypothesis 5)
There is thus no ground for rejecting the fifth null 
hypothesis. This finding does not establish that no 
relation between the variables exists; it may be that more 
sensitive instruments will disclose one. But these data 
suggest that this is unlikely. The correlations between F 
and A measures in the United States samples may reflect 
different social conditions or, as noted above, they may 
simply be an artifact of the method of measurement.
Since there is no covariance between F and A in 
this sample, the relation of each with E can be displayed 
by the simple correlation.
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Both the A and F measures are independently related 
to ethnocentrism:
A E = 04**j (hyP°theses 6 and 7)
Both correlations are significant beyond the 1 per
cent level, and hence the null hypotheses 6 and 7 must be
rejected. The difference in the size of the two
correlations may reflect only the higher internal consistency
of the A scale as compared to the F scale.
The sample was divided into Catholic churchgoers,
Protestant churchgoers, and non-churchgoers, the last
group not having attended a place of worship during the
previous month. The relation between F and E is significant
only in the non-church sub-sample, and the correlations
are depressed in the churchgoing groups:
rt F E (in Catholic sample) = -.01 (n=94) )
rt F E (in Protestant sample) = .12 (n=76)^ )(hypothesis
rt F E (in non-church sample) = .25*(n=250) ) 8)
These data give some grounds for rejecting hypothesis
8, and appear to support the findings of Knopfelmacher and
Armstrong that the usual F E correlation is dissolved
in the Catholic sample. However, the fact that the E scale
employed here includes items on Italians, who may not be
perceived as an out-group by Catholics, who share their
religious affiliations, suggests the need for a check on
this interpretation.
i6o
If the Knopfelmacher-Armstrong interpretation is 
correct, then a correlation between F and anti-Semitic 
attitudes should break down also in the Catholic sub-sample. 
The two E scale items referring to Jews were accordingly 
used to discriminate those high and low on anti-Semitism, 
and the correlation with F was computed for the three 
groups:
r^ F AS (in Catholic sample) = .17 (n=94) )
rt F AS (in Protestant sample) = .02 (n=77) )(hypothesis
r^ F AS (in non-church sample) = .24* (n=233)) 8)
Here the correlation between F and anti-Semitism in
the Catholic group is not significant, but not much lower
than the significant correlation in the much larger
non-church group. The correlation in the Protestant sample,
however, sinks to nearly zero. These two sets of data
seem to offer some grounds for supposing the F E
correlation to be lower amongst Protestant churchgoers
than the large non-church group, but give only slight
support to the hypothesis that the correlation breaks down
in the Catholic group. The position thus remains unclear.
Neither the F nor the A measure shows any relation
with political interest or activity: ’opinion leaders’
and those expressing ’a lot of interest’ in politics were
just as numerous amongst those ’high’ on authoritarianism
and alienation as amongst those ’low'. There is thus no
reason to reject the null hypotheses 9 and 10.
i6l
Sanford’s comfortable conclusions in Philadelphia 
find no parallel here: the Australian political scene
seems to accommodate both the authoritarian and the 
alienated and must reckon with them as participants 
in discussion.
We may now examine the relationships between the 
three ’psychological’ variables - authoritarianism, 
alienation and ethnocentrism - and political opinions.
A cluster analysis'*' of responses to twelve political opinion 
items elicited by this survey had yielded three clusters, 
which seemed to represent three dimensions of 
radicalism-conservatism. The first related to opinions 
on social services and public ownership, and was labelled 
the ’Established Radicalism-Conservatism’; the second to 
opinions on increased education and defence spending, 
and the introduction of a capital gains tax and economic 
planning, the ’New Radicalism-Conservatism’; and the third 
to opinions on increased economic aid to Asia, modification 
of the White Australia Policy, and the abolition of capital 
punishment, ’Conscience Radicalism-Conservatism’.
Opinions within each cluster of political issues had 
a moderately close relationship: it was possible to
1
Using the method proposed by B. Fruchten, Introduction 
to Factor Analysis, (Princeton, 195^) at pp. 12-17, and 
described in Chapter Four.
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predict, for example, that respondents with radical 
views on aid to Asia would contain a disproportionately 
high number in favour of the abolition of the death 
penalty. But links between the clusters were far more 
tenuous: confident predictions could not be made from 
opinions within one cluster to opinions within another.
The issues in each cluster were treated as scale
items and scale scores on the three continua of radicalism-
conservatism were computed for all respondents. The
following table exhibits the relation of these scores to
those on the F,A, and E scales:
rfc F with Established Radicalism = -.09 )
rt F with New Radicalism = -.06 )
rt F with Conscience Radicalism = -.28**)
r£ A with Established Radicalism = + .08 )
rt A with New Radicalism = -.08 )
rt A with Conscience Radicalism = -.06 ) (hypothesis 11)
E with Established Radicalism = +.10* j
rt E with New Radicalism = -.07 )r^ E with Conscience Radicalism = -.36**)
Most of these relationships are slight or negligible, 
with two outstanding exceptions: the highly significant
negative relationships between both authoritarianism and 
ethnocentrism and ’Conscience Radicalism’. It would seem 
therefore that these psychological factors do exercise an 
influence on political opinion in precisely the area 
suggested in our initial discussion.
The finding warrants more detailed examination. The
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table below indicates that the correlations between the F 
and E scales hold for each of the three items in the 
’Conscience’ cluster:
r, F with radicalism on economic aid = -.15**)
r F with radicalism on White Australia = -.23**)
r£ F with radicalism on hanging = -.22**)
)(hypothesis
rfe E with radicalism on economic aid *» -.34**1 11)
rt E with radicalism on White Australia = -.25**1
rt E with radicalism on hanging = -.lb**)
All these correlations are significant beyond the 1 
per cent level. Moreover, the relation of the F and E scores 
to opinions on each issue seem to be independent, since 
the magnitude of the correlations between F and each issue 
is negligibly affected when covariation with E is 
constricted by limiting the sample to the lower half of the 
E distribution; and the same holds for the correlations 
with E when the F covariation is constricted.
One further point may be considered. It might be 
objected that, since both F and E are negatively related 
to education, their apparent influence on opinions on these 
issues may simply reflect the actual political influence of 
education.
This interpretation can be shown to be untenable.
Table 5•  ^shows the combined effect of high F and E:
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TABLE 5.4
Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism and 
Conscience Radicalism (aT~~
High on 
Conscience 
Radicalism 
%
Respondents high on both F and E: 24
Respondents low on both F and E: 58
Low on 
Conscience 
Radicalism 
%
76 = 100 (n=102) 
42 = 100 (n=112)
(a) The probability of obtaining by chance alone the
frequencies on which these percentages are based is
less than 1 per cent.
Now if the above objection were correct, these 
relationships should dissolve when education is held constant. 
This can be done by fractionating the data and examining the 
frequencies for each of four educational levels separately.
The operation revealed that the frequencies deviate 
significantly from proportionality on three out of the four 
tables on a one-tailed test, and closely approach significance 
on the fourth, despite the very small size of the samples.'*'
In this exercise, only two categories of respondents were 
examined: those high on both F and E and those low on both
F and E. These respondents were divided by educational 
level into four groups, and the numbers high and low on 
Conscience Radicalism were displayed. There were thus four 
tables of four cells. The chi-square test was applied, 
with the following results:
Up to 6 years’ education: X^ =5.917-9 years’ education: 9(N=2.27
lOyears’ education: X^-J.^O
11 or more years’ education: X v= 3 .§7 
(All probability values are for the one-tailed directional 
hypothesis.)
p^ .01 (n=5l) 
p < . 10 (n=45 
p< .01 (n=49^  
p c «05 (n~77
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The correlations shown above therefore reflect the 
independent influence of the attitudinal variables, and 
not educational level.
It is suggested that this finding is of particular 
importance since opinions on issues in this cluster exhibit 
no first-order relationships with age, social class, or 
education, with one exception: radicalism on economic
aid has a first-order relation to educational level.
Sorting by standard sociological criteria thus does not 
effectively discriminate those ’radical’ and ’conservative’ 
on the ’Conscience’ issues; sorting by psychological 
criteria, on the other hand, does so quite efficiently.
It follows that it is much more useful to work within a 
psychological frame of reference in this area of political 
opinion.
We may conclude that the last hypothesis of no 
relation can be confidently rejected.
5.8. An Interpretative Model
The correlations spelt out above, taken together with 
what is known about the causal mechanisms involved, suggest 
the following general hypothesis:
Figure 5,1
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(i) The social condition of the aged and those of 
lower status generate both authoritarian orientation 
and alienation* but as discrete phenomena.
Why the old and the poor show more alienation than 
the young and the rich may not be a question which deserves 
elaborate discussion.^ But why are the poor more 
authoritarian? The following hypothesis is suggested* and 
will be further discussed in Chapter Seven. It may be 
considered an alternative to the more conventional 
explanation based on punitive child-rearing patterns.
The lower reaches of our society do not provide a 
secure environment. In the working class* skills for the 
mastery of social and work relations arenot effectively 
taught* and the individual must cling to simple rules of
r ~
However* a discussion of this question is to be found 
in Chapter Seven* where the mechanisms described in this 
section are extensively considered.
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conduct to ensure a minimum of personal security.
Frustration of all kinds is nevertheless commonly 
encountered at home, at school, and in a subordinate 
occupation. The consequent aggressiveness is directed: 
partly at rule-breakers, rebels who challenge the 
presriptions which constitute the few certainties, where 
certainties are scarce.
The old are likewise in a precarious position; but 
how deep their authoritarianism may run is questionable. 
Three items in the F scale used here refer to the need for 
control of young people. Older respondents may thus score 
high for superficial reasons.
The lack of relation between authoritarianism and 
alienation is surprising. One would have expected these 
dispositions to go together; but it seems that the tenacious 
pessimism of the second does not sympathetically combine 
with the rigidity and punitiveness of the first.
(ii) Both authoritarianism and alienation promote 
ethnocentrism.
The process connecting alienation with an outcome in 
ethnocentrism has yet to be made clear.
Two speculations can be offered. The first is that 
ethnocentrism represents a generalization of some sentiments 
of alienation. Pessimism and distrust of society and of 
immediate personal relations may be gratuitously extended 
to out-groups and minorities, about whom, after all, less
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is known, and little to be hoped for.
The second is that ethnocentrism represents a 
reaction formation to alienation. The rejection of one's 
actual in-group, which is implied in confessing alienation, 
is negated by a spurious identification v/ith a fictitious 
in-group, whose virtues marl: it off from lesser breeds. 
Ethnocentrism may thus act as an imaginative device for 
buoying oneself up, and expanding one’s identity in a 
difficult social environment.
(iii) Authoritarian orientation and ethnocentrism 
both contribute directly to conservatism on 'Conscience' 
issues.
All three of these political issues involve attitudes 
to out-groups (Asians and criminals), so the relation can 
easily be understood.
(iv) Alienation is not here directly related to 
conservatism on 'Conscience' issues.
These data suggest that it exerts an influence on 
political attitudes only in so far as it promotes 
ethnocentrism.
Social frustration does not in itself represent 
generalized hostility: rather, hostility is an outcome
of alienation in certain persons. Alienation may give 
rise to a perverse development in one's attitudes to other
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people, but it need not be intrinsically destructive.
5 « 9 « To Conclude
The initial contention that political opinions in some 
areas are susceptible to psychological influences is well 
supported by the data of this survey. The relevant 
variables seem to be authoritarian orientation and 
ethnocentrism, with alienation standing at one remove from 
the latter.
The fact that this can be demonstrated for a sample 
of the urban electorate suggests that political decision­
makers may also be directly or indirectly subject to 
the same pressures.
How far one might generalize from the findings of 
this survey is, of course, conjectural. There is a 
generally accepted view, unsupported as yet by a comprehensive 
investigation, that there is a bland uniformity in the 
urban culture of Australia,1 if one ignores migrants from 
Europe (which is just what one does). The homogeneity 
extends from child-rearing practices to the structure of 
educational, economic, and political institutions. Social 
experience in rural areas and country towns may well be
1
See for example, T. Brennan, ’Urban Communities,’ in 
A.F. Davies and S. Encel (eds.), Australian Society, 
(Melbourne, 1965) at pp. 296-309.
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substantially different.'*’ It therefore seems unsafe
to retain expectations based on these data outside
pthe perimeters of the great cities.
1
Cf. an exploratory account of some differences between 
city and country attitudes: F.H. Gruen, ’Rural Australia1 2,
in A.F. Davies and S. Encel, op. cit., pp. 255~72.
2
Only one Australian city has yet been accorded a 
thorough sociometric investigation: Melbourne. The
investigation is based on census data. See F.L. Jones, 
Dimensions of Urban Social Structure: The Social Areas
of Melbourne, Australia (Canberra, 1969)•
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CHAPTER SIX
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN MEASURING 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITIONS
1• Introduction
This chapter examines some difficulties in the 
measurement of dispositions and develops solutions to 
them.
The major problems brought to light by an illustrative 
review of research into two major constructs, authoritarianism 
and alienation, are the infection of scores on positive 
scales by acquiescent response set, and in the case of 
alienation, by anxiety.
The consequential difficulties are the failure to 
demonstrate a genotypical basis for authoritarianism; the 
failure to show that alienation and authoritarianism 
measures relate in each case to a unitary construct which 
is phenotypically cohesive; the absence of proof that these 
two constructs are unique and necessary, and not conceptually 
uneconomical extensions of other constructs, such as 
anxiety; and the likelihood that the pattern of research 
into related constructs has been grossly distorted.
The solutions proposed are the construction of 
forced-choice paired-alternative scales for the measurement 
of authoritarianism, alienation and ethnocentrism; the
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validation of the authoritarianism scale against its 
own internal consistency, and, item by item, against 
the ethnocentrisrn measure; the use of a conceptual feferent 
for each alienation item, and an examination of the 
internal consistency of the putative alienation scale 
when the covariance of each set of items with an anxiety 
measure is removed; and the use of factor analysis to 
examine the empirical discreteness of each construct,
The application of each of these solutions is then 
described.
2. Why ’Measure1 Psychological Dispositions?
We measure psychological dispositions because they 
influence social action, or promote attitudes which do so. 
Authoritarianism and alienation, for example, both predict 
to prejudice, and are important for historical explanation 
as well as having contemporary relevance. The range of 
political action they may influence is not known with 
precision.
Psychological constructs of interest to the social 
scientist are often, like those above, complex and 
multi-dimensional. Scales are used to rank people on 
these atticudinal continua chiefly because they are 
highly economical, and avoid the necessity of coaxing 
out information at great length, which may involve time
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and skills not available to an interviewer. But the 
business of ranking people efficiently is a complex one.
The items of a scale must be valid indicators, and 
responses to the items must be shown to go together in a 
meaningful way. Moreover, the same person must be shown 
to respond in much the same way on different occasions.
In practice, there is heavy reliance on the manifest 
meaningful content of items; but where their primary 
function is to predict to attitudes and behaviour, they 
must be shown to do so. Anxiety scales should predict to 
psychiatrists’ ratings of anxiety in the patient; scale 
items purporting to indicate the personality dynamics 
of the prejudiced should predict to measures of prejudice. 
This requirement is more difficult to meet for such 
constructs as alienation: here, various confessed sentiments
of alienation should be shown to predict to each other.
For the sake of parsimony, attitudinal constructs should 
be shown to be unitary, unique and separable. Extraneous 
response tendencies, such as a systematic tendency to 
agree with any item proposed by the interviewer, must be 
rigorously excluded from influence; otherwise they will 
corrupt research.
The advantages of administering attitude scales to 
groups rather than persons lie in the discovery of what
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functions attitudinal constructs perform. Their 
generality of function is never absolute. Psychology, 
sociology and political studies are sciences built on 
tendency statements. They cannot escape some idiographic 
bias. Attitudinal constructs can vary in structure from 
group to group and also be various in function. Group 
studies are therefore necessary both to provide nomothetic 
information and to define its limitations. They provide 
the social scientist with a repertoire of explanatory 
mechanisms for behaviour. The identification of processes 
general within groups is therefore methodologically prior 
to a closer understanding of social action in a personal 
way.
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate problems 
in the measurement of psychological disposition by 
considering the histories of empirical research into 
two major constructs, authoritarianism and alienation, 
to propose solutions, and to report their application. 
Three dispositional scales, measuring authoritarianism, 
alienation and ethnocentrism, with standardisation data, 
are presented for research use.
7. The Relation between a Construct and its Measure
The relation between an attitudinal or personality 
construct and its measure is commonly reciprocal. The
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entity to be measured may at first be inductively 
defined by inference from systematic observation; a 
questionnaire measure is then devised which taps some of 
its chief characteristics, identified by reference to 
criterion groups and the measure's own internal consistency; 
and the measure is then put to empirical use in order to 
clarify peripheral, and sometimes central features of 
the construct. Empirical investigation results in a 
slow accretion of information about the entity to be 
measured, and sometimes, after the information has been 
ordered in a systematic fashion, there may be a modification 
of the measuring instrument. The procedure is a familiar 
one in the natural sciences. 'Electricity' is a concept 
which now has a precise meaning in common usage, but one 
brought to birth by an empirical procedure: 'Abnormal
condition of the atoms or molecules of a body usually 
due to an excess or deficiency of electrons; various kinds 
were formerly distinguished by the methods of production.' 
(O.E.D., italics added).
However, the process frequently differs in an important 
respect from its analogue in the natural sciences, where 
precise measures of at least the manifestations of a 
construct are usually available. In the social sciences,
the principal measuring instrument often ostensively defines
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some of the chief features of the construct under 
investigation, and not a manifestation of an effect specific 
to a given set of experimental conditions. Researchers 
are therefore occasionally in the odd position of having 
to devise a measuring instrument whilst initially not 
knowing quite what it is they wish to measure. A 
systematic defect in the measuring instrument may thus 
not only corrupt research into the correlates of a 
construct, but also introduce, or reinforce, misconceptions 
of central features of the construct itself i.e. of the 
’pure’ construct as a functional reality. An imperfect 
measure may, so to speak, abort a concept. The measure 
of a construct therefore often has a greater epistemological 
significance in the social sciences than in the natural 
sciences.
4. The Corruption of Research on the Authoritarian Personality 
In the case of loose and rambling constructs, such as 
that of the ’authoritarian personality’ (Adorno et al.,
1950),^ defects in the measurement scales can be peculiarly 
destructive. A very extensive literature bears on the 
defects of instruments used to measure right-wing 
authoritarian personality orientation, and in particular
1
T.W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality,
(New York, 1950)*
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the contamination of the California F Scale1 by 
acquiescent response set; but it had not yet arrived 
at a consensus. The most recent review of the literature 
on authoritarianism (by Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967)^ notes 
the very general concern with contamination by response 
biases, but concludes only that 'studies to date do not 
determine the degree to which these biases independently 
affect F Scale scores....’ Other reviews have come to 
conclusions strikingly in conflict. Rorer (1965)^ after 
an exceptionally comprehensive account of methodological 
studies of the F Scale, remarks that 'it seems safe to 
conclude that even if these studies are interpreted 
unequivocally as showing the effects of acquiescence, 
they show that effect to be small.' On the other hand, 
Peabody (1966)^ contends that the best evidence supports 
the view that response bias is generally a major factor 
in determining F Scale scores, and, in a sweeping attack 
on the general use of attitudinal scales of this kind, 
asserts: ’The ignorant and simple-minded have been taken
1
T.W. Adorno efc al.. op. cit.. pp. 255-7.
2
J.P. Kirscht and R.C. Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarian 
isrn, (Lexington, 1967) P• 13> see also pp. 14-29.
3 fL.G. Rorer, 'The Great Response-Style Myth,’ Psychological 
Bulletin. 63 (196b) PP. 129-b6.
5
D. Peabody, ’Authoritarianism Scores and Response Bias,’ 
Psychological Bulletin. 65 (1966) pp. 11-23*
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for fanatical true believers and fascists.’ Some 
evaluation of the strength of each position is required 
as a basis for the assessment of the great body of work 
on the psychological and political correlates of 
authoritarianism as determined by the commonly employed 
measurement scales. If the principal measure has such a 
major defect, then the authoritarian individual has been 
persistently mis-identified, and research on the nature 
and correlates of the construct systematically distorted.
It will be argued here:
(i) That there is a persuasive, but not conclusive 
case that the all-positive F Scale, and several other 
standard measures of authoritarianism, are extensively 
contaminated by acquiescent response set.
(ii) That a satisfactory acquiescence-free measure 
of authoritarianism is not yet available.
(iii) That the circumstance (i) has rendered uncertain 
many research findings, and in particular the supposed 
positive relation with anxiety.
The exploration of the relation with anxiety is of 
central significance to the clarification of the F 
syndrome. Although the personality organisation of the 
authoritarian individual is discursively elaborated in the 
original work, the dicta of the original authors indicate
that a high degree of repressed anxiety is central to the
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hypothesized personality structure of the highly ethnocentric 
subject, ethnocentrism being the criterion of the 
authoritarian. Frenkel-Brunswik (Adorno et al., 1950)^ 
found empirical confirmation of a relation between 
ethnocentrism, a weak ego and a rigid, externalized 
superego in a clinically evaluated group of 80 subjects. 
Diffuse anxiety is generated by the inadequacy of the ego 
in coping with the severe internal conflict between a 
strong, thrusting id and an externalized superego, and 
repressed by recourse to the defence mechanisms of 
anti-intraception, stereotypy and projectivity, which 
displace hostility on to out-groups perceived as threatening.
Whilst it is true that many low F scorers are 
described as ’worriers', their anxiety is characterized 
as being more superficial and situation-specific than that 
of high scorers, amongst whom it is typically 'vague 
and diffuse'. The deep seated anxiety of the high 
scorer, although repressed-^ is kept in check only by frail 
mechanisms of defence which distort external reality and 
are readily broken down. 'The repressed, unsublimated 
and unmodified tendencies are ready to break through and
1
T.W. Adorno et al♦, op. cit., p. 447.
2
T.W. Adorno et al., op. cit., pp. 412-3.
Ibid ., p. 485•3
180
flood the tenuously maintained social superstructure.’
The authoritarian is thus seen as prone to bouts of 
acute manifest anxiety. For confirmation of this portrait 
of the central personality dynamics of the high F scorer, 
evidence of correlation between satisfactory measures of 
authoritarianism and anxiety is thus desirable.
Commonly, the syndrome is characterized ohenotypically 
by reference to its more superficial features, which 
constitute the sub-scales of the chief measure: 
conventionalism; authoritarian submission; authoritarian 
aggression; anti-intraception; superstition and 
stereotypy; emphasis on power and ’toughness’; 
destructiveness and cynicism; projectivity; and exaggerated 
concern with sex. But a genotypical characterization, in 
terms of its hypothesized central dynamics, which revolve 
around a theme of latent anxiety, is also to be found 
both in the original work and in later research.
The maintenance of a genotypical characterization 
of the authoritarian must rely on the empirical demonstration 
of a consistent positive relation between the standard 
measures of authoritarianism and indices of at least latent 
and preferably manifest anxiety over a variety of human 
groups. It will be argued that the scanty evidence on
T*W. Adorno et__al_., op. cit., p. 455.
I
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this point fails, since the relevant studies have been 
conducted with authoritarianism scales contaminated by 
acquiescent response set, which itself has a demonstrable 
covariance with anxiety. The covariance is strong enough 
to generate an apparent positive relation between 
authoritarianism and anxiety as an artifact of the 
defect in measurement.
It is thus concluded that defects in the chief 
measuring instruments require a cautious assessment of 
research into the central as well as the peripheral 
features of the authoritarian construct; that a ’purified* 
measure is required; and that pending sufficient evidence 
of a positive relation with anxiety, authoritarianism is 
best characterized phenotypically i.e. as an actually 
manifested construct which can be ostensively defined by 
its principal manifest features, without implication as to 
its psychodynamic basis.
5• Acquiescent Response Set and the F Scale
Acquiescent response set has been defined by two 
principal researchers in this field (Couch and Keniston, 
I960)1 as a ’general 'tendency to agree or disagree with 
questionnaire items, regardless of their content"’. The
1 “
A. Couch and K. Keniston, ’Yeasayers and Naysayers: 
Agreeing Response Set as a Personality Variable,’ Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60 (i960) pp. 151-74.
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term is often used in conjunction with others clearly
intended to be synonyms, even in the work of these
authors, who refer to ’agreement tendency’, as well as
’yeasaying’ and ’naysaying’. They make it clear that they
regard its negative pole as comprehending 'disagreement
tendency’. ’Set’ seems preferable to ’style’ (Rorer, 1965)*^
since the most authoritative psychological dictionary
2(English and English) interprets the latter as merely 
imparting a ’characteristic manner’, that will ’influence 
the attainment of a goal comparatively little'. The use 
of ’style’ therefore seems to beg the question of the 
degree of influence of acquiescence. The phrase 'regardless 
of content’ is to be interpreted as implying a logical 
rather than an empirical independence of item content. 
Cronbach (1946, 1950)^ has presented empirical evidence 
that acquiescent response set (hereinafter ARS) is to be 
found more often when items are difficult or ambiguous 
(more strictly, obscure), or when they are in an area 
with which the respondent is unfamiliar. McGee's work
1
L.G. Rorer, op. cit.
2
H.B. English and A.C. English, op. cit., p. 551«
5 L.J. Cronbach, ’Response Sets and Test Validity,
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 6 (1946) 
pp. 475-494: and L.J. Cronbach, rFurther Evidence on Response 
Sets and Test Design,’ Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 10 (1950) PP• 5-31«
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(1962) 1 23 suggests that the evocation of ARS is very 
directly governed by the type of item content. Miklich 
(1 9 6 6) has criticised the notion that ARS is a 
quasi-mechanical tendency. He suggests that it is often 
related to lack of intellectual alertness in the 
respondent, and is better characterised as ;an uncritical 
attitude towards attitude-personality questionnaire 
items’ .
The original researchers were aware of possible 
objections to scales which were all-positive i.e, ones 
where agreement, in the case of every item, registered 
positively the characteristic to be measured. Levinson^ 
defended the use of such scales chiefly on the grounds that 
an all-positive version established better rapport with 
prejudiced subjects and invited them to be candid. Concern 
that the cohesiveness of the scales might be a function of
1
R.K. McGee, ’The Relationship between Response Style and 
Rersonality Variables: I. The Measurement of Response
Acquiescence,; Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
64 (1 9 6 2) pp. 229-33;
R.K. McGee, 'The Relationship between Response Style and 
Personality Variables: II. The Prediction of Independent
Conformity Behaviour,’ Journal of Abnormaland Social Psychology,
65 (1 9 6 2) pp. 347-51;
R.K. McGee, 'Response Style as a Personality Variable: By
What Criterion?,1 Psychological Bulletin, 59 (1962) pp. 284-95.
2
D.R. Miklich, ’Social Desirability and "Acquiescence Response 
Set",’ Psychological Reports, 19 (1 9 6 6) op. 887-90.
3
In TcW. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality,
(New York, 1950) p. 59-
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ARS was expressed in an early review (Brewster Smith,
1950) although there v/as little controversy over the 
extent of contamination before the mid-1950s.
It will be convenient to categorise the evidence for 
contamination of scores on the all-positive F Scale by 
aRS under four main heads, distinguished from each other 
by the type of the main independent variable manipulated; 
sub-categories reflect the choice, and method of measurement, 
of the main dependent variable. (Some studies span more 
than one sub-category).
I: This experimental paradigm involves the
administration of reversed F Scale items, and comparison 
of the correlation of these, considered together as a 
scale, with scores on the all-positive F Scale. The 
independent variable is thus the direction of the phrasing 
of the F Scale items.
Ia: Appraises the effect on the dependent variable,
the homogeneity of responses to the two versions of the 
scale, by noting the degree to which the correlation between 
them departs from the reliabilities. If the F Scale were 
free of ARS contamination, the positive and reversed scales 
might be expected to correlate positively to a degree
I
M. Brewster Smith, Review of The Authoritarian Personality, 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 45 (1950),
PP. 775-9.
approaching their reliabilities. On the other hand,, if 
all systematic variance were contributed by ARS, there 
should be a high negative correlation. Reversed F Scales 
have been constructed, and this procedure carried out,
1 p
by Bass (1955)* Leavitt, Hax and Roche (1955) Chapman
" z  U
and Campbell (1957) * Jackson Messick (1957)* Christie, 
Havel and Seidenberg (1958)^ and Clayton and Jackson 
(1961). The earlier results are reviewed by Christie 
et al.(1958)J  Correlations between the positive and 
reversed scales vary from strongly negative to moderately 
positive, suggesting a substantial contribution by ARS in 
a variety of samples. Christie et al. argued that the 
failure to obtain high positive correlations might be a
1
B.M. Bass, ’Authoritarianism or Acquiescence?’ Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51 (1955) PP • 616-25*.
2
H.J. Leavitt, H. Hax and J.H. Roche, ’Authoritarianism 
and Agreement with Things Authoritative,' Journal of 
Psychology, 40(1955) PP» 215-21.
5
L. J. Chapman and D.T. Campbell, ’Response Set in the F 
Scale,5 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 54 (1957) 
pp. 129-52.
4
D.N. Jackson and S.J. Messick, 'A Note on Ethnocentrism 
and Acquiescent Response Sets, ’ Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 54 (1957) pp. 152-4.
5
R. Christie, J. Havel and B. Seidenberg, 'is the F Scale 
Irreversible?’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
56 (1958) pp. 145-159.6
M. B. Clayton and D.N. Jackson, ’Equivalence Range, 
Acquiescence and Overgeneralization,’ Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 21 (1961) pp. 571-82.
7
R. Christie et al,, op. cit.
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function of inadequate psychological, as opposed to 
merely semantic, reversal of the original items. They 
phrased their own reversals in a probabilistic manner, 
in keeping with what they took to be an anti-authoritarian 
outlook. They obtained what appeared to be moderate to 
high positive correlations in a variety of samples and 
interpreted their results as showing that ARS was not an 
important factor in influencing F Scale responses, except 
in some undergraduate samples. However, the magnitude of 
the correlations obtained by Christie et al. was inflated 
by corrections for attenuation, and when these are 
removed, their correlations fall into the same range as 
those of the previous researchers.
Chapman and Campbell in a later report (1959).» have 
also found only a low positive correlation between 
positive and reversed F Scales. Their study also has more 
sophisticated elements (see lib, below).
All the preceding studies employed limited samples,
in almost every case in tertiary educational institutions.
2Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (i960), in a 
1
L.J. Chapman and D.T. Campbell, ’The Effect of Acquiescence 
Response Set upon Relationships among F Scale, Ethnocentrism, 
and Intelligence,’ Sociometry, 22 (1959) pp. 155-61.2
A. Campbell, P.E. Converse, W.E. Miller and D.E. Stokes,
The American Voter, (New York, i960) pp. 512-5.
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moderately large segment of their national sample in the 
U.S.A., (n=577)^ found a negative correlation between 
short positive and reversed F Scales, which suggests that 
ARS may be somewhat more influential in extra-mural 
populations.
lb: This differs from la in its consideration of
the dependent variable only in that specific attention is
given to the proportionate role of double agreements, as
opposed to double disagreements, in reducing the correlation
between positive and reversed scales. A double agreement
is agreement with both a positive item and its reversal;
a double disagreement is the rejection of both forms.
Concern with this distinguishes the work of Christie,
Havel and Seidenberg (195Ö),1 whose critique of earlier
work is discussed above. They found relatively few
instances of respondents given to double agreements in
2their own sample. On the other hand, Peabody (1961) in 
a sample of British and American engineering students, found 
that the low positive correlation he obtained between positive 
and reversed F Scales was due to a third of his sample 
being fdouble-agreers’ (very few were ’doubie-disagreers’).
r
R. Christie, et al.t op. cit.
2
D. Peabody, ’Attitude Content and Agreement Set in Scales 
of Authoritarianism, Dogmatism,Anti-Semitism and Economic 
Conservatism,' Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
63 (1961) pp. 1-11.
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Samelson (1964)^ has pointed out that Peabody’s 
’double-agreers’ might in fact have been making logically 
consistent and not ARS-determined responses to the content 
of the positive and reversed items, since the reversed 
items were ’asymmetrical1 and had ’neutral’ points 
different from those of the positive items. Logical 
consistency therefore frequently demanded double-agreement. 
This evidence is therefore equivocal in its bearing on 
the influence of ARS.
Ic: This refines the measurement of the dependent
variable by carrying out an analysis of variance. That 
done by Bass (1955)* on his own data, suggested that 
individuals differ markedly and consistently in their
-7.manifestation of ARS. Chapman and Bock (1953A considered 
eight previous studies employing both positive and reversed 
F Scales, and, having subjected them to analysis of 
variance, found that, on the positive scale, for college
1
F. Samelson, ’Agreement Set and Anticontent Attitudes in 
the'F Scale: A Reinterpretation,’ Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology, 68 (1964) pp. 358-42.
2
B.M. Bass, op. cit.
5 L.J. Chapman and R.D. Bock, ’Components of Variance due 
to Acquiescence and Content in the F Scale Measure of 
Authoritarianism, Psychological Bulletin, 55 (1958), 
pp. 323-35.
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populations, content variance (authoritarianism) 
probably accounted for some 30 to 40 per cent of the 
total variance, the remaining reliable variance (the upper 
and lower limits of reliable variance were fixed at 
70 and 85 per cent) being divided between ARS and the 
interaction of ARS and content, in proportions which 
varied markedly from sample to sample.
Id: Here, factor analysis is employed to gauge
homogeneity of response to the positive and reversed P 
scales. The single instance of this for the one correlation 
coefficient, reported by Bass ( 1 9 5 5 ) has been trenchantly 
criticized by Messick and Jackson (1957)^ who stated 
that Bass’s factor loadings have an incorrect sign, and 
by Kerlinger (1958)^  who pointed out that in such a case 
the factors can be rotated in an arbitrary fashion.
II: This type of evidence introduces other positive
and reversed attitudinal measures, along with F Scales, as part 
of the independent variable. It multiplies the data on 
the direction of phrasing in such a way as to permit
rB.M. Bass, op. cit.
2
S. Messick and D.N. Jackson, ’Authoritarianism or 
Acquiescence in Bass’s Data,’ Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 54 (1957) pp. 424-6.
5 F.N. Kerlinger, ’On Authoritarianism and Acquiescence:
An Added Note to Bass and Messick and Jackson,' Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 56 Ü-95Ö) PP* 141-2«
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more sophisticated evaluation of the dependent variable, 
e.g. by making possible meaningful factor analysis of 
responses.
Ila: Here, factor analysis of this type of data is
carried out. Zuckerman and Norton (1961),^ in a sample of 
student nurses, used 100-item positive and reversed forms 
of the Parental Attitude Research Instrument (PARI) as 
well as F Scales. Their measures of ARS included one 
based on double-agreements to both positive and reversed 
forms of the PARI items. This measure of ARS thus avoids 
the difficulties specific to the interpretation of 
responses to obscurely-worded F items. They found, by 
a factor analysis employing orthogonal rotations, that 
ARS contributed 20 per cent, and authoritarian content 
56 per cent, to the variance on the all-positive F Scale. 
(An application of the Chapman-Bock method of analysis of 
variance to the data yielded 55 per cent for ARS and 
per cent for authoritarian content). There is thus a 
substantial correspondence between these conclusions and 
those arrived at by Chapman and Bock (under 1(c)).
lib: Another study employing positive and reversed
T
M. Zuckerman and J. Norton, ’Response Set and Content 
Factors in the California F Scale and the Parental Attitude 
Research Instrument,' Journal of Social Psychology,
55 (1961) pp. 199-210.
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scales other than F Scales, of a kind which has a relevance 
ipso facto to the contamination of all-positive forms 
of the latter by ARS, is that of Chapman and Campbell 
( 1 9 5 9 ) The additional measures here were of 
ethnocentrism. It was demonstrated that all-positive 
measures of F and E correlate significantly more highly 
than did mixed pairs of measures, i.e. F positive and 
E reversed, and F reversed and E positive. F reversed 
and E reversed measures also correlated better than one 
mixed pair, the F reversed with E positive. This finding 
was interpreted as indicating that the homogeneity of 
the direction of the phrasing of items was influential in 
spuriously raising correlations, because of contamination 
of all these measures by ARS, even although ethnocentrism 
scales appeared less affected by ARS than F scales.
Ills In the third type of evidence, scores on the 
all-positive F Scale, as the independent variable, are 
related to separate measures of ARS. Various studies of 
this kind, often in conjunction with experimental designs 
of type la, have been reviewed by Christie et a1. (1958).
Most show moderate correlations of the order of .4 - .5.
r
L.J. Chapman and D.T* Campbell, ’The Effect of Acquiescence 
Response Set upon Relationships among the F Scale, 
Ethnocentrism and Intelligence,' Sociometryt 22 (1959) 
pp. 153-61.
2
R. Christie et al., op. cit.
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Gaier and Bass (1959)* in a study of regional differences, 
found correlations varying from low to moderate between 
the all-positive F Scale and the Bass measure of Social 
Acquiescence (I958).t_ McGee (1962),^ in a study chiefly 
concerned with the generality of the ARS trait (discussed 
in this aspect below), found correlations between the 
all-positive F Scale, and the Bass Social Acquiescence 
Scale, an all-positive F Scale and Couch and Keniston’s 
short measure of ARS (1960),^ strong and moderate 
respectively, in a sample of undergraduates.
This type of evidence is ambivalent in its bearing 
on the relationship of all-positive F Scales with ARS.
On the one hand the covariance between F and ARS scale 
scores could be a function of the unidirectional phrasing 
of the F items; on the other, it might be that acquiescence 
is an aspect of authoritarianism itself, i.e. that F content 
covaries with ARS. If the latter is the case, this research
1
E.L. Gaier and B.M. Bass, ’Regional Differences in 
Interrelations among Authoritarianism, Acquiescence and 
Ethnocentrism,1 Journal of Social Psychology, 49(1959)
pp. 47-51.2
B.M. Bass, 'Famous Sayings Test: General Manual,’
Psychological Reports. 4 (1958)-PP* ^79-97.
5 R.K. McGee, ’The Relationship between Response Styles 
and Other Personality Variables: I. The Measurement of
Social Acquiescence,1 Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 64 (1962) pp. 229-55*4
A. Couch and K. Keniston, op. clt.
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does does not unequivocally show ’contamination* of the 
F measure with ARS, but perhaps a meaningful relation 
of ARS to the F syndrome. (More direct evidence on this 
point is considered below.)
IV: This research is related to type III* but
extends the independent variable in a way which surmounts 
the difficulty discussed above. It involves the comparison 
of the magnitude of correlations between balanced F Scales, 
(i.e. ones with approximately equal numbers of positive 
and reversed items), and ARS, and all-positive measures 
F Scales and ARS. If the correlation is higher in the 
case of all-positive F Scales than with balanced measures, 
the difference is likely to be a function of contamination 
of the all-positive scale by ARS through the format.
Evidence of this kind is uncommon and inconclusive.
Chapman and Campbell (1957)'1 found a slightly higher 
correlation (.43) between an all-positive F Scale and an 
ARS measure than between a balanced F Scale and ARS (.32), 
in a sample of undergraduates (n=l44) . The measure of ARS 
was derived from diverse scales, totalling 74 items, in 
which content factors were balanced out. Couch and Keniston
I ”
L.J. Chapman and D.T. Campbell, ’Response Set in the F 
Scale,’ Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 54 
(1957) pp. 129-32.
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(i960) found significantly different correlations 
between a short positive F Scale and their criterion 
measure of agreement tendency (the Overall Agreement Score), 
and a short balanced F Scale and the OAS. The correlations 
were .37 and .09 respectively, in a small (n=6l) 
undergraduate sample. However, they simultaneously report 
non-significant correlations between both the short positive 
F Scale, and another version of a balanced F Scale, and 
their short ARS measure.
Any assessment of the strength of the evidence for
contamination of the all-positive F Scale by ARS must be
qualified by the fact that most of the research has been
conducted amongst unrepresentative samples of college
students, although there are some important exceptions
2(e.g. Campbell et al. i960). However, since it is 
probable that ARS is negatively related to intellectual 
sophistication (see Shaw 1961),^ the nature of these samples 
is more likely to lead to a conservative, rather an 
extravagant assessment of the contribution of ARS.
An evaluation of the evidence may best be undertaken
1
A. Couch and K. Keniston, op. cit.
2
A. Campbell, et al., op. cit., p. $12.
J> M.E. Shaw, 'Some Correlates of Social Acquiescence,’ 
Journal of Social Psychology, 59 (1961) pp. 133-41.
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in the light of the important and very extensive
critique undertaken by Rorer (1965)1* He is principally
concerned with experimental designs of type I. Having
noted the scanty evidence of ’double-agreement’ (type lb)
he contends that ’double-disagreement’ ’need not be
negativism at all, and may be a perfectly consistent
response to item content for which no concept of response
2bias is required...’
Four main grounds for this contention are advanced:
(i) Double disagreement may not be logically 
inconsistent, particularly in view of the rather general 
and heterogeneous content of both original and reversed 
items.
(ii) Rejection of reversed items, and hence double­
disagreement on content grounds, is more likely when the 
reversed items are extreme, as for example are those of 
Jackson and Messick (1957) ?
(iii) The systematic content of reversed items may 
in any case not correspond with that of the original 
positive ones. Low correlations amongst reversed scales
1
L.G. Rorer, op. clt.
2
Ibid ., p . 135 .
3 D.N. Jackson and S.J. Messick, op. cit.
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have been reported (Mogar, 1960).^
(iv) The fact that reported means are generally 
higher for reversed than for positive F scales also 
suggests a higher frequency of disagreement than agreement.
It must be admitted that there is considerable force 
in Rorer’s critique, which relies essentially on the 
principle of parsimony in seeking an explanation for 
double-negations. His argument is not that the 
response-set position is untenable, but that it introduces 
an unnecessary complication.
However, evidence of type la, lb and Ic, whilst it 
may, in many cases, be attributable to naysaying, is at 
least suggestive and relevant, if disagrement tendency is 
accepted as representing the negative pole of ARS. The 
fact that naysaying may in part be intellectually motivated 
is not a consideration sufficient in itself to defeat its 
relevance, since the evidence indicates that ARS can be 
generated by differing conjunctions of psychological, 
intellectual and situational factors. The crux of the 
matter is whether or not the undeniable response tendency 
in evidence type I, chiefly, but by no means entirely, of 
naysaying, represents an intellectual stance specific to
1
R.E. Mogar, 'Three Versions of the F Scale and Performance 
on the Semantic Differential,’ Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 60 (i960) pp. 252-5.
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the content of the F Scale Items, as Rorer contends, or 
whether or not it reflects an underlying disposition 
related to the ARS continuum.
Evidence of type II is pivotal here, and must influence 
the construction placed on type I. Type II demonstrates 
a relation between scores on the all-positive F Scale, 
and ARS measures based on double-agreement to positive 
and reversed items on other scales (in the case of Ila), 
and systematic response tendencies on another measure 
(here E scales), whether yeasaying or naysaying (in the 
case of lib). In these experiments, response tendencies to 
F Scale items are demonstrably related to yeasaying or 
naysaying tendencies of a general kind. An ARS construct 
thus seems required, and Rorer*s objection that it is not, 
is overcome. His otherwise exhaustive bibliography omits 
a study of type Ila, that by Zuckerman and Norton (1961) 
Evidence lib suggests that, in some degree, the ARS loading 
of F items is specific to item format (i.e. the direction 
of phrasing), and cannot be considered merely a function 
of a general relation between authoritarianism and 
acquiescence.
Rorer*s comments on evidence types III and IV are 
oblique ('There are other studies employing the F scale
M. Zuckerman and J. Norton, op. cit.
1
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which are not so easily appraised’).'*' His disinclination 
to view these as suggestive of the influence of AR3 
seems to stem from a general doubt as to the validity of 
ARS measures. There are some vagaries in the evidence on 
this point, but ones which chiefly serve to emphasize the 
specificity of response sets, and the difficulty of 
measuring them, rather than to justify an overall scepticism.
pCouch and Keniston (i960) derived their criterion measure 
of ARS, the Overall Agreement score (OAS) from p60 
personality scale items, half of which were positive, and 
half reversed. They were able to show a high split-half 
reliability for the OAS, and satisfactory relations between 
the OAS and other ARS measures over a variety of pencil 
and paper tests with responses of the agree-disagree type. 
They derived a short ARS scale from the criterion measure, 
with satisfactory internal consistency. However, the 
correlation between the OAS and the Bass SAS was quite low, 
(.30)^ , although perhaps not very surprising, since the 
approaches of each to the measurement of ARS are dissimilar: 
the SAS attempts to measure ARS directly by testing 
agreement with vacuous aphorisms, whilst the OAS mingles
1
L.G. Rorer, op. cit., p. 137»
2
A. Couch and K. Keniston, op. cit.
Ibid., p. 159*3
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direct measurement of acquiescence with items addressed 
to the empirically determined personality traits of the 
yeasayer. Nevertheless, McGee (1962)^ found moderate 
to strong correlations between the SAS, the all-positive P 
scale and the Couch and Keniston short ARS measure; 
(rSAS-ARS=*51) but little relation between these and 
scores on tests where the respondent guesses the ’true’ 
response in trick tests with no systematic content.
Forehand (1962)2 found little interrelation between AR3 
measures and perseveration, and Siller and Chapman (1962) 
were unable to show a relation between ARS measures and 
social desirability set. Solomon and Klein (1969)^ found 
strong to high correlations (when corrected for attenuation) 
in the expected direction, between the OAS and measures of 
yeasaying and naysaying tendency derived from positive and
1
R.K. McGee, ’The Relationship between Response Styles and 
Personality Variables: I. The’Measurement of Response
Acquiescence,’ Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
64 (1962) pp. 229-99.
2
G.A. Forehand, 'Relationships among Response Sets and 
Cognitive Behaviours,’ Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 22 (1962) pp. 2Ö7-902.
9 J. Siller and A. Chapman, ’Response Set Paralysis: Implica­
tions for Measurement and Control,' American Psychologist,
17 (1962) p. 991 (Abstract).
4
L. Solomon and E. Klein, ’The Relationship between 
Agreeing Response Set and Social Desirability,’ Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66 (1969) PP* 176-9•
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reversed F Scales, in two widely differing samples.
Rorer’s conclusion that ’acquiescence response style
has been made, for all practical purposes, unmeasurable'^
seems unwarranted. The inconsistencies he notes in the
literature are, in many instances, to be anticipated from
a theoretical standpoint. It is not to be expected that
respondents prone to one response set are also given to
all others, e.g. extreme response set and social
desirability set (SD). Quite the contrary: ARS and SD
have frequently been found to be negatively related, and
theoretical explanations have been advanced for this
2(Miklich, 1966). However, it does seem that the stability 
of the measures of ARS is confined to the situation in 
which it is evoked by questionnaires demanding agree-disagree 
responses, including those of the F Scale type. These 
are, in any case, the focus of our concern.
It seems that ARS is a construct difficult to measure, 
and whose influence it is even more difficult to gauge. 
However, the body of assembled evidence, taken together, 
of the intrusive influence of ARS on scores on the all­
positive F scale seems persuasive, even if, in view of 
the paucity of evidence of type II, not quite conclusive.
1
L.G. Rorer, op. cit. , p. 148.
2
D.R. Miklich, op. cit.
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Chapman and Bock's1 23assessment of the extent of the 
contribution of ARS to the variance (about 30 to 40 per 
cent of the total variance) on the all-positive 
authoritar ianism measure is consistent with evidence of 
types II, III and IV, and may therefore be considered 
the best estimate.
The rationale for an unusual degree of extrinsic
influence of ARS on all-positive P Scale scores, as
compared with scores on other self-report measures, has
2been summarized by Peabody (1966). The items are 
intentionally heterogeneous in content and sometimes 
obscure in meaning. The scale as a whole is multi-dimensional 
and particularly dependent on a complex relation of item 
content to a theoretical syndrome. McBride and Moran 
(1967)" have provided direct evidence in support of 
Peabody's position, by showing that double agreement on 
authoritarianism scales is highly dependent upon the 
relative ambiguity of the items involved.
One further objection to the view that ARS variance
1
L.J. Chapman and R.D. Bock, op. cit.
2
D. Peabody, ’Authoritarianism Scales and Response Bias,’ 
Psychological Bulletin, 69 (1966) pp. 11-23.
3 L. McBride and G. Moran, ’Double Agrement as a Function 
of Item Ambiguity and Susceptibility to Demand Implications 
of the Psychological Situation,’ Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 6 (1967) PP• lip”8»
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'contaminates' the all-positive F Scale requires 
examination. There are empirical indications that some 
degree of acquiescence is intrinsically associated with the 
F syndrome. The data of Chapman and Campbell (1957)^
(see above, IV) support this view. Eysenck (1962)^ found 
an ARS factor derived from a balanced F measure to be 
related to the content of the same scale. Zuckerrnan and 
Eisen (1962)^ found moderate relationships between a 
measure of ARS, the Bass SAS, and a response-set free 
measure of F (derived from short essays), in a small sample.
j.
Solomon and Klein (1963) found a low relation between 
Couch and Keniston's OAS and a balanced F Scale in a 
sample of students (n=l'35), but no relation in a sample of 
schizophrenics (n=125). However, Clayton and Jackson 
(1961)^ found no relation between scores on two balanced F 
Scales, and ARS scores derived therefrom. Earlier work 
by Leavitt, Hax and Roche (1955)^ and Gage, Leavitt and
1
L. J. Chapman and D.T. Campbell, op. cit.
2
H.J. Eysenck, 'Response Set, Authoritarianism and 
Personality Questionnaires,' British Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology, 1 (1962) pp. 20-24.
3 M. Zuckerrnan and B. Eisen, 'Relationship of Acquiescence 
Response Set to Authoritarianism and Dependency,' Psychological 
Reports, 10 (1962) pp. 95-102.
L. Solomon and E. Klein, op. cit.
5 M. B. Clayton and D.N. Jackson, op. cit.
6 H.J. Leavitt, H. Hax and J.H. Roche, op. cit.
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Stone (1957/ argued an intrinsic relation between the 
F syndrome and ARS, relying chiefly on the unsatisfactory 
ground of evidence types I and III, as well as the narrower 
variance of reversed F Scales, which may reflect the 
conflicting pressures of set and content. Their chief 
conceptual ground for the association of ARS with the F 
syndrome is that ARS seems to be a likely correlate of 
’authoritarian submission*.
The empirical evidence is thus suggestive of a low 
covariance between balanced F Scales and measures of ARS 
in some samples, and so of a minor degree of intrinsic 
association, but one not sufficient to account for the 
major contribution, almost equal to that of content, of 
ARS to the variance on all-positive F Scales. Most of the 
influence of ARS on the all-positive F Scale seems therefore 
likely to be extrinsic, i.e. specific to the format and 
not the content of the scale, and hence to represent 
’contamination.’
6. Acquiescent Response Set and the Correlates of the F Scale
Whether, and in what ways, research on the correlates 
of authoritarianism has been corrupted by the contamination 
of the all-positive F Scale by ARS depends on two factors:
I
N.L. Gage, G.S. Leavitt and G.S. Stone, 'The Psychological 
Meaning of Acquiescence Set for Authoritarianism,’ Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 55 (1957) PP. 93-103.
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(a) Whether or not other all-positive, or 
predominantly positive, self-report measures are 
similarly contaminated by ARS; and
(b) the personality correlates of ARS itself.
Both are capable of spuriously raising or lowering 
relationships. The first question is considered here.
Where possible, the type of evidence will be indicated
by reference to the methodological paradigms described above. 
6.1. Scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (MMPI) and ARS
The MMPI scales differ strikingly in the proposition
of items keyed ’true’ and ’false1. Where all, or nearly
all, are keyed in one direction, it is possible that ARS
may influence scores. Item-reversal studies of type la
are capable of establishing a prima facie case for ARS
contamination. However, research of this kind, reviewed
by Dicken (1967),1 has ’yielded high correlations between
original and reversed items and/or scales, evidence which
contradicts the acquiescence hypothesis’. Moreover, Block 
2(1965) has shown that the factorial structure of the MMPI
1 C. Dicken, ’”Acquiescence” in the MMPI: A Method Variance
Artifact?’ Psychological Reports, 20 (1967) pp. 927“23.
2
J. Block, The Challenge of Response Sets: Unconfounding
Meaning, Acquiescence and Social Desirability in the MMPI 
(New York, 1965) esp. chs. 2 and 5.
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remains the same when acquiescence-free scales are 
factored. A further .item-reversal study by Dicken 
(1967)1 indicated that little, if any, of the variance 
of the original MMPI items can be attributed to ARS.
It might be conjectured that MMPI items are less 
likely to attract ARS than F Scale-type items because they 
are shorter, less obscure, and more immediately relevant 
to the experience of the respondent.
In this area, contamination of the all-positive F Scale 
is thus likely to have lowered rather than raised systematic 
correlations between personality factors and authoritarianism, 
except for those with the personality correlates of ARS 
itself.
6.2. Anxiety Scales and ARS»
The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS) (Taylor,pi953) ’> which is predominantly (59 of 50 items) positive, 
seems uninfected by ARS. Chapman and Campbell (1959)^* 
in an item-reversal study of type la, found a high 
correlation between positive and reversed scales of the same
1
C. Dicken, op. cit.
2
J.A. Taylor, ’A Personality Scale of Manifest Anxiety,1 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 48 (1955) 
pp. 285-90.
5 L.J. Chapman and D.T. Campbell, * Absence of Acquiescence 
Response Set in the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale,1 Journal 
of Consulting Psychology, 25 (1959) PP• 465-6.
206
order as the reliability of each. Adams and Kirby 
(1963)^ achieved similar results in a study of the same 
kind, and also found a zero relation between ARS and 
content scores derived from the TMAS, suggesting no 
intrinsic' covariation.
The MPI (Maudsley Personality Inventory - Eysenck 
1959) 24-item Neuroticism scale is all-positive, but a 
factor-analytical study by Eysenck (1962)^ suggests that 
it, too, is uncontaminated by ARS. Tne ARS factor was 
derived from positive and reversed F Scales, and had a 
negligible loading on the Neuroticism Scale.
The reasons for the lack of ARS contamination of these 
is presumably the same as for the MMPI scales, which they 
closely resemble.
6.3* Ethnocentrism Scales and ARS
The evidence here suggests that ethnocentrism scales 
have some covariance with ARS, but less than the all-positive
1 H.E. Adams and A.C. Kirby, ’Manifest Anxiety, Social 
Desirability or Response Set,’ Journal of Consulting 
Psychology, 27 (1963) pp. 59-61.
2
H.J. Eysenck, The Maudsley Personality Inventory, 
(London, 1959)•
3 H.J. Eysenck, ’Response Set, Authoritarianism and 
Personality Questionnaires,’ British Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology, 1 (1962) pp. 20-24.
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F Scale. Chapman and Campbell (1959) found no evidence 
for ARS covariance in a study of type la; but simultaneously 
report evidence of type lib from the same sample, which 
suggests some ARS contamination. Peabody (1961)^ 
found high correlations between positive and reversed 
anti-Semitism scales, and evidence of only minor double­
agreement tendencies (type lib). Gaier and Bass (1959)^ 
present evidence in some samples of low covariance with the 
Bass SAS measure (type III), but do not show it to be 
extrinsic.
6.4. The Dogmatism Scale and ARS
The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, 1956),^ which 
is all-positive, seems to be related to ARS to about the 
same extent as the all-positive F Scale.
Couch and Keniston (i960)5 found a moderate relation
1
L. J. Chapman and D.T. Campbell, ’The Effect of Acquiescence 
Response Set upon Relationships among the F Scale, 
Ethnocentrism and Intelligence,’ Sociometry, 22 (1959)
pp. 155-61.
2
D. Peabody, ’Attitude Content and Agreement Set in Scales 
of Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, Anti-Semitism and Economic 
Conservatism,' Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
65 (1961) pp. 1-11.5 E. L. Gaier and B.M. Bass, op. cit.
4
M. Rokeach, ’political and Religious Dogmatism: An
Alternative to the Authoritarian Personality,’ Psychological 
Monographs, 70 (1956) No. 18, pp. 1-45. Whole No. 425.
5 A. Couch and K. Keniston, op. cit.
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(.40) between their OAS measure and the Dogmatism Scale, 
partly attributable, in their view, to intrinsic covariance 
(evidence type III). Peabody (1961)1 23 (type lb) found only 
low correlations between positive and reversed Dogmatism 
Scales, and substantial indications of double agreement.
The data for the Dogmatism measure correspond closely 
with those for ? Scales, and suggest extrinsic contamination. 
McBride and Moran (1 9 6 7) found judged item ambiguity to be 
as closely related to double-agreement on the Dogmatism 
Scale as on the F Scale. Rokeach (i9 6 0, 1 9 6 3 )^  has 
advanced conceptual arguments why ARS might be expected 
to play only a minor role, if any, in influencing 
Dogmatism Scale scores, but little empirical evidence.
His proposals are chiefly that the variety of the 
correlates of the Dogmatism measure would be hard to 
account for on purely response set grounds, and that a 
set to fake only reversed items may account for Peabody’s 
data. The first of these arguments is insufficient to 
negate the hypothesis of some ARS contamination of the
1
D. Peabody, op. cit.
2
L. McBride and G. Moran, op. cit.
3 M. Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, (New York, i9 6 0)
pp. 405-7j and M . Rokeach, 'The Double Agreement 
Phenomenon: Three Hypotheses’, Psychological Review,
70 (1963) PP. 304-9.
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positive measure, and the second is less parsimonious 
than the hypothesis he attacks.
The correlation between the Dogmatism Scale and the 
positive F Scale may well be inflated by ARS contamination 
of both instruments.
The various measures correlated with the F Scale 
thus seem to be ranged along a continuum of ARS 
susceptibility, strong in the case of measures of complex 
social attitudes, moderate in prejudice scales, and weak 
in personality indices. The ways in which research 
into the personality correlates of the F syndrome might 
have been corrupted are considered below.
7• The Significance of the Contamination of the F Scale
by Acquiescent Response Set
The significance of ARS contamination of the F Scale 
emerges in four main ways.
(i) Research into the correlates of authoritarianism 
may be corrupted by covariance of positive F measures and 
others with ARS. The danger of this is particularly marked 
in the case of complex attitudinal measures with social 
referents, such as all-positive alienation and anomia 
scales.
(ii) Contamination of the all-positive F Scale by 
ARS is likely to have lowered rather than raised systematic 
correlations between personality factors and authoritarianism, 
except for those with the personality correlates of ARS
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itself.
(iii) It is also possible for researchers to have 
unknowingly described the correlates of ARS, when 
reporting the correlates of a positive F measure, if 
ARS is a stable personality trait with its own correlates. 
Couch and Keniston (i960)1 found their criterion measures 
of ARS (the OAS) to be related positive and significantly 
to a large number of sub-scales of the MMPI, including 
those measuring prejudice and dependency, and to those 
scales of Cattell’s 16 PF measure which contribute to 
his anxiety factor, in a sample of 6l undergraduates.
The significance of the fact that these are amongst the 
most commonly found correlates of the F syndrome, as 
measured by positive scales, hardly requires emphasis.
As the MMPI itself does not seem to be much infected by 
ARS, these correlates of ARS are unlikely to be artifacts 
of the research procedure. Of particular importance are 
the association of weak ego strength and anxiety with ARS.
The relation of the OAS to the Catteli anxiety measure 
was not tested, but one might infer that it would probably 
be of the order of .40. The reliability of the OAS was 
reported to be .85. The correlation of the anxiety 
measure with a ’pure' measure of ARS might therefore
A. Couch and K. Keniston, op. cit.
1
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be expected to be of the order of .45, i;e. they would 
share about 20 per cent of their variance. The contribution 
of ARS to the total variance of the all-positive F Scale 
seems likely to fluctuate from sample to sample, but 
generally to be between 20 and 40 per cent. Between 
4 and 8 per cent of the variance would thus be likely 
to be shared by such an anxiety measure as this, as a 
result of the covariance with ARS. This would generate 
correlations of the order .20 to .^0. Correlations 
between all-positive F Scales and anxiety measures within 
this range may thus be attributable to contamination of 
all-positive F by ARS, even when non-positive measures of 
anxiety have been employed.
Kirscht and Dillehay^ in their review of the literature 
relating the F syndrome to anxiety and neuroticism 
found no studies relating balanced or forced-choice F Scales 
to anxiety, and no studies with the positive F Scale whose 
outcome could not be accounted for, in the light of the 
analysis here, by covariance with ARS.
There is thus no substantial evidence for an intrinsic 
relation between the authoritarian syndrome and manifest 
anxiety, which would lend support to its genotypical 
characterization as unstable, possessed of a weak ego,
J.P. Kirscht and R.C. Dillehay, op. clt.
1
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and confronting deep internal conflicts with defence 
mechanisms which are only fragile and easily overborne.
The commonly employed positive measures are, indeed, 
probably incapable of verifying the genotypical features 
of the construct.
(iv) The AR3 loading on the positive F Scale may 
account, in some degree, for the correlations between 
the items themselves. This throws doubt on the cohesiveness 
of the syndrome, and so even on the stability of the 
construct viewed phenotypically. Whilst there is 
undoubtedly some intrinsic covariation between some of 
the items, it is not clear that the inclusion of all 
of the sub-scales of the original measure can be justified. 
Chapman and Campbell (1959)^ using a balanced ethnocentrism 
scale as a criterion, found no justification for the 
inclusion of anti-intraception as an F sub-scale.
Peabody (1966), having noted evidence presented by 
Campbell et al. (1960)^ of the poverty and primitiveness 
of political attitudes in the general population, and the 
low proportion of their national sample (12 per cent) 
showing evidence of using any ideological dimension,
1 “
L.J. Chapman and D.T. Campbell, op. cit.
2
D. Peabody, ’Authoritarianism Scales and Response 
Bias,* Psychological Bulletin, 65 (i960) pp. li-23.
2 Campbell et al. op. cit.tp. .
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concludes that ’social scientists who have been interested 
in the theories of authoritarianism... have tended to 
project the complexity of their own views onto their 
subjects'. This conclusion seems unnecessarily nihilistic, 
and to mistake evidence of the scarcity of ideological 
viewpoints, which are in some degree intellectually 
determined, for lack of evidence of the influence of 
psychological factors, which do not involve intellectual 
processes to the same extent.
However, there is some justice in his rebuke.
The defects of the chief measure of authoritarianism, the 
consequent confusion in identifying the construct, and the 
perils of generalizing from samples of undergraduates, 
student nurses, convicts and schizophrenics to the 
population at large should by now be manifest. There is 
no avoiding the necessity of the application of an 
adequate measure to representative extra-mural samples, 
difficult to obtain as they may be.
8. Other Measures of Authoritarianism: Are They
Satisfactory?
In arriving at an adequate measure, the positive 
F Scale is a dubious criterion instrument, since it is 
likely to infect the derived scale with ARS, or indicate 
the personality correlates of ARS. The use of balanced
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scales, employing the various reversals together with 
a version of the positive scale, has several disadvantages:
(i) The positive and reversed items will he 
individually influenced by ARS, and it is unlikely that 
this will be precisely 'balanced out'. Apart from the 
hazards of the balancing procedure, there is a systematic 
reason for this. Variance on the positive scale is 
influenced by one component, the interaction between
set and content, which is unlikely to have a counterpart 
on the reversed version, because these two elements are 
there in conflict.
(ii) Respondents with extreme yeasaying or naysaying 
tendencies will tend to score at the mean. This might 
well produce spurious correlations with other balanced 
measures where the individual items might be susceptible 
to ARS, e.g. ethnocentrism and alienation scales.
(iii) A single statement, with which the respondent 
is asked to agree or disagree, is not always a clear guide 
to the nature of the item continuum on which the 
respondent has to place himself. Respondents may reject 
items because of verbal quibbles which have little to do 
with the statement's main tendency. Some of the reversed 
F Scale items are puzzling when standing alone, since 
they are constructed as ripostes to the originals. A
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forced-choice paired-alternative item is geometrically 
more complete, since it identifies a continuum by two 
positions, not one. It thus clarifies the item for the
respondent and the response for the analyst.
*  * *
The most satisfactory measure of authoritarianism so 
far presented seems to be that of Berkowitz and Wolkon 
(1964).^ They paired 25 original F Scale items with the 
reversals of Bass (1955)2  ^ and Christie et al. (1958)/* 
in order to constitute two forced-choice F Scales, FCB 
and FCC respectively. The reliabilities, in two college 
samples, were .41 and .71 for the FCB, and .59 and .69 
for the FCC. The positive F Scale was used as a validating 
criterion, and both forced-choice forms had satisfactory 
correlations with it, ranging from .69 to .84.
Whilst these scales have the advantage of preserving 
a relation to the sophisticated psychodynamic theory 
underlying the all-positive F Scale, some imperfections 
in the method of constructing these forced-choice instruments 
are evident. The Bass reversals are merely semantic 
reversals of the originals, frequently inserting simple
1 “
N.H. Berkowitz and G.H. Wolkon, ’A Forced-Choice Form 
of the F Scale - Free of Acquiescent Response Set,1 
Sociometry, 27 (1964) pp. 54-65.
2
B.M. Bass, op. cit.
R. Christie, et al., op. cit.5
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negations, and so often leave an anti-authoritarian 
position something of a mystery for the respondent: 
whilst the Christie et al. reversals were deliberately 
phrased to impart a probabilistic, guarded and cautious 
item tone, which has been shown (Couch and Keniston, 
i960) to provoke the yeasayer to his rare disagreements.
The two halves of the FCC items may thus attract AR3 
differentially: those with high ARS may tend to agree
more with the positive halves, which are more crisp and 
exclamatory, and frequently incorporate familiar 
sayings. There is a strong case for tightly-constructed 
and substantive reversals, which put an exclamatory gloss 
on probabilistic content, where this seems desirable.
A more electic approach to the selection of reversed items 
from available reversed scales, or their construction 
ad hoc, could be justified in these terms.
Berkowitz and Wolkon do not report item characteristics. 
This seems necessary in order to demonstrate that items 
representing all sub-scales are related to the construct.
A forced-choice ethnocentrism scale would be a more 
satisfactory criterion measure than the all-positive F 
Scale.
A. Couch and K. Keniston, op. cit.
1
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9. The Requirements of an Adequate Measure of a Dispositional 
Construct
Research into dispositional constructs, especially 
complex and multidimensional ones which are of use in 
clarifying types of social interaction, can be 
extensively corrupted by their measuring instruments 
if adequate precautions are not taken in building the 
measure. It is therefore necessary, on occasion, to 
interrupt the superficial continuity of social research 
by reconstituting or modifying the original measures, 
if these prove to be clearly unsatisfactory. The history 
of research into the authoritarian personality construct 
suggests that the following precautions are amongst those 
desirable in building, or rebuilding, measurement scales:
(i) The influence of response sets should be 
demonstrably negligible.
Forced-choice paired-alternative scales have the 
advantage of escaping contamination by acquiescent response 
set, if the two halves of each item are generally matched 
for ’tone'.
If responses are dichotomised, that is, respondents 
are directed to make a choice between the two halves 
of each item without indicating gradations of agreement,
then the score will not be infected by extreme response
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set. Peabody (1962) has demonstrated that dichotomization 
of response categories does not appreciably affect 
results on the F Scale. The successful construction of 
forced-choice measures will be facilitated if items 
attracting an ’undecided’ response on a-permissive pilot 
run can be omitted.
It is possible that a positional response set (e.g. 
a set to choose the first half-item of each pair) may be 
influential on paired-alternative measures. Berkowitz
pand Wolkon (1964) have foreshadowed a concern with this, 
but its contingent influence has not, as yet, been 
explored in the literature. The 'ends’ of the scale can 
be purified by random alternation of the item halves, 
thus forcing those under a strong set to score in the 
middle range. Respondents who appear to display a strong 
positional response set can be extracted from the sample.
Contamination of a paired-alternative measure by 
social desirability set is possible if the construct 
dictates a stance on each item which is markedly socially 
attractive or unattractive. This is difficult to offset, 
but can be done by matching half-items for social
1
D. Peabody, ’Two Components in Bi-Polar Scales:
Direction and Extremeness,’ Psychological Review, 69*
(1962) pp. 65-75.2
N.B. Berkowitz and G.H. Wolkon, op. cit.
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desirability i.e, by forcing the respondent to choose 
between two equally attractive or unattractive half-items. 
This may demand considerable ingenuity on the part of the 
test-builder, particularly since the concept of what is 
socially desirable or undesirable may vary from group 
to group or person to person (See Wiggins, 1966).^
(ii) Items, and sets of items, should have a 
coherent hypothetical relation to the structure of the 
construct.
This consideration applies especially if the 
structure of the construct is merely speculatively 
defined. The. hypothesised relationship should be 
supported by a detailed empirical item analysis. Criterion 
measures need not be narrowly conceived: for example,
ethnocentrism scales as well as existing measures of 
authoritarianism may be used in reconstructing an 
authoritarianism measure. In the case of such constructs 
as ’alienation1, where no universally acceptable criterion 
groups are available, sets of items should be capable of 
representing the various dispositions regarded in the 
theoretical literature as aspects of the generic term.
(iii) The construct to be measured should be shown
I "
N. Wiggins, ’individual Viewpoints of Social Desirability,{ 
Psychological Bulletin, 66 (1966) pp. 68-77«
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to have an identity separate from that of other constructs.
If this condition is not met, researchers may find 
that they are needlessly multiplying supposed constructs, 
and sometimes reifying entities not distinct from ones 
previously explored.
Two techniques may be useful here. Firstly, the 
method of partial correlations can be incorporated in an 
item or sub-scale analysis. For example, or order to 
show that a scale designed to measure alienation does 
not cohere merely because its items are all oblique 
indicators of anxiety, the relationships of each item, or 
sub-scale, with anxiety should be partialled out in 
examining their relations with each other and the 
construct as a whole. Secondly, factor analysis can be 
employed. Responses to items supposed to represent a 
disparate construct may be factor-analyzed in the company 
of responses to an assembly of other items representing 
other related constructs. The factor loadings should 
turn out to be grouped in such a way as to show that 
scales, or candidate scales, under examination are 
measuring entities demonstrably distinct from each other. 
The employment of orthogonal rotations is a strong test
of this.
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(iv) The scales should be standardized on variegated, 
if not representative, samples of normals.
The application of scales to moderately large 
samples of this kind may provide norms against which 
deviant samples can properly be evaluated.
10. Alienation; An Uncertain Construct
The career of attitudinai research into ’alienation’ 
proclaims other kinds of problems in identifying a 
construct than those encountered in the exploration of 
authoritarianism.
One problem is unavoidable; attitudinai research 
can tell only half the story, since alienation is understood 
as a situation of the individual, defined by objective 
social conditions, as well as an array of sentiments 
arising out of this situation. In the nature of 
things, a dispositional scale can indicate only whether 
the respondent feels alienated, not whether he is 
alienated. A full-scale analysis therefore requires an 
investigation of the respondent’s environments of work, 
leisure and creative activity, as well as measurement of 
his sentiments. Researchers into alienation or satisfaction 
in the work situation have not been inclined to the use 
of dispositional scales, but have sometimes employed 
extensive questionnaires to gauge workers’ attitudes.
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These survey instruments are often discursive in
2 2character (e.g. Blauner, (1964) , and Goldthorpe (1966)).
The main point at which rigorous attitudinal scales 
can presently make a contribution to knowledge in the 
field is in clarifying the degree to which the various 
subjective sentiments of ’alienation’ are empirically 
associated with each other; that is, in the discovery 
of whether or not ’alienation’, in so far as the term 
refers to subjective sentiments, is a unitary dispositional 
construct, or merely a cover term for a variety of 
unconnected dispositions.
Subjective sentiments, consciously felt in some way 
by the individual, play a large part in the philosophical
literature of alienation, but it is not assumed that he
#
sees them as connected, or that he is aware of his total 
situation; rather the reverse.
The principal authorities are agreed that a tenacious 
sense of estrangement from society is central to the 
concept, arising variously from social breakdown, malfunction 
or disintegration, systematic tyranny in the social system 
or the individual’s blameworthy incompetence. Marx^ is
1
R. Blauner, Alienation and Freedom, (Chicago, 1964).
2
J.H. Goldthorpe, ’Attitudes and Behaviour of Car Assembly 
Workers: A Deviant Case and a Theoretical Critique,’
British Journal of Sociology, 17 (1966) pp. 227'-44.
3 Cf. L.A. Coser and B. Rosenberg, Sociological Theory,(New York, 1964) pp. 521-5.
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concerned with the proletarians1 experience of 
powerlessness in a tyrannical and inefficient social 
system, the separation of the worker from the product 
of his work by complex divisions of labour, an associated 
but not identical loss of ’charm* in the work to be done, 
and the replacement of personal bonds by the cash nexus.
Men are seen in various postures of despair and discontent, 
as the creatures of their own putative creatures. This 
conception follows that of Feuerbach and Hegel, who 
characterized man as the captive of tyrannical religious 
and social ideas which he himself has created and continues 
to sustain . Dürkheim, Merton and Parsons^ explored the 
psychological impact of rapid social changes which are 
held to sweep away the basis of traditional values and to 
leave individuals with a sense of social deregulation, or 
’anomie’, strangers in an unstructured universe, which 
offers both more and less than they do or do not have a right 
to expect. ’Anomie’ is seen as a particular condition 
central to the wider concept of ’alienation’.
These appraisals of the nature of social changes 
and the concurrent individual malaise which, it is suggested, 
will accompany them, thus incorporate predictions about
1
Cf. E. Karnenka, The Ethical Foundations of Marxism,
(London, 1962) p. 60.
2
L.A. Coser and B. Rosenberg, op. cit., pp. 539-61.
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the likely atti tudes of persons and groups which invite 
empirical endorsement. It is worth remark that none 
of the authorities confines his analysis only to attitudes 
immediate to changes in the social system, that is, to 
mere judgments by the individual as to whether the 
system is functioning well or badly. They all pursue 
notions of the psychological consequences of social tyranny 
or deregulation, and discuss them as of the same genus 
as partial awareness of an actual change in the social 
system. Earlier writers followed the same habits. Vico,1 2
a philosopher of history of the mid-eighteenth century, 
remarked of the people in those new cities which could 
acquire no coherent civil order ’....in the midst of their 
greatest festivities, though physically thronging together, 
they live like wild beasts in a deep solitude of spirit 
and will, scarcely any two being able to agree since each 
follows his own pleasure or caprice.... through obstinate 
factions and desperate civil wars, they shall turn their 
cities into forests and the forests into dens and lairs 
of men.’
Seeman (1959) has presented an“.analysis of the 
philosophical literature of alienation which is useful
1
T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch, The New Science of Giambattista 
Vico, (New York, 1948) p. 581.
2
M. Seeman, ’On the Meaning of Alienation’, American 
Sociological Review, 24 (1959) pp. 7Ö5-91«
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as a starting point for the construction of items 
related to alienated sentiments. Ke proposes five 
logically distinguishable usages of the term, each of 
which he re-states, somewhat awkwardly, in the language 
of learning theory. These are given below, along with 
a critical appreciate ion: -
(i) Powerlessness: ’The expectancy or probability
held by the individual that his own behaviour cannot 
determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements, 
which he seeks.’
Concern with this aspect of alienation is regarded 
as stemming from Marx’s conception of the wage worker 
as being ’separated' from the means of production, a 
conception extended by Weber to other individuals in a 
modern industrial society, who become functionaries 
rather than creative agents.
Seernan opines that this meaning need have no 
normative implication, nor, as a definitional matter, an 
implication that the individual actually feels frustrated. 
But this latter interpretation seems untenable. Obviously 
individuals rarely expect their behaviour to encompass all 
that they hope for. This meaning can only escape a 
description of universal disappointments if it is addressed 
to the frustration of what can in some way be regarded,
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by the actor or observer, in the given society, as 
at least approximate to legitimate aspirations.
This aspect of alienation will therefore be construed 
as a sentiment of the individual that his legitimate 
aspirations are being frustrated by an exploiting class, 
or just a spooky ’They*, some sort of personal agency; 
or to a sentiment of being frustrated by social conditions, 
perhaps obscurely perceived, i.e. by impersonal agency.
(ii) Meaninglessness; ’Low expectancy that satisfactory 
predictions about future outcomes of behaviour can be made.’
The language of learning theory is here itself 
unclear. Seeman proposes also that ’meaninglessness' 
can be defined as a situation where ’The individual is 
unclear as to what he ought to believe - when the 
individual’s minimal standards for clarity in decision 
making are not met.’ Mannheim is cited as the chief 
commentator on this condition, and it is clear that it 
comprehends moral as much as intellectual confusion.
(iii) Norrnlessness: ’High expectancy that socially
unapproved behaviours are required to achieve given goals.’
The chief commentators cited here are Merton and 
Goffman; Marx might well have been added. The sentiment 
is close to that of ’meaninglessness’, and indeed can 
be seen as an outcome of a social condition which engenders
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feelings of 1 powerlessness1 and ’meaninglessness*. 
’Normlessness* thus represents a hostility to a purely 
instrumental attitude to means of achieving social goals, 
which is seen to be widespread but not formally endorsed 
by the accepted moral code. This formulation of 
’normlessness*, like Seeman’s conception of * powerlessness *, 
is very broad, and perhaps could be usefully constrained 
by emphasis on the Marxian view that meaningful human 
links are under threat from the development of the cash 
nexus in society, the replacement of gemeinschaft by 
gesellschaft.
(iv) Isolation: The alienated ’assign low reward
value to goals or beliefs that are typically highly valued 
in the given society*.
Here, Seeman suggests that isolation should be confined 
to hostility or dissent from the reigning value of 
society as a whole. This follows from his general view 
that alienation should be seen in relation only to the 
macro-society, which has certain difficulties. Firstly, 
it fails to differentiate adequately his conceptions of 
'normlessness* and ’isolation*. Secondly, simple folk 
commonly perceive an isolation arising out of a lack of 
common outlook (the core of this sentiment of alienation) 
as an aspect of their immediate social environment, and
228
are incapable of making sophisticated judgements about 
the macro-society; indeed, if subjective alienation is 
a unitary construct, then a sense of meaninglessness may 
well prevent this.
This sentiment will therefore be extended to 
isolation from the smaller social group where this arises 
out of social distrust or a lack of identification with 
group norms.
(v) Self-estrangement: Alienation in this aspect
is defined by Seeman as ’The degree of dependence of the 
given behaviour upon anticipated future rewards’, meaning 
that an individual may do things not for their own sake. 
Fromm is quoted as defining the condition as ’a mode 
of experience in which the person experiences himself 
as an alien’. What is implied in this somewhat cryptic 
term is a sense that the individual cannot develop and 
display an integrated personality which commands his own 
respect, and is socially driven to a form of role-playing
which he privately despises.
* * *
Seeman’s categories of meaning for the subjective 
sense of alienation, as modified in the light of this 
critique, will serve as a basis for the construction of
scale items for each sentiment.
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Empirical research using measures of subjective 
alienation and anomia has not yet determined whether 
or not the five sentiments of alienation discussed above 
are part of a unitary and unique attitudinal construct.
There are two main reasons for this.
(i) With one exception, they have employed all-positive, 
or nearly all-positive scales and sub-scales, which might
be expected to exhibit a spurious unity because of 
covariance with ARS. However, Neal and Rettig (1963)^ 
found a correlation between a paired-alternative measure 
of * powerlessness’ and a balanced measure of ’normlessness’ 
in a large (n=609) urban sample, which cannot be accounted 
for by ARS contamination. No relation was found between 
either of these measures and an all-positive scale tapping 
anomia, devised by Srole (1956).
The construction of paired-alternative items for the 
five sentiments, and an examination of their interrelations, 
is thus indicated for the clarification of the nature of 
the concept.
(ii) Most of the sentiments of alienation are 
related to anxiety (see below, Table 6.2). It is thus 
possible for responses to alienation items to covary with 
each other for this reason alone. Furthermore, this makes
1
A.G. Neal and S. Rettig, ’Dimensions of Alienation 
amongst Manual and Non-Manual Workers,1 American Sociological 
Review, 28 (1969) pp. 599~608.
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questionable the conception of alienation as a disparate 
construct, since it could be objected that it may better 
be regarded as a social modality of anxiety.
The solution to this problem lies in the examination 
of the relation between measures of alienated sentiments 
when their covariance with anxiety is removed. This 
can be done by the method of partial correlations. If 
the residual correlations between the sub-scales are 
statistically significant and non-trivial, then the 
construct can be said to be unitary. Another useful 
general exercise is the factor analysis of a large number 
of items designed to measure authoritarianism, alienation, 
anxiety and ethnocentrism, specifying orthogonal relations, 
to see whether the factor loadings of the items suggest 
that these constructs are, in fact, empirically disparate.
11. Ethnocentrism in the Australian Context
Scales constructed overseas for the measurement of 
ethnocentrism often require extensive adaptation for 
Australian use, and it seemed better to begin at the
beginning. The ’target’ minority groups selected were 
Greeks, Italians and Jews. Japanese were also included, 
but failed to attract sufficient hostility. Paired-alternative 
items were invented to relate to social distance from, 
and intolerance and derogatory misconception of each
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target group. Only the last of these sentiments is 
strictly 'prejudice’.
English and English^ define ethnocentrism, in its 
stricter sense as ’a hypothesized syndrome of underlying 
attitudes that involve the following: division of the
social world into in-groups with which one identifies 
and to which one submits and out-groups to which one is 
hostile; positive stereotypy of the former and negative 
stereotypy of the latter; and the arrangement of the 
in-groups and out-groups into an evaluative hierarchy in 
which the former are always dominant and the latter always 
subordinate.1 It should be noted that such a syndrome 
can only be inferred from the scale score, since the scale 
does not range over all the attitudes spelt out in the 
above definition; for example, positive stereotypy of the 
in-group was not included. The intent was to focus the 
scale content on hostility to, and negative stereotypy of 
named out-groups.
Not all unfavourable conceptions of identifiable 
minority groups are untrue. An attempt was made, in 
constructing item halves which reflected derogatory 
misconception (stemming, hypothetically, from negative 
stereotypy) to offer statements with a certain currency,
H.B. English and A.C. English, op. cit., p. 189*
1
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but which were, as far as possible, demonstrably false.
These items require some detailed discussion. A general 
reference should be made to the works by Medding^ and 
Price^, for portraits of the Southern European and Jewish 
communities. Jupp^ has a good general discussion of the 
position of migrants in Australia.
The ethnocentric item-halves of items 5, 6, and 7* 
set out in Exhibit 6.3* are supposed to reflect derogatory 
mistake in the case of Italians. Item 5, ('street brawls’) 
obtains its currency from press reports of street brawls 
between Italian migrants and Australians in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. In the main, what are now Italian 
neighbourhoods are peaceful, and Italians have a comparatively 
low rate of violent crime in Australia.
Item 6 (’turn the districts they live in into slums’) 
appears the reverse of the truth. Down-at-heel neighbour­
hoods, such as Carlton, in Melbourne, have often in fact 
been rescued from slum status by the regeneration of their 
residential and shopping facilities, and the opening of a
1
P.Y. Medding, From Assimilation to Group Survival, 
(Melbourne, 19687”.
2
C.A. Price, Jewish Settlers in Australia, (Canberra, 1964) 
and C.A. Price, Southern Europeans in Australia. (Melbourne, 
1963).5 J. Jupp, Arrivals and Departures, (Melbourne, 1966) esp. 
pp. 64-82.
multiplicity of good cafes by Italian migrants since 
the mid 1950s.
Item 7 ('admire elegance and good manners') is of 
course hard to verify, but is apparently true in relation 
to aspiration« Italian migrants tend often to be 
deferential to Australians.
Item 11, derogatory of Greeks ('seem to be content 
with a lower standard of living than most Australians') 
is contrary to the account of industriousness and attempts 
at upward social mobility given by Price.
Item 12, derogatory (by implication) of Southern 
Europeans generally ('will take over the country') is 
intended to be violent in tone and wildly untrue, as 
Southern Europeans mainly enter the lower ranks of the 
manual work force, and are not prominent in non-migrant 
organizations. Greeks have a greater tendency than Italians 
to aspire to higher education, but they are not numerous 
in Universities.
Items 15-17 refer to derogatory misconceptions of Jews.
Item 15 ('have too much power and influence') is, 
in its literal sense, unverifiable, since what is 'too 
much' must be a value judgement. If it is loosely construed 
to mean a ’great deal of influence’, or a ’dominant 
influence,’ it does not seem to be true, since, whilst Jews
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are disproportionately numerous in petty commerce, the 
professions and academic life, they do not command much 
influence in banking, big industry, the stock exchange or 
politics.
Item 16 (’if Jewish people are interested in education, 
it is probably so they can use it to make more money’) 
has an element of truth, as one quickly sees if one 
substitutes ’Australians’ for ’Jewish people.’ However, as 
in Jewish communities elsewhere in the world, the 
traditional Jewish reverence for scholarly endeavour and 
’high’ culture is evident. There is ardent patronage of 
the theatre, and support of chamber music organizations, for 
example. The other half of this item (’place great value 
on education and culture’) is a fairer statement.
Item 17 (’are less honest and public-spirited than 
most’) is in its first part the least verifiable derogatory 
statement, except through some highly unlikely programme 
of situational tests. To endorse it, however, would seem 
to entail at least a hazardous extension of impressions 
gained from limited experience. The latter part (’ [less] 
public-spirited’) is contradicted by the many honours 
bestowed on notable Jews for public service, such as the 
one-time Governor-General, Sir Isaac Isaacs.
On Item 18, (’seem to keep their money for their own 
charities’) there is contrary public evidence. Each year,
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in Melbourne, the press publishes donations given in 
places of public worship on Hospital Sunday, when money 
is raised for all hospitals, secular and religious. In 
i960, the year of the survey, the five Hebrew congregations 
gave more, in absolute terms, than the total of Catholic 
contributions to this appeal, and an amount comparable 
with that of each of the three major Protestant denominations. 
Thus Jewish people gave, proportionately, a much greater 
amount than others.
Of the other items of the ethnocentrism scale, No. 1 
is a ’soft* lead-in mentioning ’migrants’, so that the 
intention of the scale is not too loudly proclaimed. Items 
2 and 3 refer to intolerance of Italians; item 4 to social 
distance from Italians. Items 8 and 9 refer to intolerance 
of Greeks; item 10 to social distance from Greeks. Item 13 
refers to intolerance of Jews; item 14 to social distance 
from Jews.
Nine of the eighteen items of the ethnocentrism- scale 
thus have some delusional content, and the scale therefore 
reflects an important element of the underlying syndrome: 
distortion in perception of the external world.
12. Applications
12.1. What follows is a necessarily brief account of an
1
The Age, 24 October, 1966.
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application of the solutions proposed above. Three 
forced-choice measures of authoritarianism, alienation 
and ethnocentrisrn were constructed in two stages, the first 
employing a captive sample of Public Servants, the second 
a sample of metropolitan voters. Standardisation data 
for the three scales are set out in Tables 6.7, 6.9, 6.11 
and 6 .13, at the conclusion of this chapter.
12.2. Stage I
12.2.1. Subjects: 155 Fourth Division Public Servants,
consisting of 86 Linesmen-in-training at the P.M.G.’s 
Schools of Lines in Melbourne and Sydney and 12 additional 
trainees at the School of Lines in Melbourne: 34 Clerical
Assistants in Melbourne; and 23 P.M.G. Clerks-in-training 
at Sydney.
12.2.2. Materials:
(i) Candidate alienation items: 30 forced-choice
items were administered, constructed ad hoc to reflect 
the various sentiments of alienation discussed above. Those 
which survived statistical analysis are to be found in 
Exhibit 6.2. Their manifest content was intended to relate 
to the sentiments of alienation as follows:
(i) Powerlessness; impersonal agency:
Nos. 1,2,4,5,7,9,10,11.
(ii) Powerlessness; personal agency:
Nos. 3,6,8,12.
(iii) Meaninglessness:
Nos. 16,17,18.
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(iv) Normlessness:
Nos. 13,14,15.
(v) Isolation:
Nos. 19,20,21,22,24.
(vi) Self-estrangement:
No, 23.
This classification did not pre-suppose that the items 
would cluster empirically in precisely the same way, if 
clusters were discernible; it was merely intended as a 
logical basis for their inclusion in the scale. The 
perception of their groupings by respondents could, and did, 
diverge somewhat from the classification above.
(ii) Candidate authoritarianism items: 26 forced-choice
items were administered, consisting of 26 original F Scale 
items and 26 reversals drawn from the various reversed 
scales and constructed ad hoc, with the intention of 
providing reversed half-items which had a ’tone* similar
to the positive halves. Those which survived the procedures 
of the statistical refinement set out below are given in 
Exhibit 6.2, below.
(iii) Candidate ethnocentrism items: 25 forced-choice
items were administered, constructed ad hoc to suit the 
special requirements of Australian ethnocentrism. They
are described above, in detail, at Section 11. They are 
set out in Exhibit 6.3»
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(iv) An anxiety measure: This consisted of 20
items randomly abstracted from Cattell’s AO-item IPAT 
measure of anxiety,'*' under the constraint of preserving 
the proportion contributed by each of the sub-scales.
This is a ’balanced’ instrument. These items are set out 
in the Confidential Appendix to this thesis.
12.2.3* Procedure:
(i) Administration method: The scales were
administered to groups at one sitting, each respondent 
filling in a questionnaire on which the scale items appeared, 
by himself. At the head of each scale were instructions 
urging him to avoid an ’undecided’ response. Greeks, 
Italians, Jews and respondents with incomplete questionnaires 
were removed, leaving a sample of 155*
(ii) Method of analysis: Each item pool for the
three scales, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and 
alienation, was considered separately.
To gain admission to the first two scales, a candidate 
had to satisfy the following requirements:
(a) The ’split’ in the sample had to be 80/20 
or better.
I
R.B. Cattell, IPAT Self-Analysis Form, Melbourne, 1957* 
(Published by the Australian Council for Educational 
Research by arrangement with The Institute for Personality 
and Ability Testing, Champaign, Illinois, U.S.A*)
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(b) The percentage ‘undecided’ had to be low:
10 per cent or less.
(c) The correlation with the raw score on other 
candidate items had to be statistically 
significant at the .05 level., i.e. for 
n=155, .16 or more.
In order to gain admission to the alienation (A) 
scale, a candidate item had to satisfy the following 
requirements:
(a) The split in the sample had to be 85/15 or 
better. This is a slightly more liberal 
requirement than for the F and E Scales, and 
can be justified by the much higher mean 
item-total score coefficient (even when 
covariance with anxiety is partialled out).
(b) The percentage ‘undecided’ had to.be 10 
per cent or less.
(c) The first-order item-raw score coefficient 
had to be significant.
(d) The item-raw score coefficient had to remain 
significant when the covariance of each item 
and the raw score on the remaining items with 
the anxiety measure was withdrawn, by the 
method of partial correlations.
These steps, with exception of the last for the A Scale,
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represent a conventional correlational analysis, which 
is designed to ensure that each item functions adequately 
in making discriminations. Step (d) for the A Scale is 
an innovation.
12.2.4. Results:
These operations excluded 10 of the candidate F Scale 
items, leaving 16 ; 7 of the candidate E Scale items, 
leaving 13; and 4 of the 30 candidate A Scale items, 
leaving 2 6 .
12.2.5. Discussion
The small number of items which the step (d) for the 
A Scale excluded (two) show that there is a substantial 
degree of cohesiveness between the items, which cannot be 
attributed to their covariance with anxiety. It does not 
prove that alienation is a unitary construct, since it 
is not yet established that the items do not form disparate 
and independent clusters within the putative A Scale.
12.3. Stage II
12.3.1. Subjects:
Subjects were 335 voters in Melbourne and Sydney, 
drawn from an original 200 in each city. The sampling and 
interviewing methods have been explained in Chapter Three.
12.3.2. Materials:
The remaining A, F and E candidate items were
administered, together with the 20-item adaptation of 
the IPAT anxiety measure, along with many political 
questions .
12.5.3« Procedure:
(i) Administration method: this is set out in
Section 13*
(ii) Method of analysis:
(a) A factor analysis of the 60 A, F and S candidate 
items in company with the 20 anxiety items. A 
four-factor solution, employing varirnax procedures 
with orthogonal rotations and the insertion of 
communal!ties in the diagonals, was specified.
The purpose of this was to examine the degree
to which the constructs were empirically 
distinguishable. Extensive cross loading would 
have destroyed the hypothesis that ehe constructs 
were disparate. To explore the variety in the 
data more fully, varirnax principal components 
analyses, extracting 6 and then 10 orthogonal 
components, were later carried out. The principal 
components analyses are described in Chapter Seven.
(b) The 2k items of the A Scale which emerged from 
the above operations were factor analysed (using 
varirnax procedures) stipulating five orthogonal 
factors. The items loading more heavily on each
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factor were treated as sub-scales related to the 
five factors. The first-order relations of each 
of these sub-scales to anxiety and ethnocentrisra were 
examined, and their relation with each other, when 
the common variance with anxiety was removed by the 
method of partial correlations, was determined.
This was a further test of the discreteness and 
unitary character of the alienation construct.
(c) Three scales, which would reflect a positional response 
set, if one existed, were computed from the A, F and
E Scales. The respondent scored 1 each time he chose 
the first option of a pair of half-items, and 0 if 
he did not do so. Product-moment relations between 
Positional Response Set Scales 1, 2 and 3* drawn from 
the A, F and E Scales respectively, were then 
computed. The order of magnitude of the correlations 
would indicate whether or not this set was present, 
and if so, whether it was of negligible, low or 
substantial magnitude.
(d) A conventional correlational analysis was then 
performed to determine the reliabilities of each 
scale; the mean interitem correlations; and the 
relation of each F item with Ethnocentrism. Medians 
and quartiles were also determined. These standardisa­
tion data are set out in Tables 6.7* 6.9* 6.11 and 6.13»
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(e) Product-moment correlations between all four 
scales were then computed.
12.5.4. Results
(a) The result of the four-factor varimax analysis 
of the 80 scale items is set out in Table 6.1.
TABLE 6.1
Factor Loadings of all Candidate A, F 
and E Items, and Anxiety Items
Candidate 
A Items, Nos:
I II III IV
(Alienation) (Eth.) (Anxiety) (?)
1 .34 .10 .13 .012 •35 .02 .07 .10
3 .42 •15 .09 .114 .31 •15 .18 .14
5 .36 .24 .09 -.136 .43 • 13 .09 .00
7 .34 .05 .31 -.098 .46 -.14 .08 .02
9 .36 .01 .3.5 .0910 .47 • 03 .18 -.0611 .4? .08 .30 .02
12 • 55 .10 .00 .03
13 • 55 .03 -.07 -.1214 • 35 • 15 -.10 .03
15 ,42 .11 -.10 -.0216 .24 .08 .18 -.05
17 .41 .10 .19 -.0718 .42 • 05 •15 -.22(a) .15 .03 . 16 .07
19 .46 .12 .02 .1820 .42 ,14 .03 -.07
21 .46 • 09 . Ob .1422 • 33 .08 .34 .12
23 .42 .08 .20 -.0924 .24 .09 .28 -.01
(b) .24 • 07 *38 -.07
1 .11 .07 -.10 ,502 -.01 .05 -.04 .40
3 .05 .05 .07 ,364 -.16 .11 .06 .31
Candidate 
F Items, Nos:
TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)
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I II III IV
(Alienation) (Eth.) (Anxiety) (P)
Candidate 
F Items, Nos: 5 .00 .05 -.07 .716 -.01 .08 - . 0 6 .45
7 .05 .07 -.05 .778 .09 .26 -.15 .27
9 -.04 .04 -.17 •5710 .11 .70 - .06 .1711 -.01 .21 -.07 .2912 -.02 .08 .04 • 77
(e) .18 .14 .04 .70
17 .02 .24 .07 .70
(d) .27 .14 -,01 .06
(e) .08 .14 .08 .16Candidate 
E Items, Nos: 1 .04 .47 .15 -.022 .14 .27 - . 2 6 .05
7 .14 .56 .08 .044 -.07 .67 .10 .27
5 .17 .40 .04 .186 .10 .46 .01 - . 0 6
7 .12 .44 .06 -.098 . 06 .62 .09 .07
9 .12 .27 -.22 .0210 -.05 .68 .17 .7011 .19 .44 .07 .1012 .12 .54 .09 .1617 .11 .74 .09 .2114 - . 0 7 .45 .06 .25
15 .25 .71 -.07 .07
16 .70 • 77 -.08 .18
17 .25 .77 -.07 .1218 .12 .20 .04 .77Anxiety- 
Items, Nos: 1 .15 .07 .17 .212 .0 6 -.09 .27 -.23
7 .11 - . 0 6 .14 -.494 .20 .07 .77 -.25
5 .01 -.07 .44 - . 1 66 .06 -.07 .2 6 -.07
7 .04 .04 .74 .048 .27 - . 0 6 .74 .06Q .29 .08 .20 .0 810 -.05 -.07 .75 .06
TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)
I
(Alienation)
II
(Eth.)
III
(Anxiety)
IV
(F)
Anxiety
Items, Nos : 11 -.02 .15 .57 .2212 .01 -.05 .40 -.58
15 .12 .00 .51 -.0414 .05 -.01 .14 .51
15 ♦ 25 .06 .25 .1416 .14 -.05 .16 .19
17 .14 .04 .46 .06
18 .02 .06 .41 -.14
19 .05 .05 .59 -.1420 .05 .07 . 26 .09
The principal components analyses extracted at first 
6 components, and then 10. The latter was treated as the 
most convenient device for the definition of sub'-scales .
As all items were required to belong to one or other 
of these, as meaningful elements of a construct, the 10 
principal components also governed the final admission of 
all candidate items to the A, F and E Scales. Items 
(a) and (b) of the candidate items were more closely 
related to the 'intra-punitive1 sub-scale of anxiety, 
than to the sub-scales of the A Scale; items (c) and ($) 
more to the Textra-punitive’ sub-scale of anxiety than 
to the sub-scales of the F measure; item (e) more closely 
related to the anti-Semitism Scale of the E Scale than to 
either of the F sub-scales. These items ((a) -• (e)) were 
therefore excluded from all scales and sub-scales.
The anxiety measure was retained in its original form.
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(b) Five sub-scales of the A Scale were defined 
by a five-factor varimax analysis of the 24 A items 
alone. Each factor was taken to represent a sub-scale 
of alienation (distinct from but related to the 
sub-scales which emerged from the principal 
components analysis), and items were allotted to the 
various sub-scales on the basis of their highest 
factor loading. The sub-scales were constituted as 
in Table6.2. Their principal conceptual referent 
is indicated on the basis of those elements in each 
sub-scale most closely bearing on their a priori 
classification. The correlations of each sub-scale 
with the Anxiety and E measures are also given.
TABLE 6.2 (a)
The Alienation Sub-scales: 
Conceptual Referents, and Correlations 
with Anxiety and E Scales
b-scale Item Conceptual Relation with Relation with
No. Nos. Referent Anxiety Ethnocentrism
(Product- (Product-
moment moment
correlations) correlations)
1: 1,3,7,10,11,16, Powerlessness:22 (impersonal
agency) .42** .28**2: 13,14,15 Normlessness .12* .22**
3: 5,17,'.8,23,24 Meaninglessness 
and self-
estrangement .28** .22**4: 19,20,21 Isolation .24** .27**
5: 2,4,6,8,9,12 Powerlessness:
(personal agency).26** .27**
(a) For a sample of this size (n-05b)* All
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correlations at or above .11 are significant at 
the 5 per cent level and denoted by one asterisk. 
Those significant at the one per cent level (at or 
above .14) are denoted by two asterisks.
The relations between the Alienation Sub-scales are 
exhibited in Table 6.5»
TABLE 6.5
Relations between the 
Alienation Sub-scales 
(Product-moment correlations)
1 2 5 4 5
1 1.00 .51** .45** .53** .41**2 1.00 .57** .56** .59**
5 1.00 .58** .57**4 1.00 .53**
5 1.00
The residual relations between the Alienation 
Sub-scales when their mutual correlations with the Anxiety 
Scale are partialled out are given in Table 6.4.
TABLE 6.4
Partial Correlations between 
the Alienation -Sub-scales 
(Covariance with Anxiety W it heir awn)
(Produc t-moment)
1 2 5 4 5
1 1.00 .28** .52** . 56* * . 54**
2 1.00 .53** .56** »57**
5 1.00 .50** »50**4 1.00 .54**
5 • 1.00
(c) The correlations between the three ‘positional 
response set1 scores described above are depicted in 
Table 6.5.
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TABLE 6.5
Correlations between Positional 
Response Set Scales 
(Produc t-moment J~
1 2  5
1 1.00 .17** .13*2 1.00 .12*
3 1.00
(d) Standardisation and item data for all scales 
are set out below in Tables 6.7 to 6.14.
(e) Correlations between all four substantive scales 
are given in Table 6.6.
TABLE 6.6
Correlations between 
Four Psychological Dispositions 
(Product-moment)
Alienation Authoritarianism Anxiety Ethnocentrism
Alienation 1.00 
Authoritarianism 
Anxiety 
Ethnocentrism
.08 .41** .36**
1.00 -.08 .40**
1.00 .17**
1.00
12.3.5. Discuss ion
The pattern of factor loadings in Table 6.1 are 
’bunched’ within domains located by the putative scale
items; there is little cross-loading. These data support 
the view that four disparate constructs corresponding to 
those ostensively defined by the candidate scale items
are being measured. The scales were purified by the
exclusion of those items which were shown to be ambivalent
by a further principal components analysis.
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Although the perception of the grouping of the 
alienation items by respondents differed somewhat from 
that advanced a priori, the sub-scales defined by a separate 
factor analysis of these seemed meaningful and related 
to the sentiments of alienation considered in the 
philosophical literature. However, the few ’ seif-estrangement’ 
items tended to be lost through unevenness of response 
split, or a covariance attributable only to a common 
relation with anxiety. When the moderate relations between 
all five sub-scales are assaulted by withdrawing 
covariance attributable to the common relation with 
anxiety, they retain relations of about the same order.
This emphasisesthat the empirical cohesiveness of the 
construct of ’subjective alienation' cannot be caused by 
a common loading of alienated sentiments ’with anxiety, 
except perhaps for ’self-estrangement’. One function of 
all sentiments associated with alienation is production 
of ethnocentrism.
The significant but statistically trivial correlations 
between the three indices of positional response set 
indicate that it is of negligible importance in influencing 
scores on any of the three forced-choice scales tested on 
this sample.
The overall relations between the fcur psychological
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constructs indicates that both authoritarianism and 
alienation predict to ethnoeentrism and that alienation 
is heavily laden with anxiety. There is no significant 
relation between authoritarianism and anxiety. This 
failure to demonstrate an implication of the hypothesized 
genotypical basis for authoritarianism suggests that the 
defence mechanisms of the high F scorer may be quite 
as efficient in reducing internal conflicts capable of 
generating anxiety as those of the low F scorer.
The absence of a significant correlation between the 
F and Alienation Scales suggests that the relation observed 
in previous research may have been an artifact of response 
set infection of the scales.
The reliabilities of the Alienation and Ethnoeentrism 
Scales are satisfactory. The reliability of the F Scale 
is only moderate, and further research will be required 
in expanding it for general use. As it stands, it may be a 
useful ’core’ instrument. Eleven of the thirteen items of 
this F Scale predict significantly to the E Scale.
The purpose of the empirical section of this paper 
has been to illustrate the application of various devices 
for overcoming difficulties in measuring psychological 
dispositions speculatively considered in the theoretical 
section. The three scales developed by their application
are intended for research use.
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13. A Note on Administration of the Scales
The best form of administration is face-to-face, 
with the interviewee (if literate) holding cards on 
which the items appear in sequence. The interviewer 
should read each pair of statements in turn, from a 
questionnaire which he holds, after the introductory 
remarks which appear above each scale. 'Can’t decide' 
is a permissible, although undesirable, response, and 
should be included in the questionnaire only, NOT on the 
cards. Scoring should be 2 for starred alternatives, 1 
for 'can't decide' and 0 for unstarred alternatives. The 
stars should not, of course, appear either on the cards 
or the questionnaire. The scales should be given only 
non-committal titles such as Questionnaires 1, 2 and 5; 
not 'Alienation', etc.
14. Exhibits of Scale Items
EXHIBIT 6.1
The Alienation Scale 
(Questionnaire l)
Now on this card, you will find pairs of statements about 
social opinions. Would you choose the statement out of 
each pair which expresses ycur own feelings better? Just 
say (A) or (B).
Even if you find it hard to choose, just say which 
statement better expresses whatever slight preference you
have.
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EXHIBIT 6.1 (Cont.)
1. A) 
B)
Our community is an easy and pleasant place to live in. 
Our community is a difficult place to live in.*
2. A) In this society, people seem to get to the top 
mainly by chance or good fortune.*
B) In this society, the better people mostly get to the top.
5* A) 
B)
Mostly, people are fair in their dealings with me. 
I often feel I am not fairly treated.*
4. A) Nowadays, a person has to live pretty much for 
today and let tomorrow take care of itself.*
B) It is quite possible to plan one’s life ahead with confidence.
5- A) 
B)
In this society, most people can find contentment. 
For most people, the society we live in breeds 
discontent.*
6. A) Often, people don't appreciate it when you do good 
work.*
B) People usually appreciate it when you do good work.
7. A) I sometimes feel my life is being pushed in directions where I don’t want to go.*
B) Usually, I can control what happens in my own life.
8. A 
B
My work is of real benefit to me.
In my work, I feel exploited by other people.*
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EXHIBIT 6.1 (Cont.)
9- A) 
B)
I often feel I am only a cog in a big machine.* 
In lots of important matters, my decision can 
affect what happens.
10. A) 
B)
I t ’s easy to find a job worth doing. 
I t ’s hard to find a job worth doing.*
11. A) I can normally do what I want to do in t o d a y ’s
B)
set-up.
In t o d a y ’s set-up, I often feel frustrated and 
prevented from doing what I want to do.*
12. A) In getting ahead in life, i t ’s not what you know 
that counts, i t ’s who you know.*
B) What counts in getting ahead is hard work and talent.
1 3 . A) 
B)
In this society, money will get you anywhere.* 
In this society, p e o p l e ’s respect for your 
character will get you a long way.
14. A) Most members of parliament and city councillors 
are sympathetic people and do a good job.
B) Most politicians and city councillors are only in 
politics for what they can get out of it, and are 
not much good.*
15. A) For most people these days it is more important 
to make money then to make friends.*
B) For most people, it is more important to make 
friends than to make money.
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EXHIBIT 6.1 (Cont.)
l6. A) The individual these days has a good chance of 
finding sensible moral standards to live by.
B) There is a lot of confusion about moral standards 
these days.*
17. A) 
B)
Life seems to be rather meaningless.*
On the whole, life makes good sense to me.
18. A) 
B)
Life has a clear purpose.
There is no clear purpose in life.*
19. A) You have to be careful otherwise people will take 
advantage of you.*
B) Most people are quite trustworthy.
20. A) 
B)
Most people are willing to help someone in need. 
In this society people often d o n ’t care what 
happens to others.*
21. A) These days, a person d o e s n ’t really know who he 
can count on.*
B) You can usually be sure who you can count on.
22. A) 
B)
I seldom feel lonely. 
I often feel lonely.*
25. A) People usually accept and welcome you just as you 
really are.
B) With most people, you have to put on a bit of an act.*
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I
EXHIBIT 6*1 (Cont.)
24. A} I don’t really feel at home in any group of people.* 
By I really feel at home with the people I mix withr
EXHIBIT 6.2
The Authoritarianism Scale 
(Questionnaire 2)
Here are pairs of statements on other social issues.
Would you do the same thing as before, say which statement 
you prefer,, out of each pair?
Just say (A) or (B). Just choose whichever statement better 
expresses your own feelings.
1. A) Obedience and respect for authority are the most 
important virtues children should learn.*
B) Obedience and respect for authority are not the most 
important things to teach children.
2. A) If people spent more time talking about ideas just 
for the fun of it, everybody would be better off. 
B) If people would talk less and work more, everybody 
would be better off.*
5- A) The artist and the professor are much more important 
to society than the businessman and the manufacturer.
B) The businessman and the manufacturer are much more 
important to society than the artist and the 
professor.*
2^ 6
E X H I B I T  6 . 2  (Cont.)
4. A) T h e  f i n d i n g s  of s c i e n c e  m a y  s o m e  d a y  s h o w  t h a t  
m a n y  of o u r  m o s t  c h e r i s h e d  b e l i e f s  a r e  w r o n g .
B) S c i e n c e  h a s  its place, b u t  t h e r e  a r e  m a n y
i m p o r t a n t  t h i n g s  t h a t  c a n  n e v e r  p o s s i b l y  b e  u n d e r s t o o d
b y  the h u m a n  m i n d . *
5. A) Y o u n g  p e o p l e  s o m e t i m e s  g e t  r e b e l l i o u s  ideas, b u t  
as t h e y  g r o w  u p  t h e y  o u g h t  to g e t  o v e r  t h e m  a n d  
s e t t l e  d o w n . *
B) I f  it w e r e n ’t f o r  t h e  r e b e l l i o u s  i d e a s  o f  y o u t h  
t h e r e  w o u l d  be l e s s  p r o g r e s s  in the w o r l d .
6. A) N o  sane, n o r m a l ,  d e c e n t  p e r s o n  c o u l d  e v e r  think: of 
h u r t i n g  a c l o s e  f r i e n d  o r  r e l a t i v e . *
B) A sane, n o r m a l ,  d e c e n t  p e r s o n  m i g h t  h a v e  to h u r t  a 
c l o s e  f r i e n d  o r  r e l a t i v e .
7. A) W h a t  the y o u n g  p e o p l e  r e a l l y  n e e d  m o s t  is f r e e d o m  
to f i n d  t h e m s e l v e s ,  to be c r e a t i v e  a n d  s e n s i t i v e  
a n d  h a p p y ,  i n s t e a d  o f  d r u d g i n g  o r  l e a r n i n g  m i l i t a r y
B)
d i s c i p l i n e .
W h a t  t h e  y o u t h  n e e d s  is s t r i c t  d i s c i p l i n e ,  r u g g e d  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  w i l l  to w o r k  a n d  fig"ht f o r  
f a m i l y  a n d  c o u n t r y . *
8. A) P e o p l e  w h o  c o m m i t  s e x  c r i m e s ,  s u c h  as r a p e  a n d  
a t t a c k s  o n  c h i l d r e n ,  s h o u l d  be c o n s i d e r e d  m e n t a l l y  
ill i n s t e a d  o f  b e i n g  s e v e r e l y  p u n i s h e d .
B) S e x  c r i m e s ,  s u c h  as r a p e  a n d  a t t a c k s  o n  c h i l d r e n ,  
d e s e r v e  m o r e  t h a n  m e r e  i m p r i s o n m e n t ; s u c h  c r i m i n a l s  
o u g h t  to be p u b l i c l y  w h i p p e d ,  o r  w o r s e . *
9. A) T h e r e  is h a r d l y  a n y t h i n g  l o w e r  t h a n  a p e r s o n  w h o  
d o e s  n o t  f e e l  a g r e a t  love, g r a t i t u d e ,  a n d  r e s p e c t  
f o r  h i s  p a r e n t s . *
B) H o n e s t  p e o p l e  m u s t  a d m i t  to t h e m s e l v e s  t h a t  t h e y  
h a v e  s o m e t i m e s  h a t e d  t h e i r  p a r e n t s .
EXHIBIT 6.2 (Cont.)
10. A) Most problems in the society we live in could be 
reduced by more education.
B) Most of our social problems would be solved if
we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, 
and feeble-minded people.*
11. A) Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and 
ought to be severely punished.*
B) It’s nobody's business if someone is a homosexual 
as long as he doesn't harm other people.
12. A) It's all right for people to raise questions about 
even the most sacred matters.
B) Every person should have complete faith in some
supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without 
question.*
13* A) Nowadays more and more people are prying into
matters that should remain personal and private.* 
B) Study and discussion of what used to be thought 
personal and private matters is a good thing.
EXHIBIT 6.3
The Ethnocentrism Scale 
(Questionnaire 3)
This card has pairs of statements about various nationalities 
and groups of people in Australia. Would you choose from 
each pair the statement which expresses your own feelings 
BETTER? Again, just say (A) or (B).
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EXHIBIT 6.5 (Cont.)
If you find it hard to decide, just make a snap choice.
1. A) On the whole, the intake of a large number of migrants from Southern Europe has been a good thing 
for this country.
B) The intake of a large number of emigrants from Southern Europe has not been so good for this 
country.*
2. A) It is a bad thing that the Italians keep to their 
own neighbourhoods, and do not live like most 
Australians.*
B) It is a good thing that the Italians can keep their own customs in this country.
5- A) When Italian people move into a district, they often
3)
spoil it for others.*
Italian people should be v/elcome in any district.
4. A) I wouldn’t mind if an Italian married into my own 
family.
B) I wouldn’t want an Italian to marry into my own family.*
5- a ) Italian migrants are more likely to start street brawls than Australians.*
B) Italians are not more likely to start street brawls than Australians.
6. A) The Italian communities have made the districts they 
live in brighter and more pleasant places .
B) Italians mostly turn the districts they live in into slums.*
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EXHIBIT 6.5 (Cont.)
7. A) 
B)
Italians admire elegance and good manners. 
Italians d o n ’t seem to place much importance on 
good manners and careful dressing.*
8. A) When Greek people move into a district, they often 
spoil it for others.*
B) Greek people should be welcome in any district.
9- A) It is a bad thing that the Greeks keep to their own 
n e i g h b o u r h o o d s , and do not live like most Australians*.
B) It is a good thing that the Greeks can keep their 
own customs in this country.
10. A) I wouldn't mind if a Greek married into my own 
family.
B) I w o u l d n ’t want a Greek to marry into my own family.*
11. A) Greeks mostly try to improve their standard of 
l i v i n g .
B) Greeks seem to be content with a lower standard of 
living than most Australians.*
12. A) Australians had better look out, or they will find 
that the Southern Europeans will take over the 
c o u n t r y .*
B) Migrants from Southern Europe have added much of 
value to this country.
13. A) When Jewish people move into a district, they often 
spoil it for others.*
B) Jewish people should be welcome in any district.
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EXHIBIT 6.3 (Cont.)
14. A) 
B)
I w o u l d n ’t m i n d  if a J e w  m a r r i e d  i n t o  m y  o w n  f a m i l y .  
I w o u l d n ’t w a n t  a J e w  to m a r r y  i n t o  m y  o w n  f a m i l y . *
15. A) J e w i s h  p e o p l e  h a v e  t o o  m u c h  p o w e r  a n d  i n f l u e n c e  in 
t h i s  c o u n t r y . *
B) T h e  J e w s  d o  n o t  h a v e  t o o  m u c h  p o w e r  a n d  i n f l u e n c e  
i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y .
16. A) M a n y  J e w i s h  p e o p l e  p l a c e  g r e a t  v a l u e  o n  e d u c a t i o n  
a n d  c u l t u r e .
B) If J e w i s h  p e o p l e  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  in e d u c a t i o n ,  it 
is p r o b a b l y  so t h e y  c a n  u s e  it t o  m a k e  m o r e  m o n e y . *
17. A) T h e  J e w s  a r e  as v a l u a b l e ,  h o n e s t  a n d  p u b l i c  s p i r i t e d  
c i t i z e n s  as a n y  o t h e r  g r o u p .
B) T h e  J e w s  a r e  l e s s  h o n e s t  a n d  p u b l i c  s p i r i t e d  t h a n  
m o s t  .*
18. A) J e w i s h  p e o p l e  s e e m  to k e e p  t h e i r  m o n e y  f o r  t h e i r  
o w n  c h a r i t i e s . *
B) J e w i s h  p e o p l e  g i v e  g e n e r o u s l y  to o t h e r  c h a r i t i e s  
b e s i d e  t h e i r  own.
A: (a)
EXHIBIT 6.4
R e j e c t e d  C a n d i d a t e  S c a l e  I t e m s
A) I t ’s o f t e n  d i f f i c u l t  to s e e  w h y  p e o p l e  a n d  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a c t  as t h e y  d o . *
B) I t ’s u s u a l l y  p l a i n  w h y  p e o p l e  a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
a c t  as t h e y  do.
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E X H I B I T  6.4 (Cont.)
(b) A) 
B)
I a m  h a p p y  to be as I am.
I o f t e n  w i s h  I w a s  s o m e b o d y  e l s e . *  .
F: (c) A) P e o p l e  c a n  b e  d i v i d e d  i n t o  two d i s t i n c t  
c l a s s e s :  t h e  w e a k  a n d  the s t r o n g . *
B) P e o p l e  c a n n o t  b e  d i v i d e d  i n t o  two d i s t i n c t  
c l a s s e s  - l i k e  the w e a k  a n d  the s t r o n g .
(d) A) T h e  m o r e  y o u  g e t  to k n o w  p e o p l e ,  the m o r e  y o u  
g e t  to l i k e  them.
B) F a m i l i a r i t y  b r e e d s  c o n t e m p t . *
(e) A) N o w a d a y s ,  w h e n  s o  m a n y  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  o f  p e o p l e  
m o v e  a r o u n d  a n d  m i x  t o g e t h e r  so m u c h ,  a p e r s o n  
h a s  to p r o t e c t  h i m s e l f  e s p e c i a l l y  c a r e f u l l y  
a g a i n s t  c a t c h i n g  a n  i n f e c t i o n  o r  d i s e a s e  f r o m  
t h e m .*
B) E v e n  t h o u g h  a l l  s o r t s  o f  p e o p l e  m i x  t o g e t h e r  
n o w a d a y s ,  a p e r s o n  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  f i n i c k y  a b o u t  
c a t c h i n g  a d i s e a s e  f r o m  a n y  o f  t h em.
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Standardisation Data for the Alienation. Authoritarianism, 
Ethnocentrisrn and Anxiety Scales
TABLE 6.7
Standardisation Data for the 
Alienation Scale
Reliability
(parallel forms method): .681
Range
(possible):
Mean:
Standard deviation: 
Median:
Quartiles:
High:
Middle 
range:
Low:
TABLE 6.8
0-48
12.35
8.79
10.5
Raw Score % Sample
18-48 25
(11-17 22
( 6-10 31
0-5 22
= 100$
Item Characteristics of the
Alienation Scale
Item No. $ 'Alienated1 % 'Can’t Mean Correlation
response decide’ with other Itemsw1 11 0 .17**
2 37 3 .13*
8 1 .19**4 36 3 .15**
5 15 1 .18**6 22 2 .17**
7 l6 1 .17**
8 10 5 .18**
9 39 2 .16**
10 17 1 .17**
11 21 1 .26**
12 30 3 .19**
1
S orne ’ c r i t er ion group 1 validation data for the alienation
scale, drawn from psychiatric patients and convicts, is
presented in Appendix 4 to this thesis .
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TABLE 6.8 (Cont.)
em No. % 'Alienated* % 'Can't Mean Corre
response decide' with other
w
13 36 3 .19**14 37 6 .14**
15 60 3 #l5**l6 52 3 .12*
17 11 3 .19**18 15 3 .1 9**
19 34 1 .19**
20 28 1 . 18* *
21 26 1 .13**
22 14 1 .17**
23 11 1 .19**24 10 1 .14**
.17** = Meaninter­
item
Correlation
TABLE 6.9
Standardisation Data for the 
Authoritarianism Scale
Reliability
(parallel forms method): 
Range(possible):
Mean:
Standard deviation:
Median:
Quartiles:
.509
0-26
12.855.49
13.5Rav; Score % Sample
High: 17-26 26
Middle (l4-l6 24
range: ( 9 -1 3 26
Low: 0-8 24
= 100^
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TABLE 6.10
Item Characteristics of the 
Authoritarianism Scale
Item No. % % Mean Correlation’Authoritarianism’ ’Can’t Correlation with E Scale
response decide’ with other 
Itemsw w1 82 2 .17** .22**2 69 5 .1 6** .0 8
5 55 20 . 12* .18**4 65 4 .14** .12*
5 51 5 .15* .12*6 59 1 .16** .14**
7 54 9 .16** .11*8 57 5 .14** .27**
9 46 5 .17** .12*10 21 1 .10 .28**11 28 9 .15** .11*12 29 4 .16** .10
15 54 5 .17** . 5 5 * *
.15** — Mean .17** Mean inters Corre-
- item lation
Correlation, with E
Scale.
TABLE 6 . 1 1
Standardisation Data for the
Ethnocentrism Scale
Reliability
(parallel forms method) 
Range : .787
(possible): 0 -3 6
Mean: II .5 8Standard deviation: 7.74Median: 10.5Quartiles: Raw Score % Sample
High: 1 7 -3 6 25
Middle (1 1 -1 6 26range: ( 6 -1 0 28
Low: 0 -5 25
= 100$
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TABLE 6.12
Item Characteristics of the 
Ethnocentrism Scale
Item No. % Ethnocentric % Mean Correlation
response Can t with other Items
decide 1 w1 28 2 .19**2 67 4 .13*
3 17 2 .24**4 27 2 .26**
5 22 7 .21**6 24 15 .20**
7 * 34 10 .19**8 17 3 .26**
9 54 5 .13*10 27 3 .29**11 25 11 .22**12 25 3 .26**13 8 3 .19**14 34 3 .20**
15 29 10 .18**16 30 6 .21**
17 13 6 .21**18 46 19 .14**
.21*= Mean
Inter-item
Correlation
TABLE 6.13
Standardisation Data for the
Anxiety Scale
Reliability
(parallel forms method): .552
Range
(posssible): o -b o
Mean: 11,66Standard deviation: 6.05Median: 11.5Quartiles: Raw Score $ Sample
High: 17-40 29
Middle (12-16 23range: ( 8-11 26
Low: 0-7 22
=100$
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TABLE 6.14
Item Charactei^ist ics of the 
Anxiety Scale
Item No. % Anxious 
response
% Intermediate 
response
Mean Correlation 
with other Itemsw
1 15 10 .05
2 13 14 .10
: 3 12 12 .07
4 14 13 .14**
5 3 27 .14**
6 37 8 .11*
7 l6 57 .12*
8 10 39 . 13*
9 37 29 .09
10 28 11 .10
11 41 10 .11*
12 12 25 .11*
13 7 14 .15**
14 27 8 .06
15 48 12 .11*
l6 7 12 . 06
17 19 13 . 15**
18 19 28 .13*
19 14 11 .13*
20 25 11 .09
=.11* Mean
Inter-item
Correlation
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DISPOSITIONS AND THEIR CORRELATES
7.1. Introduction
The preceding chapter has advanced the argument of 
this thesis by describing the development of adequate 
measurement scales for the psychological constructs with 
which we are concerned. It is now possible to proceed 
with greater confidence in charting the social incidence 
of these dispositional constructs, their interrelations, 
and, after the structure of political opinion has been 
explored in Chapter Eight, to investigate their relation to 
the various dimensions of political attitudes, to 
perceptions of politically relevant subjects, to voting 
choice and reasons for voting choice. The concern of this 
chapter is to pause, before doing so, to analyse the 
dispositional constructs in more detail, and, in particular, 
to discuss alienation in a more discursive way. A primary 
purpose is to attempt some answer to the ’nagging questions' 
of a general kind referred to by Aberbach in a recent paper'1’ 
on the politics of alienation: ’Which part of the composite
1
J.D. Aberbach, ’Alienation and Political Behaviour,’ 
American Political Science Review, 65 (1969) pp * 86-99*
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index is causing the relationships described or, better, 
how does each indicator relate to the various dependent 
variables?' One might also ask: 'How much does the
empirical evidence on the particular conception of 
alienation adopted in this thesis tell about alienation 
conceived otherwise?’
It will also be argued that alienation (as estrangement), 
ethnocentrisrn and anxiety can be usefully viewed as a 
'tryptich' of dispositions in which alienation is 
causally dominant. In interaction, these three dispositions 
constitute a system which will be named after its prime 
motor: it will be called the 'alienation tryptich’. As
an analytical device, it provides a useful summation and 
a partial explanation of the dispositions found in 
'cultures of poverty', for example.
This chapter will also explore variations in the 
inter-correlations of dispositions between different social 
groups.
A note might conveniently be offered here on the 
various statistical devices employed in analysing the 
data and the presentation of findings. Where possible 
product-moment correlations have been computed; but, since 
a large number of correlations have had to be computed by 
calculator, it has often been found more convenient to
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use the tetrachoric coefficient, estimated as before by 
using Davidoff and Goheenrs table as reprinted in Edwards^- 
and corrected for unevenness of marginal split, where 
necessary, by Jenkins’ method.1 2 * The level set for 
statistical significance throughout this thesis is .05. 
Where a correlation is significant at this level, a single 
asterisk accompanies it; when the probability is less 
than .01, two asterisks do so.
A problem arises in assessing the probability of 
the tetrachoric coefficient. On the one hand, Guilford^ 
notes that ’under the appropriate conditions, it gives a 
coefficient that is numerically equivalent to a Pearson r 
and may be regarded as an approximation to it.’ One of 
the appropriate conditions, a roughly median split for 
both variables, is met in most cases of its use in this 
thesis, or when this is not so, its absence is compensated 
by Jenkins’ correction. Another, that the sample be
1
A.L. Edwards, Statistical Methods for the Behavioural 
Sciences, (New York, 1955) P~* 510, Table X, reprinted 
from M.D. Davidoff and H.W. Goheen, 5 A Table for the Rapid 
Determination of the Tetrachoric correlation Coefficient,’ 
Psrfchometrika, 18 (1955) pp. 115-121.
2
W.L. Jenkins, ’An Improved Method for Tetrachoric r,’
Psychometrika, 20 (1955) pp. 255-258.
5
J.P. Guilford, Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and 
Education, third ed., (New York and Tokyo, 19*56) pp. 505ff •
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relatively large, is not met with the same satisfaction, 
but in nearly all cases the sample exceeds 100. It 
therefore seems not unreasonable to attach to the tetrachoric 
the same probability values as for the product-moment 
correlation, as given in Fisher’s table as reprinted in 
Edwards'*-, provided that these are treated with reserve, 
and that Guilford’s cautionary note on the greater 
variability of the standard error of the tetrachoric is 
borne in mind: ’The tetrachoric r is less reliable than
the Pearson r, being at least 50 per cent more variable 
... to attain the same degree of reliability as the 
Pearson r, one needs twice the number of cases in a sample* 
(my emphasis). In an investigation of the type of this 
thesis, which involves the exploration of much untrodden 
ground, particularly in looking for variations in 
correlation, a generous estimate of significance seems 
appropriate, and so, with the above reservations, the 
levels of significance for the product-moment correlation 
have been assigned to the tetrachoric coefficient.
On the other hand, considerable uncertainty arises 
in its use when, for example, the difference between two
1
A.L. Edwards, Statistical Methods for the Behavioural 
Sciences (New York, 1955) 502, Table VI, reprinted
from Table V.A. of R.A. Fisher, Statistical Methods for 
Research Workers (Oliver and Boyd^ Edinburgh).
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tetrachoric coefficients from two independent samples is 
tested by Fisher’s Zr transformation.1 2 In all such cases, 
when both coefficients have, in the first instance, 
differed significantly from zero, the significance of the 
difference between the two groups has been retested by a 
more rigorous procedure. The frequencies displayed in the 
two four-cell tables for each groups have been collapsed in 
the following manner:
EXHIBIT 7.1 (a) (b)
Method of Collapsing Data from 
Two Four-Cell Tables to One
Group 1
Group 2
(a)
High on both variables High on one variable
and Low on both variables and Low on the other
High on both variables High on one variable
and Low on both variables and Low on the other
’high’ and ’low’ mean above and below the median 
of the total sample
(b) Frequencies, are, of course, entered in the 
four cells.
This permits testing of the significance of the 
difference by chi-square.
These procedures seem to preserve the generosity 
desirable in assigning significance in an exploratory 
work of this kind, whilst maintaining the appropriate
pdegree of rigour. They are directed towards the avoidance
1
The formula for this is given in G.A. Ferguson, Statistical 
Analysis in Psychology and Education, (London, 19591 PP• 155“^•
2
I am grateful for the advice of Mr. W.K. Bartlett, of the 
Psychology Department, University of Melbourne, in two 
personal communications (on 11 December 1967* and 25 January 
1970), in arriving at a decision to employ these procedures.
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of both Type 1 errors (rejecting the null hypothesis when 
it is true) and Type II errors (accepting the null 
hypothesis when it is false), but with greater emphasis 
on the avoidance of Type II, i.e. (usually) overlooking 
a real variation in the data.
In cross-tabulations, a combination of simplicity in 
exposition and stringency in analysis has been attempted. 
This seemed best realized by the presentation of percentage 
tables, accompanied by the probability value obtained 
by a chi-square test of the frequencies on which the 
table is based, collapsed to a four-cell table. When a 
probability value is less than .10, and this seems of 
any importance, this is also indicated: 'approaching
significance’ here always refers to a probability value 
between .10 and .05. Occasionally, extreme groups, e.g. 
in educational level, are used to test the significance of 
apparent differences.
Beneath each cross-tabulation, the number is the total 
sample involved is also given.
In Section 9 of this chapter, figures are used to 
depict the relations of dispositions to ’background’ 
variables such as income of the householder. Probability 
values derived from the original frequency tables are again 
displayed below each figure.
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7.2. Ethnocentrism and Anxiety; The Partial Correlation
Covariance between the alienation and anxiety scales 
is substantial enough to give rise to a non-independent 
correlation between anxiety and ethnocentrism (displayed 
in Table 6.6). However, when covariance with alienation 
is withdrawn by the method of partial correlations, anxiety 
has no relation to ethnocentrism. The residual correlation 
is only .03. The commonly held notion that insecurity 
gives rise to aggressive behaviour thus finds no confirmation 
here, however true it might be in some circumstances.
7•3• The Effect on the Product-Moment of Constriction of
Variance
The standardisation data for the four dispositional 
scales, set out in Tables 6.7* 6.9* 6.11 and 6.13* indicate 
that the distribution of the raw scores on the alienation, 
anxiety and ethnocentrism scales are all positively 
skewed, with most respondents scoring low, i.e. below the 
arithmetic mean, particularly on the first two. The 
distribution of scores on the anxiety scale is leptolcurtic 
relative to the other three. If all four distributions 
were normalized, some elevation of the correlations could 
therefore be expected, since three of the four variances 
would be greater. Quartile scores for all four dispositions, 
and the tetrachoric correlations between them were computed.
274
Since the tetrachoric assumes a normal distribution, some 
inflation of the correlations should follow, if the 
foregoing argument is correct. Table 7*1 sets out both 
the tetrachoric correlations between the scales and the 
product-moment (in brackets):
TABLE 7*1
Correlations between Four 
Psychological Dispositions 
(Tetrachoric and Product-moment) (a)
Alienation Authoritarianism Anxiety Ethnocentrism
Alienation 1.00 .16** (.03) .47**(.41**) .35**(-36**)
Authoritarianism 1.00 .03 (-.08) .45**(.40**)
Anxiety 1.00 .l6**(.17**)
Ethnocentrism 1.00
(a) n=352 for the tetrachoric
n=355 lor the product-moment
It seems that there is a little in this argument, 
but not much. The variances of the raw scores were not 
greatly constricted. The point of chief interest is the 
emergence of the significant correlation between 
authoritarianism and alienation, which as we shall see 
in Section 11 of this chapter, is specific to the more 
educated third of the sample. It is discussed in that 
section.
7.3* The Principal Components Analyses and the Development 
of Sub-Scales of the Dispositions
The result of the four-factor varimax analysis of the
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80 scale items administered to the Melbourne-Sydney sample 
has been set out in Chapter Six, the item loadings in 
Table 6.1. As noted in Section 12.5*3» of that chapter, 
further principal components analyses were carried out, 
extracting at first 6 components, and then 10. The latter 
was used to develop sub-scales of the dispositions. There 
are two reasons for describing briefly the outcome of these 
analyses here. The first is that in their use to develop 
sub-scales, they make possible a more detailed picture 
of the relations of the elements of the major constructs. 
The second is that since all items of the major scales 
were required to belong to a sub-scale, so as to constitute 
a meaningful element of a construct, the account of the 
development of the sub-scales completes the history of the 
development of the major scales.
There is no special virtue residing in the numbers 
6 and 10; although, of course, there was a special 
significance in at first extracting 4 factors, and using 
varimax procedures, with orthogonal rotations, since this 
was a strong test of the initial hypothesis that 4 
disparate constructs were measured by the items» The 
absence of much cross-loading and the ’bunching’ of factor 
loadings within their appropriate domains was consistent 
with the initial hypothesis. The purpose of pursuing the 
investigation with principal components analyses was simply
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to penetrate the data further with the powerful techniques 
available.
Principal components analysis, as opposed to factor 
analysis, attempts to explain total variance, and not 
merely common variance. It is attractive in that it permits 
variety in the data to exhibit itself more fully; 'warts 
and all,' so to speak.^ The components are orthogonal 
and the eigenvalue of all extracted in both exceeds .unity, 
so that none are trivial. The pattern of the component 
loadings in each analysis suggested that the best imaginative 
conception of the unfolding picture was a branching-out 
of the original four constructs, which in turn sprang 
from and disclosed their internal structure. Thus, 
ethnocentrism 'branched out' into groups of items which 
reflected (a) social distance from, and distrust of 
Greeks and Italians, (b) fear and distrust of Jews and 
(c) an assimilationist attitude (as opposed to one 
favouring integration) towards Southern Europeans. The 
candidate authoritarianism items displayed two major 
groupings, one emphasizing respect and obedience, the other 
anti-intellectualism and a punitive tendency, which,
I ~
For a technical discussion of varimax procedures and the 
measurement of principal components, see H.H. Harman,
Modern Factor Analysis, revised ed., (Chicago and London, 
1967) pp. 304-313 and 3^8-350.
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could be dubbed ‘ego-defensiveness.' The branching of the 
alienation and anxiety items was more complex. If one 
conceives the process of stipulating more and more 
components as one which increases pressure on a construct 
to 'branch out', then alienation must be considered 
resilient and resistant to pressure: most items remained
loaded on the first principal component (these reflecting 
powerlessness and isolation); some exhibited a complex 
pattern of both positive and negative loading on a 
component most clearly related to anxiety; and some, chiefly 
those on the normlessness and meaninglessness sub-scales 
(defined by the varimax p-factor analysis of the alienation 
items considered alone, reported in Chapter Six) were 
loaded on the last component extracted. The anxiety 
items drawn from Cattell's IPAT anxiety measure formed 
three groups: one where the respondent expressed personal
inadequacies and confessed to small faults, seeming to 
reflect an intra-punitive tendency; one where the items 
chiefly consisted of physiological symptoms of anxiety, 
such as insomnia; and one where the items in some way 
depreciated other people or expressed lack of engagement 
with a supportive social environment, seeming to express 
an extra-punitive tendency.
The items of the alienation, authoritarianism and
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ethnocentrism scales which survived this analysis are set 
out in Exhibits 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 of Chapter Six; the 
anxiety items, which were retained in toto, are copyright, 
and, as it is customary to safeguard their status by 
non-publication, they are displayed only in Exhibit 1 
in the Confidential Appendix (of which they constitute 
the entire subject-matter). They can be identified 
readily by their numbers. Those candidate items (denoted 
by letters (a) to (e) in Table 6.1) which did not survive 
the analysis are given in Exhibit 6.4.
The procedure for constructing the sub-scales (one for 
each principal component extracted) was as follows:
(!) The group of items which loaded most clearly 
and unambiguously on each component was identified. Thus, 
for example, component I was related to those alienation 
items which reflected powerlessness and isolation; component 
II to those items to do with Southern Europeans, Greeks 
or Italians, which implied social distance or distrust, 
and also on one item expressing a similar sentiment (but 
not fear) towards Jews; component 3 to the ’intra-punitive' 
items of the anxiety scale and so on. Only in one case 
did a component relate clearly to a substantial number 
of items of two scales; this was one which related to the
items expressing the physiological symptoms of anxiety,
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but on which some alienation items had moderate loadings, 
both positive and negative. Since its most unambiguous 
relation was to the anxiety items, it was regarded as 
representing an element of that construct. Each component 
was therefore able to be treated as the basis of a sub-scale 
of a construct.
(ii) Having determined the construct to which a 
component was most clearly related, items were assigned to 
sub-scales of that construct on the basis of their highest 
component loading. Where a candidate item was related 
only weakly to the elements of its 3 own’ construct, and 
more closely to the elements of a ‘foreign’ construct, 
it was excluded from all the major scales and sub-scales. 
This applied to relatively few items, (a) to (e), whose 
fate has been described in Chapter Six at Section 12,3.4.
For the sake of content simplicity, the one anti-Semitic 
item which was loaded more heavily on the anti-Southern 
European component was placed in the anti-Semitism 
sub-scale. Likewise, an anti-Italian item with a heavier 
loading on anti-Semitism was placed in the anti-Southern 
European sub-scale. The fact that there were few errant 
items in the ethnocentric group is a point of minor 
interest. The cohesiveness of the items referring to 
Southern Europeans on the one hand, and those referring to
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Jews, on the other, is probably partly a function of the 
kind of item one tends to invent about the two groups, Of 
Southern Europeans, disdain is the dominant motif; of Jews, 
fear, as of a powerful group with self-regarding purposes.
(iii) All the anxiety items were assigned to the 
three sub-scales of that construct on the basis of the 
higher component loading, without exception. Since the 
nature of the ’branching' of the anxiety items was of 
intrinsic interest, the stability of it was tested by a 
separate ^-factor varimax analysis of the anxiety items 
alone. The outcome of the application of the same 
procedure was that the extra-punitive sub-scale retained its 
identity precisely i.e. had the same items assigned to it; 
but the intra-punitive and physiological scales exchanged 
items in a seemingly unordered fashion. No reliance can 
therefore be placed on the disparateness of the latter two 
sub-scales.
The items constituting the sub-scales, as they emerged 
from this procedure, are set out in Exhibit 7*2.
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EXHIBIT 7 .2
(Items Constituting; the Sub-Scales)
Major Scale Sub-Scale and Number Item numbers
of Sub-Scale* (see Exhibits in
Chapter Six and
Confidential
Appendix)
Alienation 1 . Powerlessness, and Isolation. 1, 3 , 4 , 5, 6, 7 , 8, 9 , 10, 11, 12, 
'15, 16, 1 9, 20, 21 
22, 25.
2 . Normlessness and 
Meaninglessness. 2 , 1 3, 1 4, 1 7, 18, 2 4 .
Authoritarianism 3 . Conventionalism
4 . Ego-defensiveness. 1, 3 , 5 > 6, 9 .2, 4 , 7, 8 , 10, 
1 1, 1 2, 13.
Ethnocentrism 5. Anti-Southern
European Sentiment. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 , 8, 10, 11, 12.
6. Anti-Semitism. 13,14,:15, 16, 
17, 18.
7 . Pro-assimilation 
Sentiment. 2, 9 .
Anxiety 8. Intra-punitive 
anxiety. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 , 8, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19
9 . ’Physiological’ 
anxiety
3 , 1 0, 1 1, 2 0 .
1 0 . Extra-punitive 
anxiety
1, 9 , 1 4, 15, 1 6 .
The sub-scales are thus very various in length and 
strength, ranging from only two items in No. 7 (Pro-assimilation 
Sentiment) to 18 in No. 1 (Powerlessness and Isolation).
Their means and standard deviations, (with scoring as for
282
the major scales) are given in Table 7.2.
TABLE 7*2
Means and Standard Deviations 
of the Sub-Scales
Number: Mean:
1 9.25
2 4.00
3 5.74
4 7.1-1
5 5.45
6 3.66
7 2.50
8 5.72
9 2.55
10 3.39
Standard Deviation:
6.922.80
2.755.81
5.21
3.09
1.73
3.892.00
2.35
These data indicated marked positive skewness of the
distributions of all sub-scales except Normlessness and 
Meaninglessness, Conventionalism and Pro-assimilation
sentiment. Obviously, with reliabilities not determined,
they are of limited use, but may tell us something of the 
finer interrelations between the major scales.
7.4. Interrelations between Sub-Scales of the Dispositions
These are displayed in Table 7*3»
TABLE 7-3 (a)
Interrelations between Sub-Scales of the Dispositions (n=358)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
1 1.00 .56** .05 .09 .33** .30** .09 .37** .14** . 3 5 * *
2 1.00 .04 .05 .21** .20** .07 .19** .12* .27**
3 1.00 .39** .22** .25** .10 -.23** -.05 .16**4 1.00 .32** .36** .11*-. 11* -.02 . 1 1 *
5 1.00 .48** .22**. 10 .16** . 2 1 * *
6 1 .00 .07 .02 .05 . 1 7 * *
7 1.00 -.06 -.01 .13*
8 1.00 .34** .28**
9 1.00 .16**10 1.00
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(a) Key: A: 1. Powerlessness and Isolation
2. Normlessness and Meaninglessness
F: 5- Conventionalism
4. Ego-de fensiveness
E: 5. Anti-Southern European Sentiment
6. Anti-Semitism
7. Pro-assimilation Sentiment
Anxiety: 8. Intra-punitive Anxiety
9. ’Physiological1 Anxiety
10. Extra-punitive Anxiety
The notable features and implications of this table are 
as follows:
(a) Within each construct, the sub-scales correlate
moderately or strongly, with two exceptions: despite its
relation to Anti-Southern European Sentiment, Pro-assimilation 
Sentiment is not significantly correlated with Anti-Semitism 
(the manifest content of the former has to do with Italians 
and Greeks ); and the three sub-scales of the anxiety 
measure exhibit rather weak intercorrelations,
(b) Both sub-scales of alienation predict to 
Anti-Southern European Sentiment, Anti-Semitism and all 
three sub-scales of anxiety, but not to Pro-assimilation 
Sentiment, nor to either of the F sub-scales.
(c) Both Conventionalism and Ego-defensiveness predict 
to Anti-Southern European Sentiment and Anti-Semitism,
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but only very weakly, and only in the case of Ego -defensive** 
ness significantly, to Pro-assimilation Sentiment. The 
slight variations in the magnitude of the correlations are 
consistent with the variation in the lengths of the sub­
scales .
(d) Conventionalism and Ego-defensiveness are 
negatively related to Intra-punitive Anxiety, and 
positively related to Extra-punitive Anxiety. Thus it 
seems that those low and high on authoritarianism have 
their own social modalities of anxiety: the liberals
finding the fault in themselves, the authoritarians in 
others, in keeping with their generally hostile tendency.
The overall zero relation between authoritarianism and 
anxiety conceals this contrapuntal relation.
The difficulty with the genotypical psychoanalytical 
account of authoritarianism remains, since the magnitude 
of the positive relation with Extra-punitive Anxiety shows 
no hint of difference to that with Intra-punitive Anxiety. 
However, consider the following hypothesis. To confess 
anxiety seems weak; the authoritarian avoids it, preferring 
to appear tough; but is caught unawares by the extra-punitive 
items, where the confession of anxiety involves no 
self-depreciation. This hypothesis implies that the 
intra-punitive and 1physiological1 sub-scales are infected
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negatively with social desirability set from the special 
viewpoint of the authoritarian, and therefore only the 
extra-punitive anxiety scale gives a true indication of 
the relation with anxiety. This conjecture seems plausible, 
but requires additional data on the influence of response 
sets, and the use of an extended anxiety scale of the right 
kind for substantiation. It is clearly an alternative, 
emphasizing response set considerations, to the ’contrapuntal1 
hypothesis advanced in the preceding paragraph.
A third possibility is that the defence mechanisms 
of the high scorers are more efficient than the original 
authors of the ’Authoritarian Personality’ concluded, in the 
context of the Australian urban culture, which has many 
pockets tolerant of 'us-them' attitudes, and involves the 
high F scorer in no special difficulties in a variety of 
social settings, ranging from informal fraternities of 
'one-eyed' football-club followers to war veterans’ 
associations. Universities and school-teachers’ common 
rooms, on the other hand, are liable to be intensely intolerant 
of ethnocentrism, On the whole, therefore, the genotypical 
characterization of authoritarianism, based as it is on 
in-depth studies of individuals, whilst not specifically 
supported here, can hardly be dismissed.
(e) The three sub-scales of ethnocentrism are also
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related to Extra-punitive Anxiety, in greater strength than 
could be accounted for simply by their common variance 
with alienation. It may be that the response-set considerations 
discussed above also apply here.
7.5. Mechanisms connecting Dispositions 
7.5.I. Authoritarianism and Ethnocentrism
The relation of these dispositions has been considered 
previously in Chapters Five and Six; at this point a 
systematic review of the mechanisms possibly connecting 
them is appropriate.
9
(a) We must first consider whether the shared surface 
content of the F and E scales is itself enough to generate 
a correlation of the magnitude obtained, but of trivial 
significance, in the non-statistical sense. The evidence 
for this appears to be negative. Table 6.30 indicates that 
11 of the 15 F items predict to ethnocentrism, whilst only 
three F items (Nos. 8, 10 and 11) have a manifest punitive 
content. Moreover, none of these are in the Conventionalism 
sub-scale, which predicts to both Anti-Southern European 
Sentiment and Anti-Semitism. This explanation is therefore 
contradicted by the data, but the desirability of developing 
an authoritarianism measure consisting of items more 
central to personality structure, rather than secondary 
attitude structures, which at some points directly bear on
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social issues, is quite obvious. The paired-alternative 
F scale developed in this thesis is capable of being used 
as a 'core’ instrument which may serve as a starting point 
not cursed by contamination by acquiescence.
(b) The discussion in the latter part of Chapter 
Five, of authoritarianism and punitive tendency in lower- 
status groups differs somewhat from the psychoanalytical 
explanation, advancing in its stead, as a central theme,
a simplistic and aggressive orientation in the working-class 
arising from social insecurity. The lack of a clear 
relation between anxiety and ethnocentrism weakens this 
hypothesis, which may be characterized as one which emphasizes 
’conventionalist anxiety.’ However, the apparent absence 
of a general relation between anxiety and ethnocentrism 
does not entirely destroy it, as the hypothesis describes 
a special function of anxiety in a particular social 
location, not a general one. A more powerful objection is 
the constancy of the magnitude of the authoritarianism- 
ethnocentrism relation at all educational and both social 
class levels, (see below, Tables 7*13 and 7*1^)* This 
seems to me to weaken greatly the generality of the 
’conventionalist anxiety’ hypothesis and to limit its 
possible usefulness to the region of lower social status.
(c) The psychoanalytical portrait of the generation
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of authoritarianism and its relation to ethnocentrism,^ 
resting as it does on analyses of individuals in depth, 
emerges with considerable force, albeit in a residual 
way (in this thesis) and through the elimination of more 
superficial alternatives. It is not the business of 
this analysis to offer a critique of the depth studies, 
but merely to acknowledge their apparent persuasiveness 
in the absence of other general explanation.
7.5*2. Alienation and Anxiety
(a) It may well be that these covary, in part, because 
of their common association with threatening social 
situations; but, as will be made clear later in this 
chapter, alienation is not a trivial appendage of, say, 
financial deprivation, and has an independent and tenacious 
character, with demonstrable personality correlates (in 
two groups of University students) apart from anxiety.
It will be argued that it cannot be considered to be, for 
example, a social modality of anxiety. Given its disparate 
ontological status, it is reasonable to suppose it to be 
an independent cause of anxiety, which in the highly 
alienated is liable to be diffuse and to arise from a
1
This has been described at the beginning of Chapter Five. 
In addition to its elaboration in T.W. Adorno et al..
The Authoritarian Personality, passim, a more concise 
account can be found in N. Sanford, ‘The Approach of the 
Authoritarian Personality, T in J.L. McCary (ed.) Psychology 
of Personality: Six Modern Approaches, (New York.] 1956)
pp. 261-82.
289
core of deep-seated social uncertainty. (see Table 6.2 
where the positive relation of anxiety to lack of 
perceived structure in the environment is suggested by 
the data) .
(b) At the same time, it should be pointed out that 
the alienation-anxiety relation is likely to be reciprocal. 
High levels of diffuse anxiety are disabling and thus 
adversely affect the individual’s capacity to cope with 
threatening social situations. An actual social failure 
would reinforce alienation.
7.5.3- Alienation and Ethnocentrism
(a) In Chapter Five, it is suggested that alienation 
may give rise to ethnocentrism through the generalization 
of social distrust from the macro-society to minority 
groups. This hypothesis views ethnocentrism as incidental 
to alienation.
(b) It is also suggested in Chapter Five that an 
individual may negate his confessed distrust of his own 
society by identifying with a glorified conception of it, 
as a reaction-formation to social despair. Such an 
identification might be an ersatz affair, where the 
individual joins an imagined in-group in a process entailing 
no actual change in his social relationships. Alternatively, 
the alienated individual may join an actual group, perhaps
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an ethnocentric one, as, it is often suggested, alienated 
sections of the German lower middle class .joined the 
Sturmabteilungen in the late 1920s and early 1930s.^ In 
this last case, there may be a kind of double resolution 
of alienation, resulting in its actual reduction with the 
discovery of a supportive in-group, and a satisfactory 
discharge of aggressive behaviour, directed towards real 
and illusory opponents perceived as threatening.
(c) A fairly simple frustration-aggression hypothesis
2is also quite viable. The individual develops aggressive 
activity directed at first toward the real obstacles between 
himself and his goals. Finding these intractable, as they 
may well be in many circumstances, such as a large-scale 
economic depression, he may withdraw and retreat, often 
into isolation, with reduced hopes, and/or work off his 
aggressive drives in punitive activity, perhaps merely 
verbal, directed at minority groups, especially innocuous 
ones unlikely to retaliate.
(d) The mechanisms connecting alienation with
1 See, for example, Z.A.B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, (London, 
1964), pp. 76-103.
2
A summary of the literature of the frustration-aggression 
hypothesis has been provided by H.T. Himmelweit, ’Frustration 
and Aggression: A Review of Recent Experimental Work,’ in
T .H. Pear (ed.), The Psychological Factors of Peace and War, 
(London, 1950).
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ethnocentrism suggested above are not incompatible with 
each other, but, on the contrary, may be mutually reinforcing. 
Generalization of distrust and the discharge of aggressive 
drives seem to me equally attractive as explanations of 
the relation; the data of this thesis do not indicate which 
may be the dominant mechanism. It seems plausible to 
suggest that they are complementary.
(e) The least likely explanation of the connection 
seems to lie in the alienation-anxiety relation, in view 
of the lack of a clear independent correlation between 
anxiety and ethnocentrism. However, moderate to high levels 
of anxiety may well be a force motivating the alienated 
individual to some activity, at least to an analysis of 
his situation, perhaps to a self-preoccupation, realistic 
or otherwise.
In conclusion, to postulate alienation as the prime 
motor in the tryptich: alienation, anxiety, ethnocentrism,
seems theoretically sound. It is not imperative, of course, 
to group these dispositions alone. Authoritarianism is 
also a cause of ethnocentrism; and anxiety may have many 
other causes apart from alienation as estrangement. However, 
if we stand back to contemplate only the four dispositions 
considered in this thesis, the most obvious feature of 
their interrelations is the systematic clustering of these
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three, with alienation, within the cluster, acting as the 
primurn agens. The argument for the usefulness of the 
alienation tryptich is pursued below, accompanied by some 
ontological house-cleaning.
7.6.1. A Typology of Alienation
A number of typologies of alienation might usefully 
be developed on the basis of the conception of it advanced 
in this thesis. There are two which compete for obvious 
utility. The first is one which characterizes alienation 
in terms of which element of the construct assumes most 
prominence in an individual or a group. The elements can 
be measured by the five sub-scales described in Chapter 
Six, in Table 6.2, If, for example, an individual exhibits 
(scores high on) the sentiments of meaninglessness and 
self-estrangement in a high degree, but shows little sense 
of powerlessness, normlessness or isolation, this has 
intrinsic meaning which is immediately apparent. This 
differentiation amongst the sentiments of alienation is 
indeed useful, as we shall see when the relations of the 
sub-scales with political opinion i.e. their political 
functions are considered in Chapter Nine. Whilst retaining 
this type of differentiation of alienation as a resource, 
this thesis will not advance it as the typology of most 
general utility. It suffers from a high degree of complexity,
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if one considers the number of types of the highly alienated 
one would have to distinguish if one were to be exhaustive.
Another, more economical typology presents itself if 
vie contemplate the relations of alienation the other major 
dispositional constructs. The discussion of the mechanisms 
connecting dispositions entered above leads to the 
conclusion that alienation has two primary functions: the
generation of ethnocentrism and anxiety. Indeed, to be 
plain, it is a cause of both. The generality of these 
relations and the importance of the three constructs 
suggests, as a superordinate construct, the concept of the 
alienation tryptich. Acceptance of this has the convenience 
of entailing a typology in terms of the overall functioning 
of alienation. The dominant statistical case of the 
tryptich (considering only those high, i.e. above the median 
in alienation) is one where the subject is high on all 
three dispositions. Less common is the case where the subject 
is high in alienation but low in ethnocentrism and high in 
anxiety, or vice versa. Least common is the case where 
the subject is high in alienation but low in the other two 
dispositions. Let us label these cases as follows:
I: High in alienation, anxiety and ethnocentrism;
II: High in alienation, low in anxiety and high in
ethnocentrism;
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III: High in alienation, high in anxiety and low in
ethnocentrism;
IV: High in alienation, low in anxiety and low in
ethnocentrism.
Since ethnocentrism, through its distortion of the 
perception of minority groups, implies a hostile sentiment 
which is in some degree irrational, an ad hoc amendment 
will he added to the above system: where the subject
evidences a generalized irrational hostility, apart from 
ethnocentrism, we shall add ’A ’ as an indication thereof.
An illustration of such a type is given below. The utility 
of our amendment will be apparent.
Alienation considered an estrangement has a curious 
reputation of being simultaneously a pathological condition 
and a creative perspective, particularly if the alienated 
person is from a rich foreign culture and is compelled 
to explore the new society and to see it from both without 
and within, in order to make his way. The archetypal 
instance of this is the Jewish immigrant. I shall later 
argue (in Sections 7 and 8) that this reputation is well 
deserved, and make use of the above typology in considering 
how this is so,
7.6.2. The Ontology of Alienation: An Illustration
For something to be considered different from something
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else, that is, to have a separate ontological status as 
a thing, in its own right, two criteria are required in 
common usage. One is that there should be a disparate 
manifestation of it, so that it is apparently distinguished 
from its surroundings. The other is that it should have 
disparate function. Thus the weary traveller, asking in 
a strange place for a ’bed’, would be dissatisfied with an 
area of the floor; even if it could be slept on, he would 
not consider he had been offered a ’bed’. Even a mat, 
disparate as it would seem, might satisfy him, if it were 
suitable for sleeping on. The bed should have the function 
of accommodating the would-be sleeper for sleep. Therefore 
everything from a soft mat, preferably with a blanket, 
to a fourposter, is unquestionably a bed, if it can be 
used for sleeping on.
If these two canons of disparate ontological status 
are accepted, then alienation, on the evidence so far 
presented, is not the same thing as social anxiety. Firstly, 
it has a disparate manifestation of a sophisticated kind: 
it is factorially distinct from anxiety. In order to make 
this clear, Figure 7*1 is presented, which displays the 
alienation and anxiety items located in a two-dimensional 
space by their factor loadings on the orthogonal factors 
I and III of Table 6.1 (ill having been renamed II for
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convenience). It can be seen that the two groups of items 
form two distinct clouds adjacent to the lines defining the 
factors. If one were to draw a line at 45 degrees to the 
point of origin, only two anxiety items and one alienation 
item would transgress it, out of 44 items.
Secondly, alienation has a function which distinguishes 
it from anxiety. Alienation generates ethnocentrism, whilst 
anxiety does not. The relation of anxiety to ethnocentrism 
is non-independent^ as the partial correlation demonstrates.
FIGURE 7.1
Relations between the Items 
of the Alienation and Anxiety Scales
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We may conclude that alienation is not a form of 
anxiety, but has a separate ontological status.
One further objection might be raised. Even if 
alienation is not a form of anxiety, might it not be a 
trivial attitudinal epiphenomenon of a social condition, 
such as financial frustration? If this were so, then 
the alienation scores would be a close associate of income 
level, for example. We shall see, in Figure 7 .10, that 
there is an association, but not a close one. Table 7-4 
takes this argument a stage further. It demonstrates 
that, with education held constant, the relation between 
alienation and income (of the householder) is trivial, 
although significant at the middle and higher educated 
levels.
TABLE 7.4
Alienation by Householder’s 
Income with Education Constant 
(Teürachoric correlations!
Education: Income by Alienation
Higher: .31** (n=94)
Middle: .24* (n=108)
Lower: .17 (n=ll8)
Nor does the income level perform the function of
alienation. Table 7*5 shows the relation between income
level and ethnocentrism with education constant.
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TABLE 7-5
Householder’s Income by Ethnocentrism 
with Education Constant 
(Tetrachoric Correlations)
Education: Income by Ethnocentrism
Higher: 
Middle: 
Lower:
-.18 (n=94) 
.16 (n=108) 
.22*(n=ll8)
These magnitudes are substantially lower than those 
in Table 7.16 in Section 10, where the relation of 
alienation to ethnocentrism is displayed when income is 
held constant.
The purpose of discussing the empirical evidence 
surrounding alienation in this section at such length is 
to emphasise that alienation, considered as social 
estrangement, is a dispositional construct with disparate 
ontological status, and is not identical with, although 
related to anxiety, as well as other personality attributes 
which locate it as a deep level in the individual’s attitudes. 
It may be encountered at all levels of society, and is not 
a simple derivative of the characteristic social experience 
at the lower level. To show clearly its importance in 
forming attitudes, two illustrative studies will now be 
presented. They are both drawn from interviews conducted 
during a survey of poverty in Melbourne in 1969* conceived 
and directed by the present writer. Both studies are of
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men, whom we shall name 'John* and ’Patrick', subject to 
extremely frustrating social circumstances, the first 
very high in alienation, the second low.^
John is a Metal Press Operator, aged 27, married, with • 
two children. He earns $70 per week, and was in fact 
interviewed in error, in the belief his income was lower.
He is a lapsed Catholic, and a Mason. He lives with his 
wife in Fitzroy, a very poor inner industrial area, in a 
single room, with a shared kitchen (refrigerator in the 
hall). The room was untidy and fairly cluttered. Few 
decorations, bare painted brick walls, poor light. His 
wife was present throughout the interview but made no 
comment. Although the interview took place in August, 
Christmas cards still hung on the wall. John's raw scores 
on the alienation, ethnocentrism and anxiety scales, which 
were those whose development is reported in Chapter Six, 
or, in the case of anxiety, adapted as reported in Chapter 
Six, which were administered along with open-ended questions, 
were 40 (in the fourth quartirange), 26 (in the fourth 
quartirange) and 8 (in the second quartirange) respectively. 
He is thus very high in alienation and anxiety and low in
1
I must thank here Mr. Gabriel Lafitte who interviewed 
'John'c The interview would have been impossible without 
his capability for writing in shorthand, as well as his quick 
ear.
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ethnocentrism. He nevertheless often lapses into 
ethnocentric patter, and his conversation teems with 
symptoms of irrational hostility. In our typology, he is 
type III A'.
John is quoted verbatim. Two dots indicate a pause.
He began hesitantly, but quickly became garrulous. The 
sentiments of alienation will be noted as he voiced them.
The first to emerge were feelings of isolation and powerless 
ness .
(Question: If you could choose JUST ONE matter for MORE
GOVERNMENT ATTENTION ... which ONE would you choose?)
It’s hard to say .. to be honest I really wouldn’t 
know .. to be able to choose it’d be O.K. but 
you're not able to choose .. This is supposed to 
be a free country but they never ask the average 
bloke, you’ve got to do what the man with the 
big collar tells you to do. I don't reckon anyone 
could give you any answer, matey, except the 
hypocrites. Nobody ever asks the ordinary man.
There followed perspicacity and violent hostility, with
isolation and normlessness in close company.
(Question: Would you like to see any CHANGES in SOCIAL
WELFARE ARRANGEMENTS for the citizens of this State?)
Yes.
(Question: What changes would you like to see?)
I would like to see a reform .. I mean people that 
go for these things [sic] and it's a cold air like 
a business. It's like they’re giving you something 
and they ain’t. I mean it all comes out of your 
taxation and when you get on your feet you pay it
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all back. It's this stiff-necked attitude by 
these welfare mongrels - you can't talk to them, 
the ordinary man in the street. You want to talk 
to a person, you talk to them properly, they think 
you’re shit - it's commo tactics, they can shove 
their charity up their ring.
He always votes for the A.L.P., and is asked why. In the 
following flood of words, note his habit of not getting 
things quite right, preoccupation with images of violence, 
ethnocentric patter (not confirmed by his E Scale score, 
when he considered his attitudes more carefully) and 
tendency to use the cliches of racial bigotry as pejorative 
epithets to be stuck on to politicians or institutions 
which he sees as oppressive. Normlessness and irrational 
hostility are manifest.
(Question: What are your MAIN REASONS for voting for the
party of your choice at this election,)
'Cause I believe .. this country’s been in two 
Great Wars, Federal Parliament shit themselves both times and Labor’s the only party that can run it..
When we got a war Labor did a good job. Bolte's1 2
a Jew mongrel. I've got nothing against Jews but 
he's money happy like all of Federal Parliament.
I'd say 75 per cent of Labor is Commo but the 
other 15 per cent get things done, or 35 per cent.
This bloody Gorton government's^ ruined this country, 
doing this, doing that, lickin' the Yank’s arse.
The Federal Government is nothing more than a 
glorified Com party anyway - the pensioners are 
struggling to live and they got more dagos here
1
The State Premier (not Jewish).
2
The Federal Government (Liberal and Country Party). 
Mr. Gorton is Prime Minister.
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than fucking White Australians. I reckon two out 
of three people you see here are dagos. They come 
here, sponge the money dry and piss off home. The 
Yanks own this joint. They sit up there in Canberra 
on their big fat butts doing frigging nothing and 
getting their corn each year just flappin' their 
mouths. You get a shovel in their hands and see 
what they're good for. This Gorton, he's a prick - 
he's lickin' everybody's arse, including his own, 
taxes on this, taxes on that like he owns the place. 
You see him on TV and he doesn't know what he's 
talking about. Manzies1 was good, I really admired 
him. We need a Labor Government while we're in the 
war.2 The man in the street has got Buckley's.5 
Unless you live in Toorak.^ A change is as good 
as a feed to what we got now. Gorton I reckon is 
too young to run this country. Kennedy of America, 
he was different, he was young but he had an old 
mind, that's why they killed him. I liked Menzies, 
Pigiron I called him because of the Japanese.
Gorton is too young, he hasn't got the experience, 
not like Menzies, he may have been a bastard but he 
knew what to do. We shouldn't have our boys 
getting their guts shot out - the Yanks are getting 
out now with Nixon, where are our troops being 
pulled out - cur head goes in every time, soon 
as there's trouble we have to be in it, what about 
this country?
In all this, two themes seem to be dominant. The first, 
motivated apparently by anxiety and hostility, is a drive 
to assume mastery of a situation and emotional catharsis 
by emotive explication, talking it out. His sharp insight
1
Sir Robert Menzies, the Liberal Prime Minister 1959-^0 
(then of the United Australia Party) and 1950-65. In the 
earlier period he permitted scales of scrap metal to 
Japan, hence 'Pig-Iron Bob'.
2
In Vietnam.
5 'Buckley's chance', a very slim one.
Melbourne's elite suburb.
4
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into the realities of social welfare arrangements - 'When 
you get on your feet you pay it all back' - which owes 
much to his hostility, are in contrast to this fantasy-laden 
outburst. The second is a barely-concealed plea for 
acceptance into the in-group, as one Aussie to another. 
Ersatz identification, the generalization of social distrust 
and the aggressive discharge of the tensions of frustration 
are all suggested here. There are overtones, too, of 
authoritarian sentiment for a strong leader - 'he may 
have been a bastard but he knew what to do.' Unfortunately, 
no F scale was administered.
John was also asked about his day dreams.
(Question: Everybody daydreams sometimes. If you had
to name your favourite daydream, what would it be? When 
you are just sitting back and letting your thoughts drift, 
what do you LIKE thinking about?) There is a poignant 
response. He gropes awkwardly for a phrase to express 
self-estrangement. He returns quickly to a mood of 
outspoken protest.
Well, I'd like to go to sea, like, you know, just 
to see the world. I'd always come home, I mean 
Australia's me home. I mean you're working in a 
factory - I mean I'm not gratified in myself, but 
on a cargo boat, you're doing something worthwhile, 
taking goods where they're needed. I mean I'd be 
in Vietnam right now - just look at the marbles 
ballot^- they whack your number out of the barrel 
and you’ve had it - there's no justice.
1
Conscription is selective and by lot. Marbles are 
drawn from a rotated barrel which denote the birthdays of 
those to be conscripted.
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(Question: If you had to name the BEST thing
about your life at the present time, what would it be?)
My wife, [no elaboration^
The most oppressive features of his social situation 
now emerge.
(Question: If you had to name the WORST thing about your
life at the present time, what would it be?)
Er - when I had to give up me kids - the social 
welfare people took them away.
(Why?)
Well, an unfit father.
(Why did they say that?)
Because I ’ve got a police record and because I 
drink. I was upset, but it upsets the old woman 
more than me. But it only makes me drink more.
That’s why I’ve got an affliction against the 
rules. I don’t like a man in uniform. I obey the 
rules, but you don’t have to like them, matey.
For this tragic man, of less than 30, alienation has been
reached by paths made fairly clear by the interview. Even
in extremis, as here, it is a situation-relevant disposition,
with consequences for personality functioning, but not a
personality syndrome. But it is not an inevitable concomitant
of objectively frustrating conditions. We turn to Patrick,
a homeless man of about 50, jobless, interviewed by the
writer after he had spent a night in Melbourne’s only
free hostel for homeless men. Accommodation is limited,
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and it is difficult to spend two nights there. Preference 
is given to strangers in the afternoon line-up, where 
tickets for the night are distributed. A high 
proportion of those sheltering there are handicapped 
accident victims or alcoholics. Patrick is a Church-going 
Catholic, born in Ireland. His last job was as a 
Storeman-Clerk. His income is literally nil, since he 
has not applied for unemployment benefit. ('I know it’s 
silly, but I just haven't been near them'). He is separated 
from his wife, who has one young child. His raw scores 
on the dispositional scales were 10 for alienation (in 
the second quartirange), 4 for ethnocentrism (in the 
first quartirange) and 14 for anxiety (in the third 
quartirange). He is thus low in alienation, very low in 
ethnocentrism and rather high in anxiety. The interview 
took place in the echoing dining room of the hostel about 
midday. No natural light - only fluorescent light.
In contrast to John, who is self-preoccupied, Patrick's 
sympathetic imagination dwells on the unfortunate, although 
his pride does not permit him to instance his own case. 
Noticing the interviewer writing in long-hand, he slows his 
remarks to dictation pace.
(Question: .. JUST ONE matter for MOKE GOVERNMENT ATTENTION
Which ONE would you choose?)
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Oh, Education.
(Probe)
Yes, ’course I'm .. at the present time an 
ordinary working man can't give his children the 
education they should get. Even if they are 
intelligent enough to win scholarships, in a 
working family, when they come of working age, 
to help their parents financially they have to go 
to work. And this is a handicap to their children 
and the country.
(Question: .. CHANGES in SOCIAL WELFARE ARRANGEMENTS?)
I'd like to see elderly people and all pensioners 
getting a better deal from the State - nothing to 
do with the Commonwealth.
(Probe)
Yes, well they already get a small pension from the 
Commonwealth, this is not sufficient, so the State 
should be able to help by providing cheaper 
accommodation and free meals. They already have 
free medical attention, don't they? [Looks enquiringly}
(Yes)
Ah.
In Patrick's imaginative world, there is a good deal of 
basic trust. People are 'helped', or will be. Something 
is being done, but improvements are possible. He spells 
out general issues calmly. He always votes DLP, and is 
asked why.
In my book, they have the right attitude towards 
defence, and family allowances. national development. 
That's about all, I suppose; that covers everything - 
of course, foreign policy, too.
When asked about his daydreams, he becomes a little more
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agitated and confesses small faults.
One time I knew what I used to think about. What 
I’d do if I won Tatts.-
(What?)
Well, it varies .. sometimes I’d like to go for 
a world trip, sometimes I'd like to just tour 
Australia and settle down here, other times I'd 
like to go horn and stay at home, in Ireland. 
Occasionally, I'd like to think I'd give it all 
to charity, more to make a big fellow of myself 
than anything else. That's about it, I suppose.
(Question: .. BEST thing about your life?)
Oh, I’d say peace of mind. The last six months 
have been an emotional and mental strain. But 
in the last few weeks I seem to have come to 
grips with myself and things don't seem at all 
too bad. It's a domestic and financial thing, I 
don't know if I could elaborate on it much.
(Family troubles?)
Family, yes, it's anonymous , so what difference 
does it make?
Patrick adheres to polite, almost courtly conventions, 
which allow him to keep some distance from the interviewer 
whilst maintaining rapport. Although destitute, he is 
socially poised, not pleading for admittance to a 
fraternal social world. He considers himself, despite his 
destitution, to be in one, and in fact is so. Even 
consideration of the worst thing in his life provokes 
anxiety, but not despair.
1
A lottery.
2
The interview.
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The worst . . oh, I don't know, I don't think I'd 
be capable of holding a job at the moment, though 
I don’t know. If I could get a suitable job I 
could hold it. I'm not capable of manual, I'm 
kind of .. [Makes an unclear gesture with his hands].
I used to do clerical work before, storeman for the .. 
[pauses] If I had a job in that suitable environment 
I'd jump at it.
(Why couldn't you hold down a job?)
I feel restless. I feel I want to go walkabcut.
Patrick has no enemies. In his view, his difficult social 
position is self-inflicted, and the resolution of it 
lies within himself, assisted by a helpful chance, quite 
likely to crop up. He is clear-sighted, if not 
perspicacious. He has a 'home', in Ireland, and no doubt 
the Catholic faith. Considered as a foil to John, he is 
constructive in the face of social difficulty. John is 
pessimistic and lives in a world peopled by vengeful 
enemies, seemingly sought for: 'I don't like a man in
uniform.’ John's hectic exposition of the perilous situation 
which confronts the whole nation, although at times 
insightful and intelligently contrived to evoke a sympathetic 
response, has no happy ending, only a desperate ’patriotic' 
plea: 'What about this country?' In his personal life,
he expects things to get worse: 1.. it only makes me
drink more'.
One salient fact hardly needs emphasis: in broad
terms, the objective social situation of Patrick is much
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worse than that of John. He has no income, no wife, 
no family. John has a good income and his wife’s support. 
The distance between them, and it is a long one, is created 
by John’s alienation.
7*7* Some Characteristics of Alienation Considered as Social 
Estrangement
'Since the meanings of alienation are so diverse, the 
entire literature on deviance, psychopathology, political 
rebellion,withdrawal, and criminality, in addition to much 
writing on personal misery and unhappiness, is often 
considered relevant to the understanding of alienation.’
So writes Keniston in guiding the reader to the massive
1 pliterature of alienation. Bell has distinguished two 
broad genres of alienation: 'estrangement' (feeling
alienated) and 'reification' (being alienated). The latter 
concept owes much to Marx, but the normative overtones of 
Marx's position lead him to speculate on the nature of the 
sense of estrangement. The conception of alienation 
explored empirically in this thesis is of a tenacious sense 
of social estrangement, and the outcome of this exploration
1
K. Keniston, The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American
Society, (New York, i960) p. 492.
2
D. Bell, 'The Rediscovery of Alienation: Some Notes along
the Quest for the Historical Marx,' Journal of Philosophy,
56 (1959) PP. 933-951*•
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is the proposal of the concept of the alienation 
tryptich, based on the general empirical relation with 
anxiety and ethnocentrism, which suggests a broader 
relation to irrational hostility. The argument is that 
the alienation is a cause of these. Although a 
situation-relevant disposition, and not primarily a 
personality construct, it has consequences for the mode 
of personality functioning.
It has been noted that there are many paths to 
alienation i.e. that it may arise out of a variety of 
social circumstances. One of these may be the circumstance 
of being reared in a family of poverty. In such a case, 
alienation is not so much a deviant as a characteristically 
maladaptive disposition. Keniston's remark that ’the 
concept of alienation in every variation suggests the loss 
or absence of a previous or desirable relationship' and 
his question : 'What replaces the old relationship?'^
(my italics) may be considered tendentious. There may 
well be a mode of socialization into alienation amongst 
the very poor, such that the individual never loses anything, 
but is accustomed to social distrust, frustration, 
uncertainty, and anxiety as 'natural' features of social
K. Keniston, op. clt., p. 4^4.
I
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experience. One might conjecture"5' the following six 
agents of alienation for the children of the poor:
1. An unstable family structure, with the father 
often absent.
2. Intense sibling rivalry.
5. Maternal deprivation.
4. An uncertain pattern of discipline.
5. Pervasive anxiety in the parent(s).
6. Frustration and humiliation at school.
When the disposition of alienation arises out of 
such conditions, which would conduce to the development of 
a weak ego structure and the lack of internalized values, 
which would in turn conduce to a customary social failure, 
there is no depletion, as there never grew anything to be 
lost. In such a case, the alienation tryptich would be 
situation-relevant in a much more remote sense, than, for 
example, in men thrown out of work during an economic 
depression. Amongst the poor, therefore, we might expect 
it to move closer, as it were, to the core of personality 
functioning. Many features of Lewis' concept of the culture 
of poverty, as they relate to the attitudes and values of 
people in a slum community, such as fear, suspicion 
and apathy, lack of trust, fatalism, helplessness, dependence
I
For suggestions of these genetic characteristics among 
some 'cultures of poverty', see Oscar Lewis, La Vida,
(London, 1967) pp. xxxix ff.
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and a sense of inferiority,strongly suggest that they 
may be given a theoretical summation in the concept of the 
alienation tryptich. This is true also of the attitudes of 
the poor in some traditionally poor communities, such as
1that described by Banfield in a Southern Italian village. 
There, many themes of the alienation tryptich, such as 
social anxiety, preoccupazione (’mingled worry, fear, 
anxiety and foreboding'), pervasive social distrust, 
uncertainty and hostility, often expressed as ’jealousy’, 
are to be found.
Having established the notion of the alienation as a 
functioning entity which characteristically invokes other 
dispositional constructs, we may speculate on its implications 
for man in his role as a social analyst, or an interpretative 
observer of social situations. In his recent analysis of
palienated University youth, Bettelheim attributes sentiments 
of estrangement and hostility to the prolongation of 
adolescence, more particularly when the individual is 
taught speculative habits rather than a craft, a technique 
for producing finished work with special skills. He 
quotes with approval Herman Melville's intuitive grasp of
1
E .C• Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society.
(New York, 195&) esp. pp. 103-122.
2
B. Bettelheim, 'Obsolete Youth,' Encounter, 53 (19&9)
No. 3, pp. 29-42.
the connection between social frustration and irrational 
hostility:
Whenever I find myself growing grim about the mouth; 
whenever it is a damp drizzly November in my soul; 
whenever I find myself involuntarily pausing before 
coffin warehouses, and bringing up the rear of every 
funeral I meet; and especially whenever my hypos get 
an upper hand of me, that it requires a strong moral 
principle to prevent me from deliberately stepping 
into the street and methodically knocking people’s 
hats off - then, I account it high time to go to sea. 
This is my substitute for pistol and ball.
In broad terms, if one contemplates the relationships
between alienation, anxiety and ethnocentrism in the mass
voter sample, it seems reasonable to expect the alienated
observer to be imperfect in his judgment. His anxiety will
seek catharsis through ’insights' rather than sustained
analysis, particularly when many elements in a historical
situation have to be weighed. He is therefore prone to
simplistic constructions. He will also tend to seek out
culprits, blameworthy persons, classes or institutions.
In sum, the alienated social analyst, or even the non-expert
alienated social observer, although likely to be penetrating,
as Otto Rank"1' suggests, will tend to be a destructive
agent, unusually prone to lapses of judgement. The case
of John provides a striking example of this.
In the typology developed in Section 7-6.1., Type IV,
1
0. Rank, The Myth of the Birth of the Hero, (New York, 
1959) PP- 184-210.
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high in alienation but low in hostility and anxiety, would 
seem the most promising for constructive analysis, which 
requires both a drive for mastery and good judgement. 
Fortunately, this type may be more at the higher educational 
levels (see Table 7 *14) where the alienation tryptich is 
much less cohesive (it is epitomised in Type I, which is 
generally more common) and the personality correlates of 
alienation may be muted. But where the social analyst is 
a marginal intellectual, without assured status and 
working with ’soft’ data requiring careful interpretation, 
the alienation tryptich may be more cohesive, high levels 
of anxiety and hostility more common, and the analysis may 
be prone to mistake. Consider the following dictum of Marx, 
himself perhaps a case in point, speaking, as it happens, 
of social conditions engendering alienation. Here the 
Marxist characterization of alienation spills over into 
speculation about the attitudinal concomitants of 
estrangement. He is speaking of capitalism in its developed 
phase.
Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted 
disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting 
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois 
epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast, frozen 
relations ... are swept away. All new-formed ones 
become antiquated before they can ossify. All 
that is solid melts into air, all that is holy 
is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face
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with sober senses his real conditions of life and 
his relations with his kind (my stress
Sometimes, as we now know, rapid industrialization disturbs
’all social conditions’; sometimes not. Where, and if
it does, and social dislocation disorients the working
class and produces a condition of social estrangement,
nothing could be more mistaken than the expectation of
sober assessment expressed above. On the contrary, it
would be more reasonable to expect the kind of outlook
exemplified in the account of John, namely, a wildly
hostile mood of despair, caricaturing the ’conditions of
life' and striving for unreal 'relations with his kind*.
Information-saving individuals, whose synthetic capacities
are enhanced by good judgement are not likely to be
commonly found under such social conditions. However,
perspicacity of an incomplete kind can often be expected.
7*8. Alienation Amongst University Students
Much could be written of this 2; the purpose of this
section is merely to present data which emphasize the
1
K. Marx, The Communist Manifesto, in H.J. Laski,
Communist Manifesto: Socialist Landmark, (London, 19^8)
p. 12%~.
2
For what is perhaps the most complete discussion of it 
see K. Keniston, The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American
Society, (New York^ i960), esp. pp. 275-310.
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constancy of function of alienation in generating
ethnocentrism and some indication of relation to anxiety
in elite educational groups. The data presented here
also suggest that the disposition has important personality
correlates, although the samples are of limited relevance.
Mr. B. Sheil1 administered the alienation scale together
2with the scales of the Eysenck Personality Inventory ; 
that is, the neuroticism (N), extraversion (E) and lie 
scales (L), to a sample of 98 male students from the 
first year Psychology Course at the University of Sydney 
in 1968. All subjects filled out Form B of the EPI.
Results are given in Table 7*6.
TABLE 7 .6
The EPI Scales and Alienation in a Sample of
Sydney Students (Product-Moment correlations)
L N E A
L 1.00 -.28** -.12 -.19N 1.00 -.07 .50**E 1.00 - .21*
A 1.00
In June, 1969, the alienation, authoritarianism
1
With whose permission these data are reproduced. They 
are drawn from personal communications of 9 July 1969* and 
11 November 1969« At these times M1", Sheil, who is a 
psychologist, was on the staff of the Psychology Department, 
University of Melbourne.
2
H.J. Eysenck and S.B.G. Eysenck, Manual of the Eysenck 
Personality Inventory, (London, University of London Press, 1964).
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ethnocentrism together with the Eysenck Personality 
Inventory, and the Cattell 16 PF Test Profile,"*" were 
administered by Mr. Sheil to a sample of second-year 
Psychology students of mixed sex (n=47) at the University 
of Melbourne. The sample was sophisticated, most subjects 
being Honours students. Some results are set out in 
Table 7.7.
TABLE 7.7 (a)
Alienation, Ethnocentrism and Personality 
Indices in a Sample of Melbourne Students 
(Product -Moment Correlations"
L N E A Eth Angst
L 1.00 .13 -.08 .06 -.08 -.07N 1.00 -.18 .18 .36* .58**
E 1.00 -.47** -.30* -.34*A 1.00 . 4y** .27Eth 1.00 .24
Angst 1.00
(a) For the purposes of this table L, N and E
to the abovementioned sub-scales of the EPI; A 
and Eth. to the alienation and ethnocentrism 
measures developed in this thesis; and Angst to 
the second-order anxiety factor from the Cattell 
16 P.F.
The most surprising feature of Table 7*7 is the
1
R.B. Cattell, D.R. Saunders and G. Stice, Handbook 
of the l6 Personality Factor Questionnaire, TTnstitute 
of Personality and Abilities Testing, Champaign, Illinois,
1967).
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correlation between alienation and ethnocentrism in 
relatively sophisticated groups at a high educational 
level. Table 7«3 indicates that both groups exhibit high 
levels of alienation; but the Melbourne student sample was 
low on ethnocentrism in relation to the representative 
voter sample. The correlation has to be understood within 
this context, but remains remarkable when one considers 
the constriction of the variance on ethnocentrism.
TABLE 7.8
Alienation and Ethnocentrism
in Two Student Samples
Alienation Ethnocentrism (a)
Mean: Standard
Deviation:
Mean: Standard
Deviation:
Students
(Sydney): 17*59 9-59 - -
Students
(Melbourne): 17*57 8.72 5.02 5.18
Representative 
voter sample:12.35 8*79 II.58 7 .7^
(a) The ethnocentrism scale was not administered
to the Sydney student sample.
Neuroticism and the anxiety scores are closely 
related in the Melbourne student sample. Alienation 
predicts significantly to neuroticism in the larger Sydney 
student sample, but to neither neuroticism nor anxiety 
in the smaller Melbourne one. The absence of evidence of 
a relation between alienation and Eysenck's Lie Scale,
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which consists of items which reflect a tendency to try 
to 'fake good', suggests that the alienation scale may 
(mercifully) not be negatively infected by social 
desirability set. Alienation shows a marked negative 
relation to extraversion in both samples and it would 
appear that the highly alienated student is located in 
the 'melancholic' quadrant of the EPI.
Sheil also found a significant correlation in the 
Melbourne student sample between the alienation scale and 
three sub-scales of the Cattell 16 PF, displayed in Table 
7*9* These are A (Schizothymia-Cyclothymia: aloof,
cold-warm, sociable), H (Threctia-Parmia: timid, shy-
adventurous, 'thickskinned') and Q4 (Low Ergic Tension-High 
Ergic Tension: phlegmatic, composed-tense, excitable).
TABLE 7-9
Alienation and the 16 PF Sub-Scales 
in a Sample of Melbourne Students (a) 
(Product-Moment Correlations)
Ain. A H Q4
Ain.
A
H
1.00 -.42** -.39**
1.00 .35*
1.00
.35*
.20
-.06
1.00
(a) Ain. here means alienation, A the Sub-Scale 
of the 16 PF.
The alienated student in this sample is thus cold, shy 
and tense, as well as introverted and tending to a deviant,
though mild ethnocentrism. The general picture is of 
a withdrawn, slightly hostile individual. It will be 
noted that the three sub-scales of the l6 PF are more 
closely related to alienation than to each other. Although 
not a personality syndrome, therefore, alienation gives 
indications of relations with a number of personality 
correlates. Whilst it rnay be reached by a chosen path 
at the higher educational level, rather than one imposed 
by constricting social circumstances in a working-class 
environment, it seems nevertheless to involve the 
alienated individual in more than a pose. Rather, it 
leads to variations in personality functioning which may 
not easily be shed.
7*9« The Social Incidence of Dispositions 
7.9*1* Authoritarianism
The social correlates of each disposition which have 
been examined are self-identified social class, education 
level, income of the head of the householder, and the age, 
sex and religious affiliation of the respondent. For 
convenience, the first three are grouped together, as are 
age and sex. Religious denomination stands alone.
Figures 7*2, 7*5 and 7*^ exhibit the relation of 
authoritarianism with class, education and householder's
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FIGURE 7.2 (a) (b) (c) (d) FIGURE 7.3 (e)
Authoritarianism by Social Class Authoritarianism by Education
Middle class Working class
0 80
HIGH
Middle Lowerhigher
(p < .01; n=325) (p <.001; n=350)
FIGURE 7.4 (f)
Authoritarianism by Householder's Income
100
HIGH
80
60 ■
40
20
--1---- 1---- 1-
Higher Middle Lower
(p < .01; n=322)
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(a) More respondents placed themselves in the 
’middle class’ category in the 1966 survey 
(reported here) than in the 1963 survey; 
probably because ’average middle' (apparently 
a very persuasive self-description for an 
Australian) was offered as a self-designation,
as well as ’lower middle class’ and 'upper middle 
class.’ (Only 'upper middle class’ and ’middle 
class' as well as 'working class’ were offered 
in 1963) .
(b) Cases of where data is missing or class 
identification eschewed have been excluded.
(c) In these figures and all those which follow ’Low’ 
and ’High' refer to those below and above the 
medians for the whole sample, set out in the 
standardisation data in Chapter Six.
(d) It will be remembered that the probability values 
refer to chi-square tests on four-cell tables
of frequencies split as near as possible to the 
median i,e. at below ’middle' on education and 
above ’middle' on income level.
(e) The educational categories have been described 
in Chapter Three. 'Higher' refers to Leaving 
Certificate or above (including University
525
education); ’Middle’ to Intermediate Certificate 
and/or a Tradesman's Certificate; ’Lower’ to 
less than Intermediate. The three groups are 
roughly equivalent in size.
(f) Income levels have also been described in
Chapter Three. ’Higher’ refers to a householder’s 
income of more than $5000 p.a., i.e. more than 
$60 per week; ’Middle’ to a householder’s income 
of between $45 and $60 per week; ’Lower’ to a 
householder’s income less than $45 per week,
Again, the three groups are roughly numerically 
equal.
These marked sociological relations confirm those 
reported with the exploratory scales in Chapter Five. The 
discussion there is relevant here.
FIGURE 7-5 FIGURE 7.6
Authoritarianism by Age Authoritarianism by Sex
— 1------------- 1—
Less than More than
46 46
HIGH
Women
(p is not sig., (hereafter 
n.s.), n=550)(pc.OOl, n=552)
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The data yielding Figures 7-5 and 7*6 confirm those 
in Chapter Five as regards age, and since a much smaller 
proportion of the items employed in the paired-alternative 
F Scale used here refer to control of young people, the 
positive relation between authoritarianism and age may be 
regarded as a real one. Older age groups are less 
educated (see Chapter Three) and have had their outlooks 
formed in times when higher education was more uncommon 
and child-rearing methods more autocratic. It is therefore 
hazardous to suppose that the cross-tabulation indicates 
that one grows more authoritarian as one ages; it seems 
more likely that it reflects a generational difference.
No difference is apparent between the sexes.
FIGURE 7.7
Authoritarianism by Religious Affiliation (a)
HIGH
Protestant Catholic
(p<.001, n=300)
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(a) This table (and most of those which follow)
collapses the three major Protestant denominations 
(Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist) to one 
category, and excludes groups other than these 
and Catholics, which are small and cannot serve 
as a basis for generalization. High Church 
Anglicans are likely to object to being designated 
'Protestant'; I plead convenience.
The differences in Figure 7.7 are marked, but not 
matched by denominational differences in ethnocentrism 
(see Figure 7.19). It follows that the correlation in the 
Catholic sample is depressed, and this is demonstrated in 
Table 7.18, although the difference in correlation between 
Catholics and others is not significant. This finding is 
therefore partially consistent with the Knopfelmächer- 
Armstrong hypothesis discussed in Chapter Five, although 
not supportive of it, since the correlation remains 
significant and not greatly different. The theme of the 
explanation for the difference in correlation, indeed the 
dissolution of the authoritarianism-ethnocentrism correlation, 
advanced by Knopfelmächer and Armstrong'1' is that the more
1
F. KnopfeIraächer and D.B. Armstrong, 'The Relation 
between Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism and Religious 
Denomination amongst Australian Adolescents,' American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 24 (1963) pp. 99-114.
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authoritarian of the Catholics acculturate more closely 
to the liberal values of the Catholic Church on racial 
matters. Another viable hypothesis is that the scale is 
not a very good measure of what was intended i.e. the 
personality dynamics of the prejudiced person, amongst 
Australian Catholics. The Irish Catholic tradition is the 
dominant one, and there is amongst them a strong emphasis 
on sexual Puritanism and a devotion to the Church. The 
exaggerated emphasis on familial virtues and ’uprightness,’ 
in the Conventionalism sub-scale in particular, are therefore 
not, amongst Catholics, mildly neurotic individual symptoms; 
they are the badges of the Irish Catholic sub-culture. Of 
course, the function of the F items is not entirely vitiated 
by this fact, since they do predict to ethnocentrism within 
the Catholic sub-sample, and, of course, it is true that 
authoritarianism may be culturally transmitted. The 
point is that the items do not function quite as they 
were intended, and the case for a genuine ’personality’ 
measure of F is reinforced.
7.9*2. Alienation
Figures 7*8, 7*9 and 7.10 exhibit the relation of 
alienation to class, education and income, measured as
before.
FIGURE 7*9
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FIGURE 
Alienation by
100
HIGH
60
40
20
Middle class
(p is n.
7.8
Social Class Alienation by Education
20
Working class
------1------------ i------------ i-----
Higher Middle Lower
s., n=323) (p is n.s.., n=350 )
FIGURE 7.10
Alienation by Householder’s Income
(pc.001, n=322)
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The negative relation reported in Chapter Five between 
alienation and status indices is thus most imperfectly 
reflected here, being in the expected direction but not 
significant, in the case of education and class, but highly 
significant for income. It will be remembered (Chapter 
Three, Tables 3 *9* 3*10 and 3«ll) that the relation 
between these three 'status' indices stops far short of 
identity. Of the three variables, income offers the most 
direct opportunities for control of the social situation, 
and so the reduction of socially frustrating circumstances: 
hence its reliable relation with alienation.
Whilst the general negative relation between status 
and alienation is by no means a misleading one, it is wrong 
to over-emphasise it, and it is clear that there may be 
many paths to alienation.
FIGURE 7-11 FIGURE 7-12
Alienation by Age Alienation by Sex
100
20
-- 1--------- 1--
Less than More than
46 46
HIGH
Women
(p is n.s., n=350)(p is n.s., n=352)
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These longer scales thus do not confirm the age 
relation reported in Chapter Five. The actual difference 
between broad age groups in the sample is slight. However, 
the data do suggest that the youngest age group is more 
alienated than their immediate elders.
TABLE 7-10
Alienation by Age 
(Sub-Groups)
(Frequencies)
Low High
Less than 25: 21 28 (n=49)26-45: 91 68 (n=159)
(p < .10, n.s.)
The apparent contrast between these groups may be 
related to marriage, job-promotion and ’settling down’.
FIGURE 7.13
Alienation by Religious Affiliation
HIGH
Protestant Catholic
(p is n.s., n=300)
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Differences here are slight, and might well be a 
function of covariance with income in the sample.
The relationship of alienation to membership of 
organizations might be expected to be negative. The data 
of this survey show no relation between alienation level 
and membership of trade unions or professional organizations, 
which is not surprising, since membership of these will, 
in many instances, be purely nominal. More surprising is 
the lack of relation between alienation and membership of 
what was broadly described, in the relevant question as 
’any sort of social club.’ Where organizational involvement 
implied a celebration of shared values, as in membership of 
Church clubs and attendance at religious ceremonies, 
there is the expected negative relation, exhibited in 
Table 7.11.
TABLE 7.11
Alienation by Church Attendance 
and Membership of Church Clubs
Church Church Club Low HighAttendance: Low High Membership:
In last month: 6o 40=100$ Yes: 71 29=100$(n=4^; 50=100$ (n=3C7i(n=129) No: 50Longer: 50 50=100#
(n=219)
(p < ,10 n.s ., n=348) (p < .01, n=552)
This table once again suggests the depth at which 
alienation inhabits, as it were, the personality and outlook
of the individual.
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7♦9•3. Ethnocentrism
FIGURE 7-14 FIGURE 7
Ethnocentrism by Social Class Ethnocentrism
Middle class Working class
100
20 ■
--1---- 1-
Higher Middle
(pc.COl, n=323) (p c .001,
FIGURE 7.16
Ethnocentrism by Householder’s Income
0 80
HIGH
Middle LowerHigher
.15
by Education
— 1-------
Lower
n=350)
(p < *05j n=322)
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These data follow the pattern of the dispositional 
antecedents of ethnocentrism, the most powerful relation 
being with education. Even a little education, it seems, 
is not a dangerous thing, in this regard.
FIGURE 7.17 FIGURE 7.18
Ethnocentrism by Age Ethnocentrism by Sex
HIGH
Women
(p <.05, n=352) ( p is n.s., n=350)
What has been said earlier of the educational 
background of older age groups is relevant here. So, too, 
is their experience of World War II and the Depression. 
Neither experience would have reduced suspiciousness and 
hostility, although how long these might ’stick’ is a 
matter for conjecture.
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FIGURE 7.19
Ethnocentrism by Religious Affiliation
HIGH
Protestant Catholic
(p is n.s., n=300)
The discussion which follows Figure 7*7 is relevant 
here. The Catholics may be higher in ethnocentrism 
than Figure 7*19 suggests, since the out-groups named 
in the ethnocentrism scale include Italians, who may be 
perceived as fraternal, since they share their religious 
affiliation. A further test on differences in Anti-Semitism 
(not done in this case) is indicated for future research.
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7*9*4. Anxiety
FIGURE 7*20
Anxiety by Social Class
FIGURE 7*21 
Anxiety by Education
%«
HIGH
Middle class Working class
(p is n.s., n=323) (p <.02, n=350)
FIGURE 7*22
Anxiety by Householder’s Income
(p is n.s., n=323)
The pattern here is interesting in that the relations
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of anxiety with income and class, although negative, as 
might be expected, are weak and not significant, whereas 
the relation with education is marked and significant.
These data reinforce the suggestion made in Section 7 .5 .2 . 
that anxiety is related to lack of perceived structure in 
the environment. Education is likely to assist intellectual 
comprehension of the environment and reduces anxiety.
Income lends a potential for control of the environment, 
but does not, to the same extent, make it knowable.
FIGURE 7.23 FIGURE 7*24
Anxiety by Age Anxiety by Sex
HIGH
0 80
HIGH
More than
46
Less than
(p is n.s., n=552) (p < . 01, n=350)
The data by se:: follow the pattern determined by R.B. 
Cattell for samples in other countries,'1' although the
1
R.B. Cattell, Handbook for the IPAT Anxiety Scale (Self 
Analysis Form), (The Australian Council for Educational 
Research, Melbourne, Copyright 1957) esp. pp. 13 and 14.
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relation of anxiety to sex is more marked than expected.
It may be based primarily on the greater physical 
vulnerability of women and the normative circumscription 
of their opportunities for overt initiatives and 
environmental control in the Australian culture. The 
sample is rather too small to confirm the curvilinear 
relation to age described by Cattell, where the very young 
(about 20) are most anxious, the level of anxiety falling 
in a gentle gradient thereafter. The sub-samples do however, 
suggest that those in the youngest group in this sample 
are more anxious than their immediate elders.
TABLE 7.12
Anxiety by Age 
(Sub-Groups)~
(Frequencies)
Low High
Less than 25: 19 30 n=49
26-45*. 91 68 n=159
(p < . 0 5 )
These data follow those for alienation, and the 
reasons may be much the same as this suggested in the 
discussion of Table 7*10, i.e. ones chiefly related to 
increasing control of the environment in the transition 
from youth to early middle age.
No differences in anxiety are apparent by religious
denomination.
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7.10. Variations in Correlations between Dispositions
Table 7*13 exhibits variations in the correlations 
between the four major dispositions at each social class 
level.
TABLE 7.13 (a)
Correlations between Four Psychological 
Dispositions within Social classes
Middle Class A F E Angst.(n=215)
.36**A 1.00 . 22** .45**
F 1.00 .31** -.12E 1.00 .14*
Angst. 1.00
Working Class A F E Angst.
(n=108)
A 1.00 -.01 .54** .31**F 1.00 .55** .11E 1.00 .19*Angst. 1.00
(a) A, F and E refer to the alienation, authority
and ethnocentrism scales; Angst to the adapted 
IPAT Anxiety scale.
There are no marked differences in the relation of 
alienation to anxiety by class, nor in the alienation- 
ethnocentrism relation by class. In other respects, there 
are class variations. Whilst no relation is shown between 
authoritarianism and alienation in the working class, the 
relation between these two dispositions is significant, 
both as measured by the tetrachoric (p < .01) and by
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chi-square (p<.05), in the middle-class group. As we 
have seen (Figures 7*2 and 7»1*0 authoritarianism and 
ethnocentrism are mildly deviant amongst the middle 
class, where, moreover, opportunities and occasions for 
’mixing freely’ are likely to be more common. The 
authoritarian is not a ’good mixer’ outside his own group.
In the more fluid middle class situation, it is not 
therefore surprising to find him mildly frustrated and 
uncertain of himself; and the (low) authoritarianism- 
alienation relation is to be expected. Likewise, ’free-mixing’ 
in the higher social class level may dampen the overt 
expression of ethnocentrism, and even perhaps reduce its 
actual incidence amongst conventionalist and ’ego-defensive’ 
persons. The reduction in the authoritarianism-ethnocentrism 
relation (significant by the application of the Fisher Zr 
transformation test to the difference between the 
tetrachorics (pc.05) and approaching significance (pc.lO) 
by applying the chi-square test to a collapsed table 
(see Exhibit 7«l)) is in accord with this hypothesis.
It must be recognized that this variation in the correlation 
is weaker, and its significance uncertain. Its failure 
to be matched when education is held constant (Table 7*1^) 
throws some doubt on it. In an exploratory work, variations 
in correlation of this status cannot be totally ignored,
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nor accepted without reservation. An explanatory 
hypothesis is therefore tentatively afforded to each one.
Table 7.14 exhibits variations in correlation at each 
educational level.
TABLE 7.14
Correlations between Four Psychological 
Dispositions within Educational Groups
iTetrachoric Correlations)
Education: A F E Angst.
A 1.00
F
E
Angst.
• 37** 1.00 • 15 .43** 
1.00
.20*
-.17*
-.06
1.00
A F E Angst.
Middle: 
(n=ll8)
A 1.00
F
E
Angs t.
.08
1.00
.54**
.38**
1.00
.37**-.12
.20*
1.00
A F E Angst.
Lower: 
(n=127)
A 1.00
F
E
Angst.
-.051.00
.25**
.52**
1.00
• 57**-•02
• 17* 1.00
Here the authoritarianism-ethnocentrism relations
are roughly constant at each educational level. 
Authoritarianism is related to alienation at the higher 
educational level. The same hypothesis as for class is 
suggested. Ethnocentrism exhibits a trivial and probably 
non-independent relation with anxiety at the lower and 
mid-levels. The two features of chief interest are^
y\ o
firstly, the apparent reduction of the relation between 
alienation and anxiety as the educational level rises, 
and secondly, the apparently higher relation between 
alienation and ethnocentrism at the middle educational 
levels, compared with both the higher and lower levels.
The first variation is significant (p <.0l) applying 
the Fisher Zr transformation test to the correlations for 
the two extreme groups, but not significant, or approaching 
significance, when the chi-square test is applied to a 
table collapsing those at the higher and lower levels. We 
may hold in reserve, as it were, a hypothesis that the 
emotional management of frustration is made easier by 
higher education, but the variation in the data is not 
so great as to demand an explanation. The second apparent 
variation is more important and better supported. The 
Fisher Zr transformation test indicates that the difference 
between the middle and lower level is significant (p<.Ol), 
and the chi-square test, applied to a collapsed table 
where the frequencies for both the higher and lower levels 
are assembled in one row and for the middle level in another, 
as in Exhibit 1.1, is also significant (p <.01). (Although 
the magnitudes of the differences in correlation are not 
much greater than for the first variation, significance 
is attained by chi-square in the second case because of
341
the larger sample). An explanation is thus required.
The variation is a curious one. A reduction of the 
correlation by education could have been expected, since 
the more educated might employ their intellectual resources 
to control their aggressive drives. This hypothesis is 
persuasive but not sufficient for the curvilinear relation. 
The correlation is also depressed amongst the less 
educated.
Two statistical hypotheses can be considered and 
discarded. The first is that there might be attenuation 
of the variances of both scales at the lower level. An 
inspection of the frequencies in each quartirange suggests 
the reverse. The second is that the reliabilities of both 
scales might be lower in the less educated group because 
the items might be less well understood. This hypothesis 
is not plausible in view of the constancy of the 
authoritarianism-ethnocentrism relation, and the strong 
alienation-anxiety relation in the less educated group.
Two sociological hypotheses are more persuasive.
These are that either there is a greater variability in 
actual social frustration in the middle educated group, 
(which incidentally implies that the alienation score is 
less well related to social frustration in this group than 
in the Other two, since the dispersion of alienation scores
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is not greater in the middle than either of the other groups, 
judging by the quartile scores); or that social frustration 
at the mid-level of education is more productive of 
ethnocentrism. A recapitulation of part of Table 3*H 
in Chapter Three recalls that there is a greater range 
of income in the middle-educated group than in the lower, 
suggesting a greater variability in financial frustration.
TABLE 7.15
Householder’s Income by 
Educational Level 
(Percentages)
Income
Lower Middle Higher
Education:
Middle: 29 33 38 = 100#
Lower: 46 37 17 = 100#
Financial frustration is more the norm in the less educated
group, where a high degree of frustration is not deviant
from their educational peer group. There is a common norm
of ’managing’. At the middle level, however, one can ’go
far’, ’do well’, ’get on’. Frustration at this level
seems more likely to lead to aggressive behaviour than at
the lower level, where retreat is more probable. Both these
sociological hypotheses seem plausible, although the
second is preferred, as it does not require us to assume
the entailed hypothesis of variability in the alienation-social
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frustration relation, for which there are no other 
grounds. The special position of the middle-educated 
group, which seems conscious of its ’middling’ position, 
will emerge when eccentricities in correlations between 
the dispositional constructs and political attitudes are 
examined in Chapter Nine.
It should be borne in mind, however, that alienation 
functions independently at every level of income, as 
Tables 7.l6 and 7*17 demonstrate.
TABLE 7.16
Correlations between Alienation 
and Ethnocentrism by Householder7^
Income Group
(Tetrachoric correlations)
Householder’s Income:
Higher: .30** (n=117)
Middle: .27** (n=97)Lower: .34** (n=108)
Alienation shows a relation to 'winning' (achieving 
an income above the median for the group i.e. $60 per 
week) or ’losing’ (having an income below the group median) 
amongst the middle educated. Table 7«17 suggests that 
even within these groups the relation between alienation
and ethnocentrism is moderate to strong
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TABLE 7.17
Correlations between Alienation and Ethnocentrism 
amongst the Middle-Educated Group 
(Tetrachoric Correlations)"
’Winners’ .65** (n=4l)
’Losers’ .40** (n=67)
In Section 7*9*1^ a depression in the authoritarianism- 
ethnocentrism relation amongst Catholics was anticipated 
and discussed. Table 7*18 indicates that there is indeed 
such a depression, but the Fisher Zr transformation test 
shows it not to be significant.
TABLE 7.18
Correlations between Authoritarianism 
and Ethnocentrism by Religious Groups 
(Tetrachoric Correlations!""
Denomination:
Catholics: .35**
All others: .47**
7.11. Conclusion
This chapter has considered in more detail the 
relations between the dispositional constructs given in 
broad outline in Chapter Six, both as they emerge from 
the examination of sub-scales of the constructs, and as 
variations in the magnitude of the intercorrelations of 
the major scales indifferent sociax groups. An attention 
to detail, both in their internal complexity and in their 
social context, is clearly necessary for a comprehension 
of their interrelations and mode of function. Particular
3^ 5
attention has been given to alienation, which is perhaps 
the most various in nature and function, as well as the 
least well explored. It has been conceived as an estrangement 
from the macro-society as well as more immediate social 
groups, since its component sentiments seem to be diffused 
over both the larger and smaller imagined social worlds.
Whilst disparate from anxiety, it seems to be a cause of 
it, as of ethnocentrism, the three constructs together 
constituting a tryptich of considerable analytical utility.
In its most extreme degree, where the subject 
evidences social despair and uncertainty, along with diffuse 
anxiety, symptoms of an unreal conception of external 
reality and intense and misguided hostility, it must be 
considered a pathological disposition. If central to 
personality functioning, it would indicate paranoid 
schizophrenia, with a prognosis of deterioration in the 
personality structure. However, this seems to be rare, 
both because its social incidence is low and because the 
disposition, although it has correlates in personality 
functioning, usually has a contemporary relevance to the 
subject’s social situation. Despite this, the possibility 
of socialization into alienation cannot be excluded, especially 
amongst the poorest sections of the community. In its 
lesser degree, alienation, especially when not accompanied
by irrational hostility or a high level of anxiety, 
as seems more often to be the case amongst the more 
educated, is a potential motive force for creative 
social analysis.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN 1966 
8.1. Introduction
No depiction of psychological influences on political 
opinion can proceed before an analysis is done of the 
structure of political attitudes themselves. This is 
set out principally in Section 6 of this chapter. This 
analysis is, of course, intended to be substantive, as 
well as ancillary to the task of showing relations to 
dispositions. It might be thought that in Chapter Four, 
the political analysis had been adequately resolved. This is 
not so, for several reasons. Firstly, political attitudes, 
and their structure change over time. The constancy or 
inconstancy of structure between 1965 and 1966 is therefore 
of interest. Secondly, whilst the range of questions about 
opinions on policies asked in 1965 was broad, it did not 
extend to issues in foreign policy. Nor did it cover a 
special set of issues which, a priori, would be expected 
to have a peculiar vulnerability to psychological influences: 
those concerned with the liberties of individuals and 
groups. The circumscription of the private as against 
the public sphere, and the licence of outre groups to
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function publicly are both delicate affairs, always at 
hazard, and likely to be threatened by punitive and 
aggressive tendencies in the mass public which may 
overawe a government unwilling to take a strong position 
on civil liberties.
A third, statistical reason for a further exploration 
of political opinion lies in the previous use of the 
tetrachoric r, the over-generous category ’Other opinion’, 
and the large numbers ’Undecided’ on some questions, which 
rendered the relationships obtained inconclusive.
An attempt is made here to reduce these problems by 
the use of a larger number of questions about policy, 
extending to the field of external affairs; the introduction 
of a ’Libertarianism’ index; instructions to interviewers 
to try to persuade interviewees not be ’Undecided,’
’Other opinion’ not being employed; and the use of factor 
analysis, not cluster analysis, which incidentally requires 
the phi coefficient, which is more conservative than the 
tetrachoric. However, the tetrachoric is used to explore 
differences in correlation between groups.
This chapter also introduces more information of a 
different kind to that in Chapter Four, such as reasons for 
party choice. Beginning with the critically important 
point of the voter's choice of a party, it proceeds to the 
structure of opinion on policy issues and winds down, as
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it were, in considering such particular phenomena as 
the cross-class vote.
8.2.1. The Social Correlates of Party Choice
The Gallup Poll has made these well known.^ The 
data of the 1966 Melbourne-Sydney sample are displayed 
principally to show their consistency with the overall 
pattern, and partly to display some findings not 
generally familiar. The format for tables and figures is 
that explained in Chapter Seven.
FIGURE 8.1 (a) (b)
Vote by Social Class 
(Percentages)
FIGURE 8.2
Vote by Education 
(Percentages)
Middle LowerMiddle class Working class
(p < .001, n=28l) (p <.01, n=298)
1
For an extensive summary of its findings, see A.F. Davies 
and S. Encel, (eds.) Australian Society: A Sociological
Introduction, (Melbourne, 1965) PP* 109-113•
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FIGURE 8.3
Vote by Income of Householder 
(Percentages)
o aor
. •*.
■ • •• 
■ ■ ;
V ; :
: . • •••
Upper Middle Lower
(p <.05, n=266)
(a) The probability values are derived only from 
chi-square tests of differences between LCP and 
ALP voters against the sociological variables.
(b) All those 'Undecided* or 'Other* in their voting 
choice have been excluded from this and other 
kindred figures and tables. The number of 
'Others’ is trivial.
There is little that is surprising here, except for the 
extraordinary tendency of the poor to vote for conservative 
parties. No direct evidence will be adduced for this 
tendency; but obviously many people living with, or being 
a householder with the less than $45 per week will be 
retired or widowed, with a limited income but preserving a
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certain gentility. One interviewee in this category 
deserves to be remembered. She is an English lady in 
late middle age living in Glen Iris, Melbourne's paradigm 
middle-class suburb. She votes Liberal; her husband is a 
retired Company Manager with an income of $35~^5 per week. 
Asked 'if you had to describe which group of the community 
you belong to.. What would you say?', she replies 'I 
suppose I'm just a very ordinary person. I've'travelled a 
lot and my family is in "Burke's Landed Gentry".' She always 
votes Liberal, because ' . ..all my life I have voted 
Conservative in England. I'm all for education and anyone 
who is from the educated class has my preference.' This 
is not a 'deferential' vote and the overall figures indicate 
little 'deferential' voting in Australia. It is a class 
vote based on a slightly deviant self-placement. This 
kind of attitude, it may be conjectured, accounts for the 
apparent anomaly in the income-vote table.
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FIGURE 8.4 
Vote by Age(Percentages)
36-45 More than 45Less than 36
FIGURE 8,5
Vote by Sex 
(Percentages)
Women
(diff. betn. young and (pc.05, n=299)
middle-aged, p <.01; diff. 
betn. middle-aged and 
elderly p<.05, n=300)
The figures for age deviate from the pattern in the 
December 1961 Gallup Poll data given in Davies and Encel.1 2
Then, youth were disproportionately pro-Labor. The 
discrepancy probably indicates the generational difference 
mentioned in Chapter Four. A Melbourne polling organization 
had foreshadowed the change in a survey of young people 
(aged 16-25) in all States (but principally Victoria and New
pSouth Wales) in 1964. Although the sample was of dubious
1
Ibid., p. 115.
2
Australian Sales Research Bureau Pty. Ltd., Understanding 
Young People, (Melbourne, 1964) circulated report (6 VoIs.), 
see esp. Vol. 2, 1:15.
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representativeness, it was so overwhelmingly pro-Liberal 
as to be suggestive of a ’new wave* in Australian politics.
Its figures for ’blue’ and ’white-collar' young people were 
very similar: there were fewer than 25 per cent of ALP
voters in each occupational group. Labor was becoming, 
and later clearly became,1 the Party of the middle-aged, 
redolent of the 1940s and the Depression.
Women once again show a conservative tendency.
Respondents in the 1966 Melbourne-Sydney sample were 
asked: ’Have you discussed any political topics recently?’,
a question which, as we shall see, is probably a good 
index of political concern, and split the sample roughly into 
two halves. Its content will be labelled ’political talk’ 
and answers categorized ’Yes’ and ’No’. (Only one respondent 
gave ’Don’t Know’ and is excluded from the relevant tables).
TABLE 8.1
Vote by Political Talk 
(PercentagesT"
LCP ALP DLP
Political Talkers: 53 41 6 = 100$Non-talkers: 56 58 6 = 100$
(p is n.s., n=299)
Table 8.1 gives no confirmation of the finding that the 
ALP attracts a disproportionate number of political talkers
1
Even after the swing to Labor in 1969* the ALP had a 
disproportionately large following amongst the middle-aged. 
See the APOP poll of A October 1 9 6 9  ^ discussed in A. Hughes, 
’Political Review,’ Australian Quarterly, 41 (1 9 6 9) No. 4, 
pp. 15-24.
(see Table 4,7 in Chapter Four). It may be that the 
questions which were used to define opinion leaders then 
were unattractive to middle-class respondents (too 
aggressive in tone, e.g. ’Have you tried to convince 
anyone of your political ideas recently?’ (my stress).
TABLE 8.2
Vote by Religious Affiliation 
~(P e r c e n t a ge s)
Denomination: LCP ALP DLP
Protestant: 59 40 1=100# (n=17l)Catholic: 47 59 :l4=ioo$?; (n=90)Other: 76 24 0=100# (n=2l)Agnostic/Atheist: 0  )i 70 6=100% (n=15)
(difference between Protestant and Catholic n.s.)
Table 8.2 gives a hint of the religious divisions which
exist in Victoria, but is interesting chiefly as a good
example of how a crucial electoral fact (Catholic support 
for the D.L.P. in Victoria) can fail to emerge in mass data. 
8.2.2. Reasons for Party Choice
The question: ’What are your main reasons for voting
for the party of your choice at this election?’, or one 
like it, had never been put to a mass urban sample in 
Australia, with the one exception of a study of a by-election 
in Victoria by Burns.^ The categorization of response 
follows that of Burns. ’Party record’ is a very general
r
C. Burns, Parties and People, (Melbourne, 1961) pp, 120-57-
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category, oriented to the past; ’party promise or policy’ 
looks to the future. ’Habit/tradition’ refers to family 
tradition as well as personal consistency. ’Class/religion' 
seemed useful a priori, but is perhaps misleading, since 
only one respondent gave a ’religious’ reason. ’Influence 
of spouse or other immediate personal influence’ and 
’Influence of public figure’ are self-explanatory. ’Principle 
or high policy’ designates ideological reasons. These can 
be subsumed under higher-order headings following Burns, as 
in Table 8.3-
TABLE 8.5
Reasons for Choice of Party 
(PercentagesT"
Responsive: Party record: 27^)1 48$Party promise or policy: 21*51 =
Situational: Habit/tradition: 8*)1 20*Class Religion: 12*)1 =
Personal influence
Personality: (spouse etc .) : Influence of public 3*;
figure: 4$j1 ~ 7*
Ideological: Principle/high policy 10*;1 =3 10*Refuse/no data (a) 15*,) = 15*
100$ 100*(n=352)
(a) Includes those ’Undecided’.
The dominance of ’party’ reasons may be partly a 
function of the question asked. Note the very few 
respondents who acknowledged the influence of their spouse 
(mainly of husbands) and the small proportion of ’ideological’ 
voters. This and the absence of a very strong ’class’
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influence suggests that most voters do not draw a 
very harsh line between the major parties. Correlations 
between opinions on policy issues (to be found in Table 
4.11 in Chapter Four and Tables 8.20 and 8.21 in this 
chapter) are mostly low, and although they are higher 
amongst political talkers (See Table 8.28) this suggests 
the low incidence of ideological conceptions in the mass 
public•
The lack of governance of opinion on particular issues 
by ideologies in the mass public suggests a similarity 
in the Australian situation to the general portrait advanced 
by Converse.'*'
’For the truly involved citizen, the development 
of political sophistication means the absorption 
of contextual information that makes clear to 
him the connections of the policy area of his 
initial interest in other areas; and that these 
broader configurations of policy positions are 
describable quite economically in the basic 
abstractions of ideology. Most member of the mass 
public, however, fail to proceed so far...’
Amongst the ’political’ public, such general connections
are more in evidence, as we shall see (Cf. Tables 8.4 and
8.28).
The higher-order headings of reasons for voting choice 
can be further collapsed, and it is useful to do so here, 
since we are testing hypotheses in an only moderately
1
P.E. Converse, ’The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass 
Publics,' in D.E. Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent, 
(London, 1964) ch, 6, p. 246.
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large sample. The ’responsive’ and ’ideological’ reasons 
can be considered political per se; and dubbed ’programmatic’; 
the ’situational’ and ’personal’ ones are essentially 
non-political and are dubbed ’Social’. We might expect 
political talkers to be more ’programmatic’ in their reasons 
for voting choice than non-talkers, and this is in fact so.
TABLE 8.4
Reason for Voting Choice by Political Talk 
"(Percentages)
Programmatic Social
Political Talkers: 76 24 = 100$ (n=159)
Non-talkers: 60 40 = 100$ (n=157)
(p <.01, n=296)
This dichotomy in reason for vote also has sociological
correlates.
FIGURE 8.6
Reason for Voting Choice
by Social Class (Percentages)
FIGURE 8.7
Reason for Voting Choice 
by Education 
“(Percentages)
/o Ö0'
'Programmatic 
(others 
'social') .«o
Middle class Working class Middle LowerHigher
(p < .02, n=276) (pc.Ol, n-296)
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FIGURE 8.8
Reason for Voting Choice 
by Householderrs Income 
(Percentages')'
100
'Programmatic' 
60
40
(others
'social')
20-
— -I------:— 1— — l—
Higher Middle Lower
(p <.001., n=262)
At the higher status levels, the voter is more likely to 
give a programmatic reason for his choice, which is to 
say that he has a more individualistic style of response; 
at the lower levels, the voters see themselves in 
collectivities. Labor, out of office for 16 years, is 
of course at a disadvantage for ’record1. Tables 8.5 
and 8.6 set out differences between supporters of the major 
parties.
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TABLE 8.5
Reason for Voting Choice by Political Party 
(Categories Collapsed!"
(PercentagesV
Party:
LCP: 
ALP:
Programmatic
80
49
Social
20 = 100# 
51 = 100#
(p^.001, n=272) 
Table 8.6 expands Table 8.5.
TABLE 8.6
Reason for Voting Choice by Political Party 
(Categories ExpandedT" 
(Percentages')"
Party:
LCP: 48 Party Record ALP: 10 Farty Record
22 Fromise/Policy 29 Promise/Policy8 Habit/tradition 15 Habit/tradition5 Class etc. 51 Class etc.5 Spouse etc. 5 Spouse etc.6 Public Figure 2 Public Figure
10
100#
Ideological 10
= 100#
Ideological
The number of D.L.P. voters is too small to serve as 
a basis for generalization, but it should be remarked that 
of the 15 for whom there is data, 11 are ’programmatic’ in 
their reason for vote.
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FIGURE 8.9 FIGURE 8.10
Reason for Voting Choice 
by Age
Reason for Voting Choice 
by Sex
100
°//o 80
'Programmatic'
( others 
‘socia l’)
40 -
20-
Less than More than
46 46
/0  80 
'Programmatic' 
( others 
'socia l')
Women
(p <.10, n=297) (pc.10, n=296)
These data suggest that young people and men are 
more inclined to programmatic than social reasons for their 
vote but the discrepancies only approach significance.
No disproportionalities in reasons for voting choice 
are apparent by religious affiliation.
8.3« The Incidence of Political Talk
Various indices of the degree of political concern 
in the respondent are possible, and the several questions 
in this area relate well to each other. It is convenient 
for methodological reasons to split the sample into two 
equal parts, and the question spelt out above on political 
talk does so, Responses to the question are closely 
related to being classed as an opinion leader, using the
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same criteria (and questions) as in the 1963 survey,
described in Chapter Four.
TABLE 8.7
Political Talk by 
Classification as ’Opinion Leader*
(Percentages)~
Talkers Non-Talkers
Opinion leaders: 85 15 = 100$ (n=89)
Non-opinion leaders: 42 58 = 100$ (n=26l)
(p < .001., n=350)
A tendency to talk politics is also related to 
political interest.
TABLE 8.8
Political Talk by Political Interest
(Percentages)
Interest Talkers non-talkers
'A lot' 83 17 = 100$ (n=6o)'some but not much' 58 42 = 100$ (11=196)'hardly any' 25
( p c . 0 0 1 ,  n=349)
77 = 100# (n=93)
There is a possibility that responses to the question 
about 'talk' may be contaminated by acquiescence, but it 
is not a very strong one, since the question relates to a 
fact of recent immediate experience. In view of its good 
relations with other relevant questions, its intrinsic 
interest and its good response 'split', it will be adopted 
as the chief index of concern with politics. What are the 
social loci of political discussion?
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FIGURE 8.11 FIGURE 8.12
Political Talk by Social Class 
(Percentages'^
Political Talk by Education 
“TPercenta^esT
Talkers
Middle class Working class
0 80
Higher Middle Lower
( p c . 001, n=322) (pc .001, n=349)
FIGURE 8.13
Political Talk by 
Householder 1s Income 
(percentages)
— I----- 1------ 1—
Higher Middle Lower
(p c .01, n=32l)
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Political talk is more common at higher status levels. In 
view of the lack of difference between party supporters, 
one must infer that higher status Labor voters must be 
particularly talkative.
In the middle class, there is a greater tendency to 
talk politics privately, with the family or with friends, 
than in the working class, where political talk at work 
or in a club is more common. The difference is not great, 
but is reliable. Respondents who were 'political talkers’ 
were asked: 'in which one of these groups would you be
most likely to discuss a political question?’ ’Family or 
relatives; Friends; At work; In a club or Social organization;’ 
were the choices listed on a card simultaneously handed 
to them. The results are set out in Table 8.9«'
TABLE 8.9
The Favoured Social Locale of_
Political Talk by Social Class 
(Percentages)
Class: Family Friends Work Club
Middle Class: 41 27 23 9 = 100$ (n=113)
Working Class: 33 17 40 10 = 100$ (n=42)
(The locales were dichotomized as family/friends 
and work/club, to test the difference between the 
private and public locales respectively; p <: .05, n=155)
No differences are apparent in frequency of political talk
by age or sex.
A further enquiry was made as to the respondents’ chief
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source of political information, namely to see whether or 
not the non-talkers were more likely to rely on the mass 
media or on political talk. However more effective 
face-to-face contacts may be1, the evidence is that both 
political talkers and non-talkers rely much more heavily 
on the mass media than on talk for information. The 
following question was on a card handed to the respondent:
!Do you pick up information on current politics more 
from TV, radio, newspapers or books etc.. OR more from 
talking to other people, or just listening to what they 
say? f
The results are set out in Table 8.10.
TABLE 8.10
Chief Source of Political Information 
(PercentagesT~
Mass Media Personal Contacts
Political Talkers: 77 25 = 100$ (n=l8'5)Non-Talkers: 8l 29 = 100$ (n=158)
(p is n.s., n=5^l)
To sum up, there is a great deal of political talk.
It is of marginal significance as a source of information 
compared to the mass media. It pervades all status levels, 
but is distinctly more common at the higher level. Its locale 
tends to be more public in the working class. There is no 
difference in the incidence of political talk by age, sex
1 ‘ ”
For what is still the best case for its effectiveness 
see P. Lazarsfeld, The People’s Choice, second ed. (New York, 
1948) pp. 152-7.
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or party support, indicating in the last case that upper- 
status A.L.P. voters must be disproportionately talkative. 
Political talkers tend to have disproportionately more 
’programmatic’ than ’social’ reasons for their voting 
choice. As will emerge in Section 8, they also have a 
more coherent view of the structure of political issues. 
8 .4 . The ’Tractable’ Vote
Once again, an attempt was made to identify the 
proportion of the sample without fixed party loyalties.
If a voter recalled the same vote in 1963 as was intended 
for 1 9 6 6, he or she was asked: ’Do you always vote for
that party?’ A negative response placed the voter in the 
’tractable’ category. Those ’Undecided’ in their vote 
were also classed as ’tractable’. ’New’ voters were not 
included on this occasion unless there were substantive 
grounds for considering them ’tractable’ as above. Even 
when they are excluded, the tractable vote is large (n=127* 
33 per cent of the sample), and constituted as follows.
TABLE 8 .1 1
The Tractable Vote 
(percentages)
Undecided: 28$ 
Those changing their vote, 1963-1966: 32$ 
LCP 1963 and 1966 but not ’always’: 24$ 
ALP 1963 and 1966 but not ’always’: 10$ 
DLP 1963 and 1966 but not ’always’: 2$ 
Other ’floating’ categories: 4$
= 100$
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This may be in some ways a conservative estimate, since 
some surveys overseas suggest that an accurate memory of 
the previous vote is more common amongst cons is tent voters.^ 
Strangely, the number switching to the Right2 (from the A.L.P. 
to the L.C.P. or D.L.P.) almost equalled the number switching 
to the Left (from the L.C.P. or D.L.P. to the A.L.P.). The 
decline in the A.L.P.’s electoral support from 1965-1966 
was apparently mostly due to the anti-A.L.P. sentiments of 
the new voters coming of age (or, more rarely, returning 
to the country), in so far as we can generalize from this 
sample. The notion of a ’swing’ away from the A.L.P. may 
thus be conceptually misleading. So, too, is the 
conventional wisdom as to which were the electorally dominant 
issues, as we shall see.
The tractable group of voters is politically 
heterogeneous, but considered as a conglomerate whole, it 
is politically more talkative than voters of fixed loyalties.
See e.g. J.G. Blumler and D. McQuail, Television in 
Politics: Its Uses and Influence, (London] i960), p. 185:
'Ninety-three per cent of those who did not change between 
the two elections [1959 and 1964] reported their 1959 vote 
correctly, compared with only fifty per cent of those whose 
voting position in 1964 differed from that of 1959»1
2
It is, of course, difficult to ranK parties on a single 
Left-Right dimension. It is nonsense to do the same with 
policy issues, as the data and discussion below will 
demonstrate.
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TABLE 8.12
1
Political Talk by Political ’Loyalty1 
(Percentages V
Voters: Talkers Non-talkers
Tractable: 
Non-tractable
6l 39 = 100# (n=127)
(1 loyal'): 49 51 = 100$ S II ro
(p<.05, n=34l)
It also shows a slight tendency to higher income.
TABLE 8.13
Political Royalty1 by Householder’s Income
(Percentages)
Income:
Higher:
Middle:
Lower:
Tractable
44
32
35
Non-tractable ('loyal')
56 = 100$68 = 100$
65 = 100$
(pc.10, n=3l4)
'Tractables' are also more likely to be more radical on
one of the three major dimensions of political attitudes 
identified and discussed in Section 6, Conscience Radicalism.
TABLE 8.14
Conscience Radicalism by Political Loyalty (a)
(Percentages V
Conscience
Low
Tractable: 43
Non-tractable ('loyal’):54
Radicalism
High
57 - 100$ 46 = 100$
(p < .05, n=342)
(a) 'High' and 'Low' here refer to score above and 
below the median.
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No reliable relations can be found between the tractable 
vote and political interest, being an opinion leader, 
education level, class or sex. Its high incidence of 
political talk is therefore probably partly a function 
of its present uncertainties rather than of a lasting 
preoccupation with politics. Nor can relations be found 
with the two other major dimensions of political attitudes, 
the ’Established Socio-economic Radicalism’ and ’Defence 
Leftism.’ The lack of relation with the latter is 
surprising in an election campaign apparently bringing 
foreign policy issues to the fore; but as we shall see, 
their prominence was illusory rather than real. Nor is 
there a relation with libertarianism.
The high proportion of ’Conscience Radicals’ can be 
understood as a reflection of a lack of rigidity; it is 
the real issues and not stolid attitudes such as steadfast 
party loyalty, which grip them. However, the category 
’tractable’ has few psychological correlates (see Chapter 
Nine).
8.5» The Relative Importance of Issues
Statistical surveys of large and unremarkable samples, 
such as this one, can only indicate which issues are salient 
to the mass public. They can tell us little of those 
issues which are important to the political intelligentsia, 
that is, informed public servants, academics, journalists,
the higher echelons of party organizers and men prominent 
in public affairs., which may move them to political 
action which sways the mass public by indirection. The 
National Civic Council and the D.L.P. are important in 
this regard. The former is a numerically tiny group which 
exercises an influence quite out of proportion to its 
numbers, and often not by bringing an issue to public 
notice, but by appealing to broader loyalties through the 
D.L.P. to sway voting preferences in a few key seats.
Some issues' may therefore play a dominant but covert 
role, not through their salience to the mass public. As 
we have seen, few voters are oriented directly to policy 
issues, whilst many have a general party or class 
orientation.^ However, since each member of the mass public 
has one vote, they compel attention.
Interviewees were handed a card, as in 1963» on which 
were printed six 'election issues’: ’Defence,’ ’Conscription,
Education Spending, ’State Aid to Church Schools,’ ’National 
Development,’ and ’Social Services (pensions, etc.).’ Two 
types of cards were again used, each of which listed the 
issues in reverse order to the other. Respondents were
1
For a sceptical elaboration of a model of ’economic 
rationality’ capable of theoretical extension to political 
decision-making, (The model assumes an orientation to policy 
goals) see A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy,
(New York, 1957) at p. 6.
asked: ’in your own personal opinion, which of these 
election issues is of first importance?’ The interviewer 
then proceeded to obtain rankings of ’2 ’ to ’6’. Table 
8.15 gives the average rankings for each major electoral 
group. New voters have been grouped separately. A low 
rank, of course, indicates high importance.
TABLE 8.15
Average Ranking of Election Issues
Amongst those always voting LCP (n=9l):
National Development 
Defence
Education Spending
Social Services
Conscription
Aid to Church Schools
2*31 (First importance 
2.63 (Second ”
2.67 (Third "
3.49 (Fourth "
4.75 (Fifth ”
5.13 (Sixth ”
Amongst those always voting ALP (n=77):
Social Services 2.12 
Education Spending 2.68 
National Development 2.82 
Defence 3*84 
Aid to Church Schools 4.6l 
Conscription 4.62
Amongst ’tractable’ voters (n=127):
Education Spending 2.62 
National Development 2.77 
Social Services 3*29 
Defence 3*31 
Conscription 4.29 
Aid to Church Schools 4.71
Amongst ’new’ voters (n=47):
Education Spending 2.66 
National Development 3*00 
Social Services 3 »02 
Defence 3«30 
Conscription 4.36
Aid to Church Schools 4.66
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The notable features of this table are the generally 
high ranking of ’Education Spending.* and the generally 
low ranking of ’Defence’ and especially ’Conscription.’ 
Although direct comparison with the 1965 survey data is 
not possible, because of changes in wording and the somewhat 
different set of issues presented, ’Defence,’ although 
still low, appears to have achieved a slight rise from 
its position of low importance, and ’Education’ to have 
receded slightly from its position of pre-eminence. The 
expansion of the description of ’Social Services’ to 
include ’(pensions, etc.)' may be responsible for their 
higher ranking here than in 1965.
It is hardly possible to claim that this election 
was dominated by considerations of defence policy and 
the principle of conscription if one considers rankings 
amongst 'tractable' and ’new’ voters. Domestic issues 
still dominated the outlook of the electorate. The identity 
between ’tractable’ and ’new' voters is noteworthy, as is 
the contrast between ’loyal’ A.L.P. and L.C.P. voters.
Some tests of significance of differences, not attempted 
in Chapter Four, seemed desirable. The differences in 
rankings-*- of 'Social Services’ and ’Defence’, as between
1
Rankings were collapsed to two values: ’high’ (in the
top 5) and ’low’ (in the bottom 9 )*
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A.L.P. ’loyals’ on the one hand, and L.C.P. ’loyals’ on 
the other, are both significant (p < .01 and p <.001 
respectively). The differences in the rankings of 
'Defence’ and ’Social Services’ as between ’loyal’ A.L.P. 
and ’tractable’ voters are also both significant (p <.05 
in both cases). Thus it seems that the identity in 
outlook of ’loyal’ A.L.P. and tractable voters on the 
relative importance of issues in 1963 was lost in 1966, 
and that defence policy, although still rated low by 
crucial sectors of the electorate, acquired a marginal 
importance in differentiating ’tractable’ and ’new’ voters 
from those always voting A.L.P.
8.6. ’Left’ and ’Right’: The Structure of Opinion on
Policy Issues
8 .6.1. General Structure
There is a deep confusion as to what is ’Left’ and
’Right’ in Australian politics, which keeps company both
with a dissatisfaction with these terms and their facile
1use by both academic commentators and journalists. The 
basic difficulty arises because of a persistence in the 
use of one continuum. This is not a viable procedure, since
r
For a striking example of this, see T. Truman, Ideological 
Groups in The Australian Labor Party and Their Attitudes. 
^Brisbane, 19^5), University of Queensland Papers, Department 
of History and Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 2. The initial 
distinction between ’left’ and ’right’ is made on the sole 
ground of attitude to nationalization (see pp. 49-50).
575
policy questions are grouped in clusters, as the analysis 
in Chapter Four demonstrates, and to generalize from, 
say, a radical opinion on the issues in one cluster to 
those in another is hazardous, or, plainly, improper. For 
the several reasons given in the introduction to this 
chapter, a refined analysis, using more sophisticated 
techniques, seemed desirable for the more extensive data 
of the 1966 survey, partly to delineate a more complete 
structure, partly to test the stability of the structure 
discovered in 19^ 5 « Table 8.16  sets out the policy 
questions asked in 1966, the response splits obtained, 
in the sequence in which they were asked. This was intended 
to be a ’global’ inventory of policy questions i.e. to raise 
as many questions as time would permit in an interview in 
which the psychological scales were also administered (there 
being a grand total of 167 questions). Questions concerning 
civil liberties, and questions concerning judgements, or 
perceptions, of political situations are discussed separately.
TABLE 8.16
Policy Questions and Responses. 1966 (a) (b) (c)
(Perce~^ is)
(n=
(a) There is an intrinsic interest in these response 
splits, and a note on their approximate standard 
error for a random sample (which this is not) of
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this size may be useful. For response splits 
of the order 70/30, the sampling error is about 
6.5 per cent i.e. the probability that the 
value estimated will be 6.5 per cent above or 
below the sample figure is .95«'"
(b) An asterisk denotes those responses dubbed, for 
convenience, ’radical’ or ’left*. There can 
obviously be argument with the procedure for
Q,. 7j where support of the status quo as well as 
one sort of change is dubbed ’left’. This was 
done because the two latter categories were 
collapsed for the purposes of computing a scale 
score, and the best (i.e. nearest median) split was 
obtained by dividing the first response from those 
which follow.
(c) Interviewers were asked to stress words underlined.
1. Do you think that Government spending on education should 
remain about the same as it is now, or be moderately 
increased. 53$
OR
Do you think it should be greatly increased?* 60$
Undecided: 2$
--= 100$
1
See L. Kish, Survey Sampling (New York, 1965), p. 576.
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2. Do you think that the Government should ..
help finance Church Schools . .* 55$
OR
should the Government spent its money on 
State Schools only? 42$
Undecided: 5$
= 100$
3. Do you think Australia should increase its spending
on defence .. 54$
OR
does Australia spend enough on defence already?* 42$
Undecided: 4$
= 100$
4. Apart from the conscription issue, do you support the
sending of Australian troops to South Vietnam .• 70$
OR
do you feel it would have been better not to send
Australian* troops to South Vietnam? 26$
Undecided: 4$
= 100$
5* On conscription, do you oppose sending National 
Servicemen, that is, conscripts, to Vietnam .•* 59$
OH
do you support sending National Servicemen, that 
is, conscripts to Vietnam? 37$
4$= Ioo£Undecided:
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6. If Australia were in danger of attack, would you
be against conscription for overseas military service ..* l6$
OR
would you support conscription for overseas
service at such a time? 84$
Undecided: 0$
= 100$
7. Should Australia seek closer defence ties with the
U.S.A. through treaties .. 30$
OR
keep defence ties with the U.S.A. the same as they 
are now ..* 57$
OR
have looser defence ties with the U.S.A. than
at present?* 12$
Undecided: 1$
= 100$
8. Do you think that Australia should set about getting
atomic weapons for defence now .. 46$
OR
do you think we should avoid getting atomic
weapons at the present time?* 52$
Undecided: 2$
= 100$
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9- Australia now gives equipment to some Asian countries 
to help them develop..
do you think this economic aid should be 
increased, * .. 46$
OR
kept about the same as it is now? 51$
Undecided: 5$
= 100$
10. Do you think the White Australia policy should be
kept as it is now .. 46$
OR
should the policy be relaxed, to allow more Asians
to settle in this country? 52$
Undecided: 2$
= 100$'
11. There has recently been a change in government in
Indonesia. Should Australia offer special aid and 
cooperation to the new Indonesian Government ..* 36$
OR
should Australia be wary of too much aid and
cooperation at the present time? 57$
Undecided: 7$
= 100$
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12. On Nevf Guinea
Should Australia spend a lot more on New Guinea 
development ..* 59$
OR
should Australia spend about the same as it does
now? 26$
Undecided: 5$
= 100$
12» Now on political topics here in Australia,
should the Commonwealth Government start up new
business enterprises of its own ..* 45$
OR
should it keep out of new business ventures? 50$
Undecided: 7$
= 100$
14. Should the Government avoid nationalization and 
promote private enterprise .. 56$
OR
should it nationalize some business monopolies?* 57$
Undecided: 7$
= 100$
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15. There has been much American investment in Australian 
industry in the last few years ..
do you think that the Australian Government should 
put special controls on American investment in this 
country* .. 55$
OR
should the Government use the same controls as 
for Australian business? 42$
Undecided: 5$
= 100$
16. On economic planning, should the Government use 
controls to guide business development more closely..*39$
OR
should the Government use only present controls
and not interfere with business development .. 54$
Undecided: 7$
= 100$”
17. Suppose the Government does introduce detailed 
economic planning. Do you think it should use strict 
controls to force businessmen to do what is best for
the country*.. 17$
OR
use mild controls and discuss its plans with
business and union leaders? 80$
Undecided: 5$
= 100$
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18. If a man owns stocks and shares and makes some money
from increases in their value, should such gains be left 
free of tax .. 47$
OR
should the gains be taxed?* 50$
Undecided: 3$
= 100$
19. Do you think there should be a death penalty
for murder .« 49$
OR
do you think there should be no death penalty?* 44$
Undecided: 7$
= 100$
20. Do you think that child endowment should be ..
increased?* .• 70$
OR
kept about the same as it is now? 29$
Undecided: 1$
= 100$
21. Should age pensions be kept the same, or moderately
increased?.. 4l$
OR
do you think they should be greatly increased?* 59$
Undecided: 0$
= 100$
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22. Do you think that Australia should be a Republic, 
with a President as head . .* 32$
OR
should it remain a Monarchy, with the Queen as 
Head of State? 62$
Undecided: 6$
= 100$
In order to obtain the relationships between the 22 
items, all responses were collapsed to two categories, 
those ’Undecided* being allotted to the smaller of the 
remaining two. (The initial procedure for Q. 7> which 
gave four possible responses, has been described).
Product-moment coefficients (numerically equivalent to the 
phi coefficient when there are two values for each 
variable) were then computed. The results are set out in 
Table 8.17.
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TABLE 8.17
Tntercorrelations between Opinions on PoliclgjL (a) rproduct-moment, correlations)
* - y - ? j ' o y iu u ic xp 10
1 1 .0 0  . 02 . 07  - .0 8  . 08 . 00 . 00  .01  .0 6  . 03 . 06 .12» .1 3 ,#  .11« .0 9  .0$
1 .0 0  - .0 2  .11*  .0^ .06  . 01 .0 9  . 08 .12«  - .0 6  - .0 7  .03  - . 1 7 #* - .0 *
1 .0 0  .26**  .17**  .11* . 22** .22** - .0 4  - .0 4  - .0 5  .11*  - .0 5  - .0 6
1 .0 0  .34**  .21**  .13»*  .16*«  - .1 1 *  - .0 9  .0 3  - .0 1  - .1 2 *  - .2 1 * -
1 .0 0  ’ '■**
.0 0  - .0 9
.11» -.20**
.13**:S. ::§•
.08  - .0 8
.07
. l 6 #  .16»* .06  - .0 6  - .1 0 *  .0 6  - .0 1  - .0 4  - .1 1 *
1 .0 0  .02  .10* - .1 0 *  - .0 1  - . I I «  - .0 5  .04  - .0 1
1 .0 0  . 20** .01  - .0 8  . 03 . 07 - .0 3  -.12*
1 .0 0  - . 1 3 #* - .  12* i 3 #* .01  - .0 6  - .0 3
1 .0 0  .25**  .3 1 ## .12*  .0 3  .0 2  .05
1 .0 0  .15**  -05 .07  . 02 . 04 .0 9
1 .0 0  .01  - .0 1  - .0 6  .07  .06
1 .0 0  .0 3  - .0 6  .1 3 #* - .0 3
1 .0 0  .4 4 ,#  .01  .23**
1.00 .00 .32**
1 .0 0  .03
.04
- . 1 5 ~ :::g •
.01
.01
- .0 2
- . 1 5 -
• .0 4
.001?::.
-1.0 8
- .1 3 * *  - 
:- .0 8
.22** :.10«
.06
- .0 9
.07
1 .0 0
13* . 20 ## .05  
12* - .0 2  .01  
02 .02  .06  
12* - .1 3 * * - .0 1if
5
09 .06
06  - .0 3
.10«  .03
.05  - .0 8  
.04  .0 9
.05  .07
.01 .02 
• 03
05 .0 6
12* .17**
• 03  
•05 .10«
1 5 ••  . 18** .0 9
03 .0 3  .04
12« .01 .01
.12* .10«
- . 1 5 #* .01  
-.01 .01 
.17** .10* 
1.00 .10« 
1.00
(a) The numbers are identical with those of the 
questions in Table 8,l6.
How many dimensions of radicalism are there in 
Australian political opinion? One meaningful answer can 
be given which is only minimally dependent on the subjective 
judgement of the analyst. This involves the statistical 
question: how many meaningful independent factors can be
extracted from the matrix of correlations above? Five 
varimax factor analyses were carried out, stipulating 
from two to six orthogonal factors. For technical reasons, 
a three-factor solution was unavoidable. These were, 
firstly, that a two-factor solution was misleading, since,
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if one examined the intercorrelations of the items loading 
on the second factor, they formed two statistically 
disparate clusters, one having to do with 'conscience* 
issues such as hanging, the other with issues in defence 
and foreign policy. Secondly, since the factors extracted 
under these procedures tend to become weaker as one 
progresses, it was decided to exclude a solution which 
extended to a factor without substantive meaning. This 
required a three-factor solution, since when four factors 
are extracted, the last, and weakest, exhibits a minority 
of significant inter-item correlations for those items 
which are loaded noticeably on it. All loadings of .02 
or more were regarded as 'noticeable'. The average 
inter-item coefficient amongst these approximated zero.
A four-factor solution, or one postulating a greater number 
of factors, is thus untenable, if the factors are required 
to have substantive meaning.
The factor loadings for the three-factor solution are
displayed in Table 8.18.
TABLE 8.18
Factor Loadings of all Policy Items (a)
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Item Nos: 1
I
• 59
II
.51
III
10 (Education Spending)
2 -.10 .21 .20 (Aid to Church Schools)
5 .15 .05 • 65 (Defence Spending)4 -.28 “•05 .60 (Troops for Vietnam)
5 -.17 -.06 •51 (Conscripts for Vietnam)6 - .06 “•19 • 51 (Conscription in Direct
7 .05 • 09 •52
Attack)
(Defence Ties with U.S.A.)
8 .07 -.15 •50 (Atomic Weapons)
9 .02 .65 -.12 (Aid to Asia)10 -.02 • 57 -.16 (Relax White Australia)11 -.09 • 53 “•07 (Aid to Indonesia)12 .15 • 56 .18 (New Guinea)
15 .04 -.08 (New Government
14 .68 -.14 -.25
Enterprises) 
(Nationalization of
15 .10 .18 -.21
Monopolies)
(Controls on US Investment)
16 .41 .04 “•51 (Economic Planning)
17 .54 -.26 -.04 (Strict Economic Planning)18 -.02 .04 -.16 (Capital Gains Tax)
19 .07 .56 -.18 (Abolish Death Penalty)20 .45 • 05 .02 (Child Endowment)21 .47 • 05 .01 (Age Pensions)22 .54 .14 .21 (Republic)
(a) The signs (+ or -) of the loadings should be
interpreted as in the following examples: Factor
III, as discussion hereafter indicates, represents a 
'hawkish* sentiment on foreign policy. Item 3 
(Defence Spending) is positively loaded on this 
factor, and item 15 (Controls on US Investment) 
is negatively loaded on it. Thus 'hawks' want to 
spend more on defence and not impose special controls 
on US investment, nor introduce economic planning
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(item l6). The meaning of a cross-loading may 
be illustrated as follows. Factor I represents 
(see discussion hereafter) the ’Established Socio­
economic Radicalism*. Item 4 (Troops for Vietnam) 
loads negatively on Factor I and positively on Factor 
III. Thus sending troops to Vietnam is in accordance 
with ’hawkish* sentiment and out of sympathy with 
socio-economic radicalism. Acquiring atomic weapons 
(item 8) is ’hawkish’, but loads negatively on Factor 
II (representing Conscience Radicalism), and so is 
in opposition to the latter.
Factor analysis, unlike cluster analysis, does not force 
an item into one category, so Table 8.18 conveniently 
exhibits cross-relationships when these are apparent.
However, they are relatively rare.
The first factor is related to various socio-economic 
issues in domestic politics, and also to the question of 
a change to a Republic. It is clearly the factor most 
nearly representing the ’Established’ radicalism discovered 
in the analysis in Chapter Four, but has annexed, as it were, 
the issues of economic planning and a capital gains tax, 
two of the four issues of the ’New' radicalism. What has 
happened to the ’New’ radicalism, no trace of which seems 
to remain? The exhaustive analysis undertaken, referred to
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in Chapter Four, and set out in Appendix Three, to test 
the stability of the three-cluster hypothesis reached 
the conclusion that the cluster of issues representing 
the ’New’ radicalism was a real one, maintaining its cohesion 
even when the analysis proceeded on assumptions hostile to 
its existence. The actual web of correlations between its 
items are set out in Table 8.19» The main connections were 
those between education spending and the introduction of 
economic planning, and between education spending and a 
capital gains tax. When ?Don’t know’ and ’Other opinion’ 
respondents were excluded, there was a significant connection 
also between education and defence spending, and between 
economic planning and a gains tax. What has happened to these 
relationships? Some correlations between them, as set out 
in Table 8.17* in 1966, are recapitulated in Table 8.19* 
and compared with those of 1963 (when those who responded 
’Don’t know’ and ’Other opinion’ were excluded).
TABLE 8.19
1965 and 1966 Correlations between 
Issues of the ’New* Radicalism 
(1963: Tetrachoric Correlations
196b: Product-moment Correlations)
1963: 1966:
Planning x Education 
Education x Gains Tax 
Education x Defence 
Planning x Gains Tax
. 3 8 * *
.24**.12*
.21** -.07 (a).08
.05
.00
3Ö7
(a) Note that an increase in defence was dubbed
‘radical5 in 1963; whilst ‘keeping it the same' 
was dubbed ‘left5 or ‘radical’ in 1966. This 
table follows the 1963 convention.
One might expect some depression in the 1966 correlations, 
because uneven marginal split would depress the product- 
moment, but not the tetrachoric. However, these figures 
make it clear that the correlations dissolved, and that a 
substantive change took place in the structure of 
attitudes. This was probably due to three things:-
(i) The changed complexion of defence spending. In 
1963 it was seen in the context of 'defence neglect.’ In 
1966 it appeared directly related to the war in Vietnam, 
and hence lost its connection with those issues which 
represented a concern with under-spending in the public 
sector of the economy.
(ii) In 1966, the stock market was recovering from 
a ‘bearish’ triennium, and there had been less talk of
a capital gains tax. Indeed, the issue of a capital 
gains tax hung in a limbo, not noticeably related to any 
of the three Factors.
(iii) The 1963 question on economic planning was 
probably construed loosely as management of the economy 
to provide full employment without inflation, and seen
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in the light of the badly mis-managed 'credit squeeze' 
of 1960-61. The change in phrasing of the question 
with the reference to additional government controls 
made it clear that what was spoken of went beyond a 
broad management of the economy, and there was less 
enthusiasm for it. It became more firmly identified as 
a socialist proposal.
In short, the death of 'New' radicalism was partly a 
result of neglect. The A.L.P. did not exploit and nourish 
the connection between the three issues other than defence 
spending but instead permitted it to wither, whilst the 
party focussed attention on external policy.
The sentiment governing this dimension of political 
attitudes will be called the 'Established Socio-economic 
Radicalism', or, for brevity, ER.
The second factor clearly represents the 'Conscience' 
radicalism of 1963« The stability of the cohesion of this 
group of issues and its disparateness from others is 
manifest. It is related to the new questions posed about 
increased spending on development in New Guinea and special 
'aid' to and 'co-operation' with the new regime in Indonesia. 
Its centra] themes appear to be nurturance and sympathetic 
identification with the 'other'. The items associated with 
it do not cross-load extensively on Factor III, nor do
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items associated with Factor III cross-load much on it.
This is surprising in the case of conscription for Vietnam 
or even, perhaps, the whole issue of participation in the 
Vietnam war. The moral argument about the war was still in 
its initial stages, and it was by no means clear that 
Australian non-involvement would benefit any group of 
clearly identifiable victims. Indeed, the contrary could 
have been argued (and is still tenable): that Australians
were defending a civilian population. The case of 
conscription for Vietnam is a more difficult one, since 
the consöript is potential symbol of a victim. However, 
the conscript as rescuer is also a possible mental portrait. 
It should be remembered that these groups of issues do not 
assemble themselves in patterns in the outlook of a totally 
unguided public, but, as has been suggested, their assemblies 
are plastic and susceptible to a degree of influence by 
opinion-forming agencies, such as political parties. In 
the case of the symbol of the conscript, the A.L.P., on the 
one hand, and the D.L.P. and Government Parties on the other, 
were rivals, the latter describing him as a 'National 
Serviceman*. The D.L.P., in the field of external policy, 
had been a champion of the radical position on the 
'Conscience' issues, and this may help to explain why 
the question of State aid to Church Schools is loaded on 
Factor II; the suggestion is that this dimension of
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radicalism is supported as a cohesive set of issues by 
a section of Catholic lay opinion which also supports aid 
to Church schools. Of course, it is also possible that 
since ’State aid' is probably seen by the mass public as 
aid primarily to the vast network of poor Catholic Schools, 
Protestant schools being few and rich by comparison, 
sympathetic Protestants are identifying with the needs of 
their Separated Brethren. The meaning of the factor 
loading on this item is thus unclear. Since opinions on 
the item seem to be more clearly dependent on immediate 
self interest (Table 8.20 shows that Catholics are 
overwhelmingly in favour of ’State aid’) it was not included 
in the scale measuring ’Conscience’ radicalism (CR for 
brevity).
Factor III represents the left-right ('dove ’ -' hav/k ’) 
dimension in foreign policy. It is related to the most 
obvious issues of defence and the American alliance. Its 
firm embrace of the question of the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons is surprising, since this question had not been the 
subject of much popular debate. The issue of special 
controls over US investment is loaded most heavily on this 
Factor. Thxs suggests that the issue was seen as one of 
relations with US, rather than of economic policy, and its 
placement in the scale measuring Defence Leftism (the name
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is awkward, but clear: DL for brevity) seems appropriate.
The factor loadings can thus form the basis for the 
construction of three indices measuring 'Established1 domestic 
radicalism (ER), 'Conscience' radicalism (CR), and 
'Defence Leftism' (DL), each named after the radical end 
of the three continua. Items were assigned to each index 
on the basis of their highest factor loading, with the 
exceptions of items 18 (Gains Tax) and 2 (Aid to Church 
Schools), which were placed in no index. A 'radical' or 
'left' response on each item contributed a score of 2; 
'Undecided' 1, and a conservative choice 0. The item 
numbers, possible ranges, medians, quartiles, and split-half 
reliabilities of the three indices are exhibited in 
Tables 8.20-8.22.
TABLE 8.20
Standardisation Data for the Political Index ER
ER (Established Socio-economic Radicalism):
Item nos: I, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22. (a)
Range (possible): 0-l6
Median: 6.5Quartiles Raw Score % Sample
(n-352):
High: 11-16 20
Middle ( 7-10 30
range: ( 5 - 6  22
Low: 0 -4 28
Reliability
(split-half method): n=595: »433
n=353: .467
(a) The factor loadings in Table 8.18 justify
the placement of these and the CR and DL items in 
their respective scales.
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TABLE 8.21
Standardisation Data for the Political Index CR
CR (Conscience Radicalism):
Item Nos: 9, 10, 11, 12, 19.
Range (possible): 0-10
Median: 4.5Quartiles Raw Score % Sample
(n=352):
High: 8-10 26
Middle (5 “7 24range: p-4 24
Low: 0-2 26
Reliability
(split-half method): n=395 .551n=353: .567
TABLE 8.22
Standardisation Data for the Political Index DL
DL (Defence Leftism):
Item Nos: 3> 4, 5* 6, 7, 8, 15.
Range (possible): 0-14
Median: 6 .5Quartiles Raw Score % Sample
(n=352):
High: 9-14 25
Middle (J-Q 20
range: (5-6 23
Low: 0-4 32
Reliability
(split-half method): n=395: .403
n=355: .417
Armed with these three indices, which measure the major 
dimensions of radicalism as they are to be discerned in the 
mass public, we can now gauge the extent to which the 
three dimensions converge. Although varimax procedures
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extract orthogonal factors, the items which load on them 
may, of course, form related groups, as we have seen in 
the case of psychological constructs. The correlations 
between the three scales are displayed in Table 8.23.
TABLE 8.25
Correlations between the Political Indices
ER, CR and DL.
(Product-momenty~(a)
ER CR DL
ER 1.00 .07 .18**
CR 1.00 .18**
DL 1.00
(a) n=395
These are low, and in- only two cases significant.
It follows that the three groups of issues, as measured 
by these indices, are almost independent. This is illustrated 
by Figure 8.14, 8.15 and 8.l6, each of which shows the 
relationship of two groups of items in two indices, located 
in each case in a two-dimensional space by their factor 
loadings. These are more sophisticated counterparts 
of Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter Four.
FIGURE 8.14
Relationships between ER and CR Items
ER
Onatlzn.
govt.enterp.
‘s tr ic t’ 
q  planning
Qpensions
Qendowment
0 planning
education
republic
New Guinea
hanging
aid to Asia
aid o  
Indonesia
Education spending is again seen to be the socio-economic 
issue with the closest relation to CR. Increased spending 
on New Guinea shows some relation to ER. But what is most 
striking is the lack of cross-relations.
FIGURE 8.15
Relationships between ER and DL Items (a)
395
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(a) The sign of the loadings of all items here on 
Factor III has been reversed, so that the items 
are displayed in relation to ’doveish’ sentiment, 
in keeping with the nomenclature adopted. The sign 
of the loading of the DL and ER items on the 
other two factors is unchanged.
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There are more cross-relations evident in this Figure. 
Economic planning is repugnant to ’hawks’ and attractive 
to ’doves', although more closely related to ER; both 
domestic radicals and ’hawks' tend to favour a change to 
a republic; Conscription for Vietnam and participation 
in the Vietnam war are inimical to those radical on 
domestic issues.
FIGURE 8.16
Relationships between CR and DL Items (a)
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(a) The sign of factor loadings has been changed as 
in Figure 8.15.
Cross-relations are evident here also. Both 'hawks' 
and 'Conscience' radicals would spend more on New Guinea. 
Hawks are hangers, and oppose further relaxation of the 
White Australia policy. The acquisition of atomic weapons 
is repugnant to 'Conscience' radicals. Those 'doves' who 
would oppose conscription even if Australia were in danger 
of attack tend to be 'Conscience' radicals.
It is therefore convenient to think in terms of a 
three-dimensional space defined by the three factors, not 
a unidimensional continuum, when describing what is 'right1 
and what is 'left' in Australian politics; and not merely 
convenient, but, if the 22 items were to be regarded as 
exhaustive, mandatory. The three-factor solution was 
compelled by the data.
Two qualifications should be made here. The first is 
that, since the 22 policy questions are not, of course, 
Identical with the universe of all possible content, there 
are other possible questions. Amongst these are ones 
concerning civil liberties, which represent a set of minor 
issues within an important but restricted field. Since they 
do not have an identity with Conscience radicalism (CR), 
they are treated as separate. Whether or not they should
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he regarded as representing a dimension of radicalism is 
a matter for judgement; I would prefer to say that, in view 
of their lesser status in public debate compared with the 
issues of the three dimensions identified, these items, 
shortly to be introduced, represent opinions on issues 
within a distinct field, but have a lesser status (as a 
‘sentiment’) than the major issues, which, each of 
considerable moment, constitute the three dimensions of 
radicalism. Others may judge otherwise.
The second qualification is that, although the indices 
of the three dimensions of radicalism display only trivial 
intercorrelations, it does not follow that we are justified 
in regarding the three axes of our three-dimensional 
spaces as being nearly orthogonal. This is because the 
indices are most imperfect as measures of the sentiment 
governing scores on each dimension of radicalism, as is 
clear from their very modest reliability coefficients. If 
we 'correct for attenuation’ a procedure which assumes each 
measure to be ’perfect,’ i.e. having a reliability of +1.00, 
then the relationships obtained are those in Table 8.24.
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TABLE 8.24
Correlations between the Political Indices 
ER, CR and DL, Corrected for Attenuation 
(Product-moment Correlations!
Tn=395)
ER
ER 1.00
CR
DL
CR DL
.17** .41**1.00 .45**
1.00
This procedure elevates the correlations considerably, 
but even the highest (between CR and Dl ) indicates a 
shared variance between the two sentiments of only 20%,
We must nevertheless, consider the axes of the three 
dimensional space to be oblique, indicating a low to 
moderate covariance between the sentiments governing the 
three dimensions.
8.6.2. Libertarianism
Six questions (put in the form of a choice between 
paired statements) intended to tap libertarian sentiment 
were administered to the 1966 Melbourne-Sydney sample.
They are displayed in Table 8.25, along v/ith their response 
splits.
TABLE 8.25
Libertarianism Items and Responses (a) (b) (c)
(Percentages)
(n=352)
(a) An asterisk denotes the ’libertarian’ alternative.
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(b) An attempt was made to force a choice between 
the two substantive alternatives.
(c) The approximate standard error for a random 
sample of this size is 7$ for response splits of 
the order 70/30.
1. A) The Communist Party should be banned: 52#
B) The Communist Party should not be banned:* 47#
Can’t decide: 1#
=100#
2. A) The powers of the Commonwealth Security Police
should be restricted to safeguard civil liberties:* 3^#
B) The powers of the Commonwealth Security Police 
should be strengthened so that they can fight effectively
the enemies of this country: 64#
Can’t decide: 2#
=100#
3» A) Homosexual acts between consenting adults
should be punished by law: 45#
B) Homosexual acts between consenting adults
should not be punishable by law:* 50#
Can't decide: 5#
= 1Ö0#
4. A) Long-haired beatnik types are a nuisance and 
ought to be brought into line with community standards:37$ 
B) Long-haired beatnik types are alright on the 
whole and should not be interfered with:* 62#
= 100#"
Can’t decide:
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5. A.) Powers of censorship over books, magazines and 
films should be used much less than at present:* 43$
B) Powers of censorship over books, magazines and 
films should continue to be used the same as they are
now: 56$
Can’t decide: 1$= lossr
6. A) Nazi and fascist organizations should be
banned: 73$
B) Nazi and fascist organizations should not be
banned:* 25$
Can’t decide: 2$
= 100$
The public seems more tolerant on social than on 
political issues, v/here they are less tolerant than the 
legal norm: neither Communist nor Fascist parties are
banned in Australia. Homosexual acts between consenting 
adults carry a gaol sentence, but the legislation is 
erratically policed. The responses to these questions 
are sufficiently cohesive for it to serve as an index of 
libertarianism (LIB for brevity.) Standardisation data 
are set out in Table 8.2b. Libertarian responses contribute 
2 to the total score, 'Can’t decide' 1, anti-libertarian 
responses 0.
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TABLE 8.26
Standardisation Data for the Libertarianism Index, LIB
(n=352)
Range (possible): 0-12
Median: 
Quartiles:
High: 
Middle 
range: 
Low:
5.5Raw Score 
8-12 
( 6-7 
( 3-5 0-2
% Sample
32
1724
27
Reliability
(split-half method): .492
Item Nos: 
1 
2
34
56
Mean Correlation with Other Items (0) 
.29**.24**
.21**
.16**
.17**.25**
The relations of the LIB index to the indices of the 
major political dimensions are displayed in Table 8.27.
TABLE 8.27
Relations of the LIB Index to Indices ER, CR and DL 
(Tetrachoric Correlations)
(n=552]~
LIB x ER rfc = -.10 
LIB x CR rt = .24**
LIB x DL rt = .27**
8.6.3« Political Perceptions
Respondents were asked five questions having to do
with their judgement or perception of political situations:
one related to the domestic issue of poverty, the other
four in the area of external relations. On poverty, they
were asked:
’Do you think there is enough real poverty in 
Australia to require special government action .. 43$
OR
do you think that poverty is a minor problem
which will come right without special government
action? 53$
Undecided: 4$
= 100$ (n=395)
This question will toe designated ’Poverty Problem’ for 
brevity. Responses were not significantly related to 
any of the political indices (including LIB) except ER 
(with which the correlation (tetrachoric) = .39**)
In the field of external affairs, they were asked 
these four questions (the short title follows each):
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'Do you think that Communism in Asia is -
a great danger to Australia’s security: 62$
a minor danger to Australia's security: 26$
OR
no danger to Australia’s security?’ 11$
Undecided: 1$
= 100$
(’Communist danger'; n=395)
4o4
’Do you think Australia may be in grave danger of 
attack at some time in the next ten years .« 34#
OR
do you think there is little danger of an attack 
on Australia in the next ten years?' 59#
Undecided: 7#
= 100#
('Danger of Attack'; n=395)
'Do you think that Britain might let us down in an 
emergency if they were in any danger themselves .. 46#
OR
do you think they would help us, even at some risk 
to themselves?' 51#
Undecided: 3#
= I W
('Trust in Britain'; n=395)
'Do you think that the United States might let 
us down in an emergency if they were in any danger 
themselves .. 15#
OR
do you think they would help us, even at some 
risk to themselves? 84#
Undecided: 1#
= 100#
('Trust in the U.S.'; n=395)
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Asian Communism is thus seen by most as a ’great 
threat’, and there is some apprehension of 'grave danger 
of attack’. Overwhelmingly, the US is seen as Australia’s 
most reliable ally, opinion being divided on Great Britain.
This survey was, of course, taken before the British 
decision to withdraw forces East of Suez. These perceptions 
are in most cases related to Defence Leftism and 
Libertarianism, but not to the other two indices, except 
for a negative relation between ’Communist danger’ and 
Conscience Radicalism.
The perception items were treated as continua in the 
same fashion as the policy items have been, and their 
relationship to the political indices tested by the tetrachoric 
coefficient. ’Low’ and ’high’ on the political indices 
in Tables 8 .28-8 .31* which follow, means above and below 
the median, as in all tables other than those giving 
standardisation data. Percentages have also been computed 
for ease of interpretation.
4o6
TABLE 8.28
’Communist Danger* by Political 
Indices CR, DL and LIB (Percentages 
and Tetrachoric Correlations) 
(n=552*)
'Communist Danger1 
’Great* ’Minor* or None
CR Low: 70 50 = 100$ rt = -.22**
High: 57 45 = 100$
Low: 80 20 - 100$ rt = -.57**Db High: 57 = 100#
LIB Low: 77 25 = 100$ rt ~ -.44**High: 50 50 = 100$
There is a slight tendency for ’Conscience radicals’ to 
assess Communism in Asia as less threatening than those 
conservative on this index, and strong tendencies for 
’hawks’ and anti-libertarians to see Asian Communism as 
more threatening. Only one item of six in the libertarianism 
index has to do directly with Communism. The item on the 
’Security Police' is also relevant in substance. But the 
correlation here, as below, with the LIB index seems 
greater than could be accounted for by these items alone.
We have seen that libertarian sentiment is at odds with 
’hawkish’ sentiment (table 8.27). It may be that 
libertarian sentiment is dependent in a diffuse way on 
feelings of security.
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TABLE 8 . 2 9
' Danger of Attack* by Political 
Indices DL and LIB (Percentages 
and Tefcrachoric Correlations) 
(n=^52)
1Danger of Attack*
Yes No
Low: 48 52 = 100# rt = -.37**High: 26 74 = 100#
Low: 
High:
48
28
52
72
= 100# 
= 100# 4 ct 1
1 -.32**
’Hawks’, as might be expected are somewhat apprehensive 
of external attack, whilst ’doves', one might almost say, 
are prone to a sense of security. The same might be said 
of anti-libertarians and libertarians, the proportions 
being very similar.
TABLE 8 . 3 0
’Trust in Britain’ 
by Political Index DL 
(Percentages and Tetrachoric Correlation)
(n=p"52j
’Trust in Britain’
Yes No
DL Lo w : 48 52 = 100# ft = .16**High: 58 42 = 100#
Trust in Britain' is not significantly related to the
ER, CR or LIB indices. In its relation to Defence Leftism, 
it is the 'hawks’ who are more distrustful of Britain. 
’Doves’ are curiously old fashioned.
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TABLE 8.51
’ Trust in the US * 
by Political Indices DL and LIB 
(Percentages ana Tetrachoric Correlations)* rH=fÜ7
’Trust in the US‘
Low:
Yes
90
No
10 = 100$ r = -.38**High: 77 23 = 100$ ^
Low: 93 7 — 100$ ~ -.50**High: 75 25 = 100$
Most people trust the Americans, but 'doves’ less so 
than ’hawks', and libertarians less than anti-libertarians. 
Doves and libertarians are much less prone to perceive 
threat or apprehend danger of attack, that is, do not 
live in an apparently threatening world, peopled by allies 
and enemies. They may therefore have a margin for scepticism 
about our greater ally.
The realities of Australia’s external situation, although 
they cannot be debated here, may justify a quite realistic 
perception of threat and danger, and it would be unwise to 
see 'hawks’ or those who perceive ’danger’ or ’threat’ as 
being irrational. There is little to justify speculation 
on an unreal ’siege mentality’. There is ex hypothesi a 
good deal of room for stereotypical thinking about the 
outside world, with which very few people have first-hand 
acquaintance. However, as we shall see, ’Defence Leftism* 
and perceptions of threat have rather weak psychological
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correlates. Cues from political leaders seem to play a 
much more decisive role than psychological dispositions in 
forming conceptions of the external world. However, 
libertarianism has strong psychological correlates. Thus 
it is not the area of the unknown in which policies are 
structured by dispositions; rather one area of the known 
world, where aggressive and punitive traits are important 
in forming attitudes to outgroups perceived as familiar.
8.7* The Social and Political Correlates of Political Opinion 
8.7 •1• Established Socio-Economic Radicalism
Figures 8.17* 8.18 and 8.19 exhibit the status 
correlates of ER.
FIGURE 8.17 FIGURE 8.18
ER by Social Class 
“ (Percentages)
ER by Education 
(Percentages)
HIGH
Middle class Working class
100
y/ O  80 
HIGH
60+
40
20
L --- 1------- 1------- 1---
Higher Middle Lower
(pc.001, n=323) (pc.01, n=350)
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FIGURE 8,19
ER by Income of Householder 
(Percentages V
0 80
HIGH
Middle LowerHigher
(p <.01, n=322)
The negative relation of ER to class, education 
level and income is explicable in terms of the conventional 
wisdom: the higher levels would have their assets diminished,
or their businesses regulated, if the proposals constituting 
the ER index were implemented. There is a minor paradox 
in the income levels in that the lowest level appears less 
radical than the middle level; but the difference is not 
reliable, and the overall negative relation of ER to 
householder’s income significant. It might be noted that 
the discrepancies exhibited here, although significant, 
are not very great.
ER has no significant relations with age, sex or a
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tendency to talk politics. It is strongly related to vote.
FIGURE 8.20
ER by Vote 
(Ma.jor Parties Only)
^Percentage's)
HIGH
(p<.001, n=284)
Although the relation in Figure 8.20 is strong, it 
is evident that many voters are strikingly deviant from the 
Party norm in their views on policy. All the proposals 
of the ER index were in opposition to the policy of the 
Government Parties. However, as has been noted, few voters 
are oriented to policy.
Figure 8.20 strikes a blow at economic determinism, 
however, since it shows a stronger relation between political 
allegiance and policy opinion than is apparent between any 
sociological variable and policy opinion. Political views 
are obviously not an epiphenomenon of sociological variables,
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and the tables leave a very large space to accommodate 
detached consideration and intention.
What of the correlations of each issue of EH with 
social background variables? Table 8.52 employs a 
compressed method of presenting these. It indicates the 
significance of a relationship when tested by chi-square. 
The direction of the difference is given in the notes.
TABLE 8.52
The Social Correlates of ER Issues 
~TLevels of Significance)
“  (n=552)
Issue: Inc.(a) Educ.(k) Class (c) Age (d) Sex(e) Vote (*’) Pol.(&)
Talk
Education
spending: n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. p<.05 p<.01 p < .01
New Govt. 
Enterp.: n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. pc.001 n.s.
National­
ization: p <.01 n.s. p <.01 n.s. n.s. p< .001 n.s.
Economic
Planning: n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. p< -05 p c.OOl n.s.
1 Strict' 
Planning: p < .05 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. p < jOlL n.s.
Child 
Endowment: n.s. n.s. p <. 02 pc.05 n.s. p < .001 n.s.
Age
Pensions: n.s. n.s. P n.s. p < .02 p <.001 n.s.
Republic: n.s. n.s. n.s. p <.05 n.s. n.s. p < .05
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(a) Higher income levels are more conservative where 
significance is attained.
(b) Educational level has no significant relation to 
any item.
(c) The middle class is less radical, when significance 
is attained.
(d) Youth is more radical.
(e) Women are more radical than men on Education 
Spending, less radical on Economic Planning, and more 
radical on Age Pensions.
(f) A.L.P. Voters are more radical v/hen significance 
is attained.
(g) Talkers are more radical when significance is 
attained.
This pattern of detail reveals the openings for a 
forward strategy for the proponent of Established socio­
economic radicalism. Hostility from higher income and class 
levels is concentrated on the ’old’ issues, the nationalization 
and income redistribution proposals. Proposals for increased 
spending on education are popular generally but more so 
amongst political talkers and women. The table once again 
emphasises the relative importance of political allegiance 
rather social background factors in shaping opinion. Of 
course, the reverse mechanism is possible. Those with formed
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radical views on the issues of ER may choose to support the
A.L.P.
8.7*2. Conscience Radicalism
The story here is a relatively simple one to tell.
The CR index has no overall significant relation to 
householder’s income, social class, age, sex and vote.
There are trivial and non-significant disproportionalities 
which suggest it may be slightly more common at the 
higher levels in income, amongst political tallcers and 
in the middle class, but no reliance can be placed on them. 
If the whole sample is dichotomized, the difference even 
by education is not significant, but the ’Higher’ groups is 
significantly higher in CR than the 'Lower* group (pc.Ol), 
with the ’Middle’ group excluded.
Chi-square tests of the relation of all background 
variables to all CR items disclosed only these significant 
relations.
(i) The educated are more radical than others on Aid 
to Asia (p <.05)
(ii) Those higher in income (p<.05) and political 
talkers (p<.00l), presumably partly because of their 
altertness, were more in favour than others of aid to the 
new regime in Indonesia.
(iii) A.L.P. voters were more in favour than others 
of developmental spending in New Guinea (p-^.05)
(iv) Women are more opposed to the death penalty 
for murder than men (p<.Ol)
The slight, almost absent sociological relations 
of the CR items are in marked contrast with their strong 
psychological correlates. In fact, CR issues, and also 
libertarian sentiment, constitute the great arena within 
which psychological dispositions are dominant in assembling 
the opposing forces.
8.7 .5 . Defence Leftism
Here again, sociological correlates are few. The 
DL index has no significant relations with householder's 
income, class, age or tendency to talk politics. The 
same weak but significant relation which CR has with 
education obtains: the 'Higher' educated being 'doveish'
and the 'Lower' 'hawkish' (p<.05). By vote, however, 
differences are very marked:
FIGURE 8.21
DL by Vote 
Ma.jor Parties Only 
(Percentages)
HIGH
( p c . 001, n-283)
4l6
Of the handful of D.L.P. voters (n=17), 12 are low,
5 high.
A detailed scrutiny, by chi-square tests, of every 
issue by every background variable shows A.L.P. voters 
to be more radical than L.C.P. voters on four of the 
seven issues of the index, at a high level of confidence 
(p < .001). They differ less on defence spending (p <.02) 
and the acquisition of atomic weapons (p <.02 and p <.01 
respectively) and not at all on the question of controls 
on U.S. investment. Social correlates are as rare as for 
the OR issues, but anomalous: despite the weak positive
overall relation of education to DL, it reaches significance 
on only one issue: defence spending, where the educated were
more ’doveish’ (pc.Ol). Other ’status’ variables play 
an opposite role. Those at the higher income level were 
more in favour than others of sending troops to Vietnam 
(p<.02), as were the middle class (p < .001) . Political 
talkers were less in favour than others of acquiring 
atomic weapons (p <.05) and more in favour of imposing controls 
on U.S. investment (p<.05).
We will shortly see that this sentiment has few 
psychological correlates. In view of this, and the 
sparseness of sociological correlates, taken with its 
strong relation to vote, political opinion on the Left-Right 
dimension in foreign and defence policy may be regarded as 
a political phenomenon sul generis. There seems no general
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class conditioning; little influence by dispositional 
variables. If we assume that the mass public, especially 
those less interested in politics, is not very well 
informed and does not 'make up its own mind' on these 
issues - a very reasonable assumption - then leadership 
by opinion forming agencies such as the political parties 
and the press may play a very big role indeed. One is 
reminded of the picture of the old and retired mariner 
pointing out to sea and telling the small boy of the world. 
The portraits of the overseas world painted by political 
leaders seems to be accepted largely on trust, and not even, 
in any marked degree, selectively accepted or rejected by 
those with differing dispositions. This applies also to 
defensive activity: the public are told by their rival
leaders what is required and adjust their attitudes 
accordingly to party loyalties. It will be recalled that 
the issue of foreign and defence policy was rated high in 
importance by relatively few. Where a group of issues is 
lacking in salience, the responsibilities of political 
opinion leaders are great.
8.7*4. Libertarianism
Whilst scores on the index LIB are strongly influenced 
by dispositions, its relation with the sociological 
variables is also marked. However, the LIB index bears no
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relation to party allegiance. It is in these respects the 
precise inverse of the index DL. Figures 8.22, 8.23 and 
8.24 display the relation of libertarianism to class, 
education and householder's income.
FIGURE 8.22 FIGURE 8.23
LIB by Social Class LIB by Education
(Percentages) (Percentages)
HIGH
Middle class Working class
100
y/ O  80 
HIGH
60-
40
20
--1---- 1---- 1-
Higher Middle Lower
(p<.05, n=323) (p < .001, n--35°)
FIGURE 8.24
LIB by Householder's Income 
(Percentages)
o 80
Higher Middle Lower
(p <.001, n=322)
Libertarianism is more common amongst the middle 
class, the well off, and emphatically, amongst those 
with higher education. Five of the six items of the index 
refer to groups not 'reputable’: Communists, Fascists,
'long haired beatnik types', homosexuals, and least 
'respectable' of all, 'the enemies of this country.' It is 
true that the more educated are more directly concerned with 
censorship of the operation of the 'Security Police', 
(officially, the Australian Security and Intelligence 
Organization (ASIO)), which screens applicants for senior 
public service positions and has a watching brief on political 
demonstrations. But obviously, being libertarian at the 
higher status levels, in the terms defined by the index, 
in most instances requires an imaginative leap into 
the shoes of an uncommon and different kind of person.
The central mechanism involved in being, or becoming libertarian 
seems likely to be the same as that for Conscience radicalism: 
sympathetic identification with the other. The Figures 
also suggest that since libertarianism is more common at 
the higher status levels, it is in accordance with the 
reigning values of Australian society: it is 'a free
country' . But at the lowex’ status levels, normative 
considerations are overwhelmed by punitive and aggressive 
traits. The outre groups named are alien and yet at the
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same time familiar at these social levels also, but their
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existence is deplored. This may be partly a function of 
aspiration to social respectability, since intolerance of 
a disreputable group at least distances the respondent 
from it: ’ I ’m not one of them.1 But psychological
dispositions are also important in influencing attitudes
of this kind.
FIGURE 8.25
LIB by Age 
(Percentages)
0 80
HIGH
Less than More than
46
(p is n.s., n=352)
FIGURE 8.26
LIB by Sex 
(Percentages)
HIGH
Women
(p .01, n=350)
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FIGURE 8.27
LIB by Religious Affiliation 
(Protestants and Catholics only) 
(Percentages)
HIGH
Protestant Catholic
(p<.01, n=300)
No reliable difference in libertarianism is apparent 
by age. Men, perhaps because they are more involved in 
worldly affairs and usually have a greater range of social 
experience than women, are more libertarian.
Libertarian sentiment, although not by any means 
absent, is deviant amongst Catholics, to a degree which 
cannot be accounted for merely by their disproportionately 
working-class identification. There is, indeed, a sharp 
cleavage in the Catholic lay community on libertarian 
issues, which is reflected in their publications, and which 
corresponds, at the level of public debate, with the views 
of the orthodox and oecumenical factions.
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FIGURE 8.28
LIB by Political Talk 
(Percentages7 "
HIGH
Non-talkersPolitical
talkers
(p <.001, n=35l)
Political talkers are much more libertarian than 
non-talkers. We may construe the category ’political talkers’ 
as the ’political public.’ This may be taken with the 
facts that political talk is more common at the higher 
status levels and that the higher status levels exhibit 
more libertarianism. In short, we have a liberal 
intelligentsia, moving as a powerful influence in the 
social structure to dernpen anti-libertarian sentiment and to 
support public institutions, such as the Courts, on occasion, 
and privately founded institutions, such as Councils for 
Civil Liberties (which exist in most States) which uphold
freedoms
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8.75« Perceptions of a 'Problem* of Poverty
All the questions asked about the perception of 
political situations were related to external affairs, with 
the sole exception of poverty. Responses to this question 
were seen to be positively related to the dimension ER.
Its social correlates are surprisingly few: it was not
significantly related to class, education, householder’s 
income, or age. Nor was it related to a tendency to 
talk politics. Women, perhaps because of their role as 
managers of domestic income, are more prone to see poverty 
as a social problem than men (p c.05) but the difference 
is slight. There is a distinct relation with vote.
TABLE 8.33
'Problem of Poverty’ by 
Vote (Major Parties Only) 
(Percentages I~~
’Problem of Poverty’
Yes No
LCP: 36 54 = 10C$
ALP: 58 42 = 10C$
(p <.001, n=264)
Vote
The relation to vote is not, perhaps, as marked as one 
might expect, especially in view of the high rating given 
to ’social services’ as an issue by ’loyal’ A.L.P. voters. 
The question has psychological correlates, as will later 
appear, and it is suggested that ’nearness’ to poverty
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at the lov/er status levels, leading to perception of it as 
a problem amongst those who are poor, or nearly poor, is 
balanced at the upper status levels by a liberal concern 
with the issue, enhanced by the perspective afforded by 
higher education.
8.7*6. Two Residual Issues
The policy issues of 'Aid to Church Schools’ and the 
introduction of a capital gains tax were not placed in any 
of the political indices. In the case of the former, its 
low loading on the factor related to the CR issues was 
ambiguous; in the case of the latter, no factor loadings were 
apparent. ’State Aid’ was something of a fait accompli 
in Australian politics, with bipartisan support, when the 
1966 survey was taken. It has no sociological correlates 
apart from religious affiliation, but was markedly better 
supported by political talkers (p < .01). The denominational 
difference on this issue is great.
TABLE 8.54.
’Aid to Church Schools’ 
by Religious Affiliation 
(percentages)
’Aid to Church Schools’
Yes No
Denomination:
42 58 = 100#
90 10 = 100#
(p <.001, n=29l)
Protestant: 
Catholic:
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As for a gains tax, speculative gains are taxed, but 
where shares have been bought for ’investment’ purposes, 
there is no tax on capital gains, even when they are 
realized. This issue has no sociological correlates except 
by sex, men being more radical (p <.0l). Why this should 
be so, especially as there is no difference by vote, 
strains this writer's speculative powers. Recalling our 
hypothesis, advanced in relation to the greater libertarianism 
of men, that males are more wise in worldly affairs, we can 
extend this to financial dealings. Support for a capital 
gains tax reflects, seemingly, more ’business sense’.
Women may see capital gains as ’windfalls’ and taxing them 
as being akin to taxing Christmas presents. Political talkers 
are also more radical than others (p <.02). The lack of 
support for such a tax by the working class and at the 
lower income level suggests that the same attitude may be 
pervasive there, or that there is a general apprehensiveness 
about any new tax proposals amongst those on marginal 
incomes. At the lower status levels, there is likely to be 
little 'business' knowledge. The meaning of a gains tax 
proposal, even phrased as simply as this, may well be obscure. 
The poor may therefore be fearful that its incidence may 
somehow fall on them.
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8.8. Variations in Correlations of the Political Indices 
Table 8.35 exhibits variations in the correlations 
between the four political indices by social class.
TABLE 8.35
Correlations between the 
Political Indices ER, CR, DL 
and LIB within Social Classes 
'(Tetrachoric Correlations)
Middle Class ER CR DL LIB
(n=215) ER 1.00 -.01 .36** .01
CR 1.00 .15* .18**
DL 1.00 .16*
LIB 1.00
Working Class ER CR DL LIB
(n=108) ER 1.00 -.04 -.10 -.32**
CR 1.00 .40** .31**
DL 1.00 .52**
LIB 1.00
There are four variations apparent. The most obvious
are firstly, that the tendency for ER to be associated
with DL is found only amongst the middle -class., and secondly, 
that the negative relation between the ER and LIB indices 
is found only amongst the working class. In the first 
case, since ER represents measures broadly antagonistic to 
middle-class interests, those scoring high on this index 
will be a minority of class rebels, who, if they are 
policy-consistent in their vote, will tend to class-deviant 
support of the A.L.P. It would not be surprising that they 
should adopt the A.L.P.’s ‘Left* position on foreign policy
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issues. On the other hand, in the working class, ER 
represents class interest, at least as it is traditionally 
conceived. Here we find those associated with support of 
the interest of the in-group intolerant of dissent and 
deviance, a theoretically consistent pattern.
The less marked variations are the apparently higher 
relation between DL and LIB, and also DL and CR, in the 
working class than in the middle class. Applying the Fisher 
Zr transformation test, both differences in magnitude are 
significant (in both cases, p <.0l). However, the more 
stringent chi-square test of the collapsed frequency tables 
finds only the variation in the association of DL and LIB 
to be significant (p<.05).
The second, less reliable of these apparent variations 
is difficult to explain. Neither CR nor DL have a significant 
relationship with social class. If there is a greater strength 
in the relation in the working class, it may have to do with 
the antagonism between authoritarianism and DL, which is 
significant only in the working class (see Chapter Nine). 
Authoritarianism in both classes is uniformly antagonistic 
to CR. At this lower class level, therefore, psychological 
factors play some part in shaping opinions on both political 
dimensions, and their closer relation may therefore be a 
function of their partly common genetic basis in the
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psychological disposition of the respondents. At the middle 
class level, the common psychological genesis is not 
apparent.
The basis of the first, more reliable variation, the 
greater magnitude of the DL - LIB correlation in the working 
class, may lie in the fact that libertarianism is deviant 
in the working class, and argues either an intellectual 
sophistication or anti-authoritarian disposition, or both. 
Either would involve an unusual orientation. The small, 
deviant libertarian group is likely to have an awareness 
of police harrassment of public demonstrations against the 
Vietnam war, for example, and to connect freedom to 
demonstrate, and the liberties with which the LIB index 
is concerned, with ’Left* views on foreign policy. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the higher relation of LIB 
sentiments amongst political talkers, compared 
with non-talkers, (see Figure 8.28) which is very pronounced.
A priori, political talkers, construed as the 'political 
public', might be expected to perceive more connection 
between the different varieties of radicalism, to relate 
them to each other, and to take up connected positions 
on the various dimensions. It follows from this hypothesis 
that the four indices should be more closely correlated 
amongst political talkers than non-talkers. This is in
fact so, as Table 8.37 demonstrates.
TABLE 8.36
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Correlations between the Political Indices 
ER, CR, DL and LIB by Political Talk 
(Tetrachoric Correlations)
Political Talkers ER CR DL LIB
(n=l86)
ER 1.00 - .06 .33** - .04
CR 1.00 .39** .24**DL 1.00 .55**
LIB 1.00
Non-talkers
(n=l65)
ER CR DL LIB 
- .24**ER 1.00 -.06 .04
CR 1.00 .05 .23**
DL 1.00 -.08
LIB 1.00
The mean correlation between the indices amongst 
non-talkers approximates zero. The two low but significant 
correlations negative in the case of ER - LIB, and 
positive in the case of CR - LIB, suggest that, in a minor 
degree, and in the manner the argument above suggests, 
dispositions form relations between the political indices 
in the non-political public. However, evidence of an 
awareness of the connectedness of radical positions is 
notably absent. By contrast, amongst political talkers, 
there are no significant negative relations between the 
dimensions of radicalism, and the mean correlation is 
significant (at .23**).
The variations in correlations amongst the political
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indices between both political and social groups emphasise 
the heavy dependence of the nature of political outlooks 
on the social context in which they are held, on the one 
hand, and on intention and seif-orientation on the other. 
However, this is not to say that the inconstancies in the 
data overwhelm the constancies. Rather, there is a delicate 
balance between the two. Moreover, as can be seen, for 
example, in the explanation for the theoretical consistency 
in ’interested* groups being anti-libertarian in the working 
class, some apparent inconstancies merely verify an 
underlying consistency in the data. Two lessons which can 
be drawn are firstly, that the interrelations of attitudes 
and dispositions are very complex and require careful 
analysis and explication; and secondly, that a reductionist 
approach which makes simplistic deductions from first causes 
and attempts to constrain the data thereto is bound to 
fail. The complementary natures of the ideographic and 
nomothetic modes of analysis, noted in Chapter One, are 
very evident. This will appear with more force in considering 
variations in the relation of psychological dispositions to 
political attitudes.
8.9* Future Prospects
The model for prediction of trends in political opinion, 
advanced in Chapter Four, based principally on the sociological 
trends towards a generally higher level of educational
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attainment and the embourgeoisement of the electorate, has 
now to be briefly reconsidered in the light of the more 
extensive exploration of political attitudes undertaken in 
this chapter. We have seen that statistically, the two 
forms of socio-economic radicalism found in 1963.» probably 
because of substantive changes in the structure of 
attitudes between 1963 and 1966, are best subsumed under one 
head.
The issues connected with the index ER have diverse 
prognoses. Those involving greater expenditure on public 
services, such as education, and the introduction of 
moderate 'socialist* measures, such as competing public 
corporations in new fields of industry, seem not to be 
fated to encounter a stiffening class resistance. On the 
other hand, expropriative proposals, such as nationalization, 
are very likely to do so. Redistributive measures, such as 
expenditure on cash social services, although more important 
than seemed to be the case in the earlier analysis, are also 
likely to attract declining support. However, they are 
presently popular, and the drift in opinion away from them 
is likely to be slow.
Libertarianism is a sentiment which relies heavily 
on both sociological and psychological bases. Given 
rising levels of general education and greater affluence,
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both its sociological and its psychological bases should 
be strengthened. We can expect a slow subsidence in 
authoritarian tendency and alienation, if social conditions 
continue to improve. The climate of opinion will thus 
become more favourable to individual initiatives in 
promoting civil liberties, and opinion-forming agencies, 
such as the press and the political parties, will become 
increasingly populated by liberals.
Conscience radicalism, where, as we shall see, the 
influence of psychological dispositions is most dominant, 
is likely to undergo a gentle accretion in strength, if 
the overall tendencies to decline in both alienation and 
authoritarianism develop as the preceding argument 
anticipates.
Issues in foreign policy are most heavily dependent 
upon political leadership. The views of political leaders, 
must of course, turn on the course of future external events, 
which are difficult to predict. Of all the political 
dimensions, the future prospects here are most fluid.
8.10. The Cross-Class Voter
The political views of the middle-class Labor voter, 
and the working-class Liberal voter are of special 
significance, since neither Party could hope to govern 
without attracting their support. The evidence is that
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middle-class A.L.P. voters share their Party’s policy 
orientation to a greater degree than the politically 
‘conformist’ middle-class i.e. are disproportionately 
radical on ER and DL. The disproportionalities are 
greater than for ’normal’ Party orientation, i.e. without 
class being held constant, (see Figures 8.20 and 8.21).
In 1966, the A.L.P. had not adopted a comprehensive civil 
liberties programme, nor was it giving much stress to 
its more radical position on CR. There is no relation 
between CR and LIB scores and the Labor vote within the 
middle class.
TABLE 8.57
Vote by ER and DL Indices 
Within the Middle Class 
(percentages)
Middle Class 
(n=l80)
LCP
ALP
EE
Low High
73 27 = 100# (n-126)
26 74 = 100# (n=p4)
(p<.001, n=l80)
DL
Low High
LCP 71 29 = 100# (n=126)
ALP 33 67 = 100# (n=54)
(p <.001, n=l80)
Working-class Liberal voters, correspondingly, showed
a marked tendency to differ from others of their class in
orientation on these indices, but are also more conservative 
on the CR and LIB indices. In the latter case, one might 
hypothesize a desire to distance oneself from 'disreputable* 
groups, and associate this with a desire on the part of 
this type of voter to be upwardly aspiring in social 
status. The two sorts of cross-class voter are, in fact, 
opposite in number of ways, although not significantly 
psychologically opposed. The middle-class A.L.P. voter is 
extending the bounds of his political concern beyond his 
class; whilst the working-class L.C.P. voter is focussing 
his politics, as it were, on to another social level. His 
conservative orientation (evident on all indices) is more 
general than the partially radical orientation of his 
counterpart in the working class. Although the sample of 
working class voters is small, differences within it are 
striking.
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TABLE 8.38
Working Class
(n=84)
Vote by all Political Indices 
Within the Working Class 
(Percentages)
LCP: 
ALP:
LCP:
ALP:
LCP:
ALP:
ER
Low
46
26
High
54
74
100$ (n=2 6 ) 
100$ (11=58)
(p <. 1 0 )
CR
Low High
73
48
2752
100$ (n=26) 
100$ (11=5 8 )
(p <-05)
DL
Low High
73
33
27
67
100# (n=26  
100# (n=58
(p -c.OOl) 
LIB
Low High
LCP: 77 23 = 100#
ALP: 50 5 0 = 100#
(p <.05)
Whether people take cues from their chosen party-
leaders on policy issues, or the reverse, choose parties 
on the basis of their policy opinion, is a question not 
answered by these data. Very probably, both mechanisms 
are at work, the former more dominant amongst the less
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politically interested, the latter amongst the 'political 
public.' A strong forward position, on 'Conscience' 
radicalism and civil liberties, if taken by the A.L.P., may 
well enable it to gather more 'cross-class' voters, but the 
Government Parties, if they do so, may find themselves in 
the curious position of shedding conservative working-class 
support. On the other hand, this strategy may be a 
necessary defensive one, if they are to stop the A.L.P. 
making inroads into their traditional class base.
8.11. The Catholic Vote and the D.L.P.
The connection between the Catholic vote and the 
D.L.P. has become a critical factor in the balance of 
electoral support in Australian politics since the Labor 
'split' of 1935.> as Chapter Two is concerned to emphasise.
The lack of its generality, however, is evident from the 
smallness of the D.L.P. sub-sample. The phenomenon is more 
important in Victoria, and, to a lesser extent, Queensland, 
than in New South Wales.
Some features of general Catholic political attitudes 
have been touched upon. We have seen that Catholics are 
generally anti-libertarian (Figure 8.27) and overwhelmingly 
in favour of State Aid to Church Schools (Table 8.34). It 
is generally supposed that Catholics are more working class 
in their identification, than are Protestants, and Table 3*12
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in Chapter Three supports this view, They also tend to 
score higher than Protestants on the ER index* probably 
as a result of their greater working-class identification.
TABLE 8.59
ER by Religious Affiliation
(Percentages)
Denomination Low High
Catholic: 40 60 = 100$ (n=106)
Protestant: 55 45 = 100$ (n=194)
(p < .0 2 )
There is a suspicion amongst Protestants of British 
stock that Catholics are less 'loyal* to the Crown, and 
this view also is supported by the data, although there 
remains a ’loyal* majority amongst Catholics.
TABLE 8.40
Republicanism by Religious Affiliation
(Percentages!
Monarchy Republic Undec.
Denomination:
f
Catholics: 52 41 7 * 100$ (n=106)
Protestants: 70 26 4 = 100$ (n=194)
(p <.0l)
Of more significance than these 'folkish' sentiments 
is the political complexion of the D.L.P. It has been 
repeatedly stressed that, since the sub-sample is too 
small to serve as a basis for generalization, little can 
be said on the basis of this survey. That little will now
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be said, primarily to serve as the slightest of suggestions 
for future research with a larger sample. The ratio of 
the actual frequencies will be given for every case where 
the ratio of 'high* to 'low' on a political index is, 
or exceeds 2:1, (an arbitrary level of interest).
D.L.P. voters in the sample are
(i) High on ER (low: 6 high: 15)
(ii) Low on DL (low:12 high: 5)
(iii) Low on LIB (low:12 high: 5)
(iv) Radical on the issue of a capital gains tax 
(rad: 12 cons: 5)
(v) ’Programmatic’ rather than 'Social' in their 
reason for vote (programmatic:15 social: 2)
(vi) Catholic rather than Protestant (Catholic:14 
Protestant: l)
What little there is to say thus confirms the conventional 
portrait of the D.L.P. voter, except that, judging from 
his position on a gains tax and the ER index, he is radical 
on socio-economic issues, as the data in Chapter Four also 
indicate.
There is, therefore, the suggestion of a basis for 
reunion with the A.L.P., whose primary rationale is its 
economic radicalism. But unless a foreign and defence policy 
common to the two parties becomes possible, there is little
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prospect of this. If the A.L.P. sets itself up the 
standard-bearer of civil liberties, it may widen the 
distance between itself and D.L.P. voters.
8.12. Conclusion
Raving reviewed in extenso political opinion in the 
mass public, and its variations, the most outstanding 
features of its structure will be now noted, in anticipation 
of the investigation of its relation to dispositions to be 
reported in Chapter Nine. These are at least three 
dimensions of radicalism, not one ’Left-Right' continuum.
These are the ’Established Socio-economic Radicalism (ER), 
’Conscience Radicalism’ (CR) and ’Defence Leftism' (DL).
These are not closely related to each other. Libertarian 
sentiment (LIB) is distinct from these, although significantly 
related to the DL and CR indices. Of all these political 
sentiments, CR is most lacking in sociological and political 
correlates. The LIB index has sociological correlates but 
no relation to vote. It seems that amongst the politically 
less interested public, there is little relation between 
the political sentiments, except that generated by psychological 
disposition. Amongst the ’political public’, the dimensions 
tend to converge.
A further, related argument can be put in the following 
way: when political leadership is lacking, and class
conditioning not apparent (as is the case with the CR
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issues), then, most of all, will psychological dispositions 
have a free reign in forming opinion. This we shall see to 
be the case.
The basic mechanisms of libertarianism are sympathetic 
identification with the other (the alien) and a concern for 
personal autonomy. Since ’libertarians’ often have an 
interest in being left alone (as may be the case with 
censorship), then we may hypothesize a lesser dependence 
on external authority for guidance, and by implication, 
less authoritarian tendency. Sympathetic identification 
may also be the basis of ’Conscience’ radicalism, but, since 
the measures proposed by the index go beyond non-interference 
to assistance, nurturance of the other may also be involved.
Inconstancies in the data encountered thus far should 
prepare us for irregular patterns in psychological influence 
on political opinion, and indeed, there are apparent 
eccentricities in this. However, an underlying consistency, 
if we have recourse to theoretical considerations, is 
often evident. In analysing the interplay of sociological, 
psychological and political factors, an understanding both 
of particularities and general tendencies is required.
It is plain, moreover, from the date examined so far, 
that political opinion is a phenomenon per se, and not a 
derivative of psychological disposition or class location.
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CHAPTER NINE
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITIONS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
9.1. Introduction
In several ways* the report of the connections 
between psychological dispositions and political attitudes 
contained in this chapter is crucial to the development of 
the argument of this thesis. The research reported in 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven on the development of adequate 
measurement scales for the psychological constructs with 
which we are concerned is intended to be substantive to 
the thesis, as are the explorations of the structure of 
political attitudes made in Chapters Four and Eight. Parts 
of the domain of the total corpus of this research thus lie 
within the wider realms of social psychology, political 
science, and sociology. This is inevitable, and indeed the 
central intention of an inter-disciplinary work. But the 
central locus of the concern of this thesis lies in the 
area best described as 'political psychology'. The actual 
connections between psychological constructs and political 
attitudes, if any are to be found, are therefore of 
particular moment. The exercises undertaken in the 
measurement of psychological dispositions and political 
attitudes are, de facto, ancillary to this chief concern.
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If earlier researchers had produced satisfactory 
instruments for the measurement of the various constructs
in the psychological and political domains, the adaptation 
of these to the Australian urban milieu might have been 
describable as a dustpan and hand broom task. As things 
were, it turned out to be one requiring a large research 
enterprise in itself: a bulldozer and re-planting operation,
to preserve the analogy. It might be remarked here that the 
instruments developed in this thesis for the measurement of 
psychological constructs are, on the whole, stronger and 
more dependable than those for the measurement of political 
attitudes, as the generally higher reliabilities of the 
former demonstrate. This is partly an outcome of the fact 
that the psychological dispositions had long been identified, 
if not always well measured, in previous research, whereas 
this was not the case with the different varieties of 
political radicalism: the scales for the measurement of
the political dimensions have come to hand in the course 
of identification, so to speak. Nevertheless, since the 
overall structure of political attitudes has now been 
identified, and the reliabilities of the indices of each 
political sentiment are known, in every case, an attempt 
can be made to gauge the intrinsic strength of the 
relationships to be discovered by correcting for attenuation.
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A brief return to part of the Introduction is desirable 
before describing the relationships obtained in the 
1966 survey of the Melbourne-Sydney sample, the culmination 
of the field work of this enterprise. I chose to call 
the ’psychological dispositions’ by this name because, 
in the first place, ’disposition' is a term which adequately 
described a construct inclining an individual to particular 
behaviours without the inconvenient connotation that the 
individual is aware of the grounds of his inclination, but 
it does not preclude awareness. It is therefore preferable 
to ’attitude’ (which connotes a greater degree of awareness) 
particularly in the case of anxiety. This perhaps, is 
best described as a 'condition’ of personality functioning, 
but one for which ’disposition’ is also a possible 
description. The prefatory term, ’psychological’ is not to 
be taken to mean that we are concerned with the impact on 
political opinion of only central aspects of personality 
functioning: it is merely intended to remind the reader
that personality functioning plays a part in the formation 
of the dispositions whose influence is being measured.
This is a truism in the case of anxiety. As the genetic 
structure of 'authoritarian personality tendency’ of the Right 
had been elaborated in the first place in terms of its 
psychodynamics, the term is also appropriate here. However,
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since the measurement scale is couched in terms of opinion 
on minor familial or social issues, it must be remembered 
that here we are dealing essentially with a secondary, 
more 1attitudinal1 structure. This is more obviously the 
case with ethnocentrism where the scale is patently 
concerned with larger social issues, but is supposed to 
tap an underlying syndrome stemming from central personality 
dynamics.
In the case of alienation, even when considered as 
social estrangement and not ’reification’, the term 
’psychological' sits less easily. The primary justification 
for it lies in the generality with which the construct 
embraces so large a part of the individual’s conception of 
his relationship to his imagined social world. Whilst, in 
many cases, the alienated individual may not be aware of 
the totality of his disposition, in some, he may well be, 
just as he might regard himself as, for example, an 'anxious', 
or ’nervy', person. The term 'alienated' is in somewhat 
restricted use, of course, and the awareness of the 
disposition may be described differently. In the case of 
John, the alienated person actually coined his own haunting 
phrase to describe his alienation: 'an affliction against
the rules'.
This recapitulation of the terms in which the
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'psychological* constructs have been defined leads to an 
important general consideration. In so far as the 
dispositions influence opinion, it does not follow that 
in that degree the subjects' intentions are dismissed. For 
example, John, having decided (as he has done) upon an 
estrangement to which he holds with a conscious tenacity, 
proceeds immediately to a seen implication of it: 'I don’t
like a man in uniform.' The concept of intention is itself 
a construct of considerable complexity, and it is not my 
purpose to attempt to consider it here at length. It 
should be pointed out, however, that the alienation, 
ethnocentrism and authoritarianism scales all involve the 
respondent in determinations of minor social or familial 
issues, on every item. Intention therefore plays at least 
a trivial part in the measurement of these 'dispositions', 
seen from the respondent's point of view, even if the 
decisions are taken step by step, item by item. However, 
the low correlations between the items of the psychological 
scales suggest that most respondents do not see each 
construct as a totality, a familiar dimension on which they 
confidently locate themselves in a manner which is self-aware. 
By contrast, the higher correlations between the items on the 
dimensions of political radicalism, and libertarian sentiment 
also, suggest a much higher degree of awareness and guided
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intention. In short, it is suggested that intention 
and awareness are present to a greater extent in the 
determination by the subject of his 'political’ scores, 
and to a much lesser extent, although varying from person 
to person, in the determination by the subject of his 
'psychological* scores.
V/hilst this point is one of those basic to the whole 
analysis, it should be stressed that it relates only to the 
degree of intention and awareness. What should be borne 
in mind is that, in employing the dispositional scales for 
alienation, ethnocentrism and authoritarianism described 
here, we are dealing with instruments measuring secondary 
attitude structures at some distance from the 'core' of 
personality functioning, on the one hand, and also from the 
structure of opinion on political issues, on the other. The 
task is to see to which dispositions political opinions are 
related, and in what manner.
For the sake of consistency with the structure of 
Chapter Eight, we shall begin with an examination of the 
relation of psychological dispositions to vote and reason 
for party choice, where psychological correlates are sparse, 
and often a function of covariance with class identification. 
From there we shall move through consideration of the 
psychological correlates of a tendency to talk politics and
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of the 'tractable* vote to the main area of discussion, 
the relationship of psychological dispositions to opinions 
on matters of policy. Here, correlations are marked and of 
substantive significance. This chapter will then progress 
to an analysis of variations in correlation by class and 
education. Since we have already seen that variations in 
the intercorrelations of the dispositional scores, on the 
one hand, and political policy indices, on the other, 
occur between different social groups, the complexity of 
the variations in correlation of the two kinds of measures 
might be expected to be greater, and this is in fact the 
case. However, certain marked constancies are also to be 
found.
9.2.1. The Psychological Correlates of Voting Choice
There is no relation between voting choice and the 
three dispositional constructs authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, 
and anxiety. However, there is a relation with alienation.
TABLE 9.1
Vote by Alienation 
(Major Parties Only) 
(Percentagesj
Alienation
Vote: Low:
62
42
High:
38 =
58 =
LCP: 
ALP: 100$ (n-163) 100$ (n=120)
(p-<.01, n=283)
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This quite pronounced relation remains significant 
in the middle class when the data is fractionated.
TABLE 9*2
Vote by Alienation with Class Constant
only
Middle Class 
(n=180)
Vote:
(Major Parties Only) 
(Percentages)
Alienation
Low: High:
LCP: 6l 39 = ioo£ (n- 1 2 6ALP:
Working Class
(p <-05)
57 = 100$ (11=5 4 )
“Tn=85)
Vote:
Low: High:
LCP: 6 2 3 8 = 1 0 0# (n=2 6 )ALP:
(p is n.s.)
55 = 100^ (n=5 8 )
It will be noted that the frequencies are small in the 
working class sub-sample, and that the disproportionality 
is about the same as in the middle-class sub-sample. These 
data therefore suggest that the relation of vote to 
alienation may be a general one. The relation later to be 
demonstrated between the 'Established* socio-economic 
radicalism (ER) and alienation is consistent with this 
hypothesis. Of all the psychological dispositions, 
subjective alienation is most variable in its function. This 
is perhaps, intrinsic to its nature. The question must
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always be asked: alienated from what? There is always
the possibility of a supportive in-group attracting the 
alienated stray, or an alternative position to ’allegiance* 
to the macro-society being on hand. Support of the A.L.P. 
and its economic orientation seems to be the ’alternative' 
to an ’allegiant’ orientation in the Australian social 
environment. The importance of comprehending the milieu 
before comprehending the function of the disposition is 
once again emphasised. ’Alienation’ resembles, mathematically, 
a non-equation between two terms; the first, the individual's 
orientation; the second, those of the macro-society and the 
relevant smaller social groups. Both halves of the equation 
require special description. We may understand what an 
’ethnocentric’ disposition may be like in most societies; 
but the outlook of the alienated person is more opaque 
before further information is added. Contrast, for example, 
the outlook of an ’alienated’ political prisoner (in a gaol) 
in a Communist society and that of an alienated intellectual 
in a Western one. An understanding of the society is a first 
requirement; an understanding of the nature of the social 
estrangement and its dispositional and attitudinal correlates 
is a second. The alternative allegiance, if there is one, 
likewise requires the environment to be sketched in before 
comprehension is possible.
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A brief note on the small D.L.P. sub-sample. If 
we employ the same criterion for interest as before, i.e. 
a 2:1 relation, no disposition appears related to a D.L.P. 
vote except authoritarianism (Low: 4; High 15)*
9*22. The Psychological Correlates of Reason for Party Choice 
Both authoritarianism and ethnocentrism are related 
to a 'programmatic* rather than a 'social' reason for 
vote. . Alienation and anxiety are not related to reason 
for vote.
TABLE 9-3
Reason for Vote by Authoritarianism 
(Percentages)
Reason for Vote
Programmatic Social
Low: 75 25 = 100# (n=l47)
— High: 62 58 - 100# (n=l50)
(p <.02, n=297)
TABLE 9.4
Reason for Vote by Ethnocentrism 
(Percentages)
Reason for Vote
Programmatic Social
p Low: 7^ 26 - 100# (n-151)- High: 62 38 - 100# (n»l46)
(p < *05j n=297)
However, these correlations are principally a function
of the higher incidence of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism
451
in the working class, where the ’social' vote is more 
common. When the two class groups are considered 
separately, the covariations do not approach significance. 
There is thus no independent relation between these 
psychological dispositions and categories of reason for 
vote: the relation is an artifact of class differences.
9*3* The 'Tractable* Vote
The politically heterogeneous 'tractable* vote shows 
no disproportionality in authoritarianism, ethnocentrism 
or anxiety, compared with voters with fixed loyalties; but 
is reliably more alienated.
TABLE 9*5
The 'Tractable* and 'Non-tractable'
Vote by Alienation 
(Percentages)
Type of Voter A
Low: High:
Tractable: 62 38 = 100^ (n=127)
Non-tractable: 49 51 = 100$ (n=215)
(p<.05, n=342)
An inspection of the quartile scores of the various 
categories of 'tractable* voters reveals that the alienated 
are not disproportionately numerous amongst those 'Undecided', 
but are so amongst those who actually changed their vote 
in either direction, 'Left' or 'Right' between 1963 and 
1966,and also amongst both A.L.P. and L.C.P. voters who did
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not change their vote, but stated that they did not always 
vote for the same party. Alienation is thus hostile to 
political 'loyalty'.
9.4. Psychological Dispositions and Political Talk
No correlations are apparent here, except for a 
tendency of political talkers to be non-authoritarian.
There is a slight tendency evident in the sample for them 
to be non-ethnocentric, but it does not approach significance. 
The finding is consistent with the tendency of political 
talkers to be libertarian.
TABLE 9-6
Political Talk by Authoritarianism 
(Percentages)"
P
Lov;: High:
Political Talkers: 57 45 = 100$ (n-186)
Non-talkers: 40 60 = 100$ (n=l65)
(p <.01, n=351)
9*5• Psychological Dispositions, the Dimensions of Radicalism
and Libertarianism
9*5.1. A General Consideration
A general presumption is made that, if a causal 
relationship exists, it will flow from the psychological 
disposition to the political attitude and not vice versa.
This need not be the invariant causal direction, but it is 
expected to be the general one. It requires some justification.
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All of the dispositions are inclinations or conditions 
which are, firstly, of a very general nature, encompassing 
a large part of the individual's perspective on the social 
world. Even the possible exception, ethnocentrism, has 
implications which go well beyond the item content.
Secondly, they involve in some degree, aspects of 
personality functioning. The political attitudes are the 
sums of opinion on political issues. It seems unlikely 
that these would redound with greater force upon personality 
functioning and the symptoms of one's more general relation 
with the social world. Rather, it seems likely that the 
psychological disposition will shape the political attitude, 
consciously or unconsciously.
9.5.2. The 'Established' Socio-economic Radicalism
Table 9»7 displays the relations of each dispositional 
construct with 'Established' socio-economic radicalism (ER).
TABLE 9.7
ER by Four Dispositional Constructs 
(Product-moment and Tetrachoric Correlations) (a)
(n=355)
A ER r = .19** rt = .55**F ER r ~ -.08 rt = .05
E ER r = -.01 r+- = .01
Angst ER r — .06 rt = .12*
(a) A stands for alienation; F for authoritarianism, 
E for ethnocentrism, Angst for Anxiety.
It will be noted that the tetrachoric coefficient 
mitigates the effect of constriction of the variances, 
where this exists.
The relation of alienation to the ER index is low 
but significant. As the introduction to this chapter 
suggests, allegiance to a well-recognized set of reformist 
economic policies is a salient alternative to allegiance 
to the present socio-economic system in the Australian 
urban context. Corrections for attenuation were calculated 
on the more reliable basis of the product-moment correlations. 
These are given in Table 9*8.
TABLE 9,8
ER by Four Dispositional Constructs 
(Product-moment Correlations Corrected for Attenuation)
(n=353)
A ER r = .55**F ER r = -.17**E ER r = -.02
Angst ER r = .12*
Anxiety and authoritarianism have slight relations 
with ER, the more authoritarian being conservative and those 
anxious more radical.
It would seem that ER stems in part from social 
frustration. It seems also that the F-ER relation might 
stem from a conventionalist apprehensiveness of change. 
However, an alternative hypothesis is viable. This is 
that both the F-ER and the anxiety-ER relation stem from
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the covariance with class, all three being more common in 
the working class. It may be, also, that a back-reaction 
is involved in the case of the anxiety-ER relation, that 
a radical stance is marginally more socially precarious 
than a conservative one, so that the opinion invokes the 
disposition.
Table 9*9 indicates which elements of alienation 
account for the correlation with ER. The correlations are 
not corrected for attenuation.
TABLE 9-9
ER by the Five 
Alienation Sub-scales (a)
(Product-moment Correlations)
(n=353)
A (1]! ER r = .14**A (2 1 ER r = .15**
A (3 ) ER r « .03A (4 1 ER r - .16**
A (5,) ER r * .19**
(a) Key: A (l) = Sense of powerlessness (impersonal
agency).
A (2) ~ Normlessness.
A (3) = Meaninglessness and self-estrangement.
A (4) = Sense of isolation.
A (5) = Sense of powerlessness (personal agency). 
The correlation stems more from frustration, especially 
a sense of being exploited (A (5)), than from social 
uncertainty.
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9.5•5• 'Conscience' Radicalism
Table 9*10 indicates the relations of dispositions 
with ’Conscience’ radicalism (CR).
TABLE 9.10
CR by Four Dispositional Constructs 
(Product-moment arid Tetrachoric Correlations)
(n=352)
A CR r = .17** rt = .26**F CR r = -.39** rt * -.36**E CR r = -.33** rt = -.41**Angst CR r = .06 rt = .01
The relations here are marked and cannot be accounted 
for by covariance with sociological variables, since 
CR correlates with only one (education)and in that case 
only weakly. Nor can the alienation-CR relation be 
accounted for by covariance with ethnocentrism as seemed 
to be the case in the earlier analysis, described in 
Chapter Five, when shorter scales were used. It has an 
independent influence.
It seems that, in the case of alienation, social 
distrust is generalized to that ’other’ specified in the 
political questions (Asians and convicted criminals) 
and/or aggressive sentiment is discharged upon these, 
perceived as out-groups. Anxiety plays little or no direct 
role, although the correlation reaches significance when
iiir
corrected for attenuation; the mechanism suggested is that 
for radicalism generally, argued above. The radical, on
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the other hand, sympathetically identifies with the groups 
concerned - whether or not they are perceived as the other - 
and exhibits a generous and co-operative sentiment.
It should be noted that whilst the absence of 
alienation, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, following 
the theoretical construction placed upon their function, 
inhibits identification, it also encourages a nurturant 
orientation. In our discussion thus far we have 
concentrated our attention upon the mechanisms of hate, 
not of love. Since the anti-alienated and anti-ethnocentric 
item halves are in many cases symptomatic of an affectionate 
disposition, and not merely absence of hostility, in these 
dispositional constructs, and in the case of authoritarianism, 
the negative poles (anti-alienation (or ’allegiance’) and 
anti-ethnocentrism) imply a capacity for a wide-ranging 
object cathexis.
When the correlations are corrected for attenuation, 
the correlations range from low to very high. These are 
displayed in Table lb should be remoibered that it
is the sentiment governing opinion on the CR issues which 
is involved when a correlation is made for attenuation, 
not opinions on each and every issue. If the latter were 
the case, near-perfect prediction for the dispositions to 
opinion each issue ’would be entailed. What is_ entailed 
is near-perfect prediction, when all dispositions are
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known, to the sentiment CR.
TABLE 9.11
CR by Four Dispositional Constructs 
(Product-moment Correlations 
Corrected for Attenuation) (n=353)
A CR r = -.37**F CR r = -.93**E CR r —: -.62**
Angst CR r = .14**
Psychological dispositions thus play a dominant, indeed 
unchallengable role in influencing opinion on CR issues, 
accounting for much of the variance on the sum of opinion 
on the various issues (when the correlations are uncorrected) 
and sharing nearly all of the variance of the underlying 
sentiment. In the absence of strong political leadership 
(which was the contemporary and is the present situation) 
they therefore play a very major role in creating the 
’climate of opinion’, which will vary on these issues as 
the dispositions wax and wane in the mass public. However, 
the introduction to this chapter makes it clear that to 
say this is not to take a ’determinist1 position. Self- 
awareness and intention can be accommodated within the 
structure of both dispositions and attitudes.
Once again, the various elements of alienation play 
a somewhat different role; in this case, two are impotent.
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TABLE 9.12
CR by the Five Alienation Sub-scales (a) 
~ (Product-moment Correlations) 
(n=353)
A (1]) CR r = -.05A (2lt CR r = -.25**
a (?;1 CR r = -.03
A (4'> CR r = -.16**
A ( 5 ,) CR r = -.15**
(a) Key as in Table 9*9
Normlessness, isolation and a sense of powerlessness 
imposed by personal agency are active; a sense of meaningless­
ness and frustration by impersonal agency are not. 
Conservatives on these issues of conscience thus ’know* 
their enemies when confessing alienation: they are frustrated
and scornful of society, and have an idea who is to be 
blamed. Social uncertainty and vague feelings of 
frustration are not associated with conservatism (or 
radicalism) on the CR index.
9o.4. ’Defence Leftism1
Table 9*15 exhibits the relations of dispositions 
with ’Defence Leftism’ (DL).
TABLE 9.15
DL by Four Psychological Constructs 
(Product-moment and Tetrachoric Correlations)
(n=355)
A DL r — .12* r, = .12*
F DL r = -.19** Ürt = -.12*E DL r = .00 rt = .06Angst DL r = .08 rt = .03
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Relations here are thin. Authoritarianism has a low 
negative relation to ’doveish’ sentiment; but ’hawks’ are 
not ethnocentric. The variable role of alienation is 
notable: we have seen it promote a radical stance on
socio-economic domestic issues (ER) and a conservative 
position on issues of conscience (CR); here it again gives 
an impetus to radicalism, albeit a small one.
Table 9«14 shows the correlations corrected for 
attenuation.
TABLE 9-14
DL by Four Dispositional Constructs 
(Product-moment Correlations 
Corrected for Attenuation)
(n=355)
A DL r - .25**
F DL r = -.42**
E DL r = .00
Angst DL r = .17**
That authoritarians should be ’hawkish’ is theoretically 
consistent; but the zero relation between DL and ethno- 
centrism is puzzling. One might have expected ’hawks’ to 
be somewhat bigoted towards domestic out-groups, as well 
as the putative ’enemy’ to be confronted. But this is not 
so. There may be two reasons for this; each involving 
opposed tendencies which, operating together, produce a 
zero correlation. One may lie in the conception advanced 
in Chapter Eight of the mechanism by which views on external
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policy are transmitted: they are ’handed down* to
trustful followers by leaders of opinion. No dispositional 
influence need be adduced for this process to occur, although 
there seems to be some selection involved, authoritarians 
'choosing' hawkish sentiments, the alienated,'doveish' ones 
(perhaps because of their slight orientation to the A.L.P.). 
The second may be as follows. The most adamant proponents of 
a strong defence and foreign policy posture, the leaders of 
the D.L.P. and the N.C.C., are in fact anti-ethnocentric, 
proposing closer regional co-operation with non-Communist 
Asian powers and abandonment of the White Australia policy.
In so far as these opinions and the sentiment underlying 
them is received, it will counteract the ethnocentric 
underlay of the old-fashioned 'hawkishness', which was often 
associated with a certain disdain for coloured peoples. The 
zero correlation with ethnocentrism may be the result of 
this strange confluence.
Radical sentiment is again associated with a low 
degree of anxiety.
Alienation plays a radical role for the in-group, as 
we have seen; a conservative role for the out-group, and 
now, once again, a radical role, although a lesser one, in 
shaping sentiments on defence policy* The variability 
noted above is partially explained by the fact that the 
elements of alienation which are active in promoting radical
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Sentiment on the DL issues are somewhat different. Table 
9.15 exhibits the correlations with DL of the sub-scales 
of alienation.
TABLE 9.15
DL by the Five Alienation Sub-scales 
(product-moment Correlations) (a)
(n=353) “
A (1) DL r = .09
A (2) DL r = .09
A b) DL r = . 14**
A (4) DL r = .00
A (5) DL r = .11*
(a) Key as in Table 9*9*
A (3) (meaninglessness and self-estrangement) and A (5) 
(powerlessness (personal agency)) are active here, A (3) 
for the first time in this analysis. It is tempting to 
suggest that ’meaning* is supplied in external affairs 
by the A.L.P. leadership; but if those high on this sentiment 
are particularly susceptible to influence from this quarter, 
why are they not high on ER? It is possible to sustain the 
suggestion against this objection by pointing out that 
external affairs Is argued to be the area of greatest 
suggestibility, and that in other fields, ideas are less 
liable to be accepted on trust. However, these are two 
other possible explanations, which are not in conflict with 
this first. One is that ’doveish* sentiment may in part 
represent isolationism, which may be peculiarly appealing 
to those who are uncertain of social verities, and may
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seek security in retreat. Another is that this element 
in the alienation construct may reflect an intellectual 
uncertainty and a reluctance to be dogmatic, and so be 
associated with a higher level of education, where, as we 
have seen, ’doves’ are more numerous. However, this 
hypothesis is undermined by the failure of A and DL to 
intercorrelate at the higher educational level (see Table / 
9.22). A (5), which seems to represent a feeling of being 
exploited, is also associated with ’doveishness’ and is more 
clearly a predisposition to accept labor views. The opposing 
conservative function of A (5) in relation to ’Conscience’ 
radicalism is easily explicable because in this case and 
at this time, the Labor Party was not a strident proponent 
of the radical position on issues of conscience.
9.5*5* ’Libertarianism’
The relationship between psychological dispositions and 
libertarianism (LIB) was tested only by the tetrachoric 
correlation. The results are set out in Table 9*16.
TABLE 9.16
LIB by Four Dispositional Constructs 
(Tetrachoric Correlations)
(n=552)
A LIB rt = .OSF LIB = -.55**E LIB rt - -.38**
Angst LIB rt - .07
464
The relation with authoritarianism is strong, and 
with ethnocentrism moderate. This is a wholly consistent 
pattern theoretically. The authoritarian is expected to 
be hostile and punitive towards outgroups; the LIB index 
has to do with punitive attitudes towards out-groups on 
four items out of six, and in the remaining two refers 
to the restraint of threatening, sinister forces, by 
censorship and the Australian Security and Intelligence 
Organization. There is, in fact, one item specifically 
referring to punishment of homosexuals in both the F scale 
and the LIB index. Of all the indices and scales, these 
are the two with the most shared surface content, although, 
of course, most of the F items are not similar in surface 
content with those of the LIB index.
However, an objection might be raised at this point 
that the strong correlation between the authoritarianism 
scale and the LIB index is not of great substantive significance, 
and is indeed trivial, because of the degree of shared 
surface content shared by the two measures. In order to 
test the strength of this objection, let us, in fact, 
adopt this view. We will now, for the sake of this 
argument, regard the LIB index as nothing more than a 
restatement of the F measure, and see what difficulties
this position involves.
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The first point of discomfort is that five of the 
six LIB items are stringently political, referring, for 
example, to the banning of fascist parties. The remaining 
one, referring to'long haired beatnik types' is more loose, 
but is suggestive of police action. All of them refer to 
punishment, banning or elimination of 'outsider' political 
or social groups. If we turn to the F Scale, we find that 
comparatively few items (three out of thirteen) are of 
this type: the 'outsiders' of the F Scale are homosexuals
(also mentioned in the LIB index) sex criminals, and 
'immoral, crooked or feeble-minded people' who are to be 
'got rid of.’ There are many items which have no reference 
at all to out-groups, such as item 3, which weighs the 
merits of professors as against businessmen, and item 2 
('talk less and work more'). The obscurantist items 4,
12 and 13, and the 'obedience' item 1, have no mention of 
out-groups, and the items referring to 'young people' and 
'youth' (5 and 7) are very generally phrased. Items 6 
and 9 refer only to family 'virtues', phrased in a deliberately 
exaggerated way. In short, the F Scale seems to do what 
it is supposed to do, that is, to offer items which range 
in a general way over the individual's perceived relation 
with the social world, and to deal in such diffuse themes 
as anti-intellectualism and over-statement of family 'virtues',
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as well as the punishment of out-groups: it is much more
a dispositional scale, even if a far from perfect one, 
than a political questionnaire.
These difficulties are thus sufficiently troublesome 
as to compel us to abandon this temporarily adopted 
position i.e. that the LIB index recapitulates the F Scale: 
it does not. The important thing is to establish a point 
of balance in this hypothetical symposium. This can be 
struck by pointing to the closeness of three of the thirteen 
F Scale items to those of the LIB index, whilst at the same 
time noting that this in itself would not be sufficient to 
generate a correlation as high as the one actually 
obtained. The correlation must be only moderately discounted 
in order to gauge correctly its substantive importance.
It might be further objected that themes of anti- 
intellectualism and exaggerated familial 'virtues' are 
nevertheless ’tied in' with ideas about the punishment of 
out-groups. But this is no objection. This is precisely 
the argument. The mistake involved in the objection arises 
from treating the disposition-index relation as a fact so 
well known as not to require demonstration, which, whilst 
it is a point of view flattering to the influence of 
disposition (and ordinary understanding) is not well founded. 
'Common knowledge' in this field is largely confined to
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intellectuals influenced by research into the authoritarian 
personality. In any case, since no prior demonstration has 
been made of the relation, it is a necessary part of this 
research enterprise.
The interpretation of correlations corrected for 
attenuation has to be made with some caution in this case, 
because of the greater variability of the tetrachoric 
correlation coefficient, which is employed here. The 
corrected correlations are displayed in Table 9*17»
_ TABLE 9*17
LIB by Four Dispositional Constructs 
(Tetrachoric Correlations Corrected for Attenuation)
(n=352)
A LIB rt = .14**
F LIB rt = -1.00** (a)
E LIB rt = -.61**
Angst LIB r^ = .13*
(a) actually exceeds unity.
The fact that we are dealing in approximations is 
emphasized by the F-LIB correlation, where we are in the 
embarrassing position of having discovered a perfect 
empirical negative correspondence, in situ. The implication 
of Table 9«17 taken as a whole, is, indeed, that we have an 
embarras de richesse: we are in a position to predict more
than 100% of the variance of libertarian sentiment, given 
a knowledge of dispositional scores. Once again, this 
makes obvious the need for a ’personality1 scale for
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authoritarianism which will remove the measure from direct 
contact with social issues; but the strength of this 
correlation, taken with that of the LIB index with 
ethnocentrism, shows libertarian sentiment to be very much 
a creature of disposition. The notion of libertarianism 
is a familiar one in its totality, of course, and it would 
be reasonable to expect both intention and awareness to 
play a part in making this relation. The high inter-item 
coefficients of the LIB index items, and its high reliability 
for so short a measure, are consistent with the view that 
its cohesiveness reflects the respondents’ knowledge of 
’what this is about.*
It is in one way unexpected to find alienation 
playing a positive role in promoting libertarianism, in 
view of the hostility of alienation to ’Conscience* 
radicalism, its positive relation to ethnocentrism and the 
similarity of the mechanisms involved in each of the 
political sentiments. It should be remembered that the 
LIB index has a good deal of punitive content, whereas the 
ethnocentric item halves are more mild in tone, implying 
no positive action other than not having one of them 
in the family. The degree of ’aggression’ implied in the 
ethnocentrism scale items is not at all great. Possibly, 
two conflicting mechanisms are at work in producing the
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trivial positive relation between libertarianism and 
alienation. One may be that, since the alienated person 
has professed, in part, a distrust of the reigning 
institutions of the macro-society, and now, in the 
libertarianism index, is presented with a vivid picture of 
these bearing down in a punitive fashion on various outgroups, 
sometimes loosely defined, e.g. ’the enemies of this country’, 
he instinctively steps out of the way, as it were, and opts 
for them to be let alone, fearing that he, another ’outsider’, 
will be next. On the other hand, he may distrust the 
named out-groups and wish to discharge aggression upon 
them. Of these two hypothetical conflicting tendencies, 
the former appears to be stronger, and produces the low 
positive relation. The low positive relation of anxiety 
to libertarianism, although reliable only on the most generous 
criterion, is consistent with this view.
9.5.6. Political Perceptions 
9.5.6.1. The ’Problem of Poverty*.
There are in this instance two significant relations, 
which are indicated by the tetrachoric correlation when 
perception of poverty as a social problem is conceived 
as a continuum, in the same manner as the responses to 
the policy questions. Table 9-18 sets these out.
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TABLE 9*18
TProblem of Poverty1 by Alienation and 
Authoritarianism 
(Tetrachoric Correlations) (a)
A ’Problem of Poverty* rt = .27**
F ’Problem of Poverty’ r^ = -.17**
(a) ’Undecided’ being excluded.
The first relation is consistent with the correlation 
between alienation and the ’Established’ socio-economic 
radicalism. The second is theoretically consistent with 
the concept of the authoritarian, who may be expected to 
be stereotype the poor as a blameworthy out-group. However, 
this hypothesis lacks the support of evidence of a 
correlation between responses to the ’poverty' question 
and ethnocentrism.
9.5•6.2. Perceptions of Danger in Communism in Asia and 
of ’Attack.’
Authoritarianism is positively related to a perception 
of Communism in Asia as a danger to Australia.
TABLE 9.19
Perception of Aslan Communism as a 
Danger by Authoritarianism (a)
(Tetrachoric Correlation)
.16**
(a) ’Undecided’ excluded.
Responses to the question of the danger attaching to
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Communism were not related to the other dispositions.
For the more general question about the danger of external 
attack (’Do you think Australia may be in grave danger 
of attach at some time in the next ten years ... (etc.)?1), 
there were low but reliable relations with every disposition* 
particularly anxiety.
TABLE 9-20
’Danger of Attack’ by Four 
Dispositional Constructs 
(Tetrachoric Correlations") (a)
A 'Danger of Attack' r^ - .18**
F 'Danger of Attack* r^ = .12*
E 'Danger of Attack' r^ = .11*
Angst 'Danger of Attack’ rt = .28**
(a) 'Undecided' in every case excluded.
All dispositions are positively related to perception of 
the danger of attack, which is theoretically consistent 
for authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, which may both 
predispose to a view of a world where peril of enemy 
attack is perceived as customary. The relation with 
anxiety, which implies projection of the subject’s personal 
insecurity onto the conception of the external world, 
is also theoretically consistent. In fact, the question 
is not so much why such a relation should be found here 
for anxiety, as why it was not found in relation to 
perception of ’danger’ in Asian Communism. The answer 
may lie in the non-specificity of the ’attack' question,
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which is worded in very general terms with a slightly 
sinister innuendo, if an innuendo is sought for.
The positive relation of alienation here is a paradox, 
since alienation is related to ’doveish’ sentiment (DL).
The difficulty is not great, since both correlations are 
low. We have hypothesized a ’reception’ of A.L.P. policy 
orientation on external affairs by the alienated, who score 
high on the ER index, indicating an allegiance to the 
A.L.P.’s position on domestic policy. On the more general 
question of attack as it is phrased, implying the possibility 
that the attack may be unexpected or sudden, the A.L.P. 
has, perhaps sensibly, no firm view to hand down. The 
a.ienated may therefore be inclined to be influenced by 
their sense of uncertainty in the social world, and to project 
it onto the conception of the external world in the same 
way as those high in anxiety.
9.5•6.5• 'Trust* in Britain and the United States
There is a slight tendency on the part of authoritarians 
to ’trust* Britain, in the event of an emergency, in the 
sense intended by the relevant question.
TABLE 9.21
’Trust in Britain’ by Authoritarianism 
(Tetrachoric Correlation) (a)
.15*
(a) ’Undecided’ excluded.
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No other dispositional correlations are significant. 
’Trust in the US’ is more general. Significant relations 
obtained between ’trust in the US’ and alienation and 
authoritarianism, negative in the first case, positive 
in the second.
TABLE 9.22
’Trust in the US’ by Alienation 
and Authoritarianism 
(Tetrachoric Correlations) (a)
A ’Trust in the US’ r^ = -.23**
F ’Trust in the US’ rt = .27**
(a) ’Undecided’ excluded in both cases.
The authoritarian’s trust in Australia’s most 
powerful ally is easily explicable, the opinion being 
heavily laden with ’Conventionalist’ sentiment. The negative 
relation with alienation springs, conjecturally, from 
reception of the A.L.P.’s tendency to play down, at this 
stage, the importance of the American alliance, and a 
tendency to generalize distrust in the same manner as in 
the case of anxiety.
9.6. Variations in Correlations
Having set out the central tendencies of the influence 
of the four psychological dispositions on political 
opinion, and noted some of the variety evident in the 
relationships, the analysis will now be directly addressed 
to the uncovering of complexities. Table 9.23 exhibits
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the correlations between all four dispositions and the 
four political indices within each social class.
TABLE 9 .2 3
Correlations between Four Psychological 
Scales and Political Indices v/ithin Social Classes 
(Tet~rachoric Correlations)
Middle Class Working Class
(n=215) (n=108)
A EH .36** .25**
CR -.37** -.11DL .06 .12
LIB .05 .26**
F ER - . 0 9 .18CR -.27** -.41**
DL -.02 -.34**
LIB -.54** -.54**
E ER - . 0 4 .06
CR -.56** -.44*
DL .02 -.18
LIB -.36** -.36**
Angst ER .06 .10
CR -.09 .22**
DL .11 .03LIB .05 - . 0 7
Constancies will be noted first. Authoritarianism and 
ethnocentrism are the foes of ’Conscience' radicalism 
and libertarianism in both classes. Alienation in each 
class is the friend of the ’Established’ Socio-economic 
radicalism. These five correlations are the major 
connections established between dispositions and political 
opinion, and to find them undisturbed by variations in 
class identification is a strong indication of their
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regularity.
The inconstancies are to be found in the less 
reliable levels of lower correlation. Where an inconstancy 
has no manifest rationale, it will be dubbed an 
’eccentricity*. The latter, as we shall see, are more 
numerous when variations in correlation by education are 
examined. The four inconstancies suggested in Table 9«25 
are the following:
(i) The alienation-’Conscience* radicalism correlation is 
significant only in the middle class. The difference 
in magnitude between the correlations in each class is 
significant (p < .05) by the application of the Fisher 
Zr transformation test. (Since the lower correlation 
is not significant, our declared procedure does not 
require a further test by chi-square). We thus have 
no reliable evidence of hostility of alienation to 
radicalism on conscience issues in the working class.
This finding, or rather lack of one, is reminiscent 
of the depression in the A-E relation, reliably 
determined in the less educated group. In that case, 
it was suggested that frustration is more liable to 
lead to retreat than aggression at the less educated 
level or that frustration had a greater variability 
amongst those at the middle level of education,
Both hypotheses seem to have a possible application here.
47 6
Social frustration may have a greater potential for 
inhibiting sympathetic, nurturant identification 
with the other in the middle class. Another possibility 
is that the issues of conscience are less salient 
generally to the working class, opinions on them less 
stable and that the influence of alienation is 
dispersed without it having much effect on what is an 
area of minor concern. This hypothesis is not supported 
by the lack of a correlation between radicalism and 
class on the issues of CR, but remains a viable one.
For substantiation, the reliability of the CR index 
would have to be shown to be lower in the working 
class, an exercise not done here but suggested for 
future research. The former two hypotheses thus win 
a slight preference.
(ii) Alienation is significantly related to libertarianism 
in the working class only, where the relation is 
positive. This accords with the ’I may be next’ 
hypothesis advanced to explain the apparent general 
relation at Section 9*5«5« Apprehensiveness of 
authority might well be more pronounced in the 
working class.
(iii) Authoritarianism is significantly related to ’doveish- 
ness1 (DL) in the working class only, where the 
relation is negative. It is hypothesized that there
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is less informed opinion at the working class level, 
that views are selectively received from above, and 
that selection at this less informed level is 
governed more by disposition. Authoritarians, in 
keeping with their generally hostile tendency, select 
’hawkish’ views.
(iv) There is a curious apparent relation, positive and
significant, between anxiety and ’Conscience’ radicalism 
in the working class. The relation in the middle 
class is negative but not significant. The variation 
was tested also by the chi-square test, which found the 
difference not significant. However, the significance 
of the tetrachoric coefficient does not permit us to 
overlook the eccentricity.
Inspection of the relevant questionnaires suggests 
that many of these anxious working class respondents 
find a general sympathy for the ’little man’, seeing 
in him both themselves and others. A fitter of 56-65 
says of the A.L.P., for which he votes: ’In the main,
[they} have the little people at heart’. He explains 
his votes as follows: ’They support little people
and the working class, including those not in the 
employed or monied bracket.’ He scores near the 
maximum on the CR index (and on the libertarianism 
index). This diffusion of sympathetic sentiment seems
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is less informed opinion at the working class level, 
that views are selectively received from above, and 
that selection at this less informed level is 
governed more by disposition. Authoritarians, in 
keeping with their generally hostile tendency, select 
’hawkish’ views.
(iv) There is a curious apparent relation, positive and
significant, between anxiety and ’Conscience’ radicalism 
in the working class. The relation in the middle 
class is negative but not significant. The variation 
was tested also by the chi-square test, which found the 
difference not significant. However, the significance 
of the tetrachoric coefficient does not permit us to 
overlook the eccentricity.
Inspection of the relevant questionnaires suggests 
that many of these anxious working class respondents 
find a general sympathy for the ’little man’, seeing 
in him both themselves and others. A fitter of 56-65 
says of the A.L.P., for which he votes: ’in the main, 
[they] have the little people at heart’. He explains 
his votes as follows: 'They support little people
and the working class, including those not in the 
employed or monied bracket.’ He scores near the 
maximum on the CR index (and on the libertarianism 
index). This diffusion of sympathetic sentiment seems
to be associated with ’worry’ over the position 
of both the subject and others. The relation between 
CR and anxiety in the working class may be reciprocal. 
We turn now to variations in correlation by 
educational level, exhibited in Table 9*24.
TABLE 9*24.
Correlations between Four Psychological 
Scales and Political Indices at three 
Education Levels 
(Tetrachoric Correlations)
Lower Middle Higher
(n=127) (n=ll8) (n=105)
A ER .35** .11 .44**CR - .1 3 - .2 7 * * - .5 0 * *DL .29** .30** - .1 7LIB .45** .08 .04
F ER .04 - .5 0 * * -.12
CR - .2 7 * * - .4 0 * * - .5 3 * *DL - .0 5 -.11 - .1 7LIB - .5 2 * * - .5 0 * * - .4 6 * *
E ER -.11 .08 - .5 6 * *CR - .2 7 * * - .4 6 * * - .4 7 * *DL .29** -.11 -.11
LIB - .2 4 * * - .2 5 * * - .4 0 * *
Angst ER -.01 .08 .18
CR .07 .01 .04DL .14 . 16 - .1 4
LIB - .0 7 .26** - .0 7
Four of the five major general correlations, the 
negative relations between authoritarianism and 
ethnocentrism, on the one hand, and ‘Conscience’ radicalism 
and libertarianism, on the other, are not disturbed when
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educational level is varied. These four great impulses 
are present at every level of education. There is indeed 
a slight suggestion that they are more powerful at the 
higher level, but no differences in the magnitudes of these 
correlations are significant.
It is sometimes assumed that dispositional influences 
are greatly reduced at the higher level. Whilst liberal 
political views are more common at this level and the 
two ‘negative’ dispositions less common, as the data of 
Chapter Seven and Eight have demonstrated, there is no 
evidence that the connection between the ’negative' dispositions 
and conservative views is dissolved at this level, or even 
reduced.
The other major finding, the moderate but reliable 
general relation between alienation and the ’Established’ 
socio-economic radicalism, is disturbed at the middle-educated 
level, where it is trivial and non-significant. This 
eccentricity is discussed below.
The relative independence of the DL index of 
psychological correlates is again evident, although some 
minor and irregular ones are to be observed.
There are, in all, seven inconstancies evident in 
Table 9»24, most of them trivial. They are discussed below.
(i) Alienation is not significantly related to ER at
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the middle educated level. The difference between 
the lesser of the two significant positive relations 
(at the lower education level) and that at the 
middle-educated level is significant (p <.05) by the 
application of the Fisher Zr transformation test, 
and the overall discrepancy approaches significance 
when the chi-square test is applied to a collapsed 
frequency table of the whole sample.
This ’eccentricity’ has a suggested explanation 
which has a substantive significance for the position 
of the middle educated. As has been remarked, inspection 
of the relevant questionnaires reveals that they are 
often self-consciously aware of their ’middling’ position. 
In a society where most people have a noticeably 
rising standard of living, their position is not'an 
easy one. They are educationally qualified to gain 
good incomes (as has been demonstrated) but through 
lack of drive, opportunity or overburdening commitments 
may fail to keep up, become ’losers’.
The lack of the A-ER relation at this level stems,
I suggest, partly from the different ’meanings* of 
alienation at the lower and higher levels of education.
At the lower level, it is likely to be an imposed 
disposition, through socialization into alienation, in
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the extreme case, or caused by the manifestly frustrating 
social conditions or working-class social experience, in 
one way or another. At the higher level, it is more 
likely to be an intellectual stance, partly chosen, 
as has been suggested in the case of students. It may 
arise out of uncertainty of social verities or a highly 
critical normative judgement of the larger and smaller 
social worlds. There are, of course, at this level 
also any number of possible paths to alienation, but 
it is suggested that they result in a disposition more 
commonly recognized in its totality by the subject.
At this educational level, he has the social assurance 
and intellectual expertise to perceive a socio-political 
solution (partial, to be sure) in a radical stance on 
the ER issues. Conversely, at the lower level, grouches 
against society are less likely to result in an 
intellectual step to ER, but rather a firmer acculturation 
to working class political norms, that is, the radical 
domestic policy of the A.L.P. At the middle level of 
education, however, there is often neither the 
acculturation to working class political norms nor 
intellectual expertise, and so alienation is more 
likely to be experienced as a personal dilemma without
political implications. An outspoken radicalism of
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the ’Labor* sort might, indeed, endanger the social 
status of the subject, who is often in a transitional 
political phase, shedding, or moving further away, from 
the collectivist politics of the working class to the 
individualist stance of the middle class.
Here is another fitter and turner (56-45), 
identifying himself as middle-class, high in 
alienation. He earns over $60 per week, and votes 
Liberal. He is asked ’if you could choose just two 
matters for more government attention .. which two 
would you choose?’ They both illustrate his very 
moderate ’individualist' position.
A National Health Scheme - something that 
covers more than dental care, and general coverage 
of hospital fees, etc. I think perhaps the 
person who throws away his money on gambling 
and drinking, and has nothing, gets more help 
in time of need than a person who saves steadily 
and runs into trouble and it is all gone. A National Health Scheme would protect this 
second person.
Closer watch on gross profiteering - 
especially chemists - this is not done by grocers 
and the little man. When you need medicines, 
they mark up the profits. This is not fair to 
the average man.
In this case, a ’middle-class’ protest rather than espousal 
of EH - which he rejects in toto (i.e. he scores 0 on this 
index) - results from his social concerns. He epitomises 
the suggestion made above. It can also be illustrated 
by the following response to the same question, reflecting
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the apoliticism of the petit bourgeois. The speaker
is an ’average middle class’ widow of 55“65j with an
income of less than $15 a week, again a Liberal voter.
Nothing that comes to mind. I think they’re 
doing a good job. I’m on an invalid pension 
and I think it’s marvellous what’s being done for 
us. I don’t know why people complain.
As far as child endowment is concerned, when I 
was bringing up my children, I didn’t have it, 
and managed. People expect too much help these 
days.
The interviewer commented ’This respondent was 
very adamant about the fact that age and invalid 
pensions are adequate ... This seems, to me, contrary 
to what most people think.’ The respondent is very 
high in alienation, and scores zero on ER.
The two cases above are extreme ones, of course, 
and serve only to illustrate a trend which is countered 
by many respondents who score high both in alienation 
and ER (or low on both). The point is that the two 
conflicting tendencies in the middle-educated group 
seem to produce the near-zero correlation.
(ii) Alienation is positively related to libertarianism in 
the working class sample only. The explanation 
afforded above for this correlation in the working 
class is also plausible here.
(iii) Another inconstancy is the rather low but significant 
prediction of alienation to ’doveishness’ at the
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lower and middle educated levels, but not at the 
higher educated level. As Table 9*^5 demonstrates, 
the active sub-scales of the alienation measure in this 
relation are those of meaninglessness and self-estrange­
ment, and a sense of exploitation. In accord with the 
hypothesis advanced in discussion at that point, it 
is suggested that these sentiments are possibly 
promoting Defence Leftism seen as isolationism, or, that 
at the lower level, there is a ’reception1 of A.L.P. 
policy. At the higher educated level, ’doveishnessf 
has other sources.
(iv) Authoritarianism is negatively related to ER to a
moderate degree in the middle-educated sample, but in 
no other. If the chi-square test is applied to the 
collapsed frequency table for the whole sample, the 
discrepancy approaches significance. Once again, it 
is suggested that this apparent eccentricity stems from 
the transitional character of the politics of the 
middle-educated group. At this level, conventionalist 
and ’ego-defensive’ persons are sometimes inclined to 
distance themselves from the working class by rejecting 
radical views and associations. Here is the second 
fitter and turner mentioned above in relation to the 
first inconstancy, asked to name two ’good things*
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about the Liberal Party.
They have handled the unions well. I work 
in a factory but I don’t like to see the 
Government baök down to the Unions. I can’t 
think of any special instances off hand, though.
An authoritarian infusion is also hinted at in his
view of what may be ’wrong’ with the Labor Party.
The main-obvious-thing is the split in Labor - 
I mean the A.L.P. and D.L.P. I think this is 
bad. Anything divided is weak.
Sometimes the middle-educated authoritarian, whilst 
rejecting Labor policies, is a reluctant, backward­
looking A.L.P. voter, for ’individualist’ reasons.
An Electricity Council Inspector (36-45), ’Common 
ordinary working class I suppose’, who is radical only 
on age pensions, says of his reasons for voting A.L.P. 
’Only that I think they are more interested in the 
worker as a person ... I don’t agree with withdrawal 
from Vietnam but I vote Labor anyway.’ He is very 
high in authoritarianism, endorsing all the punitive 
half-items.
(v) Ethnocentrism has a substantial and significant
negative relation to ER at the higher education level 
only. This seems to be relatively straightforward in 
theoretical terms. The ethnocentric person at the 
higher educated level is deviant, an unusual bigot.
It is not surprising to find him expressing an
/
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again high in ethnocentrism and Defence Leftism, 
found the Liberals ’buttering up America too much.
We need dollars but too much was spent on Johnson’s trip. 
Sure we need American help and we need American dollars 
but in my mind that money what went on ail those flags 
and things, could have been put to better use for the 
nurses.^ Waste of money all of it.' The explanation 
for this eccentricity in correlation virtually leaps 
off the pages of the questionnaires.
(vii) Anxiety is positively associated with libertarianism, 
at the middle-educated level only. This eccentricity 
is amongst the most reliable, being significant (p <.02) 
when tested by chi-square. In this group aspirations 
to success involve respectability rather than prestige. 
This requires the subject to put a clear distance between 
himself and outre groups of low status, homosexuals, 
beatniks, Communists. But one badge of high status 
is tolerance. The upwardly aspiring middle-educated 
person is thus in an awkward position, wishing to deplore 
'bad behaviour’ comme il faut, but at the same time 
striving to exhibit a high-minded liberalism. Libertarian 
sentiment may thus be ambiguously perceived, in his 
particular ambience, either as a suspect sympathy with 
disreputable groups, or as a praiseworthy tolerance.
Nurses were asking for more pay at the time
488
According to this hypothesis, therefore, the 
political opinion creates the disposition, and not 
vice-versa.
In affording theoretical explanations for these seven 
inconstancies in correlations between dispositions and 
political opinion, the social position of the person has 
often to be considered. Not only an understanding of the 
general social environment and the nature of subjective 
dispositions, but also a comprehension of the significance 
of the social location of the subject and the ways in which 
his views may be formed at various social levels is necessary, 
if the variety In the relations are to be explained. Many 
nuances are exhibited by the relationships, and great 
complexity. Having attempted to understand some of this 
complexity, the reader may be left with the false impression 
that the relationships are so various that few reliable 
predictions from disposition to political opinion can be 
made. This is not so, for two reasons.
The first is that, as we noted before this extensive 
consideration of inconstancies, there are a number of 
striking constancies to be found. These lie in the special 
vulnerability of 'Conscience* radicalism and libertarianism 
to psychological influence, especially by authoritarianism 
and ethnocentrism, which produces apparently invariant
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general relations, moderate when the correlations 
are uncorrected for attenuation, very strong when they 
are corrected. There is also a fairly reliable relation 
between alienation and a radical position on socio-economic 
questions.
The second reason for confidence in the possibility 
of reliable prediction is that, once the fact of an 
inconstancy in a relation is established, and its location 
noted, the prediction can take into account an unusual 
correlation, or lack of one, in a particular locale. More 
research is clearly necessary to substantiate many of the 
conjectured theoretical explanations for particular 
inconstancies, but these, too, if shown to be reliable, 
can qualify prediction so that it is apt to the situation 
being considered. What is most clear is that a narrowly 
political, psychological or sociological approach to the 
understanding of the relation of disposition to opinion is 
bound to fail. The researcher must have recourse to an 
armoury of techniques to facilitate and expand the analysis 
until it is capable of matching the complexity of reality.
9.7. Conclusion
We have established that two of the three main dimensions 
of radicalism, ’Conscience’ radicalism, and the ’Established’ 
socio-economic radicalism are susceptible to high and moderate
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degrees of influence, respectively, by psychological 
dispositions. Opinions on the third dimension, the ’Left' - 
’Right* continuum in foreign and defence policy are more 
independent of dispositional influence, but do not altogether 
escape it. A fourth continuum of political opinion, 
libertarianism, is strongly influenced by disposition.
The principal interrelations are displayed in Figure 9*1*
FIGURE 9.1
The Principal Interrelations between 
Psychological Dispositions and Political Attitudes
All forms
radicalism
Higher
age
Lower
social
status
Anti-libertarianism
‘Hawkishness’
Socio-economic
radicalism
(ER)
Conservatism 
on issues 
of conscience
What do these findings amount to? All these dimensions 
relate to matters of policy, and it is therefore reasonable 
to suppose that dispositions (a) create a motive force for 
radicalism or conservatism in their respective domains at 
the highest level, that is, they influence decision makers 
and leaders of opinion as well as the mass public, and 
(b) that they create ’climates of opinion’ in the mass public
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which invite forward policies or negate and impede them.
We have also shown that perceptions of political situations 
are influenced by psychological disposition.
But two objections could be raised with considerable 
force if we were to go so far as to suggest that political 
events related to the implementation of these policies 
are strongly influenced by psychological dispositions.
The first is that, as we noted in first introducing discussion 
of psychological influence in Chapter Five, economic interest 
groups, through their influence on political parties and 
governments, play a large part in determining the course 
of events in economic policy. Likewise, external forces 
in international relations often compel actions in defence 
and foreign policy.
The second objection is that, even in so far as 
we have been able to gauge their influence in the 
electorate, policy opinions, and hence dispositions 
influencing policy opinions, play a relatively small 
part in the voter’s choice. True, party record as well as 
promise may be weighed in terms of policies implemented 
or proposed and so policy considerations may have more 
weight with the mass public than may at first appear. The 
’political* public, also, is more alive to them, and by 
personal contact may influence those ’social’ voters amongst 
the less interested. Speakers on the mass media may also
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increase the actual impact of policy considerations.
But one striking finding is that in exploring the correlates 
of voter’s choice of party, only alienation is a disposition 
apparently capable of altering the balance between the 
major parties. Domestic economic policy issues, on which 
opinions are related to alienation, are, as we have seen, 
given a much higher rating in importance by voters than 
defence and foreign policy. Moreover, these two dimensions 
of policy were, at the time of the major survey, the only 
two which differentiated the major parties. The A.L.P. and 
the L.C.P. were not seen to be much different in respect 
of ’Conscience’ radicalism and libertarianism. The 
dispositions influencing radical opinion, therefore, were 
operative at the margin of policy determination, and it 
cannot plausibly be argued that they were central.
However, three important considerations should be 
borne in mind. The first is that through the erosion of 
anti-liberal dispositions by rising affluence and levels 
of education, ’Conscience’ radicalism and libertarian 
sentiment are likely to become more widely diffused, and 
issues connected with them to increase in importance.
The second is that, as this occurs, the major parties may 
seek to differentiate their positions on these continua 
in the eyes of the mass public, and indeed, since 1966,
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have taken steps to do so. The A.L.P. is presenting itself 
as the champion of radical opinion in both cases. It 
follows that the influence of disposition on vote, and, 
ultimately, the determination of policy, will become more 
central. Thirdly, this empirical study has been conducted 
at a time of relative calm, in a stable democracy. In 
critical episodes, when, for example, basic liberties 
guaranteed by the state are at hazard, or democratic 
regimes are threatened by extreme mass movements with an 
ethnocentric basis, then psychological dispositions may be 
paramount in influencing the course of events, although 
still only some of several important factors in any 
actual situation. One such situation was the collapse of 
the Weimar Republic in Germany in 1933* It would not be 
possible to describe the collapse of the Weimar regime 
without engaging in an analysis which emphasized the themes 
of alienation, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and 
anti-libertarian sentiment. The mechanisms connecting these, 
obtainable by empirical investigation in periods of 
quiescence in stable democracies, can be useful in forming 
a reportoire of analytical devices for such critical 
episodes. Indeed, they are of crucici importance, if 
the analyst of political history is to accomplish his 
essential task, which is not to be able to ’know’ something 
in its totality, but to be able to say ' I see*.
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CHAPTER TEN
POLITICAL CONVERSATION IN A SMALL GROUP
10.1. Introduction
This chapter is an excursus. It consists, in the 
main, of a speculative discussion of a political conversation 
amongst a small group of voters after the elections. One 
purpose of it is to illustrate the complexity of the 
structure and function of political attitudes (and their 
relations with dispositions) in situations of actual 
personal interaction. Another is to show how such 
contrived situations may be used to generate hypotheses 
testable on the larger sample (none of these subjects were 
included in the final voter sample).
Some general problems in attaching a specific meaning 
to the location of a subject on a continuum by assigning a 
scale score to him are discussed.
Some data consistent with one hypothesis is advanced.
A brief discussion follows of ways in which the influence 
of psychological dispositions on opinion may be deflected.
10.2. A Political Conversation
This conversation was recorded in December, 1966, a 
fortnight or so after the Federal Elections. The venue 
was an office of a market research firm. The writer
9^5
chaired the discussion, which was tape-recorded. All five 
of the other participants had voted Liberal, and been 
interviewed before Election day. They were invited to 
participate in a discussion either because they had at that 
time confessed a ’lot* of interest in politics (in the 
case of three) or had fallen into one of the two questions 
designed to identify ’opinion leaders’ (all five).
The purpose of contriving these circumstances was 
partly to illustrate the complexity of expressed attitudes 
in actual social interaction and partly to see whether 
any hypotheses capable of being tested with data from the 
total sample of about 400 might be suggested. Accordingly, 
the participants were pushed on to as many ’sensitive’ 
topics as possible, the chairman aspiring to the conflicting 
demands of neutrality and the role of agent provocateur.
The interpretation of the fragments of conversation offered 
below is therefore highly speculative, and is meant to be.
To introduce the participants (the unbracketed data 
is from their questionnaires):-
Mr. A.*: A shoe factory manager, aged 46-55. Education:
Intermediate Certificate. Married, no children 
under 17.
Described himself as ’average middle’ class.
’No Church, just a Christian.’ Father a farmer.
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(Tough face, self-concept rough but just?
Working class manner.)
Mr. B.: Manager of a civil engineering firm, aged 46-55«
Senior Technical College Engineering Diploma. 
Married, one child under 17 «
Described himself as ’average middle’ class. 
Non-churchgoing Congregationalist. Father a 
’senior’ engineer.
(Dressed carefully and formally, socially assured, 
relaxed.)
Mrs. A.: Home duties, aged 36-45, educated to Matriculation.
Wife of a graduate engineer, his father being a 
farmer. Two children under 17• Once again, 
’average middle’ class. A Catholic churchgoer. 
Fortuitously, the same surname as Mr. A.
(Elegant, charming, physically attractive).
Mr. C.: Sales Manager in an electronics firm, aged 26-35*
Had a Trade Certificate and had undergone further 
technical training. Married, with two children 
under 17 * Described himself as 'upper middle* 
class. A non-churchgoing Presbyterian. His father 
a sergeant in the army.
(Confident, middle class demeanour; aggressive in 
discussion.)
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Mr. D?: Employed as a metallurgist, a part-time student
pursuing an Engineering Diploma, aged 26-35* 
Married, with one child under 17; refused 
absolutely to place himself in any social class.
A churchgoing Presbyterian.
(Awkward, shy, spoke in a hushed voice in the 
direction of the right lapel of his yacht club 
jacket.)
They were disposed about a table, thus:
Mrs A Mr B
* Watch these
_______________Mr A*
The writer
All but one (Mr D*) said they seldom talked politics.
The tone of the conversation was often like that of a 
managerial meeting: issues were discussed in a practical
fashion and principles struck a jarring note when they 
cropped up. Mr A* and Mr D* seemed eager to be socially 
acceptable to the other three, who were not at all anxious 
about their own status, and were faintly patronising.
Two conflicting groups emerged in the course of an hour: 
on the one hand, Mr A* and Mr D*, who might be described 
post hoc as punitive and dependent; and on the other, Mr C
Mr C
Mr D*
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and Mrs A (non-punitive and independent). Mr C bore 
the brunt of such hostility as developed. Mr B preserved 
throughout a position of social leadership and withdrew 
from violent argument. All except Mr C overstated their 
agreement with one another’s views; he alone intervened 
from time to time to disagree.
The conversation was marked by some sketchy anecdotes 
from the personal histories of both Mr A* and Mr D*, which 
were evidently intended to add conviction to their opinions.
The early experiences of both men seemed to lie heavily 
upon them, and to colour their views. The remaining three 
were reticent, apparently untroubled, and never implied 
they had been taught wisdom by experience.
Picking over the conversation on tape, in retrospect, 
led to the following suppositions:
1. Although at one on socio-economic and party political 
issues, the discussants exhibited such divisions 
on non-economic issues as to suggest two camps: 
the ‘punitive, dependent’ pair of Messrs A* and D*, 
who spoke feelingly on their own histories, 
sometimes reduced complex problems of causation to 
the conspiratorial machinations of persons, admired 
strong leaders, were somewhat racially prejudiced, 
one in favour of hanging, both for violence generally,
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and anti-libertarian. They were of lower status.
In contrast to this pair, Mrs A and Mr C either 
had no personal problems, or sat on them without 
difficulty; were sceptical of heroes, ascribed 
social problems to systematic causes capable of 
being remedied, were libertarian and assured of 
their own social position. Mr B hovered pensively 
between them, his support valued and sought by both 
sides.
2. Both Mr A* and Mr D* revealed their dispositions
with caution: sometimes only by the violent language
surrounding a ’liberal* formal opinion. They often 
abandoned punitive opinions when they found they 
were sailing too close to social rejection.
It is suggested here that these two were 
trying to shrug off a somewhat authoritarian disposition 
in the face of middle-class social pressure, through 
the adoption of liberal opinions on particular 
issues. They were nevertheless haunted by social 
disasters narrowly avoided. Their basic dispositions 
accommodated liberal opinions with some difficulty.
The two speculative interpretations advanced above may 
now be illustrated from the voices. Two dots indicate a 
pause; three an omission.
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Mr D* on his early life:
I spent the first part - the first eighteen years 
of my life in a small town called Hay in New 
South Wales...in the smaller country towns you 
have the townspeople, and you have the so-called 
squatters, or cockies. Now, in the smaller 
country towns there is a very, very strong, and 
very cliquey groups [sic]...the land owner has 
their clubs in each of the different towns, 
and they stick to their group and that's it.
They only come to town to shop.
I disagree with that. I believe the division 
is greater in the city than it is in the country.
[Uproar]
Mr D* ^shouting]:
This is a statement of what l‘ve seen, and lived 
in.. [more calmly] they have their own dances, 
their own ball, they have the Country Club race 
meeting, picnic races and that sort of thing, 
and you've got to be in there to get there and 
that's - that 's it.
Despite attempts to change the topic, Mr D* returned 
frequently and bitterly to the theme of social rejection 
in country towns.
Mr A reveals a little of his early life in discussing 
the A.L.P. The group as a whole is pessimistic about the 
party's future. Mr A* exceeds them all in pessimism.
Mr A*:
...I'd go along with this but I - I - I - can't 
see, I can't foresee - and I was a member of the 
Labor Party.. .
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Mr C:
But I think it must [put its house] in order to 
survive, I can1t see any future for the Labor 
Party unless they do something to resolve their 
problems.
Mr A* [desperately] :
I can’t see it! I genuinely can’t see it!
Mrs A deplores class distinction by the Labor Party.
Mr C:
They try too much to project this image of 
being for the working man, and the working man 
just doesn’t exist., look at the people!
Mr A* is asked for his view:•
I*d go along with Mrs A., just as well you’re 
not my wife; [all laugh]. Ugh, go along with it 
strong - I think it’s a matter of growing up...
I think this is the big failing in the Labor 
Party and why I can never see it coming good, 
because the people that control it are - like the 
shop steward that’s got a vote at work and I’ve 
got to kid to him to be a shop steward anyway - 
he hasn’t got any brains......The need for it the A.L.P. 
is gradually diminishing.
Mr A* links the 'diminishing need’ for the A.L.P.
to his new paternal role. For Messrs B and C, and Mrs A,
/
it is a matter for other people.
*  *- -* *
Both Mr A* and Mr D* have their political heroes. The 
others are sceptical, and sometimes disdain particular 
politicians.
Mr A* is asked whether the D.L.P. will ever succeed in
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convincing people ’that they're not sectarian’ (his 
phrase).
Mr A* [pauses] :
I think they could, yes!...If they get coves 
like Benson.. ^
Mr C:
Benson’s not D.L.P.
Mr A* [raises his voice] :
No, I’m just saying if they can incorporate coves 
like this - leaders and men - like Benson - I 
think they could go places!
Mr D* [in a whisper] :
I think l‘d agree with that one too.
Mr A*:
...you speak to very few people - even Labor 
Party men - that don’t respect Benson. This 
is the type of person they’ve got to get - someone 
that's shown a bit of courage in their bloody 
time, and! - a Mason if necessary, just to get 
this stigma out of their - their party that 
this is controlled by the Roman Catholic Church.
Mr D* greatly admired President Johnson, and felt
that Mr Calwell created ’an uneducated image, for want of
. la better term which led many to lose respect for him as a
potential national leader.
Neither Mr C nor Mrs A admired Johnson. Mrs A felt 
that the publicity given to the President’s visit was:
1
Captain Benson, a retired merchant sailor, had won a seat 
as an Independent candidate at the elections, after being 
expelled by the Victorian A.L.P. because of his membership 
of a 'Right-wing* body, the 'Defend Australia Committee1.
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an implicit help to the Liberal Party and I 
felt that the less - well I just don’t think 
he had a right to come over, I think he meddled in 
our politics.
So too, Mr B:
Well, I, I don’t think too much of President 
Johnson -he's a bit of a larrikin, although I - 
from my brief acquaintance with America I - have 
a very high regard for Americans generally - I 
think they're hard workers - particularly for 
Texans, I had a good time in Texas, but President 
Johnson I think is a., [vehemently] he's just a 
politician and a wheeler-dealer..
Mr C:
Exactly.
Mr B:
.. and a real larrikin, in a way.. As to his 
coming to Australia., it was just a political 
move, I think - thought he'd help a bit, and 
help himself, and help Harold^-.. fquiet laughter 
from Mr C at the mention of 'Harold' J .
Mr B is asked what-sort of an impression Mr Holt made when
travelling with President Johnson?
Mr B:
Oh, that made me slightly sick.
* * * * *
I
A debate on whether or not social class differences 
exist in Australia had the more authoritarian pair thinking 
in personal terms of class enemies. Mr D's*grirn 
recollections have been set out.
1
Harold Holt, then the Prime Minister and Leader of the 
Liberal Party.
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Mr A*:
I think there’s a very small percentage - 
possibly one and a half percent - that consider 
themselves high society. Outside that, nought.
The others, however, saw social differences as generated
in an impersonal, systematic way, and not as the creature
of supposedly exclusive groups. Mr B even discovers in
himself a little Marxist residue:
Mr B:
...I think there’s another division too. I think 
there’s the division between the people who work 
for their living on - on wages, and the people - 
the capitalists, if you like, who own the m - 
the, the sources, or the means of production.
...not that they're wealthy 
people necessarily...
* * * * *
Discussion of migrants and migration policy revealed 
some surprising dissonance between the professed general 
attitudes and particular opinions accommodated within the 
one person.
Notably Mr B:
I don’t know whether we’re going to talk aboujt 
the colour - the White Australia policy - but'
I would have views on that, too.
Well I would think that we should preserve 
the White Australia policy...That’s not to say 
that there are some, perhaps some Asians - 
Asiatics - that would - v/ouldn’t perhaps be 
permissible. From my view, I think that if 
we need to build up the country..population 
quickly we may have to accept a sort of a 
quota of perhaps Asians, but [pause] they’re 
not really coloured in the sense that I was 
thinking about: I mean they are and they aren’t.
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Chairman [baffled] :
In what way are they not?
Mr P:
Well I mean I’m thinking the - that dark 
coloured people are ..present..problems, 
but there is less trouble with - even where 
intermarriage occurs with, say, Malaysians 
and people like that.
Chair:
How about Malaysian Indians? When you say dark 
people are you thinking of Africans?
Mr P [suddenly] :
Well I was thinking about negroes, of course.
Stereotypes seem to be stretched to breaking point 
here: Asians, Malaysians especially, are made, perhaps,
honorary Whites. Messrs. A* and D* declare themselves for 
a quota system of Asian migration, but nevertheless fail 
to avoid a fight with Mrs A and Mr C, who want to open the 
floodgates. Mrs C, indeed, dislikes the idea of any quota
system except one based on education.
* * * * *
On the issue of capital punishment, battle was joined 
on the question of whether a convict (Ryan) who had shot 
dead a warder in a bid to escape from prison should have 
been hanged. Mr A* thought it was imperative to hang him, 
for administrative reasons - the good management of the
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prison. Mr B vacillates, and is temporarily attracted to 
the abolitionist view by Mr C, who reminds him of a case 
where an innocent man was hanged. Mrs A says she is 
opposed to capital punishment in any circumstances. Mr D*, 
still having trouble in grabbing life by the tail, has 
a special point of view:
There is always that little bit of doubt... 
no matter how sure - how much evidence there is 
in favour of the person’s guilt. To take that 
person’s life is so final...
This is final. No matter what comes up in 
the future you can’t bring this person back.
However, I wouldn’t - I wouldn’t be against, 
say, physical punishment, I wouldn’t - I wouldn’t 
be against Ryan getting, ah, two lashes a day 
for the rest of his life, as a deterrent, or 
anybody else in a similar category, because 
this can always be stopped. But to take the 
person’s life, I feel it’s - so final.
It is not the violence, but the finality, to which Mr D*
is implacably opposed. Rejection, after all, played a
notable part in his early life.
* * * * *
The final question was whether or not the Communist
Party should be banned. By now everyone was heated. Mr A*
shuttled rapidly between permissiveness and a sharply-felt
need for counter-violence:
I don’t think you can outlaw any political party. 
I think education, standard of living, can keep 
them in their place. But certainly if they get, 
ah, start getting power in a certain direction, 
give them the option - say that’s where you want 
to live you just go there and live there! Don’t
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treat them with kid gloves all the time.
If they can hit hard, well hit hard back! And 
no-one should scream if one of them is sent 
back to - over to China...
Mr B, Mrs A and Mr C are all convinced that social conditions 
will prove an adequate impediment to the growth of Communism 
in Australia and find legal measures wrong in principle.
Mr A* states a contingency:
If they can get a cell, in a union, they can 
tie this country up in two minutes.
Mr D* comes to his assistance:
I*m not talking about suppressing, I mean forcing 
into the open,
Mr A*:
Yeh.
Mr D*:
Force them out - force them out into the open, 
where everybody can see what's going on.
Mrs A: [confused]
How do you do [that] ? - but I mean - look - 
what do you do? - they are in the open.
Mr D* [reluctantly] :
Well, yes and no.
Mr A* [to the aid of Mr D*] :
They’re not in the open! No fear! They've 
got their meetings - underground meetings - 
don't worry about that!
Mr D*:
And they've got their own little schools!
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Mr A*:
And they’ve got their own school and cadre 
and own education.
Mr C: [sceptically]
You could say that about the Labor Party and 
the Central Executive,1 couldn't you?
Here the tape ends, with the two factions at last 
shouting at, and down, each other. Mr C, and later also 
Mrs A, were moved easily to a spirited defence of liberal 
values; Mr B approaches his own opinions with caution and 
detachment. But Mr A* and Mr D* have invested a lot of 
emotional capital in a view of society beset by crisis and 
emergency, and are loath to give it away.
10.5« A Hypothesis
We will now check this onrush of speculation and 
proceed with our exercise in method. The purpose is to 
counterpoint imaginative insight with hard data. We are 
fortunate enough to have some reliable information about the 
participants in this discussion, through their interviews. 
The five participants in this discussion were also given 
political questionnaires after its conclusion. We are 
thus in a position (a) to throw some light on what v/as going 
on during the discussion; and (b) to see whether any of the 
processes which emerged in the group discussion have any
I
The controlling Committee of the A.L.P. organization in 
the State of Victoria.
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generality; that is, can be discovered in the wider
sample.
In taking out ideas from the recorded conversation to 
face the crowd of data from the survey, only a very minor 
confrontation is planned. Much of the conversational 
transaction, it was suggested, was related to obtaining, 
often in an oblique way, social acceptance; and it is to 
this point that the exercise will be directed.
Table 10.1 shows authoritarianism (F) scores for 
each member of the group, and their radical or conservative 
position on three issues, as shown in their written 
questionnaire before and after^ discussion:
TABLE 10.1
Participant F Scale 
Score.2 
(0-26)
White 
Australia: Before:After:
Aid to 
Asia:
Before:After:
Capital Punishment: 
Before:After:
Mr D* 
Mr A* Mr B
middle^ 
range ^
12
914
Cons. 
Had. - Rad. -
- Rad. 
Rad. 
Rad.
Cons. - Rad. 
Rad . - Rad . 
Rad. - Undec.
Cons. - Rad. 
Cons. - Cons. 
Rad. - Cons.
Mrs A 
Mr C low |
2
6
Rad. - 
Rad. -
Rad. 
Rad.
Rad. - Rad. 
Cons. - Cons.
Undec. - Rad. 
Rad. - Rad.
For the sample as a whole, the median F score was 15*5*
Although the relative magnitude of the F scores is as 
expected, only Mr B is above the sample median. Three are 
normal (9-lM in authoritarianism, two very low. The three
1
The first questionnaire was that administered about a month 
earlier; the second immediately after the discussion,
2
The designation of the raw F scores is as for quartiranges, 
the first being designated low, the second and third 'middle 
range'. The standardisation data have been set out at the 
conclusion of Chapter Six,
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issues are ones connected with ’Conscience1 radicalism which 
were touched upon in the conversation.
What is chiefly interesting here is the extraordinary 
instability of the views of Mr whose outlook has 
undergone a sea-change since he was interviewed a month 
before. Taken together with the suppositions elaborated 
above, these data suggest that ’upwardly mobile' persons of 
working-class origin may, in the process of seeking social 
acceptance, adopt liberal opinions on such ’conscience’ 
issues as those above; or adapt their views to those of 
whatever group they aspire to join, perhaps a conservative 
one. In either case their current opinion would stem less 
from dispositions, such as authoritarianism, and more from 
infection of opinion, so to speak, from the groups in 
which they seek acceptance. It follows that for the upwardly 
socially mobile group, the correlation between F scores and 
opinions on particular issues,especially those susceptible 
to dispositional influence, should be lower than it is for 
the socially fixed.
Figures 7*2 and displayed in Chapter Seven, indicate
that there is a reliable negative relation between both 
social class identification and education, on the one hand, 
and authoritarianism, on the other. But whilst the relation 
is reliable, its magnitude is not great, and there are many 
high scorers amongst the middle-class and the educated.
o
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Table 9 »10, in Chapter Nine, indicates a moderate negative 
relation between the ’Conscience’ radicalism index (-.59**) 
and authoritarianism. The CR index (of five items) incorporates 
opinions on the three issues mentioned above in Table 10.1. 
There is no reliable relation found between ’Conscience’ 
radicalism and class, and the relation with education is 
significant only when the 'higher’ and ’lower’ groups are 
compared (excluding the ’middle’ group).
These data indicate that it is most unsafe to generalise 
in small group settings from class identification to 
authoritarian orientation or opinions. A shift to a liberal 
opinion may be some help, or no help at all, in gaining 
acceptance in a particular small group. The process of 
bargaining for acceptance which seemed to emerge in the 
recorded group discussion involved pressure to a change in a 
liberal direction in that particular group: the general
point, however, seems that to be acceptable, one may have 
to change in either direction. If this is true, then the 
opinions of the upwardly socially mobile, and their confessed 
prejudices, should be uncertainly related to authoritarian 
disposition. Hence we expect a low correlation.
An 'upwardly socially mobile’ group was extracted from 
the sample as follows. Those ’average' or ’upper’ middle 
class, but without higher formal education (Leaving or above)
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were identified, and of these those with higher than 
average income ($5000 to more than $12000 p.a.) were 
retained. They numbered 45»
Amongst this group, the F-CR correlation is indeed 
lower, as Table 10.2 demonstrates. But the difference 
between the correlation in this group is not significantly 
different from the rest of the sample.
TABLE 10.2
Relations between CR Scores and F Scale Scores 
(Tetrachoric Correlations)
Upwardly mobile; F CR rt = .18 (n.s.) (n=45)
All others: F CR r^ = «59** (n=505)
However, a more detailed scrutiny of the data 
revealed the following: on two issues, hanging and economic
aid, the negative relation between the radical position 
ana authoritarianism is absent in the upwardly mobile group. 
The differences on these issues between the correlation in 
the upwardly mobile group and that in the rest of the sample 
is significant in both cases by the Fisher Zr transformation 
test, and also, in the case of hanging, by chi-square.
This finding is important, since these two issues 
are amongst the more salient of the CR group.
The data thus seem to suggest that the process of 
bargaining with one’s opinions on the way up acts to some 
extent as a solvent on their connection with psychological
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dispositions. It is not that authoritarians must appear 
liberals in order to rise: rather one must be prepared
to exchange internal psychological formative pressures 
for external social ones.
The process appears to reflect one of Greenstein’s-1- 
maxims: ’If ... the disposition that is strong is to
take one’s cues from others, the effects of personal 
variation on behaviour will be reduced.’
To make a general point, in the larger, ’socially stable’ 
part of the sample, the fact of psychological influence 
in the area of ’Conscience’ radicalism is possibly a result 
of the absence of a definable self-interest in this area, 
as the introduction to Chapter Five suggested. These are 
thus no class or interest group sanctions to be wary of.
Here again, one of Greenstein’s principles2 seems to be 
relevant: ’The impact of personal differences in behaviour
is increased to the degree that sanctions are not attached 
to certain of the alternative possible causes of behaviour.* 
The point that has been made about the apparent 
deflection of psychological influence amongst the upwardly 
socially mobile, is, of course, that, in their case, there 
are social sanctions waiting in the wings. They fhust have
1
F.I. Greenstein, 'The Impact of Personality on Politics:
An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush,' American Political 
Science Review, 6l (1967) pp. 629-41.
2
Ibid.
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a careful eye to the opinions held in the groups they 
aspire to join: They are involved in a game situation,
where the dice are opinions, and the reward chips,signals 
of social acceptance.
10.4. The Deflection of Psychological Influence
Apart from the rather special pressures on the upwardly 
mobile, there are two major contingencies which may deflect 
psychological influence on opinion. Neither has come very 
much to the fore in this thesis.
The first is institutional affiliation, especially to 
political parties. Affiliation to Socialist organizations, 
which propound liberal opinions on racial harmony, for 
example, may well dampen the effects of working-class 
authoritarianism in such societies as contemporary Britain.
But since, at the time of this survey, the A.L.P. had not 
emphasised its radical position on issues of ’Conscience’ 
(except hanging) it exhibited little influence in the mass 
sample on these.
The second is what may be termed ’moral’ or ’intellectual’ 
control by the subject of his own authoritarian impulses. This 
concept presupposes an authoritarian personality structure in 
a process of transmutation, with the super-ego, particularly 
that component of it dubbed the ego-ideal, perhaps playing 
an active role in persuading, as it were, a compliant ego
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to mitigate expressions of hostility. This is likely to 
be a lengthy and difficult process, since the hypothetical 
defence mechanisms of the ego which underpin ethnocentrism 
as a stratagem (namely anti-intraception, projectivity 
and stereotypy) are unconscious.
The moral deliberations of Mr B, in our recorded 
conversation, are perhaps a case in point. The hesitancy 
he displays, taken with his air of command over proceedings, 
suggests that he has come to an awareness of his 
authoritarianism in the first place through social interaction. 
He is introspective and self-critical (deviant characteristics 
in an authoritarian, but perhaps ones acquired in the course 
of coping with social difficulties) even audacious: he
himself raises the issue of the ’colour - the White 
Australia policy.’ But he does so in order to put forward 
what is in fact a liberal opinion, after staking out a 
formally conservative general position. He has adopted the 
substance of liberalism whilst retaining the conservative 
form. The first requirement of his ’moral control’, and 
perhaps ’moral control’ in general, appears to be some 
anti-authoritarian element in the super-ego; the second, 
deliberate contest with anti-intraception.
The pressure (and opportunities) for this kind of 
'moral control’ of authoritarianism might be expected to
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be most marked amongst those with tertiary education, 
mixing in middle class circles.
The two modes of ’deflection’ of psychological 
influences discussed above are, of course, different in 
kind: the first is through an external, social influence;
the second refers to the deflection of the influence of 
one kind of psychological disposition (authoritarianism) 
by other ’internal’ psychological mechanisms.
IO.5. ’High’ and ’Low’ Scoring
Reflection on the conversation reported above leads 
me to two further considerations, the first a speculation, 
the second perhaps better termed a rumination.
(i) It was something of a surprise to find that the 
two ’punitive’, ’dependent’, ’more authoritarian' contestants 
in the conversational struggle were, in fact, scorers in 
the middle range of the F distribution. What an argument 
between very low and very high scorers might have been 
like is an interesting question. The two ’more authoritarian’ 
subjects nevertheless exhibited what seem unquestionably 
authoritarian views at times (such as Mr D ’s proposal that 
the convict discussed should be lashed every day). At 
other times, they are not authoritarian in their views. In 
the middle range, therefore, we may speculate that, rather 
than finding deepening shades of grey, so to speak, there
r
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are spasms of authoritarianism.
This is, in a way, not out of accord with theoretical 
expectations, since the work done in the field has been 
much more concerned with the elaboration of the personality 
mechanisms of the authoritarian, those of the liberal being 
somewhat neglected. Most of the theoretical substance 
of the F Scale used here is to be found, therefore, in 
the authoritarian item-halves, the non-authoritarian 
ones being more in the form of after-thoughts or replies, 
and, taken together, less coherently related to a body of 
central principles. The zero point of the scale thus 
resembles a nullity rather than a liberal, and, as we 
allow our gaze to travel along the scale towards its 
higher reaches, we see something like an authoritarian 
ghost taking more and more concrete shape, being solid and 
fully rounded at the maximum score.
In the central range of scores, therefore, it is not 
to be unexpected if we find ambivalence as much as neutrality.
(ii) The second point has a general bearing on scale 
scoring, and so on the general methodology of research 
with scales. The question of whether the zero end of a 
scale designates the opposite pole from its maximum, or a 
neutral point, has seldom been raised. It is an important 
one. It seems reasonable to suppose that the lower scores
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on this paired-alternative F Scale, 'fuzzy* though the 
non-authoritarian item-halves may be, do not reflect 
authoritarianism in a minor degree, but an inclination 
opposed to authoritarianism. Just where the watershed 
i.e. the true neutral point, may be, is likely to be 
contentious, but the desirability of treating anti-authoritarian 
persons as arithmetically negative in their scores seems to 
me to be clear.
One tenable solution to this problem might be to use 
the information we have about the empirical distributions 
and to use quartile scores, negative for the first and 
second, positive for the third and fourth. Thus, using the 
standardization data set out at the conclusion of Chapter 
Six, one might translate the raw authoritarianism scores 
in these terms to ones with a minimum of - 2 and a maximum 
of +2.
The same procedures are defensible for the ethnocentrism 
and alienation scales, if these are to be treated as capable 
of defining polar opposites.
If a standard procedure admitting negative scoring 
had been in vogue for the past two decades, we might have 
seen fewer cases where authoritarianism and its correlates 
had been researched amongst undergraduates and other 
unsuitable samples, since their preponderantly negative
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scores would have made their inappropriateness abundantly 
obvious. To go looking for fascist tendencies, in the 
manner of much reported research, amongst University 
students, in English-speaking countries, is like measuring 
kangaroos in the hope of quantifying tigers.
This suggestion can only be raised with diffidence 
at this stage of the argument of this thesis. However, the 
fact that data from a large, representative urban sample 
have been obtained and presented makes possible its easy 
implementation. It seems particularly appropriate to the 
description of individuals through use of the scales 
developed in this thesis in later research.
10.6. Conclusion
This excursus has been, in part, designed to show 
how contrived circumstances may be useful in throwing up 
hypotheses capable of being tested in larger samples. One, 
in particular, that upwardly mobile persons may be less 
susceptible to dispositional influence than to group pressures 
in forming their opinion on issues of conscience, has been 
shown to have some limited evidential support in the larger 
sample. Other considerations have been raised speculatively, 
with a view to future research. We shall now return to the 
main themes of this thesis, to point to the pith of its 
argument and demonstrate the mode and extent of the general 
analytic utility of its findings.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION
11.1. Introduction
A cartographical enterprise requires adequate 
instruments. A major part of this thesis has been 
devoted to showing why the instruments in previous use 
for the measurement of some dispositions have been inadequate, 
and in constructing more adequate ones. The dispositional 
measures of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and alienation, 
the construction of which is described in Chapter Six and 
Seven, are held to be adequate for investigation and are 
offered for research use. In charting the social incidence 
of these dispositional constructs, and anxiety, we have 
been breaking new ground in the exploration of the 
Australian urban environment. In employing correlational 
and factor analysis in identifying political constructs, 
we have evolved more modest indices.
However, the process of enquiry in which these 
instruments have come to hand actually clarified the 
structure of political opinion itself. Although it has 
been shown to have changed somewhat between the times at 
which the two sample surveys were taken, in 1963 and 1966,
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the structure has a clarity almost unlooked for; and 
one of the political dimensions identified, ’Conscience' 
radicalism, exhibits a constancy over time, a cohesiveness 
and rootedness in psychological dispositions which 
suggest that it will persist as a disparate attitude. 
Sociological considerations suggest it will grow in 
importance.
Of the four psychological dispositions whose influence 
on one another and on political opinion has been investigated, 
it is anxiety which has proved the most disappointing.
Although it appears to have a low positive relation to 
each of the four sentiments of radicalism, and to a very 
general perception of threat, its relations with other 
dispositions and political attitudes has been less than 
might have been expected. As the Introduction notes,
*
this thesis was initially inspired by an interest in the 
implications of insecurity and aggression. It seems now 
that, far from being at the core of mechanisms of hate 
and distrust, anxiety cowers in a corner by itself, so 
to say, and that confident men possessed of complex social 
frustrations are closer to a central symbol of the 
aggressive type. This is not to say that latent or 
repressed anxiety has no role: on the contrary, there is
persuasive evidence from in-depth analyses, dwelling on
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the themes of externalization and ego-defence,1 which 
cannot be ignored. But this thesis has been concerned 
chiefly with the function of relatively manifest anxiety.
In exploring the interrelations of dispositions, 
their influence on political attitudes and the structure 
of political attitudes, this study has declared its 
'contextualist' persuasion, has been concerned to 
acknowledge the potentiality of intention, and, at almost 
every stage of the analysis, has argued, implicitly as 
well as explicitly, the necessity of verstehen in social 
enquiry, both as a tool of research and a method by which 
the results of research can be interpreted. A few of 
the most salient findings are noted below, as a prelude 
to consideration of the major question of prediction from 
disposition to action, and from action to a sequence of 
historical events.
11.2. Psychological Dispositions and Political Attitudes;
3
Constancies and Inconstancies
The five major constancies in the correlation of 
psychological dispositions and political attitudes are the 
following:
(i) Authoritarianism is negatively related to 
'Conscience’ radicalism.
r
M. Brewster Smith, 'A Map for the Analysis of Personality 
and Politics,' Journal of Social Issues, 24 (1968), p. 25.
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(ii) Authoritarianism is negatively related to 
libertarianism.
(iii) Ethnocentrism is negatively related to ’Conscience* 
radicalism.
(iv) Ethnocentrism is negatively related to libertarianism
(v) Alienation is positively related to socio-economic 
radicalism.
All these relations are substantial, and only the last 
exhibits any disturbance when variations in correlation 
between different social class and educational groups are 
considered. The mechanisms connecting these dispositions 
and sentiments have been elaborated in the text. Every 
apparent inconstancy in relation has been brought forward, 
and it is a task for the future to determine the 
reliability of these, perhaps with appropriate samples 
magnifying those characteristics of individual or group 
functioning apparently responsible for the inconstancies.
This exploratory exercise has been concerned with their 
initial, tentative identification.
Of the four psychological dispositions, it is 
alienation, conceived as social estrangement, which is the 
most various in its function, being the friend of 
socio-economic radicalism, the foe of ’Conscience' radicalism, 
a minor ally of a ’Left’ position in defence and foreign
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policy, and, in a very minor degree, an associate of 
libertarianism. It is in contemplating this disposition 
that the unexpected is most in evidence; ’wherein’, to 
quote one clinical usage of the term itself, ’familiar 
persons and situations appear strange: it is the opposite
of de.ja vu’ .1 Its most significant role is in its prediction 
to ethnocentrism, which seems a result either of the 
familiar frustration-aggression mechanism, or the 
generalization of social distrust. But its effects go beyond 
this, as the illustrative case of ’John’ suggests: the
world is not the place ’John’ thinks it to be, nor, one 
might go on to say, is it the place he is trying to 
create. At its most extreme, alienation may generate a 
paranoid world-view, and its creative potential may assume 
a sinister significance, inventing hostile intentions and 
imputing them to innocents.
11.3. Psychological Dispositions and Political Interpretation 
The independent predictions of both authoritarian 
personality tendency and alienation to ethnocentrism are 
empirical findings of very substantial analytical utility 
to the political scientist. It may be as well, in standing 
back to contemplate the potential influence of dispositions 
on political attitudes, to take a case which illustrates
H.B. English and A.C. English, op, cit., p. 22.
1
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clearly the utility of the knowledge of the interrelations 
of dispositions themselves. Ethnocentrism is a disposition 
of considerable political importance, being relevant to 
the social disharmony or, in extremis, social disintegration, 
and, when the cultural conditions are ripe for them, 
capable of generating extremist mass movements of great 
distructive force.
Before advancing this illustration, it might be salutary
to recall that the general utility of psychology to political
science has, on and off, been in considerable doubt. As
Greenstein has said,^ in a cri de coeur:
If the political scientist persists in his 
determination to make systematic use of psychology, 
he is likely to experience ... discouragement. Much 
of the research and theory he encounters will seem 
singularly irrelevant to explaining the kind of 
complex behaviour which interests him...
Psychologists' insights seem irrelevant to political 
scientists, for the good reason that many psychologists 
do not conceive of their science as one which should attempt to explain concrete instances of social 
behaviour, but rather as a means of understanding 
general principles underlying that behaviour.
The political scientist is often puzzled as to how to
apply the findings of psychology, which is nomothetic in
its bias, having as its purpose the production of
generalizations. Whilst the political scientist is rarely
purely idiographic in his concern, that is, trying to portray
1
F.I. Greenstein, 'Personality and Politics: Problems of
Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization', American 
Behavioural Scientist, 2 (1967) p. io.
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a political situation in all its idiosyncracy, he is 
sufficiently of the two contrasting worlds of social 
analysis as to be uncomfortable, or even at a loss, in 
using the tools of either.
Let us consider briefly the circumstances of the 
fall of the Weimar Republic, to see how difficulties of 
this kind can be resolved. The later period of Weimar, 
and that of the National Socialist regime, are, of course, 
ones where the influence of psychological dispositions had 
un jour de fete. Indeed, they provided an impulse to the 
psychological interpretation of political events which 
had its beginnings in the very distinguished work by 
Fromm,1 The Fear of Freedom, and is still active, particularly
pin the analysis of the fate of European Jewry. The 
dominant themes have been of a malignant alienation, 
especially in the middle class, and of a diffusion of 
authoritarian personality characteristics in the German 
national culture of the time.
The illustrative case to be presented, in order to 
show how psychological insights are necessary to an
1 E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom (London, 1942). The most 
recent study of the psychological climate of Weimar is by 
P. Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (London, 1968).
2
M. Wangh, ‘National Socialism and the Genocide of the 
Jews,’ International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 45 (1964),
pp. 586- 95• "
&
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understanding, is that of the German Jews, as they were 
seen by their fellow Germans, and as they saw themselves, 
in the twilight of Weimar. Their self-conception was, 
in the main, based on a realistic appreciation of 
experience; the conception of them advanced by the Nazis 
was that of a social cancer, destroying the nation. It 
bore little relation to actuality.1 2 Jews were in socially 
exposed positions in petty commerce, the theatre and the 
professions, but not in a position of great economic or 
political power. Confronted by this extraordinary conception 
of themselves as a group, the Jews tried to reason on the 
basis of an ordinary logical interpretation of experience, 
attempting to engage on this basis the sympathy of their 
fellow Germans. A political scientist resistant to the 
employment of the data of psychology might have taken the 
same view as they did. In June, 1933* the Zionist paper 
Jüdische Rundschau appealed in the following terms to the 
German public:
The National Socialists, in their demonstrations, 
designate the Jews as ’enemies of the state’. That 
designation is incorrect. The Jews are not enemies 
of the state. The German Jews desire and wish for 
the rise of Germany, for which they have always 
invested, to the best of their knowledge, all their 
resources, and that is what they wish to continue to do.
1
For a contemporary account in plain language of the position 
of the Jews in German society, see S.H. (Sir Stephen) Roberts, 
The House that Hitler Built (London, 1937) pp. 258-67.
2
Quoted in R. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews 
(Chicago, 1961) p. 50.
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Hilberg’s1 account of earlier events runs as follows:
£ April] The Central-Verein Zeitung, organ of the Jewish 
assimilationists, had published an editorial, born out of 
despair, which contained Goethe’s famous line of 
frustrated love: ”lf I love you, what business is it of
yours?” The Zionist paper Jüdische Rundschau thereupon 
published a reply which stated with defiance: ”lf I love
you, then it Is your business. The German people should 
know: a historical alliance, hundreds of years old, cannot
be severed so simply.” But it was severed.’
What the German Jews could not understand, and what 
nomothetic research of the type undertaken in this thesis 
can tell us, is this: it was not the Jews the Nazis hated.
They were not concerned with the actuality of the German 
Jewish community, in its real relations with the state. What 
they hated was intrinsic to themselves, their idea of the Jew. 
In the Jew was the paradigm of the intrusive foreigner, 
the alien corrupting the national Volk. Ethnocentrism is 
not a disposition reflecting a realistic appreciation of 
the out-group. It reflects a stereotype of the out-group, and 
the more extreme its causal antecedents, alienation and 
authoritarianism, the more extreme is ethnocentrism, which 
incorporates derogatory mistake. What the Nazis were arguing
1 .
Ibid., p. jyO.
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was for the German people to abandon a conception of the
Jew based on the logic of ordinary experience, and to
put in its place a stereotype which bore no relation to
reality, indeed contradicted it. But it was one in which
they themselves believed. Here is Hitler epitomising
those dispositions apparently possessing the audience to
whom he addressed himself: authoritarianism, alienation and
ethnocentrism. He is at the dinner table, on 25 January
19^2 (the following is a stenographic record of his private
conversation).1 He is speaking of the Jews:
A good three or four hundred years will go by 
before the Jews set foot again in Europe. They’ll 
return first of all as commercial travellers, then 
gradually they'll become emboldened to settle here - 
the better to exploit us. In the next stage, they 
become philanthropists, they endow foundations.
When a Jew does that, the thing is particularly 
noticed - for it’s known that they're dirty dogs.
As a rule, it’s the most rascally of them who do 
that sort of thing. And then you'll hear these poor 
Aryan boobies telling you: 'You see, there aregood Jews.’
Here, he is urging his audience to put the opposite 
construction to the normal one on a datum of experience: 
an ostensibly generous act is really cunningly selfish. 
Indeed, more than usually so: 'it's the most rascally
of them who do that sort of thing'. What is real is what 
is 'known' a priori '... they're dirty dogs'. But this 
'knowledge' is not based on external reality; it is a
1
H.R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler's Table Talk, 19^1-1944, 
(London, 1955) P* 256.
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paranoid reconstruction of elements of external reality,
with a great deal added. It springs from within the
personality of the highly ethnocentric subject. Even the
Jews’ own consciousness of their motives and actions can
be disregarded in the light of this ’knowledge’. Here is
Hitler speaking on the night of 1-2 December, 1941.1 2
Ten years ago, our intellectual class hadn’t the 
least idea of what a Jew is.
Obviously, our racial laws demand great strictness 
on the part of the individual. But to .judge of their 
value, one mustn’t let oneself be guided by individual 
cases.^  It is necessary to bear in mind that in 
acting as I do I arn avoiding innumerable conflicts 
in the future.
I ’m convinced that there are Jews in Germany who’ve 
behaved correctly - in the sense that they've 
invariably refrained from doing injury to the 
German idea ... Probably many Jews are not aware 
of the destructive power they represent. Now, 
he who destroys life is himself risking death.
That’s the secret of what is happening to the Jews. 
Whose fault is it when a cat devours a mouse? The 
fault of the mouse, who has never done any harm to 
the cat?
This ’knowledge’ from the inner springs of personality 
functioning extends far and wide. On 18 October 1941,-^  
Hitler ruminates:
It’s a queer business, how England slipped into 
the war. The man who managed it was Churchill, 
that puppet of the Jewry that pulls the strings.
1
Ibid., p. 140-1.
2
My underlining, here and below.
H.R. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p. 72.3
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The murder of the Jews in the concentration camps is 
never mentioned in the ’Table Talk', only deportation.
The real nature of the ’Final Solution’ had been disclosed 
to a small group of higher bureaucrats by Heydrich on 
20 January, 19^2 at a conference at Gross-Wannsee.^  But
pon 25 January, 19^2, Hitler is saying this:
One must act radically. When one pulls out a tooth, 
one does it with a single tug, and the pain quickly 
goes away. The Jews must clear out of Europe.
Otherwise no understanding will be possible between 
Europeans. Its the Jew who prevents everything.
When I think about it, I realize that I'm extraordinarily 
humane. At the time of the rule of the Popes, the 
Jews were mistreated in Rome. Until 1850, eight Jews 
mounted on donkeys were led once a year through the 
streets of Rome. For my part, I restrict myself to 
telling them they must go away. If they break their 
pipes on the journey, I can’t do anything about it.
But if they refuse to go voluntarily, I see no other 
solution but extermination. Why should I look at a 
Jew through other eyes than if he were a Russian 
prisoner-of-war? In the p.o.w. camps, many are 
dying. It’s not my fault. I didn't want either 
the war or the p.o.w. camps. Why did the Jew provoke this war?
How much this tells of the subject who is speaking, and 
how little of the Jews! To discuss the world of the 
concentration camps, of the 'S.S. State’, would be to 
enter a nether region beyond the scope of this illustration, 
where, perhaps, the alienated imagination, in a monstrous 
historical episode, had created a physical alternative to
1
G. Reitlinger, The Final Solution: The Attempt to
Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1959-19^5/ (London, 1953) 
pp. 9bff.2
H. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p. 255-6.
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the rejected society, with its own complex ’language 
rules1'*' to avoid even the mention of ’killing’ in 
surroundings of general slaughter. This world must be 
accorded its own psychopathology, to grapple with an 
explanation of its grands grotesques. Here there is an 
enclosed character to deviant behaviours, which often, as 
in the faces in the demonic paintings of Hieronymus Bosch, 
exhibit an apparent serenity in a grossly eccentric 
environment.
Let us return to the theme of the illustration, that 
of attitudes to the Jews in the late Weimar period. 
Nomothetic research can show how ethnocentrism can come 
about as a result of disturbing social conditions, via 
the stepping stone of alienation, and also how it can emerge 
from the personality dynamics of the authoritarian. But it 
also tells us what it is; i.e. essentially a disposition 
of the subject, not of the object, the target group. To 
be sure, the actual relation of the two in a given society 
is also relevant: the target group here, the Jews, were
seen by some as the paradigm of the foreigner, being 
actually the descendants of a wave of migration from the 
East; so that one can regard anti-Serr.itism, in part, as 
the result of a dysfunctional relation between the society
Cf. R. Hilberg, op. cit., pp. 555ff.
I
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and the minority group. But most of the dysfunction 
arises because of the characteristics of the society 
and of the ethnocentrism within it.
It is important to make it clear, in a general way, 
what is not argued were. Obviously, the collapse of the 
Weimar Republic, and the fantastic sequence of historical 
events which followed, cannot be deduced from a knowledge 
of the interrelations of the dispositions we have discussed. 
What is_ being argued is that the historical situation 
cannot be understood without this knowledge. But notice 
that even the generalizations of nomothetic analysis have 
to be understood within the given culture. V/hy the 
Jews should have been the target group for extreme prejudice 
requires special explanation, that is, complementary 
idiographic research.1 That the anti-Semitic stereotype 
was of the foreigner, not so much, as in English-speaking 
countries, the unscrupulous money-grubber, is also important, 
because it clarifies the reason for the centrality of 
anti-Semitism: the Jew was the symbol of the alien, and
therefore, putatively, the natural foe of the organic 
völkisch nation-state which the Nazis sought to create.
Why they sought to create such a state is itself a question
1
An example of this is a work by P.G.J. Pulzer, The Rise 
of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, (New York^  1964).
534
which requires a delicate analysis of the idiosyncrasies 
of the historical situation, such as that of Erikson.
The generalizations afforded by nomothetic analysis are 
modulated by the particularities of the socio-historical 
situation in a given culture. The idiographic and 
nomothetic approaches to an understanding of politics are 
therefore complementary, not opposed.
Cross-cultural research, to establish whether the 
intercorrelations between dispositions and attitudes 
discovered in this thesis, in the Australian urban context, 
are general to other cultures or not, is a desirable future 
prospect. What one might say, indeed must say, on the 
basis of the work done here, is that social conditions 
which are liable to engender alienation, conceived as 
social estrangement, or which conduce to the diffusion of 
authoritarian personality characteristics, are surrounded 
by a penumbra of ominous potentiality. They exacerbate 
ethnocentrism. Thus to launch an immigration programme 
during an economic recession is a dangerous enterprise, 
not merely because it will increase competition for jobs, 
but because, if a wave of unemployment increases alienation, 
as would seem highly likely, a growth of irrational antagonism 
to migrants will follow. One of the main lessons of this
I
E.H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, second ed., (New 
York, 1965)* ch. 9*
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research is that, rather than attempting to predict 
to attitudes directly from social conditions, it is 
preferable to consider first the step from social conditions, 
understood in their particularities, to dispositions, 
likewise cautiously measured, before attempting to 
prophesy the structure of opinion on particular issues. 
Empirical research, heavily qualified by the operation 
named verstehen, is the sine qua non of such social analysis. 
11.4. A Note on the Method of Political Science
A final note on the method of political science and, 
in particular, of political psychology might here be 
usefully offered. Of the social sciences, political science 
is the most various in its method. Indeed, it happens 
that it has not one methodology, but several. It is 
sometimes difficult to distinguish it from history, except 
for its generally contemporary bias. It is therefore 
appropriate that, for some purposes, it should adopt the 
methodology of that discipline. At other times, methods 
more like those of the natural sciences, on the 
empirico-mathematical model, are useful. This is not 
confusion; it is simply that, in a discipline addressed to 
the analysis of affairs of state, the subject matter is as 
large in scope as life itself, and the variety in techniques 
of analysis must be broad in order to match the difficulty
*
536
of the subject. In the treatment of disposition and 
political opinion in this thesis* one methodological 
lesson has emerged with paramount force: it is that,
in political psychology, many methods of analysis must be 
conjoined, and that statistical techniques must be married 
to a human understanding, before they can be used to 
display the subject in all its intricacy.
P P E N D I C E S
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APPENDIX I: The Questionnaire of the 1963 Survey
VOTERS’ OPINION SERVICE 
PRE-ELECTION SURVEY, NOV. ’65
Good morning/afternoon/evening; I’m helping to 
carry out a public opinion survey in connection with the 
coming elections. Would you like to help us by answering 
a few questions?
1. Did you see either Mr. Calwell or Sir Robert YES 1.
NO 2.
Menzies give their policy speeches on TV? D.K. 3»
2. (IF YES) Which of them did you see? BOTH 1.
ONLY CALWELL 2.
ONLY MENZIES 3.
D.K. 4.
3. Do you think age pensions should be increased, 1.
OR
should they be kept as they are now, for the time being? 2.
Other opinion 3»
D.K. 4.
4. Do you think Australia should increase its
spending on defence > 1.
OR
does Australia spend enough on defence already? 2.
Other opinion 3*
D.K. 4.
I
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5. Do you think; child endowment should be doubled, 1.
OR
be raised by a smaller amount, 2.
OR
be kept at the present rate? 5.
Other opinion 4.
D.K. 5.
6. Should government spending on education remain
about the same as it is now, 1.
OR
be moderately increased 2.
OR
be greatly increased? 5.
Other opinion 4.
D.K. 5.
7• Should the Commonwealth Government start up new 
business enterprises of its own, 1.
OR
should it keep out of new business ventures? 2.
Other opinion 3.
D.K. 4.
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8. Should the government avoid nationalization and
promote private enterprise, 1.
OR
should it nationalize some business monopolies? 2.
Other opinion 3*
D.K. 4.
9. On the aborigines; do you think the government should
spend more on their welfare and education, 1.
OR
spend about the same as it does now? 2.
Other opinion 5«
D.K. 4.
10. Australia now gives equipment to Asian countries 
to help them develop. This aid amounts to about
£5 million a year.
Do you think this aid should be increased, 1.
OR
kept about the same as it is now? 2.
Other opinion 5*
D.K. 4.
11. Do you think the White Australia policy should be
kept as it is, 1.
OR
should the policy be relaxed to allow greater numbers of
Asians to settle in this country? 2.
Other opinion 5«
D.K. 4.
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12. Do you think the death penalty for murder should
be abolished? i•
OH
should the death penalty be kept? 2.
Other opinion 3-
D.K. 4.
13. Should the government start more detailed
economic planning, 1.
OR
should it use only the present controls? 2.
Other opinion 3«
D.K. 4.
14. If a man gets income from increases in the value 
of stocks and shares that he owns,
should such income be left free of tax, 1.
OR
should it be taxed? 2.
Other opinion 3*
D.K. 4.
5*n
15. (HAND INTERVIEWEE CARD A)
In your own personal opinion, which of these 
election issues is of first importance? Second? Third? 
Fourth?
Foreign and defence policy ( ) Education ( )
Housing ( ) Social services ( )
Unemployment and economic policy ( )
(NUMBER ISSUES IN ORDER GIVEN BY INTERVIEWEE)
(OFFICE USE ONLY: For. pol. 1 2  3 ^ 5
Educ. 1 2  3 ^ 5
Housing 1 2 3 ^ 5  
Soc. Serv. 1 2 3 ^ 5  
Unemp. 1 2  3 ^ 5 )
16. For which party did you vote at the last Federal 
Elections, in 1961?
LCP ALP DLP Com. Other D.K. Did not vote Refuse
1 2 3 ^ 5 6  7 8
17. For which party did you intend to vote at the corning 
Federal Election?
LCP ALP DLP Com. Other D.K. Refuse
1 2  3 ^  5 6  7
18. (IF SAME BOTH TIMES)
Do you always vote for that party? YES 1.
NO 2. 
D.K* 3.
19. What is your main reason for voting for the party 
of your choice at this election?
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(OFFICE USE ONLY.
1 2 5 4 5 6 7 8 9  0)
20. (ASK ONLY DLP VOTERS AT THIS ELECTION)
Which party will you give your second preferences 
to at this election?
LCP ALP Other D.K. Refuse1 2  5 4 5
21. (ONLY DLP) Why?
(OFFICE USE ONLY: 1 2 5 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 )
22. Do you take quite a lot of interest in current
politics? 1.
some, but not much? 2.
OR hardly any? 5.
D.K. 4.
2J. (HAND CARD B TO INTERVIEWEE)
Do you pick up information on current politics: 
mostly from T.V., Radio, Newspapers, or Books etc. 1.
OR
mostly from talking to other people, or just
listening to what they say? 2.
D.K. 3.
24. Which would influence you more in deciding how to 
vote:
what you see on T.V., in the newspapers etc? 1.
OR
ordinary conversation? 2.
Neither .
D.K. 4.
25. Have you tried to convince anyone of your political
ideas recently? YES
NO
D.K.
26. Has anyone asked your advice on a political qu
recently? YES
NO
D.K.
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(HAND INTERVIEWEE CARD C)
Here is a list of brief statements of opinion. We’re 
trying to see if political opinions link up with opinions 
on other issues. You’ll probably agree with some, disagree 
with others. As I read out each statement, would you just 
tell me whether you AGREE or DISAGREE? If you are 
UNDECIDED, just say ’’don’t know”.
27. What the youth needs is strict discipline, rugged 
determination, and the will to work and fight for family 
and country.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3«
28. People can be divided into two distinct classes: 
the weak and the strong.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3*
29. If people spent more time talking about ideas just 
for the fun of it, everybody would be better off.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3•
30. Obedience and respect for authority are not the 
most important things to teach children.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.
31. An insult to our honour should always be punished.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3*
5^5
32. If it weren’t for the rebellious ideas of youth 
there would be less progress in the world.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3«
33* In our society, if you work hard you can usually 
get ahead.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3»
3^. Life today is a difficult and dangerous business, 
and it’s a matter of chance who gets on top.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3•
35« Life seems to be rather meaningless.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3«
36. Most members of parliament and city councillors are 
sympathetic people and do a good job.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3»
37» One can’t hope to become the sort of person one would 
like to be.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3*
33. Most people can be trusted.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3*
39« Visits to Australia by Japanese politicians and 
businessmen should be welcomed.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.
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40. Australians should not be too keen on friendship with 
Japanese after the lessons of the last war.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 5*
41. The Italian communities which have settled in the 
inner suburbs have made them brighter and more pleasant 
places to live in.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3*
42. Italian migrants have not added much of value to 
the Australian way of life.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3»
43. The Jews have too much power and influence in this 
country.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3«
44. Jews are as valuable, honest and public spirited 
citizens as any other group.
Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3*
Thanks. (RECOVER CARD) This last section is on the 
characteristics of voters...would you mind telling me, 
please:
45. What is your occupation? (A FEW DETAILS)
(OFFICE USE ONLY: 1 2 3 ^ 5 6 7 8 9 0 )
547
46. (ASK ONLY IF ANSWER NOT YET CLEAR)
Are you married or single?
MARRIED 1. SINGLE 2. WIDOW/WIDOWER
47. (IF MARRIED)
Do you have any children sixteen or less - if so how many? 
One 1. Two 2. Three 5« Four 4. Five 5 . Six or more 6. 
None 7«
43. (ASK ONLY IF NOT HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD)
And what is the occupation of the householder?
(OFFICE USE ONLY: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 )
49. What standard of schooling did you complete?
PRIMARY ( ) SOME SECONDARY ( ) INTERMEDIATE ( )
TRADE CERTIFICATE ( ) LEAVING ( ) MATRICULATION ( )
SENIOR TECH. DIPLOMA ( ) UNIVERSITY ( ) DK ( )
OTHER (Write in) ........................................
(TICK THE ANSWER GIVEN)
(OFFICE USE ONLY: 1 2 ^ 4 5 6 7 8 9  O)
50. Would you consider yourself:
Upper middle class? 1.
Middle Class? 2.
or Working class? 3*
Can't say 4.
51. Would you mind telling me your religious denomination?
Church of England 1. Catholic 4. Other non-Christian J.
Presbyterian 2. Other Christian 5» Agnostic or Atheist 8.
Methodist 3* Jewish 6. Can’t say 9-
52. Apart from weddings, funerals, etc., how long is it, 
roughly, since you last attended Church?
(Fortnight or less) 1. (Longer) 3*
( 3 ~ 4  weeks) 2. (Never) 4.
Thank you for co-operating in the survey!
INTERVIEWER ONLY (DO NOT ASK)
53. Sex of respondent: MALE 1.
FEMALE 2.
54. Approximate age of respondent: Less than 25: 1.
26-35: 2. 36-45: 3. 46-55: 4. 56-65: 5- 66 or more: 6.
55. Address:
No..............  Street......... ........Suburb...........
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56. Comments and interviewer’s signature:
(OFFICE USE ONLY: 1 2 5 4 5 6 7 8 9  0)
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APPENDIX 2: The Questionnaire of the 1966 Survey
PRE-ELECTION SURVEY November, 1966.
Good (morning). My name is .... I’m from Nation’s
Opinion Service. At present we’re carrying out a survey
amongst voters for the Australian National University ..
The University if carrying out this opinion survey in
connection with the coming elections ..
CHECK: We want to interview as many young voters as
possible in this survey .. Is there any voter under 30
years of age here I can interview?
(ALWAYS GIVE PRIORITY TO VOTER UNDER 30)
(NOTE THAT t,V0TER” MAY BE ELIGIBLE 
NOW BUT NOT FOR LAST ELECTIONS)
1. Undecided: 1
The first two questions are about education ..
Do you think that Government spending on education should .. 
remain about the same as it is now, or be moderately 
increased .. 2
OR
do you think it should be greatly increased? 3
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2. Undecided: 1
Do you think that the Government should - 
.. help finance Church schools .. 2
OR
Should the Government spend its money on state schools 
only? 5
5. Undecided: 1
Now a few questions on defence and foreign policy .. 
Do you think Australia should increase its spending 
on defence .. 2
OR
Does Australia spend enough on defence already? 5
4. Undecided: 1
Do you think that communism in Asia is -
A great danger to Australia’s security: 2
A minor danger to Australia’s security: 5
OR
no danger to Australia’s security: 4
5. Undecided: 1
Apart from the conscription issue, do you support
the sending of Australian troops to Sth. Vietnam .. 2
OR
Do you feel it would have been better not to send 
Australian troops to Sth. Vietnam? 5
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6. Undecided: 1
On conscription, do you oppose sending national 
servicemen, that is, conscripts, to Vietnam .. 2
OR
Do you support sending national servicemen, that is, 
conscripts, to Vietnam? 3
7• Undecided: 1
If Australia were in danger of attack, would you be 
against conscription for overseas military service .. 2
OR
Would you support conscription for overseas service 
at such a time? 3
8. Undecided: 1
Do you think Australia may be in grave danger of
attack at some time in the next ten years .. 2
OR
Do you think there is little danger of an attack on 
Australia in the next ten years? 3
9. Undecided: 1
Do you think that Britain might let us down in an
emergency, if they were in any danger themselves .. 2
OR
Do you think they would help us, even at some risk to
themselves? 3
10. Undecided: 1
Do you think that the United States might let us
down in an emergency if they were in any danger 
themselves .. 2
OR
Do you think they would help us, even at some risk to 
themselves? 5
11. Undecided: 1
Should Australia seek closer defence ties with the
U.S.A. through treaties .. 2
OR
Keep defence ties with the U.S.A. the same as they are
now .. 3
OR
Have looser defence ties with the U.S.A. than at present?^
12. Undecided: 1
Do you think that Australia should set about getting
atomic weapons for defence now .. 2
OR
Do you think we should avoid getting atomic weapons 
at the present time? 5
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13 Undecided: 1
Australia now gives equipment to some Asian 
countries to help them develop .. Do you think this 
economic aid should be increased .. 2
OR
Kept about the same as it is now? 3
14. Undecided: 1
Do you think the White Australia Policy should be
kept as it is now.. 2
OR
Should the policy be relaxed, to allow more Asians to 
settle in this country? 3
15. Undecided: 1
There has recently been a change in government in
Indonesia. Should Australia offer special aid and 
cooperation to the new Indonesian government .. 2
OR
Should Australia be wary of too much aid and cooperation 
at the present time? 3
16. Undecided:
On New Guinea .. should Australia spend a lot more
on New Guinea development .. 2
OR
Should Australia spend about the same on New Guinea as 
it does now? • 3
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17* Undecided: 1
Now on political topics here in Australia, should 
the Commonwealth Government start up new business 
enterprises of its own .. 2
OR
Should it keep out of new business ventures? 5
18. Undecided: 1
Should the government avoid nationalization and
promote private enterprise •. 2
OR
Should it nationalize some business monopolies? 5
19. Undecided: 1
There has been much American investment in Australian
industry in the last few years .. Do you think that the 
Australian Government should put special controls on 
American investment in this country .. 2
OR
Should the government use the same controls as for 
Australian business? 5
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20. Undecided: 1
On economic planning, should the government use
controls to guide business development more closely .. 2
OR
Should the government use only present controls and
not interfere with business development? 3
21. Undecided: 1
Suppose the Government does introduce detailed
economic planning. Do you think it should use strict 
controls to force businessmen to do what is best for the 
country ..
OR
Use mild controls and discuss its plans with business 
and union leaders? 3
22. Undecided: 1
If a man owns stocks and shares and makes some money
from increases in their value, should such gains be left
free of tax .. 2
OR
Should*the gains be taxed? 3
23. Undecided: 1
Do you think there should be a death penalty for 
murder .. 2
OR
Do you think there should be no death penalty? • 3
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24. Undecided: 1
Do you think that child endowment should he ..
increased . . 2
OR
Kept about the same as it is now? 5
25. Undecided: 1
Should age pensions be kept the same, or
moderately increased .. 2
OR
Do you think they should be greatly increased? 3
26. Undecided: 1
Do you think that there is enough real poverty in
Australia today to require special government action .. 2
OR
Do you think that poverty is a minor problem which will 
come right without special government action? 3
27• Undecided: 1
Do you think that Australia should be a republic, 
with a President as head .. 2
OR
Should it remain a monarchy with the Queen as head of
State? 5
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28. Now a general question. If you could choose .just 
two matters for more government attention .. which two 
would you choose?
(Record 2 only .. Probe & record verbatim)
(1) .................................................
(2) .....................................
29. HAND CARD 1: In your own personal opinion, which
of these election issues is of first importance?
(Force choice - record "l" for first)
(then rank order 2 (2nd) to 6 (last)
Rank order
Defence:
Conscription:
Education spending:
State aid to Church schools:
National development:
Social services (pensions, etc):
(If unable to rank precisely 1 to 6)
(record answers and reasons below)
TO BE ASKED ONLY AFTER TUESDAY 8TH NOVEMBER:
Yes: 1
No: 2
30. Did you see either Mr. Calwell or Mr. Holt 
give their policy speeches on TV?
DK: 3
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31. IF YES TO Q.3Q:
Which of them did you see? Both: 1
Only Calwell:2 
Only Holt: 3
DK: 4
32. What do you think of Mr. Holt as leader of the 
Liberal Party?
(Probe & record verbatim)
33« 'What do you think of Mr. Calwell as leader of the 
Labor Party?
(Probe & record verbatim)
34. If Mr. Calwell retired, who would you like to see in 
his place as leader of the Labor Party?
(Record name - Probe and record)
(comments and reasons verbatim)
35. IF NEITHER CAIRNS OR WHITLAM 1ST IN Q.34:
If it came to a choice between Mr. Whitlam Whitlam: 1
and Dr. Cairns, which of these two would you Cairns: 2
prefer as Labor leader? 
(force choice)
Undecided:3
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5 6. This section is about the images people have in 
their minds of the various political parties. Take first 
of all the Liberal Party ..
If you had to name just two things wrong with it, what 
two would you say?
(Probe & record verbatim ONLY 2 things)
(1) ....................................................
(2) ..........................................
57• And if you had to name just two good things about 
the Liberal Party .. What two would you say?
(Probe etc, as in Q.56)
(1) ..........................................
(2) ..........................................
58. Now, the Australian Labor Party .. If you had to name 
just two things wrong with it, what two would you say? 
(Probe & record verbatim ONLY 2 things)
a) ..............................
(2) ........... ..............................
59« And if you had to name just two good things about 
the Australian Labor Party .. What two would you say? 
(Probe etc. as in Q.58)
a) ...........................
(2) .....................................
561
40. And finally, the Democratic Labor Party ..
D.L.P., If you had to name just two things wrong with it, 
what two would you say?
(Probe & record verbatim ONLY 2 things)
(1) ....................................................
(2) ..........................................
4l. And if you had to name just two good things about the 
D.L.P., What would you say?
(Probe etc, as in Q.4o)
a) .............................
(2) ........................................
42. Which party did you vote for at the last Federal 
elections, that is, the Federal elections in 1963?
L.C.P. 1 
A.L.P. 2 
D.L.P. 5 
COM. 4 
OTHER: 5 
D.K: 6
DIDN’T VOTE: 7
ANSWER REFUSED: 8
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45. For which party do you intend to vote at the
coming Federal election this month? L.C.P. 1
A.L.P. 2 
D.L.P. 3 
COM. 4 
OTHER: 5 
D.K: 6
ANSWER REFUSED: 7
44. IF SAME PARTY NAMED IN Q*S 42 & 43:
Do you always vote for that party? Yes: 1
No: 2
D.K: 3
45. IF HAVE DECIDED PARTY FOR NEXT ELECTION:
What are your main reasons for voting for the party 
of your choice at this election?
(Probe & record verbatim ALL reasons)
46. Undecided/no opinion: 1
Do you think that the A.L.P. and the D.L.P. should 
link up with one another .. 2
OR
Remain as they are? 3
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47* Don’t know: 1
Do you take quite a lot of interest in 
current politics .. 2
OR
some, but not-much.. 5
OR
hardly any? 4
48. Which daily newspapers do you regularly read, that
is, at least 5 issues a week? Australian: 1
Melbourne - Age: 2
Melbourne - Sun: 5
Melbourne - Herald: 4
Sydney - Telegraph: 5
Sydney - Morn.Herald: 6
Sydney - Sun/Herald: 7
Sydney - Daily Mirror: 8
49. Closely: 1
Do you follow the political news in the
papers .. Occasionally: 2
(read out)? OR Not at all? 5
D.K: 4
6^4
50. On television, do you follow the political
items .. Closely: 1
Occasionally: 2
(read out)? OR Not at all? 5
D.K: 4
51. What one particular political topic, if any, are
you especially interested in at present? None: 1
Topic is: ...............................................
52. What is your opinion about it? (Probe)
55- Have you discussed any political topics recently?
Yes: 1
No: 2
D.K: 3
54. IF YES TO Q.53 (HAND CARD 2):
In which one of these groups would you be most likely 
to discuss a political question?
(Force one choice) Family or relatives: 1
Friends (e.g. when 
visiting): 2
At work: 5
In a club or social 
organization: 4
None: 5
6D.K:
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55» Have you tried to convince anyone of your political 
ideas recently? Yes: 1
No: 2
D.K: 3
56. Has anyone asked your advice on a political question 
recently? Yes: 1
No: 2
D.K: 3
57- HAND CARD 3 :
Do you pick up information on current politics ..
more from TV, Radio, Newspapers, or books, etc. .. 1
OR
more from talking to other people, or just listening 
to what they say? 2
(Force 1 choice) Can't decide: 5
HAND CARD 4 :
On this card you will find pairs of statements about social 
issues. Please say which one out of each pair comes closer 
to your own view. I will read them out, and you choose 
"A" or "B". Even if you find it difficult, try to make
a choice.
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58. A: The Communist Party should be banned .. 1
B: The Communist Party should not be banned: 2
Can’t decide: 5
59» A: The powers of the Commonwealth Security Police
should be restricted to safeguard civil 
liberties . . 1
B: The powers of the Commonwealth Security Police
should be strengthened so that they can fight 
effectively the enemies of this country: 2
Can't decide: 5
60. A: Homosexual acts between consenting adults
should be punished by law .. 1
B: Homosexual acts between consenting adults
should not be punishable by law: 2
Can't decide: 5
61. A: Long-haired beatnik types are a nuisance and
should be brought into line with community 
standards .. 1
B: Long-haired beatnik types are alright on the
whole and should not be interfered with: 2
Can't decide: 5
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Powers of censorship over books, magazines and 
films should be used much less than at present ..1 
Powers of censorship over books, magazines and 
films should continue to be used the same as they 
are now: 2
Can’t decide: 3
Nazi and fascist organizations should be banned.. 1 
Nazi and fascist organizations should not be 
banned: 2
Can’t decide: 3
HAND CARD 5 :
Now on this card, you will find pairs of statements about 
social opinions. Would you choose the statement - 
out of each pair which expresses your own feelings better? 
Just say ”A” or ”B” - Even if you find it hard to choose, 
just say which statement better expresses whatever slight 
preference you have ..
64. A: Our community is an easy and pleasant place
to live in .. 1
B: Our community is a difficult place to live in: 2
Can't decide: 3
62. A: 
B:
63 • A : 
B:
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65« A: In this society, people seem to get to the
top mainly by chance or good fortune .. 1
B: In this society, the better people mostly get
to the top: 2
Can't decide: 5
66. A: Mostly, people are fair in their dealings
with me .. 1
B: I often feel I am not fairly treated: 2
Can't decide: 5
67* A: Nowadays, a person has to live pretty much
for today and let tomorrow take care of itself: 1 
B: It is quite possible to plan one's life ahead
with confidence: 2
Can't decide: 5
68. A: In this society, most people can find
contentment .. 1
B: For most people, the society we live in
breeds discontent: 2
Can't decide: 5
69* A: Often people don't appreciate it when you do
good work .. 1
B: People usually appreciate it when you do good
work: 2
Can't decide: 3
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70. A: I sometimes feel my life is being pushed in
directions where I don’t want to go .. 1
B: Usually I can control what happens in my own
life: 2
Can’t decide: 3
71. A: My work is of real benefit to me .. 1
B: In my work, I feel exploited by other people: 2
Can’t decide: 3
72. A: I often feel I am only a cog in a big machine ..1
B: In lots of important matters, my decision can
affect what happens: 2
Can't decide: 3
73« A: It’s easy to find a job worth doing .. 1
B: It's hard to find a job worth doing:. 2
Can’t decide: 3
74. A: I can normally do what I want to do in today’s
set-up.. 1
B: In today's set-up I often feel frustrated and
prevented from doing what I want to do: 2
Can’t decide: 3
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75* A: In getting ahead in life, it’s not what you
know that counts, it's who you know .. 1
B: What counts in getting ahead is hard work and
talent: 2
Can't decide: 5
76. A: In this society, money will get you anywhere .. 1
B: In this society, people's respect for your
character will get you a long way: 2
Can't decide: 3
77. A: Most members of parliament and city councillors
are sympathetic people and do a good job .. 1
B: Most politicians and city councillors are only
in politics for what they can get out of it, 
and are not much good: 2
Can't decide: 3
78. A: For most people these days it is more important
to make money than to make friends .. 1
B: For most people, it is more important to make
friends than to make money: 2
Can't decide: 3
79« A: The individual these days has a good chance of
finding sensible moral standards to live by .. 1
B: There is a lot of confusion about moral standards
these days: 2
Can't decide: 5
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80. A: Life seems to be rather meaningless . . 1
B: On the whole, life makes good sense to me: 2
Can’t decide: 5
81. A: Life has a clear purpose .. 1
B: There is no clear purpose in life: 2
Can’t decide: 5
82. A: It's often difficult to see why people and
organizations act as they do .. 1
B: It's usually plain why people and organizations
act as they do: 2
Can’t decide: 5
85« A: You have to be careful otherwise people will
take advantage of you .. 1
B: Most people are quite trustworthy: 2
Can’t decide: 3
84. A: Most people are willing to help someone in need..l
B: In this society, people often don’t care what
happens to others: 2
Can’t decide: 5
8 5. A: These days, a person doesn't really know who
he can count on .. 1
B: You can usually be sure who you can count on .. 2
Can’t decide: 5
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86. A: I seldom feel lonely .. 1
B: I often feel lonely: 2
Can't decide: 3
87* A: People usually accept and welcome you just
as you really are .. 1
B: With most people, you have to put on a bit
of an act: 2
Can't decide: 3
88. A: I don't really feel at home in any group of
people .. 1
B: I really feel at home with the people I mix
with: 2
Can't decide: 3
89» A: I am happy to be as I am .. 1
B: I often wish I was somebody else: 2
Can't decide: 3
HAND CARD 6:
Here are pairs of statements on other social issues. Would 
you do the same thing as before, say which statement you 
prefer out of each pair - say "A” or "B" ..
Just choose whichever statement better expresses your own 
feelings ..
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90. A: Obedience and respect for authority are the
most important virtues children should 
learn .. 1
B: Obedience and respect for authority are not
the most important things to teach children: 2
Can't decide: 3
91. A: If people spent more time talking about ideas
just for the fun of it, everybody would be 
better off .. 1
B: If people would talk less and work more,
everybody would be better off: 2
Can't decide: 3
92. A: The artist and the professor are much more
important to society than the businessman and the
manufacturer .. 1
B: The businessman and the manufacturer are much
more important to society than the artist and the
professor: 2
Can't decide: 3
93* A: The findings of science may some day show that
many of our most cherished beliefs are wrong .. 1 
B: Science has its place, but there are many
important things that can never be understood 
by the human mind: 2
Can't decide: ' 3
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94. A: Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas,
but as they grow up they ought to get over 
them and settle down .. 1
B: If it weren’t for the rebellious ideas of
youth there would be less progress in the 
world: 2
Can’t decide: 5
95* A: No sane, normal, decent person could ever
think of hurting a close friend or relative . . 1
B: A sane, normal, decent person might have to
hurt a close friend or relative: 2
Can’t decide: 5
96. A: What the young people really need most is
freedom to find themselves, to be creative and 
sensitive and happy, instead of drudging or 
learning military discipline .. 1
B: What the youth needs is strict discipline,
rugged determination, and the will to work and 
fight for family and country: 2
Can't decide: 5
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97* A: People who commit sex crimes, such as rape and
attacks on children, should be considered mentally 
ill instead of being severely punished .. 1
B: Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on
children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; 
such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, 
or worse: 2
Can’t decide: 3
98. A: There is hardly anything lower than a person who
does not feel a great love, gratitude, and 
respect for his parents .. 1
B: Honest people must admit to themselves that
they have sometimes hated their parents: 2
Can’t decide: 3
99» A: Most problems in the society we live in could
be reduced by more education .. 1
B: Most of our social problems would be solved
if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, 
crooked, and feeble-minded people: 2
Can’t decide: 5
576
100. A: Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals
and ought to be severely punished .. 1
B: It’s nobody’s business if someone is a
homosexual as long as he doesn't harm other 
people: 2
Can’t decide: 3
101. A: It’s all right for people to raise questions
about even the most sacred matters .. 1
B: Every person should have complete faith in
some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys 
without question: 2
Can't decide: 3
102. A: People can be divided into two distinct classes:
the weak and the strong .. 1
B: People cannot be divided into distinct classes -
like the weak and the strong: 2
Can't decide: 3
103. A: Nowadays more and more people are prying into
matters that should remain personal and 
private .. 1
B: Study and discussion of what used to be thought
personal and private matters is a good thing: 2
Can't decide: 3
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104. A: The more you get to know people, the more
you get to like them .. 1
B: Familiarity breeds contempt: 2
Can't decide: 3
105. A: Nowadays when so many different kinds of people
move around and mix together so much, a person 
has to protect himself especially carefully 
against catching an infection or disease from 
them .. 1
B: Even though all sorts of people mix together
nowadays, a person should not be finicky about 
catching a disease from any of them: 2
Can't decide: 3
HAND CARD 7 :
This card has pairs of statements about various nationalities 
and groups of people in Australia. Would you choose from 
each pair the statement which expresses your own feelings 
better .. again just say "A" or "B" ..
If you find it hard to decide, just make a snap choice ..
106. A: On the whole, the intake of a large number of
migrants from Southern Europe has been a good 
thing for this country .. 1
B: The intake of a large number of emigrants from
Southern Europe has not been so good for this 
country: 2
Can't decide: 5
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107. A: It is a bad thing that the Italians keep
to their neighbourhoods, and do not live like 
most Australians .. 1
B: It is a good thing that the Italians can keep
their own customs in this country: 2
Can’t decide: 3
108. A: When Italian people move into a district they
often spoil it for others .. 1
B: Italian people should be welcome in any
district: 2
Can’t decide: 3
109. A: I wouldn’t mind if an Italian married into my
own family .. 1
B: I wouldn’t want an Italian to marry into my
own family: 2
Can’t decide: 3
110. A: Italian migrants are more likely to start
street brawls than Australians .. 1
B: Italians are not more likely to start street
brawls than Australians: 2
Can’t decide: 3
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111. A: The Italian communities have made the districts
they live in brighter and more pleasant 
places .. 1
B: Italians mostly turn the districts they live
in into slums: 2
Can’t decide: 3
112. A: Italians admire elegance and good manners .. 1
B: Italians don’t seem to place much importance on
good manners and careful dressing: 2
Can’t decide: 5
115. A: When Greek people move into a district they
often spoil it for others .. 1
B: Greek people should be welcome in any district:2
Can't decide: 5
114. A: It is a bad thing that the Greeks keep to their
own neighbourhoods, and do not live like most 
Australians .. 1
B: It is a good thing that the Greeks can keep
their own customs in this country: 2
Can’t decide: 3
115. A: I wouldn't mind if a Greek married into my
own family .. 1
B: I wouldn't want a Greek to marry into my
own family: 2
Can't decide: 5
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116. A: Greeks mostly try to improve their
standard of living .. 1
B: Greeks seem to be content with a lower standard
of living than most Australians: 2
Can’t decide: 3
117. A: Australians had better look out, or they will
find that the Southern Europeans will take 
over the country .. 1
B: Migrants from Southern Europe have added much
of value to this country: 2
Can't decide: 3
llB. A: When Jewish people move into a district, they
often spoil it for others .. 1
B: Jewish people should be welcome in any
district: 2
Can’t decide: 3
119» A: I wouldn’t mind if a Jew married into my
own family .. 1
B: I wouldn't want a Jew to marry into my own
family: 2
Can’t decide: 3
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120. A: Jewish people have too much power and influence
in this country .. 1
B: The Jews do not have too much power and influence
in this country: 2
Can’t decide: 3
121. A: Many Jewish people place great value on
education and culture .. 1
B: If Jewish people are interested in education,
it is probably so they can use it to make 
money: 2
Can’t decide: 3
122. A: The Jews are as valuable, honest and public
spirited citizens as any other group .. 1
B: The Jews are less honest and public spirited
than most: 2
Can’t decide: 3
123. A: Jewish people seem to keep their money for
their own charities .. 1
B: Jewish people give generously to other charities
beside their own: 2
Can’t decide: 3
124. A: I see quite a few Italians in my daily life .. 1
B: I seldom see Italians in my daily life: 2
Can't decide: 5
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125. A: I see quite a few Greeks in my daily life .. 1
B: I seldom see Greeks in my daily life: 2
Can't decide: 3
HAND CARD 8 :
On this card, you will find some statements dealing with 
difficulties that most people experience at one time or 
another. Please say frankly which answer is right for you . 
Only say "in between" if you can't possibly decide for 
"Yes" or "No" ..
[Questions 126-145 are 20 items of the 40-itera Cattell 
IPAT anxiety scale. It is customary to safeguard the 
copyright which attaches to them by non-publication. They 
may be found in the Confidential Appendix for Examiners.]
This last section is on the characteristics of voters .. 
would you mind telling me ..
146. FEMALES ONLY:
Do you go out to work at all .. either full-time or
part-time? Not gainfully employed: 1
Work full-time: 2
Work part-time: 5(If work, ask Q.147)
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147. What is your own occupation? (Probe fully)
Occupation: ............................................
Status: ................................................
Industry : .............................................
148. CHECK IF RESPONDENT IS ALSO THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD 
IF SO . . DO NOT ASK QUESTION:
Not asked - resp. is H.H.: X
And what is the occupation of the head of the household, 
that is, the main bread-winner?
(Probe fully) H.H. is .. Male: Female:
Occupation: .............................................
Status:..................................................
Industry: ...............................................
149» What occupation did the father of the head of the 
household follow, during most of his working life?
(Probe fully - if several, write in all)
Occupation: ................................. ............
Status: .................................................
Industry: ...............................................
Occupation: ................................... ..........
Status : .............. ...............................
Industry:
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150. HAND CARD 9:
Which number on this card represents the householder’s 
income group?
Write income-code from card in column:
Don’t know: 11
Refused answer: 12
151. Ask only if answer not clear:
Are you married, single, or what? Married: 1
Single: 2
Widowed: 3
Separated/Divorced:4
I52. Omit this question if single:
How many children lo or less, if any, have you? One: 1
Two: 2
Three: 3
Four: 4
Five: 5
Six or 
more: 6
None: 7
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153* What standard of schooling did you complete?
(Read out if necessary) Primary: 1
Some secondary: 2
Intermediate: 3
Trade Certificate: 4 
Leaving: 5
Matric (Vic) or Leaving Hons. (NSW): 6 
Senior Technical Diploma: 7
University (incl. some Univ.): 8
Other standard (describe): 9
Don’t know: 0
Refused: X
154. If you had to describe which group or section of the 
community you belong to .. What would you say?
(Record verbatim)
155. IF "CLASS" NOT SPECIFIED AS LISTED BELOW:
Would you consider yourself .. Upper middle class:1
(read out)? Average middle class: 2
Lower middle class: 3
Working class: 4
#•
Can't say/refused: 5
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156. Is your family Greek or Italian? Yes: 1
No: 2
P a r t l y : 5
DK/Not answered: 4
157. Where were you horn - in which country?
A u s t r a l i a : 1
United Kingdom: 2
5
R e f u s e d : 4
158. Into which of these age-groups do you fall ..
(read o u t ) ? Under 26: 1
(Estimate if refused) 26-55: 2
36-45: 3
46-55 : 4
56-65: 5
66 and ever: 6
159. Are you a member of a trade union or a professional
organisation? Yes : 1
No: 2
Not answered: 3
160. IF YES:
Which ones? Any others?
587
l6l. Are you a member of a Church Club? Yes: 1 
No: 2 
Not answered: 3
162. IF YES:
Which ones? Any others?
163. And are you a member of any sort of social club?
Yes: 1
No: 2
Not answered: 3
164. IF YES:
Which ones? Any others?
165. Would you mind telling me your religious denomination?
Church of England: 1 
Presbyterian: 2 
Methodist: 3 
Catholic: 4 
Other Christian: 5 
Jewish: 6 
Other non-Christian: 7 
Agnostic/Atheist: 8
Not answered: 9
166. Apart from weddings, funerals, etc., how long 
is it, roughly, since you last attended Church?
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Fortnight or less: 1
3 to 4 weeks: 2
Longer than 4 wks: 5
Never attended: 4
Not answered: 5
167» Thank you very much for your co-operation in the 
survey .. should the University want to do a further 
study on similar lines .. would you be available to give
us your opinions? Surely Yes: 1
Probably Yes: 2
Probably not: 3
Definitely not: 4
168. Circle answer without asking: Male: 1
Female: 2
(Office use only)
169. City: Melbourne: 1
Sydney: 2
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(Print full name arid address clearly)
NAME: . ........................................
ADDRESS: ......................................
SUBURB: ......................................
TEL.NO: .................... Not-on-tel: 1
INTERVIEWER (name): ...........................
(number): ......................
DATE: .........  AREA NO: ............  INT.NO:
INTERVIEWER COMMENTS:
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APPENDIX 3 : The 1965 Survey: The Reliability of the
Three-Cluster Resolution
The tetrachoric correlation coefficient, which is an 
estimate of the product-moment correlation from a two by 
two table, is perhaps the most suitable for service as 
a basis for a cluster analysis, since the alternative, 
the phi coefficient, distorts the pattern of 
intercorrelations through its pronounced tendency to low 
maximums where the splits are uneven. Guilford1 lists 
as necessary assumptions for computation of the 
tetrachoric coefficient that the variables to be correlated 
must be essentially continuous, normally distributed 
and linearly related. Of these, the most difficult 
assumption for the data of the 1965 survey was the second. 
It is made rather arbitrarily, since nothing is known 
of the essential nature of the distribution of these 
variables. However, it would seem not unrealistic to 
assume that in the context of Australian politics, opinions 
on issues raised in this survey should tend to be heaped 
between the extremes of a hypothetical continuum, whilst 
the questions here sometimes provide cutting points away 
from the medians of the distributions. The two by two
1
J .P. Guilford, Fundamental Statistics in Psychology 
and Education, (New York, 1956) pp. 310-511.
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tables in no case suggest a non-linear relationship 
between any two variables, on Guilford’s criteria. All 
tetrachoric coefficients have been corrected for 
unevenness of marginal split by Jenkins’ method, as noted 
in the text.
A cluster analysis may be performed only if the 
samples for which correlation coefficients have been 
calculated are identical, or nearly identical. It was 
therefore necessary for each coefficient to represent 
the relations between the answers of all respondents, and, 
since the tetrachoric coefficient can be computed only 
from two by two tables, to dichotomise opinions on 
each issue. ’Don’t know’ and ’Other opinion' categories 
had thus to be assigned to the most suitable division of 
each continuum of opinion. The most difficult problem 
was the allocation of ’Other opinion’, which constituted 
one to seven per cent of responses to each question.
This was done by identifying the alternative, radical 
or conservative, which the internal logic of each question 
suggested was the one least likely that any ’other opinion’ 
should touch or transcend. This was preserved as a ’pure’ 
category, and the other possible responses were assigned 
to a ’dump’ category. ’Other opinions’ were thus conceived 
as scattered along the continuum in a single direction from
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the ’pure’ section of it. ’Don’t know’ was conceived as 
a category essentially intermediate between the radical 
and conservative responses, and allotted in each case to 
the ’dump’ category. All determinations of the best 
’pure’ category were made^a priori, in scrupulous ignorance 
of the outcome of the cluster analysis.
An illustration may clarify this procedure. ’Other 
opinions’ on the question concerning child endowment 
were thought unlikely to be more generous than to favour 
doubling it, the most generous explicit response offered; 
more probably, they inclined to its reduction, which was 
not available as an explicit response category. Support 
for doubling endowment was therefore designated the 'pure' 
category, and all other responses, including the 
substantive ones, were allotted to the ’dump’ category.
Six out of the twelve questions on political issues 
concerned public spending, and since none of these offered 
reduction as an explicit response, ’Other opinions' were 
thought likely to congregate at this contingency. On the 
remaining six questions, the position was less clear, but, 
with one exception, the number of 'Other opinions’ 
negligible.
Whilst this procedure is the most defensible, there 
are, of course, other possible ways of dichotomising the
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data. It is important to determine to what extent the 
choice of method in dichotomisation will influence the 
magnitude of the correlations. One way of testing this 
is to re-calculate the coefficients with ’Don't knows* 
and ’Other opinions' allocated to the ’wrong’ category, 
i.e. by selecting the least plausible of the substantive 
responses to act as the ’pure’ category. Another way of 
measuring associations between opinions on the various 
issues is to exclude all 'Don’t knows’ and ’Other opinions’ 
from each pair of issues and to correlate only the 
residual responses. Table 12.1 exhibits the results of 
the application of these different procedures where both 
issues of a pair have a high proportion (more than 10 per 
cent) ’Don’t know’ and 'Other opinion’.
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TABLE 12.1
Intercorrelations between Policy Opinions in 1963
(By different methods of dichotomising; opinions on each issue)
Issues , rt , rt(by most (by least (with Dont
defensible defensible know' and
splits) splits) ’Other
opinion’
excluded)
Defence x endowment .07 .15** .02Defence x public
enterprise .11* -.05 .05Defence x nationalization -.19** -.15** -.16**Defence x economic aid .08 .15** .15*Defence x death penalty .21** -.10* -.25**Defence x planning .11* .06 -.02Defence x gains tax .08 .02 . 06Endowment x public
enterprise .70** .02 .52**Endowment x nationalization .57** .07 .45**Endowment x economic aid .05 .18** .09Endowment x death penalty .04 .01 .02Endowment x planning .25** .15** .24**Endowment x gains tax .07 .17** -.08Public enterprise x
nationalization .42** .43** .47**Public enterprise x
economic aid .02 .07 .15*Public enterprise x death
penalty .15** .21** .50**Public enterprise x planning. 14** .50** .48**Public enterprise x gainstax • o 00 .21** .21**Nationalization x economicaid .06 .04 .16**Nationalization x death
penalty .16** .18** .28**Nationalization x planning .11* .11* .51**Nationalization x gainstax .12* .25** .24**Economic aid x death
penalty .50** . 16** .50**Economic aid x planning .15** .55** .29**Economic aid x gains tax .06 .05 .ii*Death penalty x planning .19** .18** .50**Death penalty x gains tax .14** .08 .15**Planning x gains tax .21** .08 .21**
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The following observations may be made:
(i) The effect of reversing procedures for the 
distribution of ’Don’t know’ and ’Other opinion' is 
substantial. The mean difference between the correlations 
based on the first two procedures = .10; the maximum = .^ 0. 
The overall relations of the issues of defence spending 
and child endowment are the least certain, and most 
dependent upon which procedure is adopted. If the 'least 
defensible’ splits are treated as the basis for 
intercorrelation, the division between the issues of the 
’New’ radicalism and the 'Established' radicalism clusters 
is diminished, and, with the exception of views on defence, 
they appear as extensions of each other. The internal 
consistency of all clusters is reduced. The correlations 
within the ’New’ radicalism cluster, which is most 
affected, are considered in more detail below.
(ii) The effect of excluding 'Don’t know’ and 'Other 
opinion’ responses is also to increase correlations 
between the issues of the ’New’ and the ’Established’ 
radicalisms. However, an inspection of the tables from 
which the correlations were computed reveals that the 
overall division between the two groups of issues arises 
in part because many respondents who were prepared to take 
an explicitly radical position on education, planning and 
a capital gains tax were undecided on the issues of
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nationalization and new Commonwealth business enterprises. 
Thus there are substantive grounds for expecting a looser 
relation if the responses of the sample as a whole, and not 
merely its committed elements, are to be accurately
represented.
A closer examination of the internal consistency of the 
’New’ radicalism, the weakest cluster, is necessary to
establish a minimum position as to the cohesiveness of
this group of issues. All correlations with a bearing on
this question are set out in Table 12.2.
TABLE 12.2
Issues rt
(by most 
defensible 
splits)
Education x defence .25**
Education x planning .37**Education x gains tax .24**
Defence x planning .11*
Defence x gains tax .08
Planning x gains tax .21**
Mean .21**
, rt , rt(by least (with Don
defensible know and
splits) ’Other
opinion
excluded)
.04 .12*
.24** .38**.19** .24**
.06 -.02.02 .06
.08
.10*
.21**
The ’most defensible’ splits offer five significant 
correlations out of six; pairs with ’Don’t know' and
’Other opinion' excluded offer four; the 'least defensible’
splits, only two. The mean correlation on the third 
basis only barely achieves significance. There is a 
conclusive case, supported by all three sets of correlations,
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for a connection between three of the issues in the 
cluster (education spending, a gains tax and economic 
planning). The hypothesis of an overall relation between 
the four issues is clearly supported by the two stronger 
of these three procedures, and is not markedly counter- 
indicated by the weakest. It is therefore accepted.
The tenability of the three-cluster hypothesis 
thus relies in large part on the defensibility of the 
preferred procedure for dichotomisation. This is clearly 
better in logic as a means of condensing the primary data, 
and has the added advantage of producing a greater 
proportion of even splits (eight of twelve are more even 
by the preferred method). In sum, the case for the empirical 
differentiation of the ’New’ and the ’Established* 
radicalisms is persuasive, but by no means conclusive.
It is adopted as the best hypothesis afforded by the data 
of this preliminary survey.
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APPENDIX 4: The 1966 Survey; Additional Data in
Validation of the Alienation Scale
Whilst it is noted in Chapter Six, at Section 8, 
that no ’universally acceptable’ criterion groups are 
available in the case of alienation, so that one cannot 
validate the scale in the same way as one might, for 
example, validate a neuroticism scale against a 
hospitalized sample of anxiety neurotics, certain 
identifiable groups may be useful in testing the 
alienation scale. These are convicts and hospitalized 
psychiatric patients. In both cases external circumstances 
impose a condition of powerlessness in relation to 
life-goals, at least temporarily, and unless these are 
very substantially reduced; both are likely to feel 
isolated from those who share their values; the nature 
of the administration of gaols and psychiatric hospitals 
may engender normlessness, especially in the former; in 
these circumstances, and in this company, the patients 
and prisoners are likely to feel a sense of meaninglessness; 
and it seems not unreasonable to hypothesize self­
estrangement .
The alienation scale has been administered to groups 
of convicts and mental patients and students at a
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tertiary institution by Mr. Brian Ross.1 The samples 
must first be described.
(a) Prisoners
These were all male, in two gaols in New South Wales: 
Long Bay in Sydney, where the sample of prisoners is 
described by Ross as ’hard core’, with an age range of 
18-45, and Bathurst Gaol, where the prisoners were 
recidivist and, in most cases, under 50.
(b) Psychiatric Patients
These were in two groups of mixed sex; one in Broughton 
Hall, in Sydney, a voluntary-patient psychiatric clinic, 
where the sample was in the majority neurotic, the 
remainder psychotic; the other in the psychiatric ward 
of a general hospital, Prince Henry’s, in Sydney, where 
again most were neurotic, some psychotic. The age range 
of the psychiatric patients tested was 16-65»
(c) Students
These were trainee teachers at the Australian School 
of Pacific Administration, Sydney, being prepared for 
positions in schools in Papua and New Guinea. They were
T
With whose permission these data are reproduced. They 
are drawn from a personal communication of 25 September 
1968. At the time of communication, Mr. Ross was located 
at the District Hospital, Bourke, New South Wales, as 
psychologist attached to the ’Human Ecology of the Arid 
Zone Project’ of the University of New South Wales.
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intended to serve as a group whose norms would 
approximate those of the normal adult population, which
was, in fact, the case. Their age range was 18-32.
The scale was administered to the students, 
psychiatric patients and Long Bay prisoners in 
January-February, 1968; to the students once again in 
June 1968; and to the Bathurst prisoners in September 1968. 
The normative data obtained are given in Table 13.1, 
along with means and standard deviations from the 
Melbourne-Sydney adult sample reproduced from Table 6.7»
TABLE 13.1
Criterion Group Validation Data 
for the Alienation Scale
Group: Mean: Standard Deviation: Sample Size:
Prisoners: 21.64 12.15 n=83Patients: 20.69 10.43 n=58Students: 12.81 10 058 n=99RepresentativeVoter sample: 12.35 8.79 n=355
These data indicate that the alienation scale
validates well against these criterion groups . Table 13.2
indicates that reliability is also good.
TABLE 13.2
Test-retest Coefficient of the Alienation 
Scale (Product-Moment) (Students, n=99) 
(February-June 1968)
.689
603.
This is a satisfactory reliability coefficient for 
re-administration after an interval of four months, and 
closely approximates the reliability coefficient obtained 
by the parallel forms method (.681, as exhibited in 
Table 6.7).
APPENDIX 5: Confidential Appendix for Examiners
(submitted separately)
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